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RATIONAL GAUDISM

 

The Philosophy of Reason, Liberty and Rational Maximization of Self-happiness

 

For Norwegian version click here

 

Superior Constitution

 

 


 

Preface

 

Rational Gaudism is a complete philosophical system with metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and politics, and may shortly be summarized as follows:

 

Metaphysics: Metaphysical ideas are cut down to the absolute minimum that is necessary if further epistemological progression is not to be meaningless / indeterminate.

 

Epistemology: The epistemology is based on strictly logical, rational and scientific principles.

 

Ethics: All human actions are self-happy-motivated, while the ethical guideline is the consequent use of optimal rational evaluations, i.e. to maximize the probability of generating the largest possible sum of self-happiness during life according to basically the same principles as used by natural science.

 

Politics: Let us imagine a hypothetical and unlikely (but revealing) situation where the President and a unanimous Congress decide to exterminate all Jews inside the USA (a large majority have in advance changed the Constitution in such a way that the extermination is not unconstitutional), and 95 % of the US population agree. You, who read this, will say that this is an extremely severe crime, and that it is illegitimate in spite of the overwhelming majority. This indicates that it is difficult to claim that true legitimacy of a political act basically relies on the will of the majority. The allegation that such a mass murder is illegitimate whatever size of the supporting majority, may hardly be claimed without referring to the “unpopular” individuals having inherent, nature-given, inviolable rights. Rational Gaudist politics is occupied with proving the existence and content of these nature-given rights of the individual and deducing logical conclusions thereof. Thus, on this philosophical basis all true legitimacy relies (concerning actions, permissions/licenses, decisions, prohibitions, commands etc.). Rational Gaudism constitutes a framework where all politics has to reside in order to be legitimate, and shows that all other fundaments for legitimacy than the Rational Gaudist one necessarily will meet a contradiction. The basic principle is that each individual has the right to do whatever he likes as long as he does not violate the similar right of others, other nature-given rights or their logical consequences.

 

Rational Gaudist politics means that neither adult men's, nor children's, nor superior animals' nature-given rights may be violated. This implies that neither the government nor any others may initiate force against (adult) people. According to Rational Gaudism the State are primarily to fund administration of justice, Police and defense, but the State may also fund additional domains under the assumption that the funds are not obtained by violating any nature-given rights. Thus, compulsory taxes are excluded, and then State expenses will automatically be limited. Honorable projects may include: supporting children's fundamental needs in low income families, subsidizing social security benefits and health insurance for low income groups, and funding some basic research programs. Rational Gaudist politics may simplified be regarded as a hybrid between Objectivism and social liberalism (about 3:1), where we retain the positive Objectivist idea that no force may be initiated against the individuals, but at the same time (in moderate form) embrace the idea of social liberalism that the State if necessary / desirable may use funds to prevent disadvantaged groups from “falling into the black hole”. In addition, Rational Gaudism shares the social liberalist view that it is a State task to prevent animal cruelty.

 

 

This book was written in the period 26th December 2003 21st August 2017.

(First published version: 2nd September 2013)

 

 

 

 


CONTENT

 

 

I.  Rational Gaudism  in abstract

 

II.  Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics

 

 

1.  Metaphysics and Epistemology, Part A

 

1.1  The axioms of Rational Gaudism

 

1.2  Senses, concepts and definitions

 

            1.2.1  Creation of concepts

 

                              1.2.1.1  Definitions

 

                              1.2.1.2  Objective and subjective concepts

 

 

1.3  Induction

 

1.4  Deduction

 

1.5  Philosophy of Science

 

            1.5.1  The hypothetical-deductive method (HDM)

 

            1.5.2  The factors influencing the well-foundedness of a hypothesis

 

            1.5.3  Dethronement

 

                              1.5.3.1  Non-dethronable hypotheses

 

 

            1.5.4  Absolute well-foundedness

 

            1.5.5  Limitations of social science

 

            1.5.6  Science and non-science

 

 

1.6  The hypothetical-deductive method outside Science

 

            1.6.1  An observation is essentially a hypothesis

 

            1.6.2  Biological and technological evolution

 

            1.6.3  Evolution of ideas

 

            1.6.4  Evolution of happiness in daily life

 

 

1.7  Subjective and objective knowledge

 

            1.7.1  Objective knowledge

 

            1.7.2  Subjective knowledge

 

            1.7.3  Intersubjective knowledge

 

            1.7.4  Objective and subjective scientific knowledge

 

            1.7.5  The making of objectivity by changing definitions

 

            1.7.6  Summary of objective and subjective knowledge

 

 

1.8  Accurate knowledge

 

 

2.  Metaphysics and Epistemology, Part B

 

2.1  The outer reality

 

2.2  The consciousness of individuals

 

            2.2.1  Subjective / objective / intersubjective reality

 

            2.2.2  Happiness

 

                              2.2.2.1  Why does perception of happiness exist?

 

                              2.2.2.2  Experiencing happiness is the only value

 

 

2.3  Supernatural reality

 

2.4  Identity and nature

 

            2.4.1  The fundamental nature of different objects

 

 

2.5  Free will

 

            2.5.1  The reality limits the realism of actions but not the free will

 

            2.5.2  Animals and “free will”

 

            2.5.3  Man cannot choose his own values

 

            2.5.4  Predisposing determinism

 

                             2.5.4.1  Time perspective

 

 

3.  Ethics

 

3.1  Metaphysical fundament for rational ethics

 

            3.1.1  Rational Gaudist ethics contra philosophically “correct” ethics

 

 

3.2  Moral and immoral actions

 

            3.2.1  Deliberately happiness-unprofitable action choices are impossible

 

            3.2.2  Can animals act morally?

 

            3.2.3  Can organizations act morally?

 

 

3.3  Concrete ethical guidelines

 

               3.3.1  The hypothetical deductive method as ethical guideline

 

                              3.3.1.1  Direct evaluation of probabilities and consequences

 

                              3.3.1.2  Association-based action choices

 

 

            3.3.2  Types of actions that practically always are immoral

 

            3.3.3  Tie-break

 

                              3.3.3.1  Life-elongating actions

 

                              3.3.3.2  Strong, short-term, direct perception of happiness

 

                              3.3.3.3  Choices of action with highest potentially continuous use of HDM

 

 

            3.3.4  Virtues

 

                        3.3.4.1  The virtues make a part of the reality

 

 

3.4  Summary of the ethical guidelines of Rational Gaudism

 

3.5  Subjective, objective and intersubjective moral evaluations

 

3.6  Self-happy motivation and how to consider other individuals

 

            3.6.1  The role of the State in ethics

 

 

3.7  Primary self-happy-motivated actions

 

            3.7.1  Instincts and habits

 

 

3.8  Secondary self-happy-motivated actions

 

3.9  Tertiary self-happy-motivated actions

 

            3.9.1  Senses of duty and rational TEM actions

 

                              3.9.1.1  Senses of duty against irrational actions (PMI)

 

                              3.9.1.2  Senses of duty for rational actions (PFR)

 

                              3.9.1.3  Duties of virtue

 

                              3.9.1.4  Summary of duties and rational TEM actions

 

 

          3.9.2  Implementation of a sense of duty

 

 

3.10  Exchange of different types of actions

 

            3.10.1  Definition of erotic love

 

 

3.11  What are actually “altruistic” actions?

 

 

 

III.  Politics

 

 

4.  Nature-given rights

 

4.1  Individual rights of adults

 

          4.1.1  Right violations against adult human beings

 

 

4.2  Animals' rights

 

            4.2.1  Why do not animals possess the right to liberty?

 

            4.2.2  The conflict between the rights of animals and humans

 

                        4.2.2.1  Concrete examples of non-right-violating treatment of animals

 

 

            4.2.3  Can an animal violate human rights?

 

            4.2.4  Summary of human and animals' rights

 

            4.2.5  The distinction between rational and non-rational beings

 

            4.2.6  Artificial life and rights

 

 

4.3  Children's rights

 

          4.3.1  Right violations against children

 

            4.3.2  The beginning of life and abortion

 

            4.3.3  The biological mother's responsibility for the child

 

            4.3.4  The biological father's responsibility for the child

 

            4.3.5  The State's responsibility for the child

 

            4.3.6  Other persons under guardianship

 

 

4.4  The State

 

            4.4.1  The right to rebel

 

            4.4.2  Which actions may be subjected to punishment?

 

 

4.5  World wide Superstate

 

 

5.  Specification of nature-given rights

 

5.1  Property right

 

            5.1.1  Property right is not based on initiation of force

 

            5.1.2  Working up property right in non-owned area

 

            5.1.3  Property that lie fallow

 

            5.1.4  Inheritance

 

                        5.1.4.1  Organ donation

 

 

5.2  Right to use

 

            5.2.1  The right to use to forest

 

            5.2.2  The right to use to fishing

 

            5.2.3  The right to use to hunting

 

            5.2.4  The right to use to oil

 

            5.2.5  The right to use and property right in the beach area

 

 

5.3  Contractual freedom

 

            5.3.1  Why is contract breach right-violating?

 

                              5.3.1.1  Sanctions against contract breakers

 

                              5.3.1.2  Private arbitrators and contract fees

 

 

            5.3.2  When is a contract valid?

 

                              5.3.2.1  Rational voluntariness

 

                              5.3.2.2  Special contracts and obligation to inform

 

                              5.3.2.3  Slave, violence and death contracts

 

                              5.3.2.4  Presumptive contracts

 

                              5.3.2.5  Standard contracts

 

 

5.4  Right to organize

 

            5.4.1  When is an organization legitimate?

 

            5.4.2  Citizenship

 

            5.4.3  Living together with a contract is an organization

 

            5.4.4  Trade unions

 

 

5.5  Free enterprise

 

            5.5.1  Companies

 

                              5.5.1.1  The interaction between the company and the employees

 

 

            5.5.2  Monopolies

 

            5.5.3  Price settlement

 

            5.5.4  Consumers' rights

 

                              5.5.4.1  Buying and selling of drugs

 

 

            5.5.5  Monetary politics and banking

 

                              5.5.5.1  Bankruptcy

 

 

            5.5.6  Building permits

 

            5.5.7  Enterprising activity and work for foreigners

 

 

5.6  Freedom of speech

 

5.7  Which nature-given rights are the most important ones?

 

            5.7.1  Nature-given rights on other person's property

 

 

6.  Fundamental politics on essential areas

 

6.1  Crimes and punishment

 

          6.1.1  Liberty-restricting punishment

 

            6.1.2  Death penalty

 

            6.1.3  Torture and uncivilized punishments

 

            6.1.4  Evidences in criminal cases

 

            6.1.5  Surveillance, search warrants, interrogation, and Police custody

 

 

6.2  Self-defense of nature-given rights

 

6.3  Military defense

 

            6.3.1  Individual rights during military conflicts

 

                              6.3.1.1  Compulsory military draft

 

 

6.4  Immigration politics

 

6.5  Environment protection

 

6.6  Roads

 

            6.6.1  How can roads violate rights?

 

            6.6.2  Speed limits

 

            6.6.3  Road rights and pricing

 

            6.6.4  Cessation of property rights to roads

 

 

6.7  Fire brigades and fire safety

 

 

7.  The function of the State

 

7.1  The obligatory function of the State

 

            7.1.1  Laws

 

                        7.1.1.1  The Superior Constitution

 

                              7.1.1.2  The General Constitution

 

                              7.1.1.3  The law

 

                              7.1.1.4  Supreme court

 

 

            7.1.2  The State has some obligatory welfare tasks

 

 

7.2  The empirical function of the State

 

            7.2.1  How to carry out the empirical function of the State?

 

 

7.3  What is the Rational Gaudist sign of good politics?

 

7.4  Why shall the majority obey the Superior Constitution?

 

            7.4.1  Why become a political Rational Gaudist?

 

 

7.5  The sovereignty of the State and the individual rights

 

            7.5.1  Only the individual is sovereign

 

            7.5.2  Payment for the obligatory tasks of the State?

 

            7.5.3  Absurd implications of the State sovereignty

 

 

7.6  The State's income

 

        7.6.1  Compulsory taxation

 

                              7.6.1.1  “Confiscation via collateral damage”

 

 

            7.6.2  Income based on natural monopolies

 

                              7.6.2.1  Road fees, electricity fee etc.

 

                              7.6.2.2  Transport fees resembling sales tax

 

                              7.6.2.3  Restricted printing of money

 

 

            7.6.3  The State Stock Fund

 

            7.6.4  Taxation of interactions with right-violating states

 

            7.6.5  Environmental fines

 

            7.6.6  Citizenship fee

 

            7.6.7  Other fees

 

            7.6.8  Balance

 

            7.6.9  Voluntary welfare system

 

            7.6.10  “Altruistic” bloodsucking

 

            7.6.11  The transition period towards the Rational Gaudist society

 

 

 

IV.  Aesthetics

 

 

8.  The Rational Gaudist view of art

 

 

 

V.  Appendix

 

 

9.  Appendix – Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics

 

9.1  Level of happiness and perception of happiness

 

9.2  Religion – before and now

 

            9.2.1  The God hypothesis is de facto scientifically falsified

 

                              9.2.1.1  The well-foundedness of other religions, deism and atheism

 

                              9.2.1.2  Liberal Christianity

 

                              9.2.1.3  Respectable Christianity

 

 

            9.2.2  Why is agnosticism wrong?

 

 

9.3  Can morality be completely objective?

 

9.4  Examples of TEM actions

 

            9.4.1  Examples of irrational TEM actions

 

                             9.4.1.1  The effect of “a mouse piddling in the ocean”

 

 

            9.4.2  Examples of senses of duty and rational TEM actions

 

 

10.  Appendix – Politics

 

10.1  The right to liberty implies the right to life

 

10.2  The relationship between nature-given rights and ethics

 

            10.2.1  Why should a supporter of Rational Gaudist ethics become a political Rational

                         Gaudist?

 

 

10.3  Nature-given rights in emergency situations

 

            10.3.1  Seeking emergency shelter in a mountain cabin

 

            10.3.2  Emergency break in for defense against right violations

 

            10.3.3  Cannibalism after plane crash in the Andes Mountains

 

            10.3.4  Shipwrecked seaman arrives hermit's island

 

            10.3.5  Asylum seeker

 

            10.3.6  Poor man

 

            10.3.7  Lifejacket for a drowning person

 

            10.3.8  Summary on emergency situations

 

 

10.4  Violence

 

          10.4.1  Physical and psychical violence

 

                    10.4.1.1  Temperament as psychical violence

 

 

          10.4.2  The borderline between right-violating violence and accepted violence

 

            10.4.3  Corporal punishment of children

 

            10.4.4  Prostitution

 

 

10.5  New acquisition of right to use to forest

 

10.6  Feminism

 

            10.6.1  Female representatives in the boards of private companies

 

 

10.7  Monetary politics

 

            10.7.1  Banking history

 

            10.7.2  Concrete proposals for new banking and monetary policy

 

            10.7.3  Advantages with the new banking system

 

            10.7.4  Growth in the money supply

 

                              10.7.4.1  Growth in the money supply for former monopolistic and compulsory currencies

 

 

10.8  Motivation for charity

 

10.9  Rational egoism, altruism and Objectivism

 

            10.9.1  Altruistic financing of the State

 

 

10.10  Why vote?

 

            10.10.1  Why vote for Rational Gaudism?

 

 

10.11  The problem of the Welfare State

 

 

11.  Appendix – Philosophy in general

 

11.1  Philosophical comparisons. Are you a Rational Gaudist?

 

            11.1.1  The differences between Rational Gaudism and Objectivism

 

                              11.1.1.1  Objectivism and “the legitimate tasks of the State”

 

 

11.2  Why should I care about Philosophy?

 

 

12.  Appendix – Definitions

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

I.  Rational Gaudism in abstract

 

The human consciousness is able to perceive and remember sounds, sights, smells, tastes and to sense pressure, coldness and warmness, and will experience these with feelings of different degrees of happiness – positive or negative. The human consciousness also has the ability to speculate over the reasons for this. In order to progress in the epistemological process Rational Gaudism introduces its three axioms:

 

 

1)

The sense perceptions of the consciousness are caused by influence of material surroundings in (at least) three spatial dimensions and one time dimension.

 

2)

The human consciousness has the ability to choose between alternatives of action (free will).

 

3)

The only way of obtaining knowledge about the reality is through the consciousness' ability to logical thinking on the basis of the sense perceptions.

 

On the basis of the foregoing, observation, induction, deduction and the hypothetical deductive method are the epistemological tools that the human consciousness has at its disposal to achieve knowledge of the reality. We can only achieve knowledge about the outer reality with degrees of certainty, but the uncertainty is often so infinitesimal that it for all practical purposes may be disregarded. HDM is the central process having progressed biological evolution, science, technological evolution, evolution of happiness for the individual in the daily life and the evolution of improved political solutions. For the concrete description of the existence and functioning of physical, biological and astronomical objects, Rational Gaudism refers to the international frontier of science in the respective spheres.

 

Experiencing happiness and avoiding unhappiness are the only values. Superior animals are happiness-perceiving beings, but they have a non-rational and mainly instinctive nature, and are predetermined to follow these instincts in the purpose of maximizing their happiness at the present moment. The human being is a rational being with ability to experience happiness and unhappiness, and is predetermined to try to maximize the sum of self-happiness during his life on the basis of the present realities. However, we have free will to choose remedies and strategies for this purpose. The ultimate objective and value for the individual is to maximize his self-happiness during his life – everything else is remedies in the pursuit of thereof. All this is given in the fundamental human nature. Therefore, the moral principles and standards of an individual form a strategy for guiding him towards the maximization of his lifelong self-happiness. Rational Gaudist ethics means to apply a scientific-like method to consequently carry out optimal rational evaluations (directly or indirectly) of the probability of the consequences of the action alternatives to occur and what value these consequences will have for the individual during his life span on the basis of the moral virtues acquired at the time point for the choice of action; in this way a Rational Gaudist pursue the maximization of his self-happiness in the life-long perspective. The concrete content in the strategy is mainly based on the use of HDM on your own and others' life experiences in addition to rational self-happy-motivated senses of duty, but deductions from the fundamental human nature and logical consequences of the nature of HDM are also used. The virtues needed for moral acting are deduced from the elements that participate in the chain of reasoning leading to the definition of the moral action pattern of Rational Gaudism.

 

Any collection of fermions and bosons being able to experience happiness/unhappiness has the right to pursue happiness and to avoid unhappiness according to its nature. Superior animals have a nature-given (innate) right to pursue happiness by following their instincts. Any adult human has a nature-given (innate) right to pursue happiness by following his rational nature, which implies the right to liberty, life, property, right to use, free enterprise, organizing, entering contracts and freedom of speech. Children have a nature-given right to parents in the sense that the biological parents (or others who have adopted this function) are obliged to develop the children's rational potential into an adult being able to use its right to liberty as a tool for the pursuit of happiness.

      The human beings inside a given geographical area have the right to create a State since the right to organize and the right to self-defense are nature-given rights. The State is a rational institution since it is a prerequisite for realizing the rational nature of the humans. The obligatory tasks of the State are Police, military defense and administration of justice to defend the nature-given rights of its individuals. Additionally, the State may take on further tasks as long as the State can finance the tasks without violating the nature-given rights of the individuals (including the property right), and a HDM-like process is the guideline for which non-obligatory tasks the State is to carry out in order to assist individuals in their pursuit of happiness.

      There are too many examples through history of seemingly good political hypotheses that mistakenly have claimed to have the ability to “maximize the happiness of the society”; e.g. National Socialism, Fascism, Marxism-Leninism, the ideology of Pol Pot and Maoism. The testing of the hypotheses led to the most terrible crimes: Holocaust, Moscow processes, killing fields and hunger. Almost all people will agree that the means that were used for testing these hypotheses are unacceptable. This shows that unrestricted utilitarianism is a bad idea. Testing of hypotheses by putting different political ideas into practice is very important, but it has to be a boundary for what kind of means that legitimately may be used in the “experiments”. Rational Gaudism shows that it is contradictory to label politics as “legitimate” if the nature-given rights are violated (see the introductions to Chapter 4 and 7). Therefore, absence of violation of the nature-given rights constitutes the widest boundary inside which political testing of hypotheses legitimately may take place. Political Rational Gaudism is the interior of this boundary.


 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

II. Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics

 

 

 


 

1.  Metaphysics and Epistemology, Part A

 

Epistemology is the study of the methods of acquiring knowledge. Metaphysics is the part of philosophy studying the fundamental nature of the reality that observation or scientific methods cannot detect. Since these two branches of Philosophy are partly interwoven, Metaphysics and Epistemology are explained collectively over two chapters.

      What kind of existence can I have absolutely certain knowledge of? In order to answer this question it is important to precisely define the term “I”: “I” is the consciousness; the consciousness is the element making the term “I” meaningful. It is impossible to deny one's own existence. Let me assume the opposite of what I want to prove, namely that I do not exist, i.e. that I deny my own existence. Since I do not exist, I am not able to deny anything, neither my own existence; I cannot even define the concepts “existence” and “I”. But that is exactly what I do. The assumption that I do not exist led to a contradiction; ergo, I exist! When I am able to deny my own existence, it is an irrefutable proof of my existence. This applies only in the specific moment (at present) when I deny my own existence, but it does not prove that I existed before the present, or that I will exist in the future. It does not even prove that time has existence in reality.

      In the same present the consciousness (“I”) registers sense perceptions (sights, sounds, tastes, smells and sensations of pressure, cold, heat, etc.). In the present “I” (the consciousness) also register feelings (perceptions of happiness/unhappiness) that accompany the sensory impressions. The consciousness (“I”) also recognizes a touch of other sensations and feelings than those above (which I will later describe as memory). What may be the cause of these sensory impressions and feelings (both the clear ones and the more diffuse ones), I basically do not know, but at present “I” register that I have the ability to think and ponder over this and over what has value (i.e. what the consciousness wants to achieve). I know all this without having adopted any epistemological axioms.

      However, I register that I completely obviously and automatically believe that the sensory impressions are caused by the influence of material surroundings in a three-dimensional space. Similarly, I believe that the hints of other sensations and feelings are due to memories of something that has affected my consciousness at an earlier stage, i.e. I believe that I have existed before the present so that time is a real concept. To get on with the epistemological process I need to introduce three simple axioms:

 

 

1.1  The axioms of Rational Gaudism

 

An axiom is defined as a basic truth that is absolutely unavoidable if further epistemological progression is not to become meaningless / indeterminate and that all further knowledge acquisition has to build on. It is logically possible to deny an axiom, but without the axiom further knowledge acquisition becomes meaningless / indeterminate. The following axioms are considered to be the only rational metaphysical fundament:

 

Axiom 1 (the reason for the sense perceptions): The sense perceptions of the consciousness are caused by influence of material surroundings in (at least) three spatial dimensions and one time dimension. The material surroundings have independent existence from the consciousness; the consciousness does not produce these. These material surroundings, together with those processes making the consciousness, have real existence in The Reality.

 

Axiom 2 (free will): The human consciousness has the ability to choose between alternatives of action (free will).

 

Axiom 3 (fundamental epistemological axiom): The only way of achieving information about the reality is through the consciousness' ability to logical thinking on basis of the sense perceptions.

 

 

On axiom 1:  Without the introduction of axiom 1, the content of the consciousness could have been consequences of a kind of virtual reality game with “God” and/or “Satan” as participants, and where “I” is a projection of their immaterial nature into a non-divine dimension. The first axiom of Rational Gaudism excludes this possibility, and without this axiom further epistemological progression on a material reality would have been meaningless.

      If I had not introduced axiom 1, only the present might exist without time before and after, so that remembrance necessarily has to be a fantasy. Another possibility would be that time exists, but that I can not remember – the perceived remembering back in time is just imagination in the present. God, Satan or The Flying Spaghetti Monster may be double-crossing me to believe that I have memory of the past.     

 

On axiom 2:  Free will is a consciousness' ability to choose between alternatives of action. To answer the question if Homo sapiens has free will, we have to examine our own consciousness.

       By extrospection I observe something that I (completely obviously and automatically) believe is caused by material surroundings influencing my senses and consciousness. The existence of material surroundings was stated through axiom 1 as a fundamental and epistemologically unavoidable truth that all further knowledge has to be based on. By introspection I observe something that I (completely obviously and automatically) believe is “free will”. Similarly, Rational Gaudism introduces “free will” through axiom 2 as a fundamental and unavoidable truth that all further knowledge has to be based on since the hypothetical-deductive method (see Section 1.5.1) presupposes that the human consciousness is able to choose to carry out experiments, and in the scientific process (and in epistemological processes in general) you have to choose the most well-founded one of the competing hypotheses as explanatory model (see also Section 2.5)). Therefore, it is also impossible to prove “free will” scientifically since HDM presupposes namely “free will”. Without “free will” ethical evaluations will become meaningless since moral choices also presuppose “free will”. If being sufficiently philosophically stubborn, it may be objected that each choice is just an illusion – perhaps there is a “God” or a chain of apparently incomprehensible causes that 100 % forces me to make the actual action “choice”, but then all further epistemological progression become meaningless.

      The human consciousness has the ability to start its own chain of causes, as a local “prime mover”, even if there usually will be a number of factors influencing my consciousness to choose one alternative over another.

 

On axiom 3:  Through axiom 1 it was established that the sensory perceptions are caused by a material reality, and axiom 3 are introduced in order to obtain knowledge about this material reality. Without the introduction of this axiom we could e.g. imagine that the true knowledge about reality came falling down on silver platters through a divine revelation in a way that we are not able to imagine. There is high probability that we had to wait very long before such a revelation came true – probably we had to wait forever, and besides, there is a risk that an alleged revelation would be pure fraud. If a true divine revelation really was to occur – in spite of all improbability – it will not be damaging to acquire knowledge from our senses and brains in the meantime. Axiom 3 is the basis of the scientific method, included induction, deduction and the hypothetical-deductive method (see paragraphs 1.3 to 1.6), and thus is the basis of all the knowledge we currently have about the external reality. Axiom 2 (free will) is a prerequisite for the use of these epistemological means.

 

Rational Gaudism is completely based on the introspective knowledge of the consciousness and these three axioms. In the rest of this chapter it is demonstrated how to obtain knowledge by using this framework. Firstly, I induce the very well-founded hypothesis that all other human beings' consciousnesses have the same basic qualities as my own (see also Section 2.2).

 

 

1.2  Senses, concepts and definitions

 

Some knowledge is genetically determined; how to breath and scream, how to get milk from the mamma as a newborn etc. It is also claimed that small babies have a genetic instinct for swimming. Apart from this, all knowledge is supposed to originate from our senses. But does not thinking function independent of the senses? If an individual had not been exposed to a single sense perception, he would not have been able to think.

     The humans obtain information about the outer reality through their senses (axiom 1). They are vectors for projecting the outer reality into the consciousness. Technology (e.g. a telescope) is a link between the outer reality and the senses and is able to improve the ability of the consciousness to perceive the reality. Our senses give us observations.

     The humans are rational beings and therefore, our consciousness has another tool, namely reason. Our reason can be used for converting the sense perceptions into concepts and thereby be a basis for further knowledge (axiom 3). The basis for the creation of a concept is two or more sense perceptions that are alike in some respects. Our reason extracts these similarities and makes an abstract concept from the similarities; we induce a general concept from several individual observations. The concept is often assigned a definition (explicitly or implicitly).

     In order to achieve knowledge from the reality exceeding the pure observations, our reason can use induction, deduction and the hypothetical deductive method (HDM); see Section 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5.1). Concepts and their definitions are prerequisites for a rational use of these methods for scientific purposes, and at the same time, induction and HDM are tools in the creation of concepts.

 

 

1.2.1  Creation of concepts

 

Each individual, except for sufficient small children, has a pool of concepts in his consciousness. Before this pool is established there are no concepts in the consciousness. Pre-concept children receive sense perceptions from the outer reality. Some perceptions are grasped to have significant similarities, while other perceptions are perceived as different. Elements that create sufficiently similar sense perceptions (axiom 1) in a given context are induced into a general concept (categorization). Elements creating perceptions that are perceived as sufficiently different in a given context are induced into different concepts and are placed in different categories. Thus, a pool of concepts arises in the consciousness by induction from a waste number of sense perceptions from the reality. The magnitude of this pool expands rapidly in childhood and continues to increase the rest of life but with decreasing slope. Elements that are categorized in the same category in one context may be categorized in different categories in another context. Such categories often have subcategories, which again has its subcategories and so on, until we arrive at a category that only consists of individual elements. The latter are not concepts.

     We are able to observe similarities and differences between objects because this has had significance for the survival of our species. Our senses have the ability to perceive the combination of those fermions and bosons making sheep as similar, wolfs as similar and sheep and wolfs as different. An individual lacking this ability would walk to a wolf and hug it. He would be eaten, and his genes would not be preserved in the evolutionary process. Similarly, we have the ability to distinguish colors. Individuals who were not able to distinguish red from green developed reduced survival since finding berries in a jungle of green leaves was more difficult. Thus, concepts like sheep, wolf, green and red arose.

 

Figure 1: Schematic drawing of a fish

 

Elements moving in the water and showing sufficient similarities with fig. 1 are named and categorized as “fish” based on induction from some individual observations. This includes a hypothesis that there exists more of its kind. We have the following knowledge: elements showing sufficient similarities with fig. 1 are associated with “movement in water”. We examine 1000 figure-1-like elements moving in the water closer and observe that absolutely everyone have vertebrae. We adopt the hypothesis that all elements corresponding to “fish” (as defined above) have vertebrae. The hypothesis continuously resists attempts of falsification when we in the future examine more elements of the type “fish”. Then we know that it is highly probable that an element of the category “fish” has vertebrae. Our acquired knowledge is that elements moving in the water and resembling fig. 1 have large probability for having vertebrae. After some time we are so convinced that all elements belonging to the concept “fish” (as until now defined) have vertebrae, that we adopt this as a part of the definition of the concept “fish”. We have not acquired any new knowledge by taking “presence of vertebrae” to be a part of the definition of “fish”. We have only become more confident of the association between (1) resemblance with fig. 1, (2) movement in water, and (3) vertebrae, but this is independent of the adoption of vertebrae as a part of the definition of the concept “fish”. Our acquired knowledge is that these three relations are associated. The concept “fish” is something we use as a tool in order to keep track on this association against other associations that do not resemble fish. This makes it easier to acquire new knowledge (i.e. association between different elements and attributes) in the future.

 

Why is it so important to convert collections of individual observations into concepts? It is because this strategy has resisted intense attempts of rejection. The strategy of using concepts, not at least in social contexts, has had huge importance for the survival of the species Homo sapiens. More primitive primates with significantly less capacity for concept production were ousted. The result has been that all humans make use of concepts. The concepts are converted into words and sentences, which in turn are transformed into writing. Printed matter may be conserved through the centuries, and this is very important for building up increased knowledge through the generations and over geographical distances. The faster and more efficient the information can be spread, the larger potential for increased knowledge and technology is present; digitalization and Internet are the newest and best means in this respect. Concepts and their elongations give the basis for increased survival and better opportunities for creating happiness and avoiding unhappiness.

 

1.2.1.1  Definitions

 

The creation of a concept results in a definition uniting the similarities. The definition contains other concepts with their own definitions. In this way, a concept may be defined in a long chain of gradually simpler concepts, or the concept may be at risk of being defined into a circle that returns to the original concept. When a concept is to be defined into simplicity, we have to end up with some intuitive concepts – concepts being so self-evident that they do not need to be defined. Without the use of intuitive concepts all creation of concepts, and accordingly all use of human reason, is impossible. Chapter 12 is a list of definitions of several important concepts used in the description of Rational Gaudism.

 

1.2.1.2  Objective and subjective concepts

 

The basis for forming a concept is to co-categorize elements that give rise to sufficiently similar perceptions, and induce them into a general concept while other elements are excluded from the same category (see Section 1.2.1). Sometimes, a high degree of intersubjective agreement will exist on what “sufficient similarity” means in practice, while in other cases there will be considerable intersubjective disagreement about this. This gives rise to objective and subjective concepts.  An objective concept is a concept whose content does not give room for subjective interpretations. A subjective concept is a concept whose content gives substantial room for subjective interpretations. The concept “justice” is a very subjective term, e.g. a communist will mean something completely different with this concept than a liberalist. The concept “elephant”, however, provides little room for subjective interpretations. If you are asking for an elephant, different people will not serve you different animals. All concepts can be placed on a scale between absolute objectivity and absolute subjectivity.

      However, a subjective concept can be objectivized by attaching an unequivocal definition of the concept. Then everyone will clearly understand what is meant by the concept leaving no room for subjective interpretations.

 

It is possible to commit long-term argument manipulation by redefining concepts. There is something, X (e.g. opposition to the left-winged gender politics) that the manipulator does not like, and he describes it with a familiar concept, B (e.g. male chauvinism), which most people regard as unambiguously negative. However, most people have historically a somewhat different and more positive perception of X in their consciousness. But when people repeatedly observe B defined as X, they will sooner or later perceive X as negative since their minds are stuck in the old, traditional, negative definition of B.

 

 

1.3  Induction

 

Induction is a process where knowledge of individual observations (axiom 1) is converted into an abstract concept of the general case (axiom 3). We observe that many different objects fall towards the earth according to the formula s = 5t2. We induce the general hypothesis that this is valid for all objects. All humans observed consist of cells. Then we induce the hypothesis that all humans consist of cells (“hypothesis” is here used somewhat absurd-philosophically). We may also induce into the definition of the concept “human being” that consisting of cells is a criterion for being a human. If so, a human being is per definition an object consisting of cells and no hypothesis. Thus, both abstract concepts and hypotheses may be produced by the use of induction.

     The nature of induction is to generalize from information of individual cases. Presupposing a potential for an unlimited amount of cases, then, independently of the number of individual cases making the basis for the inductive conclusion, there may exist – now or in the future – cases that have not been used for producing the inductive result. There is no guarantee that the inductive result is correct for these new cases. But the more individual cases the inductive result is based on, the better these individual cases are distributed, and the less inaccuracy of each observation, the more correct the inductive result is expected to be. The accuracy of an inductive result based on numeral observations is proportional to the square root of the number of observations and inversely proportional to the standard deviation of the observations.

 

 

1.4  Deduction

 

A deductive process is based on one or more premises from which the conclusion arises logically with absolute certainty. The deduction occurs in our consciousness and therefore, the deduction will be independent of the axioms of Rational Gaudism. In pure mathematics, which is a deductive discipline, we deduce that if 2 + x = 4 then x = 2. This is 100 % accurate knowledge. Mathematics is used for inducing a systematic coherent hypothesis from similar, but not identical, measurable individual observations. The mathematical correlation may later on be used for testing the validity of the hypothesis. When the hypothesis has resisted a waste number of attempts of rejection, it can be promoted into a theory, and it can be used for predicting events in the future. But the observed values, which are put into the formulas, are associated with a level of uncertainty, and the theories of natural science are theoretically always associated with somewhat uncertainty since they basically are founded on induction.

 

A deductive process in “real life” is based on the concepts in which the sense perceptions are categorized, and then we deduce logical consequences from this. I see flames on a field. Then I deduce that the temperature has to be high in the area around the flames since flames per definition are warm.

     What really happens is the following: I observe something on a field fitting very good to the concept of “flames”. Then I produce a hypothesis stating that there are flames on the field. If this hypothesis is correct, the temperature around the area, which I perceive as flames, will be high. Usually, the sight of flames will be so clear cut and certain that we for all practical purposes can disregard the uncertainty.

 

Considering the following deduction:

 

All boys love chocolate.

Hans is a boy.

Consequently, Hans loves chocolate.

 

One possibility is that the concept “boy” has its usual definition (and this definition does neither include “loving chocolate” nor exclude it). Then a large, but limited, number (n) of boys have been observed, and all of them love chocolate. The following inductive conclusion are made; “all boys in the world love chocolate”. But this inductive conclusion includes a non-insignificant source of uncertainty since the fact that a number of n boys love chocolate, does not exclude the existence of one or more boys outside the observed group not loving chocolate. The first premise is a hypothesis produced from a limited number of individual observations. If we observe boy NN, we can with a relatively high degree of probability conclude that he loves chocolate. If he really likes chocolate, the hypothesis is strengthened since it has resisted an attempt of falsification.

      Another possibility is that the concept “boy” among other criteria is defined to be a creature loving chocolate. If so, the chocolate-loving tendency is implicitly included in the premise “Hans is a boy”. This means that the conclusion is already implicitly incorporated in that premise.

      A third possibility is that all boys really are observed to love chocolate, but in that case Hans is also included. Then the conclusion is implicitly included in the premise “all boys love chocolate”.

      This kind of Aristotelian logic does not give other knowledge about the reality then what is given by the implicit induction of the premises. This is a method that is correct in the “world of the consciousness”, but like mathematical methods the uncertainty in the induction or the observations is not eliminated. It may also be regarded as a game with concepts where the conclusion is already included in one of the premises, but deduction will often clear up the content in the premises in such a way that their content is made explicit for the human consciousness.

 

Strictly speaking, deduction only works for considerations in our own consciousness (e.g. mathematical parameters or abstract hypothesis – as the premises in the Aristotelian logic really are). Concepts, definitions and hypothesis are all based on induction. But the induction supporting the premises is often so good that we for all practical purposes can say that the deductive conclusion is accurate. Therefore, we often choose to “forget” the uncertainty introduced by the induction; otherwise we would be completely restrained in both our daily life and science.

      Deduction has its best practical function when reversing the Aristotelian logic by assuming (in our consciousness) that the first premise (hypothesis) is true. When the second premise is an unequivocal observation and exemplification of the general component in the first premise, the conclusion will follow logically. But if the conclusion does not appear in real life (results from experiments), the first premise (hypothesis) has to be wrong. This principle is used in the hypothetical-deductive method.

 

 

1.5  Philosophy of Science

 

 

1.5.1  The hypothetical-deductive method (HDM)

 

The hypothetical-deductive method (HDM) is fundamentally regarded based on a number of individual observations (axiom 1). Then we induce a hypothesis in order to give an explanation of the phenomenon (”Ding an sich”) which the observed data are exemplifications of (axiom 3). The next step is to deduce logical consequences from this hypothesis (axiom 3). Then we carry out experiments (axiom 2) to observe if these consequences really occur. If so, the hypothesis is strengthened. Otherwise the hypothesis is falsified.

     A theory is a hypothesis that extraordinarily has resisted intense attempts of falsification / dethronement. The promotion of a hypothesis into a theory is subjected to intersubjective judgments. Usually, a hypothesis is declared as a theory when most of the research community accepts it as a sufficiently probable explanation and useful tool for making predictions. Because of the induction problem (see Section 1.4) theories are still attached with a certain degree of uncertainty (even though sometimes being only “absurd-philosophical”), and are in this respect a special type of hypotheses; thus, there is a gliding transition between theories and non-theory-hypotheses.

     A hypothesis may arise without induction by being necessary for a main hypothesis to avoid falsification; it is called an auxiliary hypothesis to the main hypothesis. Thereafter, the (auxiliary) hypothesis ought to resist attempts of falsification in order to show its justification (well-foundedness). A hypothesis may also be deduced from a theory; in such a case the hypothesis often makes statement about a peripheral part of the phenomenon that the theory is about, where the theory until now has been exposed to little or no empirical data.

 

A hypothesis that makes statements about a limited number of cases can be verified. Examples of such hypotheses are: “More than 10 % of all current residents in nursing homes in area Y have the diagnosis Alzheimer's disease”. “More than 50% of all rapists convicted in the years 1990-2005 had brown eyes”. When such hypotheses are verified, they are not hypotheses anymore, but observations (but strictly speaking, an observation is also a hypothesis – see Section 1.6.1).

      A hypothesis that makes statements about an unlimited number of cases can never be verified since a limited number of observations supporting the hypotheses do not exclude a future observation contradicting it. The hypothesis “there is life on Mars” is obviously impossible to falsify, but it may be verified since it makes statements about a limited number of cases as a minimum (one or several cases of life). The hypothesis “there is not life on Mars” can be falsified (if we consider the observations as accurate and impregnable even by extreme ad hoc hypotheses) but cannot be verified since verification requires an unlimited number of negative searches for life.

     Usually, a hypothesis can not be directly falsified since auxiliary hypotheses (often more or less ad hoc) almost always can be produced for defending the main hypothesis. Therefore, the idea of a hypothesis being scientific only if it is falsifiable and the idea of a hypothesis' quality depending on its ability to resist attempts of falsification are too easy.

 

HDM is the method of choice for science to asymptotically approach the truth of different processes in nature. Knowledge from many different single processes may be integrated, and a more general view of nature is achieved. HDM will be the safest method for collecting knowledge about nature. We can also achieve knowledge about single processes in nature by guessing on a theory and insist on it as a dogma. But it will only be “good luck” if we approach the truth about a process by using this method. HDM is “the safe way”. If we consider the sum of all knowledge about all single processes in nature (almost an infinite amount) corrected for its quality, HDM is the method maximizing this sum. This is a generally accepted principle in natural science.

 

Let us initially adopt the hypothesis that HDM is a well-suited tool for solving integrals. When this hypothesis is tested in practice, the hypothesis will be rejected. But then we have used HDM for rejecting the use of HDM for this specific purpose. Therefore, we can say that HDM stands by its own strength (opposed to something falling by its own weight). The use of HDM is safely based since its fundamental principle is self-correcting.

 

 

1.5.2  The factors influencing the well-foundedness of a hypothesis

 

A hypothesis is characterized as well-founded when it estimates “Ding an sich” of the outer reality well; an absolutely true hypothesis has a well-foundedness equalizing 1, while an absolutely false hypothesis has a well-foundedness equalizing 0. We deduce observable consequences from the hypothesis and examine if such consequences are observed in practice. The hypothesis is gaining well-foundedness in step with unsuccessful attempts of falsification. The observations that were used to induce the hypothesis in the first place are also to be regarded as unsuccessful attempts of falsification. The increase in well-foundedness is larger the more unique these attempts are compared to earlier unsuccessful attempts of falsification, i.e. the more of the hypothesis' “nooks and corners” that undergo unsuccessful attempts of falsification the more well-founded the hypothesis will become. Scientific knowledge is basically acquired through induction. Exposing a hypothesis for intense attempts of falsification is only a tool in the pursuit of expanding its induction basis to the whole scope of the hypothesis (covering all “nooks and corners” of the hypothesis with observations). The scope of a hypothesis is the totality of its logical consequences. A nook/corner is a subcategory of the hypothesis' scope where its logical consequences are considered internally similar while consequences in different nooks/corners are considered non-similar. We let the factor ‘φ’ denote how large share of the “nooks and corners” of the hypothesis that have undergone unsuccessful attempts of falsification, and will e.g. decrease in step with “cherry picking” and lacking systematic in the observation basis. Increased number of observations in each “nook and corner” will also strengthen the well-foundedness, but in an asymptotical manner (repeating the same experiment three times with hypothesis-compatible result, will increase the well-foundedness somewhat, but repeating the same experiment one million times beyond this, will not result in a noteworthy further increase).

 

If a hypothesis H arises by extrapolation (deduction) from other, more well-founded hypotheses, theories or theory networks (let us call them ‘G’), hypothesis H will inherit some well-foundedness from G (since H in one way is a “nook” in G) even if H is untested or inferiorly tested. We may say that the observations making the foundation for G's well-foundedness, will “shine through” to H's scope and give rise to a certain well-foundedness also for H. The more well-founded G is, the larger H's inheritance becomes. If H had stood alone without being matted by G, H would have been more ad hoc and without inherited well-foundedness; more empirical testing would have been required in order to gain the same degree of well-foundedness (“extraordinary claims need extraordinary proofs”). With similar argumentation a hypothesis explaining a given issue P, but additionally also explaining the issues Q and R (larger prediction potential), will be a more well-founded explanation model for P than an alternative, competing hypothesis explaining only P (given that the hypotheses otherwise are equally well-founded).

 

The hypothesis' well-foundedness will increase in step with the accuracy / objectivity (sj) of each of the observations in both the induction basis and the experimental basis (the use of technological tools and their quality will often influence this accuracy positively). The basis for the existence of inaccuracy is the fact that an observation basically is a hypothesis (see Section 1.6.1), but the inaccuracy / uncertainty may sometimes be present at an absurd-philosophical level.

 

Most hypotheses are not only induced on the basis of observations, but also on the basis of other hypotheses, called auxiliary hypotheses, which the main hypothesis depends on in order to be able to keep its claim. Sometimes, an auxiliary hypothesis resembles absolute truth because of its high degree of well-foundedness, while other auxiliary hypotheses are extremely far-fetched. The well-foundedness of a hypothesis increases when the product of the well-foundedness of its auxiliary hypotheses (Пvi) increases (presupposed that the auxiliary hypotheses are mutually independent; if they are not, the product has to be adjusted for the degree of dependency). In this way attempts of falsifying a main hypothesis will always fail; avoiding falsification is only a matter of introducing fitting auxiliary hypotheses. However, for each attempt of falsification the well-foundedness of the main hypotheses may fall because of possibly low well-foundedness of the auxiliary hypotheses – even if the main hypothesis in itself gains somewhat by undergoing an unsuccessful attempt of falsification. Therefore, in the continuation we usually use the concept “dethronement” instead of “falsification” (and sometimes “de-facto-falsification”; see Section 1.5.6).

      The substance of auxiliary hypotheses may be included in the main hypothesis. Then the number of auxiliary hypotheses, which the main hypothesis depends on, is formally reduced. But the more far-fetched this substance is, the more ad hoc the main hypothesis will become (i.e. more detached from already existing theories), and the less well-foundedness will be “inherited” from already existing theories. Thus, the main hypothesis will of course not become more well-founded if the substance of auxiliary hypotheses is included in the main hypothesis.

      The larger number of other theories disagreeing with the main hypothesis and the more well-founded they are, the less well-founded the main hypothesis is. In such a case we have to introduce auxiliary hypotheses more or less ad hoc stating that the (supposed) well-founded theories are wrong in spite of the previous opposite presumption. Therefore, this means that the product of the well-foundedness of the auxiliary hypotheses decreases, and is therefore included in the preceding paragraphs.

 

 

1.5.3  Dethronement

 

Scientifically, a hypothesis, which at a given time point is the most well-founded one, can not be adopted as the favorite hypothesis for all future. One has to constantly search for observations that potentially can make it less well-founded than its competitors. The wish is to make the favorite hypothesis even more well-founded both absolutely and relatively to its competitors, or that its favorite status is taken over by an even more well-founded (or more simplistic) competing hypothesis.

     We assume a hypothesis to be correct. A logical consequence of the hypothesis is deduced. If the logical consequence is observed in practice, the hypothesis is strengthened. According to standard theory of science, the hypothesis is falsified if the opposite is the case. But it is not so easy. Sometimes you can narrow down the scope of the hypothesis so that the observations, which apparently falsified the hypothesis, remain outside this scope – or you may in a more or less sneaky way redefine sub-objective concepts that are included in the hypothesis and thereby rescue it from falsification; but in the remainder of this section we will consider another complicating factor, namely rescuing auxiliary hypotheses:

     If logical consequences of the hypothesis apparently are not observed in the world of reality, the hypothesis is not necessarily falsified since one or more auxiliary hypotheses (often more or less ad hoc) may be introduced for rescuing the hypothesis in such a way that it is not in discordance with any of the observations. But after such a process the combination of auxiliary hypotheses carrying the favorite hypothesis may have so low degree of well-foundedness that the original favorite hypothesis is no longer the most well-founded one (from the definition in Section 1.5.2) for explaining the phenomenon. The original favorite hypothesis has been weakened, and one of the other hypotheses has been relatively strengthened, and this one will now become the new favorite hypothesis. The original favorite hypothesis is said to be dethroned. It may also happen that a completely new hypothesis is shown more well-founded than all the original competing hypotheses after considering the new observations.

     However, the old favorite hypothesis may have a comeback if one or more of its auxiliary hypotheses in the future may be shown to be more well-founded than previously thought, if it gains increased well-foundedness through further empirical testing in the absence of ill-founded auxiliary hypotheses, or if the new favorite hypothesis in the future is sufficiently weakened through the same test procedure that dethroned the old favorite hypothesis. Alteration in inherited well-foundedness (g) will also be able to influence which hypothesis to get the favorite status.

     If the original favorite hypothesis is strengthened by the test procedure mentioned above, it has resisted an attempt of dethronement. The larger number and the more intense, serious attempts of dethronement a favorite hypothesis is able to resist, the more well-founded (strong) the hypothesis is – absolutely regarded. Preferably, we want one favorite hypothesis to become so well-founded that it resembles a fact and at the same time the competing hypotheses to be so poorly-founded that they de facto are considered falsified. If there is no significant difference in well-foundedness between two or more competing hypotheses, the favorite hypothesis is to be chosen by largest possible simplicity. Resisting such attempts of dethronement is also an important tool for ranking different favorite hypotheses, which seek to explain completely different phenomena, with respect to well-foundedness (see Section 1.5.2 and 1.5.5).

 

1.5.3.1  Non-dethronable hypotheses

 

A hypothesis that is genuinely not exposable to attempts of dethronement can, strictly speaking, not depend on auxiliary hypotheses that can be exposed to attempts of dethronement since a dethroned or weakened auxiliary hypothesis may lead to dethronement of the main hypothesis. Moreover, no alternative hypotheses can depend on auxiliary hypotheses being able to be strengthened by resisting attempts of dethronement, otherwise one or more of the alternative hypotheses may be strengthened and thus dethrone the main hypothesis. The observations that have been used for inducing the hypothesis have to be so unique that observations of the same phenomenon, which the hypothesis makes statement about, may in no way be reproduced or regained. But how can we know that all this will be the case for all future? Thus, it is difficult to imagine absolutely non-dethronable hypotheses, but some may be very difficult to dethrone.

 

 

1.5.4  Absolute well-foundedness

 

The definition of “the most well-founded hypothesis” includes the term to be defined, namely the well-foundedness of the auxiliary hypotheses (see Section 1.5.2). Thus, we end up in a seemingly endless system of “Russian nested dolls” (matryoshka doll) defining into a spiral where the definition of a hypothesis' well-foundedness always contains the term to be defined, namely the well-foundedness of the auxiliary hypotheses.

      If you break up all the “Russian dolls” and release the contents, the well-foundedness of a hypothesis will be basically and implicitly a function of the number of observations that the main hypothesis, its auxiliary hypotheses and their possible “testators” are induced from or tried dethroned by, the extent to which these observations are representative for their hypotheses's “nooks and corners”, the accuracy of each observation, and the ability of the consciousness to systematically make and compare continuously improved abstractions of the similarities in these observations. Since an observation, strictly speaking, also is a hypothesis induced and tested from quantified sense perceptions (see Section 1.6.1), the quality of an observation is fundamentally resting in the ability of the sense perceptions to represent the outer reality (axiom 1), and the human consciousness' ability to systematically make and compare continuously improved abstractions of the similarities in these sense perceptions.

 

From the above statements and the parameters of Section 1.5.2 the absolute well-foundedness of a hypothesis may be expressed in the following way:

 

 

The function f increases in step with increasing n, with increasing sj (j = 1,2,….n) and with increasing φ and g; the function f also includes statistical tools. The function f and vi (i = 1,2,….m) have their range of values between 0 and 1 (n is the number of observations that actually have been completed inside the scope of the hypothesis; sj expresses the accuracy / objectivity of the j-th observation for j = 1,2,.....,n ; vi expresses the well-foundedness of the i-th auxiliary hypothesis for i = 1,2,......,m , where m is the number of auxiliary hypotheses which the main hypothesis depends on; ’g’ is possible “inheritance” of well-foundedness from other, more established and well-founded hypotheses, theories or theory networks which the hypothesis is extrapolated from; for more info about ’g’ and ’φ’ see Section 1.5.2). The formula presupposes that the auxiliary hypotheses are mutually independent; if they are not, the product of vi (i = 1,2,….m) has to be adjusted for the degree of dependence. The formula is not useful in practice but illustrates the theory.

      As illustrated by the formula above the well-foundedness of a hypothesis never become larger than the product of the well-foundedness of its auxiliary hypotheses (absolute truth = 1 and absolute untruth = 0). If this product falls under the threshold for de-facto-falsification (see Section 1.5.6), the main hypothesis will never be able to crawl over the threshold again by resisting new attempts of dethronement – recrossing the threshold can only be achieved by improving the well-foundedness of its auxiliary hypotheses.

 

 

1.5.5  Limitations of social science

 

If we carry out the same experiment of physics in 2013 or in 1890, or if it is carried out in USA or Uganda, we may expect the same result. Testing a hypothesis of social science in 2013 gives completely different test conditions than in 1890, and we cannot necessarily expect the same results; similarly if it is tested in Uganda instead of in USA. We may say that hypotheses of social science have an extra dimension of “nooks and corners” in the form of time and location (includes culture). Thus, the hypothesis will often have to contain very many “nooks and corners” if it claims to be very general. Because of the location- and time aspect it will also be very difficult to know which “nooks and corners” the hypotheses should contain when the hypotheses are produced. When we carry out experiments, it will be difficult to cover the large number and the uncertain identity of “nooks and corners” with observations. Therefore, the factor φ easily become small, and i.a. for that reason hypotheses of social science often have less degree of well-foundedness than hypotheses of natural science. The security of their predictions is accordingly, and the generalization of theories of social science will be more intricate. Another reason for this is the fact that the observations in social science often are not so easy to measure objectively and are consequently more likely to be influenced by the subjective political preferences of the researchers, and thus, the degree of objectivity (sj) in the observations becomes small (sometimes social research may be difficult to distinguish from political propaganda).

      Because of the time dimension, it is also difficult to know for how long time we are to test e.g. political and economic “hypotheses” before we dethrone them. Some difficult short-term impact does not necessarily imply dethronement, but rather that the hypothesis has not been in operation long enough before the real positive, long-term consequences show up. Some simple theories in such fields may basically be regarded as accurate and time-independent (e.g. about the fundamental nature of the human being), and it may sometimes be better to draw logical consequences of such theories than testing elaborate social hypotheses.

 

 

1.5.6  Science and non-science

 

According to standard theory of science, a hypothesis is unscientific if it is not falsifiable. The problem is that a hypothesis which apparently is falsified can be rescued by introducing one or more auxiliary hypotheses (often more or less ad hoc) that support the main hypothesis in such a way that it become consistent with all the observations from the test panel. Thus, hardly any hypothesis is falsifiable; as the ultimate ad hoc hypothesis, one may state that an unknown physical force interferes with the experiments making the results appear differently than they should have done. It is more correct to speak of a gradual transition from very poorly-founded hypotheses to very well-founded hypotheses. If we are to use the term ‘falsification’, we have to set a cut-off for how low degree of well-foundedness a hypothesis can have and still be worthy of participation in the scientific process; if the well-foundedness of the hypothesis is less than this cut-off, it could in practice be considered falsified. But not even this will absolutely exclude the possibility that the future will reveal observations making the hypothesis more well-founded so that it exceeds this cut-off (e.g. because some auxiliary hypotheses, which it relies on, are found more well-founded); therefore, it also has to be very unlikely that the hypothesis in the future may become so much more well-founded that it crawls above this cut-off before we in practice can regard it as falsified. We call this de-facto falsification.

      According to Rational Gaudism, Science is “the process pursuing to estimate ‘Ding an sich’ of the reality with maximum accuracy, i.e. pursuing to identify the most well-founded hypotheses (‘Ding für mich’) to give answers on ‘Ding an sich’-questions with fundament in observations in a process where such hypotheses are exposed to constant and maximum intense and sincere attempts of dethronement”. Another way of stating this is that we pursue the most well-founded hypotheses in a process where we constantly try to obtain observations covering more and more “nooks and corners” of the scope of such hypotheses. Thus, a scientific hypothesis is a hypothesis that makes statements over “Ding an sich” of the outer reality with the purpose of estimating them as accurate as possible. A hypothesis does not need to be (directly) falsifiable in order to be scientific. A scientific hypothesis is not to be adopted because it necessarily represents the Truth, but because it is the best one of the available hypotheses to explain the observed data, and the adoption must take place in a process with constant and intense attempts of dethronement. Non-science is defined as “the choosing of a hypothesis as an answer on a ‘Ding an sich’-question when there is an alternative hypothesis that is significantly more well-founded in this respect (by the considerations in Sections 1.5.3 and 1.5.4) or reluctance against serious attempts to dethrone the most well-founded hypothesis” (the latter equalizes “reluctance against searching for observations in all ‘nooks and corners’ of such hypotheses”). Therefore, whether a hypothesis is scientific or not has to be considered in relation to the process that it is intended to participate in. A non-scientific hypothesis is a hypothesis that is intended to take part in a process where the objective is not to choose the most well-founded of the competing hypotheses in a dethroning-oriented atmosphere as the general explanation of the issue. From this perspective, we may say that no hypothesis in itself is scientific or unscientific, but science or lack thereof is defined by the process that the hypothesis takes part in.

 

 

1.6  The hypothetical-deductive method outside Science

 

 

1.6.1  An observation is essentially a hypothesis

 

When is a statement about an object an observation, and when is it a hypothesis? When are we able to say that an object is a stone, a lion or a magpie? When all criteria of the (more or less explicit) definition of the concept x are securely satisfied, we have a secure observation of the object X being an x, and no hypothesis. We see a black and white object of magnitude 40-50 cm with wings. We believe that it is a magpie since the elements of the observation (black/white, magnitude, and wings) satisfy the definition of a magpie. We believe that we have observed wings, black-white color and approximately the right size, but how can we be really sure? Then we have to consider the definition of e.g. a wing, and examine if the criteria of “a wing” is satisfied. Theoretically, we can continue in this way until the definitions bite themselves in the tail into a ring or until we find something that is self-evident without definition. But how are we going to deal with the uncertainty in the observations?

 

0.03 seconds is the shortest time lag that is needed for a human being to observe a perception of sight (Goos, 1999). In this way, a visual observation can be regarded to be quantified. An observation lasting for 3 seconds consists of 100 different continuous perceptions of sight, each with duration of 0.03 seconds. A person A sees an object X. The perception of sight number 1 from X (with duration 0.03 sec) enters A's consciousness. A has a pool of concepts in his consciousness. He produces (very rapidly) the hypothesis that X fits concept z. The perception of sight number 2 arrives from X, but hypothesis no. 1 is rejected. Then he produces the hypothesis that X fits concept y. The perception of sight number 3 arrives from X, but hypothesis no 2 is also rejected. …This process progresses until he arrives at perception of sight no N where he produces the hypothesis that X fits the concept x. For each new perception of sight from N+1 this hypothesis resists all attempts of dethronement. At last, the uncertainty connected to the hypothesis is infinitesimal, and A can for all practical purposes say that he is sure that the object X is an x. Then we have obtained an observation (even though it is theoretically a hypothesis with an uncertainty attached).

      Therefore, an observation is a hypothesis that is induced very quickly from many individual sense perceptions and tested very quickly against a pool of concepts in our consciousness, and this hypothesis has resisted intense attempts of dethronement.

 

Goos L. An evolutionary based investigation of facial expression perception. Annual meeting, Human Behavior and Evolutionary Society, Utha (1999).

 

 

1.6.2  Biological and technological evolution

 

Newer and improved species have developed during the evolution, and the principle of “survival of the fittest” is very similar to HDM, even if it is meaningless to assign nature epistemological attributes: The establishment of the hypothesis occurs through coincidences; the hypothesis is that the new mutation will breed a new or improved species being better fitted for survival in the present environment; the deduction is included in the hypothesis, and the testing occurs by “examining” to what extent the new or improved species manages in its environment. The motive power in the biological evolution has been the pursuit of maximizing the total mass of DNA in the world. This process has been slow, and has been going on for hundreds of millions of years and in the last 50-100 thousand years the process has culminated in the modern human being. Homo sapiens is the ultimate result of nature's HDM. When considered in a human time perspective, this evolutionary process progresses extremely slowly.

 

The humans have started their own process of evolution. In this process improved technology is evolved in stead of improved organs, senses and limbs. These technological improvements are the fundament for better goods and services giving the humans increased feeling of happiness. In the same way as the motive power in the biological evolutionary process is the pursuit of maximizing of the total mass of DNA in the world, an important incitement in the technological evolution is the human pursuit of maximizing the economical profit (which in turn is a tool for achieving happiness). In this way, money and DNA have the same role in their respective processes of evolution. Therefore, technological progresses (= materialized knowledge) is nothing but a continuation of the biological evolutionary process fitted to the human time perspective.

     The hypothesis is that a new product (or technology) will be a success in the market. The hypothesis has been induced on the basis of knowledge of already existing products (technologies). We can deduce that if the hypothesis is correct, the introduction of the product (technology) in the market will generate significant profit. Then we test the hypothesis by producing and marketing the product (technology). If the product (technology) gives significant profit, the hypothesis is strengthened; oppositely it is dethroned.

 

 

1.6.3  Evolution of ideas

 

Evolution of ideas includes the development of the knowledge that has driven the technological progresses described in the previous section, development of knowledge of the existence and behavior of different objects and not at least development of which political ideas being best suited for governing a society (see Section 7.2). These ideas have to a large extent progressed by HDM. We have an idea (hypothesis) obtained from individual observations and foregoing ideas. The quality of this idea is determined through the ability of the materialized idea to influence the reality in positive direction or if the consequences of the idea are in accordance with test results from the reality.

 

 

1.6.4  Evolution of happiness in daily life

 

The sense perceptions may affect my feelings in such a way that I obtain a more or less constant state of unhappiness, and by logical thinking my consciousness ought to achieve the knowledge that my action pattern is wrong, and that it ought to be changed so I can obtain more happiness in the future.

     Since nature has optimalized its work by creating the Homo sapiens by HDM, it is rational to assume that the human beings can maximize their self-happiness by the use of HDM. We often use a HDM-like process in our daily life without being aware of it. Paul produces a hypothesis from his own observations at school and from the experiences of others that being a teacher is a good profession. The hypothesis is as follows: If Paul becomes a teacher, he will produce significantly more self-happiness during his life span compared to the amount of happiness obtained by choosing another profession. He tests the hypothesis by taking teacher education and becoming a teacher. The consequences of the hypothesis testing are detected by observing how happy he becomes as a teacher. If he obtains sufficient amount of happiness by being a teacher he will remain in this profession. If Paul produces a too small amount of happiness or too large amount of unhappiness as a teacher, he may reject the hypothesis and start as a jointer in stead (adopt the jointer hypothesis), and then he will observe to what extent he becomes happy by carrying on that profession.

 

 

1.7  Subjective and objective knowledge

 

 

1.7.1  Objective knowledge

 

If we present an elephant to 100 people and ask them what it is, everyone will say that it is an elephant. This knowledge is independent of the subject who observes – the knowledge does not depend on “the eye that sees”. We say that this knowledge is objective, which equivalently is knowledge that is consistent with “Ding an sich” of the reality.

      Lions eating Zebras and the existence of the sun are realities not depending on the subjective senses of humans. A person's weight of 120 kilograms (with a little level of uncertainty in the measurement) is an objective fact since his weight is independent of the observing subjects. Those are objective facts (axiom 1). The basis for claiming this to be objective knowledge is that the concepts “elephant”, “lion”, “zebra”, “eat”, “sun” and “kilogram” are so precisely defined that there is in practice no basis for subjective interpretations. In addition, there are many and very truthful observations of zebra-eating lions (see Section 1.6.1).

 

If you prefer the philosophical considerations of absurdity, you can also say that the observations of an elephant are dependent on human consciousness. Perhaps there is a person who seriously believes that it is a car and not an elephant – how can we be sure that it really is an elephant? If DNA measurements can determine that it is an elephant, the wrangler can still argue that the result depends on people reading the results correctly. Such theoretical philosophical subjectivity will always be present, but for all practical purposes we can say that absolutely objective knowledge of an elephant is present. Whether it is an elephant, a car or anything else, the existent is what it is independent of what the human consciousness believes (axiom 1).

 

 

1.7.2  Subjective knowledge

 

If we ask 100 people about what they like best of sausages or hamburgers, we get very different answers. In a similar way we will obtain very different answers if we ask the same people who are the most handsome of Barack Obama and Bill Clinton. Assertions of the type “sausage is better than hamburger” or “Clinton is more handsome than Obama” is basically subjective knowledge because it does not exist any “Ding an sich”, but basically only a “Ding für mich”. This kind of knowledge depends very much on human beings' subjective consciousnesses. The basis for stating this knowledge to be subjective is that the concepts “good food” and “pretty” is not precisely defined, which gives wide spaces for subjective interpretations.

      In a large test panel a narrow majority will perhaps prefer hamburgers in favor of sausages. Thus, there is a certain amount of objectivity in the sense that the flavor molecules in the hamburger have a slightly greater ability to affect the taste cells positively than the flavor molecules in the sausages. But this degree of objectivity is so small that the knowledge for all practical purposes is subjective. If we hold the absurdities outside, hamburger is objectively better than cyanide (unless the purpose is to commit suicide). It is an objective fact that the body can make use of the meat, but not the cyanide – the human body is just built this way regardless of what the human mind thinks.

      A person's dreams at night are perhaps the most subjective existing “knowledge”, but even these have a weak reference to events from the reality, and therefore contain a theoretical touch of objectivity.

 

 

1.7.3  Intersubjective knowledge

 

If 100 persons are to evaluate the attractiveness of Miss Universe, someone will claim that she is 90% pretty, others will claim her to be 100% pretty and the average will perhaps be 95% pretty with a standard deviation of 4%. We say that Miss Universe is intersubjectively 95% pretty, and the intersubjective consensus of the measurement is inversely proportional to the standard deviation. The attributes of an old woman in a nursing home do not have the same temptation on the same people (she is perhaps 5 % pretty with a standard deviation of 4%). We may intersubjectively say that Miss Universe is significantly prettier than the old lady with a statistical p-value < 0.0001.

      According to axiom 1, the attributes of Miss Universe and the old female have objective existence in the reality (independent of individual consciousnesses), and their ability to influence the happiness of others does exist because of evolutionary selection mechanisms, which also have objective existence independent of human consciousness. Those are the objective components in the individual judgments and are the basis for the intersubjective consensus; claiming that only subjective criteria exist for deciding the attractiveness of people is wrong.

      It is impossible to determine how pretty Miss Universe is compared to others without the judgments from human consciousness; that is the subjective component in such knowledge. Often, the degree of consensus in the intersubjective judgments reflects the degree of objectivity provided that the observers relate honestly and rationally to the reality.

      Another example of intersubjectivity is a person weighting 120 kilograms and measuring 175 cm in height; he can intersubjectively be regarded as fat with high degree of objectivity. The thick fat layer has objective existence in the reality and should evolutionarily be a buffer in times of scantiness of food and represents therefore the objective component, while the subjective component is due to the fact that the concept “fat” is not precisely defined.

 

 

1.7.4  Objective and subjective scientific knowledge

 

If only a few observations of a nature phenomenon exist, this will lay the ground for subjective descriptions of the general nature phenomenon and thus, many hypotheses will be “on the market” for giving a general explanation of the phenomenon (the reasonable creativity of the individual consciousness, i.e. the subject, have relatively large space). The more and trustier observations, and the larger part of the phenomenon's range being covered by the observations, the less basis for subjective adjustments of the general description of the nature phenomenon (the increase in test results / observations will tighten the limits for individual reasonable cretivity). The objectivity increases and the subjectivity decreases in step with the progressing of the scientific process.

 

 

1.7.5  The making of objectivity by changing definitions

 

The absence of objective knowledge and presence of subjective or intersubjective knowledge may often be regarded as a problem of defining concepts (see also Section 1.7.2).

 

-

Let us define pretty woman as follows: “a woman with that numerical mamma size and that numerical curving of the hips.” Then we may carry out instrumental measurements and objectively say that Miss Universe is pretty.

 

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Let us define fat man as follows: “a man with a BMI higher than 25”. A man with weight 120 kilograms and height 175 cm is objectively fat according to this definition.

 

-

If we make the definition that all criminal actions always are immoral, each criminal action will automatically be objectively immoral.

 

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Let us make the definition of good politics as follows: “the present politics of the Democratic Party”. According to this definition, the citizens of the USA are objectively always under the influence of good politics when a Democratic president rules the USA.

In this way we can create objectivity, but what really happens is that we falsely give knowledge more authority than it deserves. Which objective criteria to enter the definitions, depend on the subjective consciousness making the definitions. Besides, such defining is often an insincere way of doing argument manipulation (see Section 1.2.1.2).

 

 

1.7.6  Summary of objective and subjective knowledge

 

All knowledge of the reality contains certain components of objectivity and certain components of subjectivity. However, one of the components may sometimes be present in such a tiny amount that it is only of absurd-philosophical interest. Thus, there is a gradual transition from absolute objective knowledge to absolute subjective knowledge, and between the two theoretical extremes all mixing ratios of the two components are possible. The degree of intersubjective consensus (in the most relevant academic communities and that shows the strongest integrity towards rational epistemological principles) will often be able to estimate the degree of objectivity in the knowledge.

 

 

1.8  Accurate knowledge

 

What is accurate knowledge about the reality? Can we claim accurate knowledge about an element if many observations give the same result and no contradictive observations exist? That could have been the case if the knowledge was based on an infinite number of observations (and if we disregard the uncertainty, which according to Section 1.6.1 is present in the observation itself). But the number “∞” does not exist in the world of reality. Since a limited number of observations are to be considered, knowledge of an element Q is only accurate with an uncertainty q (even if the results from all observations are cohering, it does not exclude the arising of diverging results in the future). Having measured the distance from Sun to Earth and the distance from Moon to Earth and their corresponding standard deviations, the result is that “the Earth is farther from the Sun than from the Moon” with statistical p-value < 10-100 or something like that. Theoretically, we do not have absolute accurate knowledge, but for all practical purposes we have accurate knowledge (i.e. the knowledge can be trustworthily used for predictions). The certainty increases proportionally with the square root of the number of observations and inversely proportionally with the standard deviation. This is objective knowledge – the fact that the distance from Earth to Sun is larger than the distance between Earth and Moon does not depend on the observing subject.

 

Socrates said to his critics: “You claim to know nothing with certainty. How can you then be certain that you do not know anything with certainty?” The answer of Rational Gaudism is as follows:

 

Induction is an abstract concept in our consciousness that we have absolutely certain knowledge about; in the same way as we have accurate knowledge of mathematical concepts like derivation, multiplication and the area of a circle. Therefore, deductive conclusions made on the basis of the principles of induction have to give absolute certainty. Assuming that induction has given the 100 % accurate knowledge that element X behaves in way x. Then element X has to behave in the x-manner tomorrow, but we cannot be sure of that since nobody has observed tomorrow. We have obtained a contradiction. Therefore, we do not have 100 % accurate knowledge that element X behaves in way x. The basis for stating that induction cannot give 100 % accurate knowledge is that ∞ is not a natural number.

       Absolutely accurate knowledge about phenomena in the outer reality with infinite observation potential can only be achieved by A) obtaining the ability to observe infinitely into time and space, B) other fundamental methods than induction that have not yet been discovered by any human being (e.g. true divine revelations). Therefore, in the future it may theoretically happen that we will obtain absolutely accurate knowledge about some elements in the outer reality, but then either A or B has to be fulfilled. Thus, we cannot for sure know that we never can know anything for sure, but it is extremely unlikely. On the other hand, most of the commonly accepted theories in nature science are accompanied with very small uncertainties. Today, I know with absolute certainty that I do not have any absolutely certain knowledge of the outer reality since neither A nor B is fulfilled. However, I know something for sure about my own consciousness, namely what is mentioned in the beginning of chapter 1.

       We can have absolutely accurate knowledge about phenomena in the outer reality that refers to a finite observation potential if each observation is considered absolutely accurate (see Section 1.5.1). But an observation is, strictly speaking, a hypothesis attached with uncertainty (see Section 1.6.1), and strictly speaking we do not have absolutely accurate knowledge in such cases either.

 

In medical research, a statistical p-value < 0.05 is usually thought to be an adequate certainty for publishing a scientific result. In a worst case scenario this means that for each twentieth published research paper we may expect to have one case with faulty knowledge. It is very dangerous for the philosophy to say that since all knowledge fundamentally is based on observations and induction with uncertainty attached, we really cannot know anything – therefore we may jump into wild religious and metaphysical speculations. Rational philosophy of science ought to be the less gambling-directed method of gathering knowledge of the reality. When this book mentions knowledge of the reality as “certain”, “accurate”, “facts” etc., the very small uncertainty being induction-theoretically present is disregarded for simplicity.

 


 

2.  Metaphysics and Epistemology, Part B

 

 

Metaphysics is the part of philosophy studying the fundamental nature of the reality that observation or scientific methods cannot detect. Fundamentally, Rational Gaudism accepts only the minimum of metaphysics presented in the principles which are absolutely unavoidable if further epistemological progression is not to become meaningless / indeterminate and that all further acquiring of knowledge has to build on; i.e. what is described in Chapter 1 before Section 1.2. Additional metaphysical speculations are subjective fantasy and will reduce the probability of approaching the reality's “Ding-an-sich”-values to the absurd-philosophical level. Everything mentioned in this chapter is recognized through the epistemological principles described in chapter 1.

 

The reality is separated in two parts: 1) the outer reality, and 2) the consciousness of individuals.

 

 

2.1  The outer reality

 

The outer reality is matter (moons, stars, planets, cars, trees, humans, animals) and physical forces like electromagnetism, gravitation, electricity etc. Knowledge of these objects is obtained by HDM. In physical terms the outer reality consists of all collections of fermions and bosons of the Universe, and this outer reality exists independently of our senses and consciousness. This is the essence of axiom 1.

      In the year 1000 AC no human being was aware of the existence of the dwarf planet Pluto. The perception of this astronomical object was not inside the consciousness of any man at that time. But of course, Pluto existed all the same because scientists can prove its existence at that time by the use of adequate technology. The human genome (genetic code) existed as an object in the outer reality both before and after 1953, though it was in this year that scientists decoded the genetic code.

      The outer reality exists the way it exists (Ding an sich), 100% objective; independent of the observing subject (axiom 1); we disregard “bizarre” quantum effects at the particle level. We can asymptotically approach knowledge of this reality with gradually decreasing degree of uncertainty (see Section 1.5.1).

 

For the description of the existence and function of physical, biological and astronomical objects, Rational Gaudism refers to the frontier of science on the actual topic – especially the most acknowledged journals in their respective areas (Science, Nature, The New England Journal of Medicine, The Lancet etc.). If anything in this book should be proven not to be in accordance with generally acknowledged science, Rational Gaudism accepts the new, scientific knowledge if this clearly is the most well-founded one (see Section 1.5.3 and 1.5.4).

 

 

2.2  The consciousness of individuals

 

The consciousness is the sum of all biological functions in the nerve system that makes an organism perceive happiness/unhappiness. Such functions may be sense perceptions, remembering, choice of action and thinking. What functions to use depends on the degree of evolution of the consciousness. The input of the consciousness always starts directly or indirectly with sense perceptions. An organism that is able to receive perceptions from the surroundings, but does not possess the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness, does not have a consciousness. The human consciousness also includes being self-aware.

 

According to the introduction of chapter 1, the content of my consciousness is my only source of absolutely accurate knowledge. I observe a body always following “me”, and I call this “my body”. I also observe other collections of fermions and bosons that are very similar to me and my body, and I induce these into a concept: “human beings”. Furthermore, I induce the well-founded hypothesis that their consciousnesses have the same basic nature as my own consciousness.

      The outer reality is transferred into the consciousness of the individuals with the senses as vectors (axiom 1). Additionally, the humans have developed a lot of technology as links between the outer reality and the human senses (see Section 1.6.2). The human consciousness arises as a consequence of a nerve system carrying out biological processes (Koch & Greenfield, 2007). The consciousness has to be an element in the definition of the concept of a human being.

 

An individual can create a correct picture of the reality in his consciousness, and he can perform an action as a consequence of thinking from that picture. This action may change the outer reality (e.g. hewing a tree). In this way, the consciousness will indirectly influence the outer reality.

      The consciousness of an individual may produce a wrong picture of the reality, e.g. by gathering deficient information about an object. But this incorrect picture exists – even if we do not like it. All humans dealing with this person (the person himself included) have to deal with the part of the reality represented by the mispicture and its influence on the rest of the reality. On the other hand, the part of the reality represented by the mispicture may be changed and brought into accordance with the outer reality.

      In our consciousness we can have our own “fantasy world” of thoughts, dreams, and views, and by thinking or dreaming we can have experiences in this world of fantasy (axiom-independent knowledge) that undoubtedly may influence our happiness in positive or negative direction even if the corresponding objects do not exist in the outer reality. We can also perform actions as a consequence of the “fantasy world”, and this may obviously influence the outer reality.

 

Considering the functioning of the consciousness, Rational Gaudism refers to the frontier of sciences in neurophysiology, neuropsychology etc. – especially the most acknowledged journals in their respective areas. The present description of Rational Gaudism does not differentiate between consciousness and subconsciousness – both are described by the same concept “consciousness” without considering the differences between these.

 

Koch C, Greenfield S. How does consciousness happen? Sci Am. (2007) 297, 76-83.

 

 

2.2.1  Subjective / objective / intersubjective reality

 

The outer reality is objective (independent of the observing subject). How a consciousness perceives the outer reality, depends on the individual consciousness observing, i.e. subjective perception of the reality. Observing a salt herring will give my consciousness negative associations; observing the same fish will give my mother positive associations. Observing a red flag will give a former prisoner of GULAG negative associations; observing the same flag will give Fidel Castro positive associations.

       Nevertheless, the judgments of individual consciousnesses have an inherent component of objectivity since the outer reality is the same independent of the observing subject and since there is a common objective evolutionary mechanism that has selected all the senses and consciousnesses of all human beings. Therefore, a large degree of consensus often (but not always) exists when different individuals transfer an object in the outer reality into their consciousnesses by use of their senses. The subjective perceptions of different consciousnesses may differ somewhat and this is caused by different bases of experiences and different genes.

 

 

2.2.2  Happiness

 

Happiness is defined as profit from the feelings. Each human feeling has a degree of value of happiness; positive or negative. Negative happiness is also named unhappiness. One feeling can never have neutral value of happiness, but two or more feelings may in summation have neutral value of happiness. Sometimes a collection of feelings may seem as one single feeling. Therefore, such a multiple feeling may have neutral value of happiness. The death has neutral value of happiness. The value of happiness is the valuation of human feelings in the similar way as dollars are the valuation of accumulated work. Positive expectations mean to borrow happiness that later on has to be paid back in terms of disappointments or reduced happiness. Happiness is produced in the consciousness of individuals (see also Section 9.1). Rational Gaudism adopts the sensible hypothesis that superior animals also have the ability to experience happiness and unhappiness (see Sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.2).

 

2.2.2.1  Why does perception of happiness exist?

 

The fundamental reason for the existence of perception of happiness is that certain types of actions have caused consequences statistically being evolutionary profitable with respect to the maximization of the total mass of DNA (the survival of the species) in the world. The individuals who experienced happiness by the consequences of such actions were more eager to perform similar actions in the future than individuals without the ability to perceive happiness in such situations. Thus, the former individuals were selected in the evolution. In a similar way, certain types of actions have caused consequences statistically being evolutionary unfavorable. Individuals who perceived unhappiness for such consequences were not keen to carry out similar actions in the future. These individuals were also selected during the evolution. Therefore, humans (and superior animals) have the ability to experience happiness and unhappiness for different consequences of actions. Perception of happiness is a “carrot” used by the DNA-molecule in order to double-cross the individual to act in the direction of the DNA-molecule's quantitative maximization. A sea lion is not interested in making tricks for the sake of the spectators but in getting fish as reward. If the sea lion had got the fish without doing the tricks, it would not have carried them out.

      Perception of happiness is a prerequisite for human life. If the ancestors of the Homo sapiens had not felt happiness by having sex, the sexual act would have been skipped, and consequently the human beings would not have existed today. Therefore, happiness implies human life. The human life is founded on perceiving happiness, and without the existence of happiness the evolution of Homo sapiens had been impossible.

 

2.2.2.2  Experiencing happiness is the only value

 

What is valuable for me; i.e. what do I want to achieve? To answer this question it is important to be aware of the meaning of “I”. “I” is the consciousness. The consciousness has five tasks: perception of senses, memory, thinking, making choices of action and experience of happiness and unhappiness; additionally it coordinates these five tasks. Let us assume the opposite of what is to be proven, namely that there are other aspects than perception of happiness and avoiding unhappiness that are valuable for the consciousness. Consequently, either perception of senses, remembering, thinking, or making choices of action or a combination of these is valuable in themselves for the consciousness.

 

Sense perceptions and memory are remedies for performing actions fitted to the reality and whose consequences are expected to give the consciousness perceptions of happiness or avoidance of unhappiness. Sense perceptions and memory can also be obtained without being accompanied by action; e.g. by watching a good movie or remember good memories. But perceptions of continuous pictures or memories are not primary values of the consciousness. Perception of happiness as a consequence of the continuous pictures is its value.

      Similarly, thinking is a tool for fitting the choices of action to the reality so the consciousness can perceive happiness from their consequences. Thinking can also be used for solving completely theoretical problems in our consciousness, which results in a perception of happiness by having achieved something (see also Section 3.3.3.1). But neither thinking nor making choices of action are objectives in themselves for the consciousness; only tools for achieving happiness or avoiding unhappiness.

      It is also important for the consciousness to make choices of action in order to ensure its own existence, but its existence has no value in itself; it is only a tool for perceiving happiness (there is no potential for perception of happiness without existence). Perception of happiness and avoidance of unhappiness are correctives for the consciousness in order to make the best possible choices of action in the future, and in that respect they are also tools for secondarily achieving more happiness and to avoid further unhappiness.

      Perception of senses, memory, thinking, and making choices of action are not valuable in themselves for the consciousness. Since these are the only activities performed by the consciousness in addition to the perception of happiness and unhappiness (even if absurd-philosophical considerations may not exclude that the consciousness may get other tasks in the future), we have shown that perception of happiness and avoidance of unhappiness are the only valuable aspects of the consciousness (= I = the individual). Disproving this requires at minimum the detection of one single case of something else than happiness that the consciousness wishes to achieve and which is not simultaneously a means in the pursuit of creating self-happiness or avoiding self-unhappiness. As long as this has not been detected, self-happiness is considered factually as the only value.

 

Since perception of happiness has value, more happiness has even greater value, and the ultimate value of the consciousness is the maximization of the sum of the perceptions of happiness during the life span; or more precisely to maximize the surplus of happiness (eventually to minimize the deficit) where the surplus of happiness = S(happiness) - S(unhappiness). When this book speaks of “maximization of happiness” or “the sum of happiness” etc., it always refers to S(happiness) - S(unhappiness). Some religious persons may include “eternal life” in the concept “life span”, but Rational Gaudism does not consider life after death a part of the reality.

       The reality (all human consciousnesses included) is a tool for a given individual to achieve happiness. The reality itself is irrelevant; it is the reality's ability to influence my sensation of happiness that is relevant for me. But objects in the reality (both the outer reality and the consciousness) are important tools for producing happiness for the individual consciousness. The reality is a “necessary evil” for a consciousness to realize happiness. Each fermion and boson or whatever collection of these are considered to be tools for maximizing my self-happiness. I respect that all other individuals regard the same fermions and bosons in the same way.

       Imagine that humans were able to produce happiness without a life. Then life would be unnecessary. Muslims believe that a man produces happiness in Heaven after death if he sacrifices his life in “Holy war”. Buddhists wish to avoid unhappiness by annihilating in Nirvana. In the world of reality neither Heaven nor Nirvana exist, but atheistic death does exist.

 

If (maintenance of) life had been more important than happiness, it would have been rational to maintain life in a situation where the rest of the life is expected to give larger deficit of happiness (= surplus of unhappiness) than death. Based on the thought that one's own experiences of happiness are the only valuable aspects in the Universe, maintenance of life can never be more important than generating happiness / avoiding unhappiness during the life span. But producing relative happiness (avoiding unhappiness) may be more important than maintaining life if one realistically may expect to generate major deficit of happiness in the remaining lifetime. An example is a 12 weeks old embryo having defects that will imply a hell of pain after birth; then abortion (total life happiness = 0) is a better alternative than to be born (total life happiness strongly negative).

 

 

2.3  Supernatural reality

 

Does anything exist in addition to the outer reality and the consciousness of individuals? Superior animals have consciousness, but this is already included under “individual consciousnesses”. There are probably a lot of objects in the outer reality that have not yet been transferred to any individual consciousness (e.g. many planets probably exist in orbits around distant stars without having been discovered yet), but these are included in the concept “outer reality”. What about God, Satan, goblins, fairies, effect of homeopathy beyond the placebo effect, the fourth space dimension, the existence of the consciousness independent of the body etc.? As long as there are no scientific evidences for such supernatural elements they are supposed to not be existent (see Section 9.2). Rational Gaudism will accept the existence of such elements if the hypothesis of their existence has resisted sufficiently intense attempts of scientific dethronement (see Section 1.5.3). According to prominent physicists, experiments will be carried out in order to test the hypothesis of the existence of a fourth space dimension (MacRobert, 2003; Steinhardt & Turok, 2002). If the hypothesis of the existence of this new dimension resists sufficiently intense attempts of dethronement in the future, Rational Gaudism will accept the fourth space dimension as a part of the reality.

 

When facing observations, a waste number of hypotheses will be able to explain the observed data. A scientific approach means to adopt the explanatory model that explains the observations by the least help of far-fetched auxiliary hypotheses (see Section 1.5.2 , 1.5.3 and 1.5.4). If I observe something that clearly looks like a car, this observation can be explained by the object being an elephant, but my senses are for some reason distorted in such a way that it appears falsely as a car. The alternative hypothesis is that the object is a car. The scientific approach is to adopt the hypothesis that the object is a car. Rationally, it is difficult to assign any respect to the elephant hypothesis. Similarly, the reality presents a large number of observations that nowadays very well can be scientifically explained (the age of Earth, evolution, laws and rules in society etc.). Explaining this with the existence of a god is as epistemologically dubious as explaining a clear cut observation of a car by being an elephant. Epistemologically regarded neither the elephant hypothesis nor the religion hypothesis deserves serious consideration.

      Religion and science are basically preoccupied with the same interest: presenting models for explaining phenomena of the reality. Religion contra atheism is basically a question whether we are to keep tight to a beloved hypothesis which is strongly depending on many far-fetched ad hoc hypotheses, or if we are to adopt hypotheses which do not need far-fetched auxiliary hypotheses as crutches for avoiding falsification (see also Section 9.2.1). By using an epistemological process that accepts far-fetched ad hoc hypotheses you will achieve the results of your whims and hopes. It will tell something about the content of your consciousness, but hardly anything about the reality outside your own skull, i.e. pure subjectivism.

 

Let us consider the hypothesis 1: “God exists”. In order to avoid direct falsification this hypothesis has to be supported by very active use of far-fetched ad hoc hypotheses (see Section 9.2.1). Consider a “hypothesis 2” in the regular scientific area, and let us imagine that this hypothesis has to be supported as intensely by ad hoc hypotheses as hypothesis 1. Then the product of the well-foundedness of the auxiliary hypotheses is extremely small. If it shall be meaningful to talk about “falsification” (for hypotheses with an infinite observation basis), we have to set a lower limit for this product where the hypothesis in practice is considered falsified if the product falls behind this limit (see Section 1.5.6); the alternative is to drop all talk of “falsification” and only consider “dethronement”. Hypothesis 2 would undoubtedly have been described as falsified – especially if there are more well-founded alternative hypotheses. Thus, hypothesis 1 will also necessarily be considered falsified, i.e. the hypothesis of the existence of God has been scientifically falsified de facto.

 

If a scientist is religious, that is one contra-argument against his professional quality (but other arguments may exist pointing in his favor). He keeps on to a beloved hypothesis (God's existence) that depends on many and far-fetched ad hoc hypotheses for avoiding falsification in spite of the fact that the observations of the reality very well can be explained by hypotheses that do not need far-fetched auxiliary hypotheses as crutches. When a scientist uses such dubious hypothesis adoption on one area, it is possible that it originates from a bad scientific attitude that also can infect his scientific work. The validity of this argument is stronger the more fundamentalist he is, and may vary with his area of science.

 

MacRobert AM. A Cyclic Univerce? Sky & Telescope. July 23, 2003

 

Steinhardt PJ, Turok N. A Cyclic Model of the Universe. Science (2002) 296, 1436-1439

 

 

2.4  Identity and nature

 

A specific stone (a collection of fermions and bosons that e.g. is hard) is a stone (fits the concept “stone”) because it has the attributes satisfying the implicit definition of the concept “stone”. We observe a stone falling towards Earth. This is an observation and according to axiom 1, this event has existence in the outer reality. Why does the stone fall towards Earth? It is explained by the well-justified hypothesis that the large mass of Earth attracts the stone with a gravitational force with acceleration = 9, 81 m/s2. The specific stone is a collection of fermions and bosons that had those attributes needed for falling towards Earth (at least at that particular moment when it actually fell); that is a fact from axiom 1. All other collections of fermions and bosons belonging to the concept “stone” have observationally been shown to fall towards Earth (as far as I am concerned). Theoretically, the principle of induction does not give a 100% guarantee that all collections of fermions and bosons belonging to the concept “stone” will fall towards Earth (unless “falling towards Earth” is taken to be one of the elements in the definition of the concept “stone”).

 

A fundamental philosophical question: Does a stone have a nature, an identity? We cannot be 100% sure of that unless “the nature” of the stone is included in the definition of the concept “stone”:

 

 

1)

Considering a stone, we can predict (with high degree of statistical certainty) that the stone will behave in a particular way (i.e. fall towards Earth) because on beforehand a hypothesis has been induced (from knowledge from the behavior of other stones) stating that all stones behave this way, and this hypothesis has to an extreme extent resisted intense attempts of dethronement). The hypothesis may be formed as follows: “it is the nature of stones to fall towards Earth”.

 

2)

A stone is dropped from a height of one meter and we observe that the stone falls towards Earth. We repeat the experiment 10000 times with the same stone and the result is always the same. Then we can induce the hypothesis that it is the nature of this stone to fall towards Earth. Since the hypothesis is produced by induction, we can theoretically not exclude that the stone will rise into the sky at the next experiment, but the probability is extremely small (perhaps something like 10-300). Still, it is very rational to adopt the hypothesis that the nature of this stone is to fall towards Earth.

 

3)

Considering a particular stone. We can predict the behavior of the stone (or its particular qualities) because the actual behavior is included in the definition of the concept “stone”. If “falling towards Earth” is included in the definition of the concept “stone”, the particular stone is guaranteed to fall towards Earth. If the object was not to fall towards Earth, it was no stone after all.

 

Rational Gaudism does not consider “A=A” as an axiom but as a hypothesis with more or less uncertainty attached depending on the object under examination. Generally, an object in the outer reality may be estimated to have an identity (a nature) at a particular level of certainty if we have performed a corresponding lot of adequate observations (see Section 1.5.2). Rational Gaudism states that most objects have an identity (nature) since the uncertainty often can be disregarded for all practical purposes. We may also choose to give a concept an identity/nature by including the actual qualities into the definition of the concept, but such ad hoc definitions will often be somewhat dubious epistemology.

 

Considering the question whether all events have a cause, the answer is a consequence of the text above: when observing an event H, we may say that H is caused by X with probability S. A stone's fall towards Earth is with extremely large probability caused by the gravitational force of the Earth's mass pulling the stone towards Earth.

 

 

2.4.1  The fundamental nature of different objects

 

A stone's nature is to be influenced by chaos and physical laws (e.g. the gravitational force) or by a man or an animal moving it. Other non-living inorganic and organic objects have the similar nature.

      The evolution of life began with an aqueous soup of organic molecules that gradually started to replicate. After millions of years the environment made it favorable to form a cell membrane to protect the replicating molecules. In this way, the first cells originated and through “survival of the fittest” gradually more complex life forms were developed. The maximum of the evolution is Homo sapiens – the modern human being.

      Lower life forms: Plants' nature is to use biochemical processes for growth and multiplying. The plant is a medium used by the DNA molecule in the pursuit of maximization of the total mass of DNA in the world. Bacteria, virus, fungi and lower multicell animals like jelly-fishes, starfish and sea urchins have a similar nature. The perception of happiness and unhappiness is not the nature of these lower organisms' nature.

      Mean advanced animals: These animals (fish, amphibians) are driven by instincts, have no or negligible ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness, and have no consciousness (Cabanac, 1999; Rose et al., 2014). It is believed that the first amniotes (tetrapod vertebrates that have terrestrially adapted eggs) were the first animals to have the ability to experience happiness/unhappiness; i.e. they had consciousness (Cabanac et al., 2009). The first amniotes arose in the evolution 325 million years ago. Thus, it is assumed that the evolutionary distinction between happiness-perceiving and non-happiness-perceiving animals goes between amphibians and reptiles. This means that animals that are amphibians or evolutionary more primitive than these are non-happiness-perceiving, while animals that are evolutionary more advanced than the amphibians, are happiness-perceiving. An exception from this is probably octopus, which seems to have signs of consciousness (Mather, 2008).

      Superior animals (mammals, birds and reptiles) have consciousnesses with different degrees of complexity. These animals have individual pursuit of happiness and avoidance of unhappiness in the instant moment as their objectives. It is believed that reptiles have weaker and more primitive ability to this than mammals and birds. It is the genetic instincts and the taught habits that tell the animal how to obtain feelings of happiness and how to avoid unhappiness. When the animal uses its instincts and taught habits, the result will point towards the long-term survival of the species within the present external environment and towards the maximization of the total mass of DNA in the world. Happiness is mainly represented by sexual pleasure while unhappiness most often is represented by hunger, fear (e.g. for being attacked by other animals) or physical pain. Pursuit of happiness and avoidance of unhappiness in the instant moment through their genetic instincts is the fundamental nature of superior animals.

      The human beings have the most advanced consciousness. The only objective of the individual is to maximize his self-happiness during his life span. The human way of doing this is to think and then choose to perform those actions that are expected to maximize their self-happiness during their life spans, i.e. through a rational process (see also Section 4.1). The use of this rational process will not necessarily maximize the number of individuals – even if it historically has done so. Pursuit of happiness and avoidance of unhappiness by the use of rationality in the life-long perspective is the human nature.

 

 

 

Non-life

Lower life forms

Mean advanced animals

Superior animals

Human beings

Chaos and physical laws

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Biochemical processes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Happiness

No

No

Insignificant

Yes

Yes

Free will

No

No

No

Insignificant

Yes

Rationality

No

No

No

No

Yes

 

 

Cabanac M, Cabanac AJ, Parent A. The emergence of consciousness in phylogeny. Behav Brain Res (2009) 198: 267-272

 

Cabanac M. Emotion and phylogeny. Jpn J Physiol (1999) 49: 1-10

 

Rose JD, Arlinghaus R, Cooke SJ, Diggles BK, Sawynok W, Stevens ED, Wynne CDL. Can fish really feel pain? Fish and Fisheries (2014) 15, 97-133

 

Mather JA. Cephalopod consciousness: behavioural evidence. Conscious Cogn. (2008) 17(1):37-48

 

 

2.5  Free will

 

Free will is the ability of a consciousness to choose between different alternatives of action, and according to axiom 2 the human consciousness has this ability.

     If assertions about the outer reality (knowledge) arrive as a consequence of bosons and fermions interacting passively with my consciousness without “I” considering and choosing to reject the bad ideas in favor of the good ones, all alternative hypotheses (assertions) about a phenomenon will basically have the same credibility. Explanation models that have existed through human beings' evolutionary period, will mainly converge towards being good means in our species' pursuit of survival, but will not necessarily estimate “the truth” (i.e. “Ding an sich”). But since we have lived and functioned evolutionarily in the world of reality, is it possible that a few simple evolutionarily tested explanation models may estimate “the truth” anyway even without the presumption of “free will”. Explanation models not having lived through significant parts of human beings' evolutionary history or not having relevance for our survival, will be completely meaningless.

     The probability of obtaining success with our actions is limited by the conditions of reality. Some actions are less probable to be successful than others. This fact will influence the actual choice of action, but it does not prevent the consciousness from choosing to try to perform an apparently impossible action. This refers to a real, genuine attempt where the performer of action actually believes that he can succeed (and not a false attempt).

     Natural compulsion is conditions in the reality that make certain consequences and corresponding probabilities strongly advantageous for choosing a specific alternative of action (i.e. that humans have to works for their survival). Of course, the natural compulsion will influence the consciousness when making choices of action, but the natural compulsion does not change the fundamental qualities of the consciousness, and free will is such a quality. If you are to remove the free will, you have to hit a person's head so hard that he obtains a severe brain damage destroying completely/partly the consciousness. The fact that we “have to” work (in order to survive) is completely natural and does no way mean that the consciousness is so destroyed that it is not capable of carrying out choices between alternatives of actions and thus, the free will is not reduced.

 

 

2.5.1  The reality limits the realism of actions but not the free will

 

I want to fly, but no other human being has ever performed a flight with his own limbs. But I have free will in the sense that I can try to perform those actions needed for flying (gene manipulation perhaps?). I want to run 100 meter at 9 seconds, but no man has ever run so fast. But I have free will to try to run that fast. A son of a violent homeless father has free will to try to become a respectable citizen, and that is realistically not impossible. But the probability of being a homeless person himself is larger than the probability for the son of a doctor to be the same.

       A person with a desire of traveling to a distant star can theoretically try to perform this alternative of action tomorrow. But because of technological limitations in the present reality, we can (for all practical purposes) with certainty can say that he will not succeed. This knowledge makes it extremely unlikely that he will try. Theoretically, this person may try to change the future reality by inventing technology that increases the probability of a successful star journey.

       A woman is being raped by a huge, strong man. The woman understands with her rational mind that if she could hit him into fainting, she would avoid the very unpleasant experience of a rape. She can use her consciousness to choose to try to hit him into fainting, but for all practical purposes we can for certain say that she will not succeed because of her physically weakness. The present reality limits her realistic chance to succeed. This knowledge makes it unlikely that she will try. In the future she may try to change the reality by exercising karate and thereby having realistic expectations to knock out a future rapist.

       A third person wants to buy a new Ferrari, but he does not have enough money, and the bank is not willing to give him a loan. But he can try to haggle about the price to $20 and thereby buy the car. But the present reality limits his realistic chance to succeed with the car purchase. This knowledge makes it extremely unlikely that he will try. But in the future he may work harder or save more money and thereby change the reality making a Ferrari purchase more realistic.

      Some parts of the reality can easily be changed by a person, but other parts of the reality can not realistically be changed by the individual. The present reality experienced by an individual is a result of external circumstances and earlier choices made by the individual.

 

The individual human being has unlimited free will in the sense that he always can choose to try to perform whatever alternative of action that he is able to think up, but the present reality will set limitations for what kind of action alternatives he realistically can succeed with, and this will influence the choice of action. In this way, a predisposing determinism exists accompanying our free will (see Section 2.5.4).

      Strictly speaking, it is impossible “to choose to perform an action”. The choice of action is made in the consciousness, and the consciousness can “choose to try to perform an action”. Just after the choice of action (we can change our mind until a few nanoseconds before performing the action) follows “the attempt of performing the action”. The attempt is carried out by the nerve system and the muscles, and by the time it will be apparent if the attempt was successful.

 

 

2.5.2  Animals and “free will”

 

When the lion “Simba” observes a zebra, an instinct tells him that it is food. Simba has observed that his parents have relatively short distance to the zebra when attacking. Repeated observations of this kind in combination with own experiences have taught Simba that he needs to have short distance to the zebra before attacking. This wisdom refines Simba's hunting qualities, originating from the genetic instinct, and he becomes a better hunter compared to an untrained lion. Simba has to evaluate if he is to attack when he is 10, 15 or 20 meters away from the zebra. There is no genetic automatic telling him to start the attack at a distance of 12.37 meters.

 

In this respect the lion has a certain choice. Thus, the lion's consciousness has a little ability to choose between alternatives of action; a little degree of free will. But the choices are strongly limited by the fact that the lion has an approximately zero-dimensional time perspective for its choices of action; i.e. the lion can only choose between alternatives of action in the pursuit of maximization of happiness and avoidance of unhappiness in the present; long-term evaluation in the lifelong perspective is not a part of the lion's nature. Thus, it is impossible for the lion to initiate a technological evolution since it requires advanced thinking beyond the instant moment (plus handiness and language). The lion cannot disobey its instincts, only evaluate which instinct it is to follow and against what in the pursuit of maximization of happiness or minimization of unhappiness in the instant moment. The lion does not have the ability to evaluate if it will produce more happiness in the lifelong time perspective by omitting to obey the instincts (e.g. by starting to grow corn in stead of hunting zebras). The lion can never make the choice of “trying to travel to the Moon” because its genome implies so low brain capacity that the lion never will be able to understand neither moon, nor rocket engine nor landing vehicle since this requires long-term intelligent thinking both in the future and the presence. Besides, handiness and language must probably be present in front of an intelligent mutation in order for the mutation to be promoted in the evolution – an intelligent brain is useless if you do not have practical skills to carry out the technological progresses thought out by the brain. Theoretically, man has the ability (freedom) to choose to try to perform any alternative of action that the human consciousness can imagine, and which the consciousness genuinely believes that the individual can succeed with (even if the probability of success sometimes may be infinitesimal). Considering a hypothetical alternative of action that the human consciousness is not able to imagine (but we do not know if such actions exist) the human does not have free will to choose this alternative. The corresponding reasoning applies to a lion, but we (humans) know that there are a lot of alternatives of action that a lion cannot imagine – those alternatives of actions which require advanced evaluations beyond the instant moment and which thus are not implied by its instincts.

 

Rational Gaudism assumes that many animals with nerve system exceeding a certain limit have a certain, but very little ability to choose between alternatives of action, and this ability decreases proportionally with the inferiority of the consciousness. It is assumed to be a very moderate increase in “free will” from birds to chimpanzees, but an extreme increase in “free will” from chimpanzees to human beings. Animals do not have significant degree of “free will” since their consciousnesses are so limited that they are predetermined to be slaves of their instincts; they have only insignificant degree of “free will” in the sense that they can choose which instinct they are to follow and what to direct their instinct against in the present (will a hungry and potent male lion choose to have sex with a female lion or will it hunt down the zebra when the two animals appear simultaneously for the male lion). Animals' learning rule is quite automatic. There is no intelligence built in, and no significant degree of “free will” that guides learning. The rule just says that if activity in one neuron is soon followed by activity in a second neuron, then the connection from the first to the second should be strengthened (Biegler, 2004). A being has significant degree of “free will” if it is capable of carrying on a technological evolution and thereby liberate itself from its natural instincts. Chimps have been shown to make primitive spears for killing their preys, and thus, these primates have almost a tiny “significant degree of free will” (Pruetz & Bertolani, 2007). Beings living exclusively at the automatic instinctive level without perceiving happiness/unhappiness (amphibians and lower) are not supposed to have any “free will” at all.

 

Biegler R. Network models of memory. NTNU Lecture. (2004) Spring, pp 2

 

Pruetz JD, Bertolani P. Savanna Chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes verus, Hunt with Tools. Current Biology (2007) 17, 412–417

 

 

2.5.3  Man cannot choose his own values

 

Value is what a consciousness wants to achieve. Experiencing happiness is the only value. Considering a consciousness with the ability to make choices of action, value is what the organism wants to achieve with its actions. Accordingly, perception of happiness is the only motive power for human actions. We are talking about perception of happiness for the individual who performs the action because it is the individual who is the only human element capable of perceiving happiness; the nation, the race, the family or the social class does not have the ability to perceive happiness or unhappiness. If e.g. the nation had been an element capable of perceiving happiness, producing happiness for the nation would have been a motive power for action in itself. In the same way as a muscle cell is a slave for the human consciousness for contributing to the consciousness' happiness, the individual man would be a slave in the nation with the job of serving the nation with happiness.

 

Having made a choice of action confirms that in the very moment before carrying out the action, the performer believed that no other alternative of action was better fitted in the strategy for achieving the ultimate value (= maximizing of the perceptions of happiness during the life span). The individual human being is predetermined to try to maximize the sum of his own perceptions of happiness during his life span. We may say that “pursuit of happiness in the life-long perspective” is the fundamental human “instinct”. The individual cannot act in another way than what he believes will obtain the ultimate value, but both subjectively (in the future) and intersubjectively (both in the moment of action choice and in the future) the action may be considered to be inferiorly adequate (see chapter 3). Thus, the individual human cannot choose his own values, but he has “free will” to evaluate what tools/means will be best suited in the strategy towards the ultimate value.

      The individual man can only perform self-motivated actions. Self-motivation is an attribute of the fundamental human nature and not an ethical dimension. There are 3 types of actions: primary, secondary and tertiary self-motivated actions. All these types of actions can be rational or irrational to different degrees. Since the description of the self-motivation interacts significantly with the ethics, self-motivation is considered closely under “Ethics” in chapter 3.

 

 

2.5.4  Predisposing determinism

 

A person A is put into prison by a totalitarian regime and cannot be blamed for his stay in prison. His consciousness has the same qualities as before he was imprisoned; the ability to choose between alternatives of action (free will) included. Thus, he has the ability to make the following choice of action: “I will try to perform those actions needed for escaping from jail.” The probability of success is perhaps small but not zero since there are several examples of escaped prisoners. Given this situation, is it appropriate to say the following? “Shut up and do not complain! You have free will to choose to escape. It is your own fault that you are still in prison.”

      Another person B has been born into extreme poverty in the ghetto with bad parents and bad friends. During his youth, formally until he comes of age, person B is not responsible for living in these surroundings. His consciousness has the same qualities as if he had lived in a royal castle; the ability to choose between alternatives of action (free will) included. Thus, he has the ability to make the following choice of action: “I will try to perform those actions needed for escaping from the ghetto and become a successful businessman.” The probability of success is perhaps small, but not zero, since there are several examples of businessmen originating from the ghetto. Given this situation, is it appropriate to say the following? “Shut up and do not complain! You have free will to choose to work yourself out of the ghetto. It is your own fault that you are still living in the ghetto.”

       As these two examples show, it is not sufficiently to refer to the free will of the humans when evaluating if a person is to be blamed (or praised) for his own life situation or not. But oppositely, if the humans did not have free will at all, no individuals would ever be to blame (or praised) for anything.

      To evaluate if an individual is to be blamed or not for his life situation, Rational Gaudism introduces the concept “predisposing determinism”. This concept is defined as “the influence that (elements in) the reality performs on the choice of action of a consciousness”. Thus, a predisposing determinant is an element of reality influencing the choice of action of a consciousness.

 

An individual is predetermined to try to perform alternatives of action (H) in the pursuit of maximization of his sum of self-happiness during his life span from (1) the probabilities (S) for being hit by the consequences of elements in the reality and (2) the value (V) that these consequences are expected to have for him during his life span (value = the ability of the consequences to influence his long-term sum of happiness); for more on S- and V-values see Section 3.1.

      An individual, P, faces a choice of action. For each alternative of action, Hi (i = 1,2,..., ∞), the possible consequences are Kj (j = 1,2,..., ∞), and for each Kj the corresponding Sij and Vj exist. For each alternative of action the same series of theoretically possible consequences with the same values exists, but the probability for the consequences to take place depends on the choice of action. Sij and Vj are metaphysical parameters with existence in the reality, but their exact values are hidden for us. The reality directs its predisposing determinism through these parameters. The reality has a determining effect of   on the alternative of action Hn. The larger positive value, the larger determining effect the reality has on individual P to carry out Hn. Examples of elements with low determining effects on particular alternatives of action is “stay in prison” and “living in the ghetto” mentioned in the examples above; “winning $2 million in a lottery” has a high determining effect for buying a new car.

      The individual consciousness has the ability (free will) to evaluate the ability (Vj) of the consequences to influence his sum of self-happiness during his life span, and the probability (Sij) for consequence Kj to occur for each alternative of action (Hi). And the individual consciousness is predetermined to try to find the values of Sij and Vj. The estimates actually found by the individual consciousness are named sij and vj.

      The parameters for Sij and Vj are metaphysically given and not under our control (see Section 3.1). Thus, it is the differences | SijVj – sijvj| that the individual consciousness is responsible for, and these differences are the fundament settling to what extent we are to be blamed (or praised) for the consequences of our choices of action. The lower difference, the better job is performed by the consciousness. But when the consciousness faces a choice of action, not only the potentially chosen alternative of action Hn is to be evaluated; all alternatives of action Hi (i = 1,2,..., ∞) have to be evaluated. Therefore, the consciousness is assigned the following total blame/credit for a choice of action:

 

 

The rest is assigned to other humans and/or coincidences (chaos).

 

Example: Person A is imprisoned and he is to stay in jail for one more year. The fact that he imprisoned is a part of the reality influencing the probability of performing alternatives of action and realistically, the imprisonment excludes a successful journey to Mallorca next year. The probability (S1) for a Mallorca-trip-attempt to fail is very large and the value (V1) of the consequences of such a failure is expected to be strongly negative. The probability (S2) for succeeding escaping to Mallorca on vacation is very small and the value (V2) of the consequences is expected to be moderately positive. The stay in prison has a very high determining effect (S1.V1 + S2.V2) on “not attempting to travel to Mallorca” the next year.

      Theoretically, he has free will to choose si and vi in such a way that S(si.vi) becomes favorable for the escaping attempt. But if he really makes this choice, it is because he believes that he has found the best values for Si and Vi, but in that case his consciousness has performed bad thinking.

 

2.5.4.1  Time perspective

 

The reality can have so low determining effect on Hn within a time perspective of “a” time units that Hn (realistically) is excluded. But within a time perspective of “b” (b>a) time units, the reality can have so much larger predisposing effect that Hn becomes a realistic alternative of action. If we consider a time perspective of 0 time units (t = 0), the reality excludes all alternatives of action with 100 % certainty. When t = 0.0000001 seconds, for all practical purposes the reality will exclude all alternatives of action. When t = 1 week, the reality excludes a series of alternatives of action, whilst others may be realistic to perform.

 

 


 

3.  Ethics

 

 

Morality is a set of norms and principles for the guiding of human actions. Ethics is the branch of philosophy that is occupied with discovering and defining such sets of norms and principles. To make morality meaningful for this definition, the following fundamental question is crucial: What is the purpose of the actions of the individual? Having defined this purpose, it is meaningful for ethics to ask which norms and principles (morality) humans are to base their actions on in order to achieve this purpose in the best possible way.

 

 

3.1  Metaphysical fundament for rational ethics

 

If considerations of morality contra immorality are to be meaningful, the consciousness needs to have the ability to choose between alternatives of action (free will). The free will of humans is stated in axiom 2. The only valuable aspect in the Universe is happiness (see Section 2.2.2.2). The individual is the only human element with happiness-perceiving consciousness with ability to make choices of action; the nation, the race or the social class does not have such consciousness. The purpose of an individual human being is to maximize his self-happiness during his life span. The moral principles/norms are to guide an individual to maximize his sum of self-happiness during his life span. The individual is predetermined to try to achieve this ultimate value, but the norms and principles to use in this pursuit, are not predetermined (see Section 2.5.3).

 

When an individual is to make a choice of action Qu, the individual has to evaluate what kinds of effects the actual alternatives of action Hi (i = 1,2,..., ∞) may have on the sum of self-happiness during his life span. He has to ask the following question: “what consequences may be expected as a result of the alternative of action, Hi?” and “which value (= degree of happiness) may these consequences be expected to have for me in the life-long perspective?” and “what is the probability for the consequences to occur?” We sum up these factors in one word: the motive power for choosing that particular alternative of action.

 

For each alternative of action Hi (i = 1,2,..., ∞) the same possible consequences Kj exists (j = 1,2,..., ∞), and for each Kj the corresponding Sij (the real probability, “Ding an sich”, for the consequence Kj to occur by carrying out the alternative of action Hi – i.e. the probability that the performer of action realistically ought to predict at the time point for the choice of action) and Vj (the value of consequence Kj for the action performer that he optimally ought to foresee at the time point of the action choice – not what he believes about the value on beforehand). Even if we had known all factors influencing an action choice, we had at the time point for the choice of action not been able to calculate the consequences with absolute certainty because of quantum mechanical uncertainty effects. At that time point the consequences are not present as “Ding an sich”. Additionally, the performer of action can, realistically considered, never gain knowledge of all factors influencing during an action choice. Therefore, we have to consider the probabilities Sij.

 

From the statements above the expected happiness effect (Rui) of choosing to perform the alternative Hi in connection with the choice Qu is defined by:

 

 

when we assume that the alternative of action has an infinite amount of theoretically possible consequences (for very many of these consequences the probability of occurrence will for practical purposes be zero, and therefore, in practice the alternative Hi has a finite number of realistic, possible consequences).

 

The performer of action will always choose the alternative of action that he believes to have the highest value of R. An alternative of action Hx exists (”Ding an sich”) whose expected happiness effect, Rux, is larger than or equal to Rui for all i = 1,2,...., ∞. The performer of action wants to find this alternative of action Hx. He does not know Vj and Sij and therefore, he has to estimate these values as close as possible to the real ones with basis in the existing reality at the time point for the choice of action Qu with the objective of finding Hx. The values that he finally reaches are denoted vj and sij (Ding für mich). Therefore, the motive power for choosing an alternative of action Hi for i = 1,2,...., ∞ is:

 

 

He will choose the alternative of action Hy that gives the largest M-value (Muy) (motive power), and at the time point of the choice of action the performer believes that Hy= Hx. If there exist other action alternatives that also come out with an M-value of Muy, the consciousness draws lots among these.

 

The quality of the performer's thinking in the evaluation of the alternative of action Hi in connection with the choice of action Qu is given by:

 

and the less this difference is, the better thinking has been carried out. But since Sij and Vj are “Ding an sich”-values, we may very seldom with absolute certainty calculate this difference (except in simple game theory).

      But the performer is not only to evaluate one alternative of action, but all Hi for i = 1,2,...., ∞. Therefore, the quality of the performer's thinking in connection with the whole choice of action Qu is given by:

 

 

The less Gu, the better quality of thinking has been carried out in connection with the choice of action Qu.

      When we are to evaluate to what extent a person has made a rational choice of action, we have to base the evaluation on consequences that the performer of action realistically ought to predict at the time point for the choice of action and not the consequences that the action really implied. If a person has performed an optimal evaluation in order to find the alternative of action Hx with the highest value of R, he has per definition made a maximally rational choice of action.

 

The individual will make very many choices of action through his life (the number is denoted “n”). When he consequently through his life makes optimal evaluations for finding the alternatives of action with largest R-value for each choice of action, he has a maximally rational action pattern (see Section 3.3 and 3.4). Glife is defined as the sum of all misjudgments connected to all action choices during his whole life. The less Glife, the better quality of total thinking has been carried out through his life:

 

 

All humans are predetermined to try to choose alternatives of action in such a way that Glife becomes as small as possible (see Section 2.5.3).

 

 

3.1.1  Rational Gaudist ethics contra philosophically “correct” ethics

 

The ethical principle of Rational Gaudism is to maximize the sum of self-happiness of the individual during his life span by minimizing the value of Glife according to the principles described in Section 3.3 and summed up in Section 3.4, which fundamentally have the same content as the principles that natural science is built on (see Section 1.5). Actions performed on the basis of these norms and principles are moral according to Rational Gaudist ethics. You may be lucky and make more total happiness in life by using the principles of other philosophies, but the ethical guidelines of Rational Gaudism will maximize the probability of minimizing Glife and thereby maximizing the probability of creating as much self-happiness as possible during life.

      This may be compared with a ski jumping competition in Planica. All the jumpers want to jump 250 meters, but they may have different strategies for reaching this objective. A good coach, good training based of their own and others' experiences with ski jumping, and implications of scientific theories for aerodynamics will be important elements in a rational strategy for maximizing the probability for jumping 250 meters. Other strategies may involve trusting in Mrs Fortuna and advantageous wind conditions, prayers to God or getting drunk for feeling as a World Champion before jumping. A participant may win the competition by using such strategies, but the probability of success is significantly higher by using the rational strategy.

 

In this book the concept “rational action” is used for describing an action that is based on good thinking. A maximum (100 %) rational choice of action occurs when a person has performed an optimal evaluation in order to find the alternative of action with the highest expected happiness effect (R value). Thus, actions may have different degrees of rationality. The term “irrational action” is used for describing an action that is based on inferior thinking. A maximum irrational choice of action occurs when a person do not think at all when making a choice of action, e.g. acts wildly after having used narcotics. Thus, actions may have different degrees of irrationality.

 

“Correct” philosophers claim a rational action pattern to be the following:

 

 

(1)

Examine if there exists an ethically mandatory action alternative associated with the present situation of action choice; if so, this has to be promptly chosen without further evaluation, and (2) and (3) do not come into effect.

 

(2)

Ask if the alternative of action is ethically forbidden – usually from an altruistic moral code. If so, you are not to proceed to (3), but this alternative of action is to be discarded. If being ethically permitted, you are to proceed to (3).

 

(3)

Examine if it is value-profitable compared to other alternatives of action from a probability-consequence-value evaluation (see Section 3.1). If so, this alternative of action is to be chosen.

 

But the question is as follows: Why are you to accept the ethical command if rejecting it is significantly more value-profitable. What is the motive power to accept the ethical command? Is it the fear for punishment (from God, authorities, relatives, friends) if you do not accept it? If so, this is included in (3) and does not concern the non-value-profitable ethical evaluation in (1) and (2); thus, this explanation is not good enough.

      Then it seems obvious to follow Kant: you are to accept ethical commands through an inner duty. But at one or another time point you have to have implemented this duty in your consciousness – eventually under (often strong) influence of parents, authorities, priests etc.

      Next question follows: Why are you to accept the implementation of this duty in your consciousness (you have “free will” to choose to not implement it or to throw it out – even if the latter may be somewhat difficult)? What is the motive power? Actually, the last question has only been delayed in time. The only rational answer is that the motive power to accept this is that you expect to produce significantly more values during your life by implementing the duties than by not implementing them. Then a lot of duties ought not to be implemented, namely the irrational duties of Section 3.9.1. Thus, you ought to implement those – and only those – senses of duty that maximize the probability of creating as much value as possible in the long-term perspective. But then we return to the result that the motive power is included in (3), and consequently only (3) is really relevant.

 

The only logical approach is to fuse (1), (2) and (3), and stating that the ethical norm for a human being is to be guided towards the maximization of his life-total value profit (and experiencing happiness is the only real value). You may choose between several moral codices. The rational choice has to be to choose the codex giving the highest probability for maximizing the lifelong sum of happiness; i.e. Rational Gaudist moral code.

 

 

3.2  Moral and immoral actions

 

If an individual performs an action without making a good evaluation (see Section 3.1.1), he has performed an inferiorly rational action. Such an action may of course imply positive consequences for the person in the future. But the probability for such an action pattern to maximize the sum of happiness of the person during his life span is very small. Such an action pattern is per definition immoral. If an individual carries out an action choice without thinking, he has performed some thinking at one or another time point before the action choice anyway (except for genuine instinctive or reflexive actions); he has thought out the conclusion that he will not think in that situation of action choice (e.g. thinking may seem too laborious). Thus, even a seemingly thoughtless action is to a certain extent based on evaluations by thinking. Nevertheless, we choose to define an irrational action to be an action that is based on inferior thinking. Absence of thinking may often be a bad choice, but if you suddenly have a lion in front of you, please do not sit down and think, but follow your escape instinct!

       There is a difference of degree in bad evaluation, and the poorer evaluation, the larger potential for unhappiness. Thus, if it may be recognized that a person made a somewhat poor evaluation (regarded from the reality existing in connection to the choice of action) he has performed a somewhat immoral action (from 0 % immoral to 100% immoral). See also Section 3.5 and 9.3.

 

At the first glance, one could perhaps believe that the previous text in this chapter implies the immorality of performing an action with lower long-term expected happiness than the alternative actions (i.e. that obtains a lower M-value than the alternatives). But if the performer of action carries out an evaluation and chooses one alternative of action in preference to others, it proves that he believes, consciously or not, (at least at the very time point of the action choice) that the chosen action alternative is the one contributing optimally in the pursuit of maximizing the sum of self-happiness during his life span (see Section 2.5.3).

      Given the existing reality, it is impossible to choose an action alternative that the performer of action (at the time point for the choice of action) believes give lower happiness during his life span than an alternative action (see Section 2.5.4 and 3.2.1). But it may have been a severe (or less severe) miscalculation during the choice of action (e.g. perhaps the person overestimated the value of a consequence). It is miscalculations of the expected happiness effects (R-values) considered in the light of the existing reality that makes an action immoral. Lessons in the form of consequences from miscalculations are to be used as a base of experience when one later on is to make new choices of action (see Section 3.3.1). Moral or immoral action depends on the quality of the action performer's evaluation in connection to the action choice – given the existing reality of that time – in predicting the expected happiness effect (R) for himself during his life span.

 

 

3.2.1  Deliberately happiness-unprofitable action choices are impossible

 

Shortly after a choice of action a person says that he believes he would have generated greater sum of life-long happiness by performing action alternative H1 than H2, but he performed H2 anyway. Why did he choose this option? Soon after (perhaps even before, and long after) the action choice, he thought that performing H1 would be more happiness-profitable, but at the very time point of the action choice he believed that H2 was a more suitable element in his strategy to maximize his lifetime sum of happiness. The reason for this is that chronological immediate consequences tend to be assigned larger absolute values by the consciousness than what the reality may account for. To avoid such miscalculations, it is important to strengthen a number of virtues; especially self-discipline, patience, self-confidence and courage (see Section 3.3.4).

      Another person realizes over a long period of time that he may expect to significantly increase his lifetime sum of happiness if he carries out action alternative H, but he chooses to avoid performing H during this period. The reason for this may be as follows: at each possible time point for choosing H he believes that he will generate a little more lifetime sum of happiness if he delays the choice of action somewhat. Finally, the reality may have changed in such a way that he can no longer use H as a rational means to increase the life-long sum of happiness. In this example the person should seek to strengthen the virtue of determination (see Section 3.3.4).

 

 

3.2.2  Can animals act morally?

 

From the introduction of this chapter and Section 3.1 a moral code is a set of norms and principles for guiding a being's actions. To make morality meaningful for this definition, the following fundamental question is crucial: Based on its fundamental nature, what is the individual animal's purpose with its actions? Having defined this purpose, it is meaningful for the philosophy branch “ethics” to try to answer the question: “Which norms and principles (morality) are animals to base their actions on in order to achieve this purpose in the best possible way?”

      The only valuable aspect for any being is happiness. The purpose of an individual happiness-perceiving animal is to maximize its immediate self-happiness (or minimize its unhappiness) on basis of its instincts. When the philosophy branch ethics is to answer the question above, the answer is directly given by the animal's fundamental nature: The animal can only use its instincts for guiding its performance of actions – other alternatives do not exist. Accordingly, the instincts of the animal are the animal's moral guideline. Since the animal is predetermined to follow its instincts, a happiness-perceiving animal only carries out moral actions. An animal cannot perform immoral actions. An animal without the ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness has no values or objective, and the concept “morality” becomes meaningless in the same way as for a stone falling to earth.

      Superior animals have a certain, but very little, ability to choose between alternatives of action, but we denote this ability as insignificant since it is bound by the animals' instincts (see Section 2.5.2). Theoretically, we could say that such animals have a certain ability to distinguish between moral and immoral action, but for all practical purposes this ability may be denoted as insignificant.

 

 

3.2.3  Can organizations act morally?

 

Organizations (in this context companies are also included) do not have consciousness with the ability to generate self-happiness, and thus have no direct ability to act morally, but there is an indirect approach. Organizations have certain objectives, which directly or indirectly are expressed through their constitution (statutes) (se Section 5.4). These objectives express what its members, owners or founders want to achieve through the organization, which in turn are tools in the pursuit of maximization of their total sum of happiness during their lives. Thus, having ethical guidelines directly or indirectly included in the organization's constitution will be rational, and the path of thinking is that if the guidelines are followed by the employees, owners, leaders, members etc., it will optimally contribute to promote the objective. The individual participant may choose to include the ethical guidelines into his moral code, and usually he ought to do so; if he acts against them, he has committed contract breach (see Section 5.3.1). The consequences of acting against the guidelines ought to deter the individual participant from doing so; this may be direct consequences of contract breach (see Section 5.3.1.1) or different social discomfort. The individual participant may find it rational to establish a sense of duty against violating the ethical guidelines (PMI – see Section 3.9.1.1), giving him bad consciousness if he considers breaking the rules.

 

 

3.3  Concrete ethical guidelines

 

 

In Section 3.3 and 3.4 we will consider how to minimize the value of Glife (see Section 3.1) through a rational assessment of action alternatives and choices of action; to be precise, we will consider the way to act for an individual in order to maximize the probability for obtaining the largest possible sum of self-happiness during his life span (it is considered impossible to generate self-happiness after death).

 

 

3.3.1  The hypothetical deductive method as ethical guideline

 

 

3.3.1.1  Direct evaluation of probabilities and consequences

 

When a person faces a situation where a choice of action is required, he has to use both his own and other's earlier experiences as fundament for estimating the expected happiness effect (R-value) of the present alternatives of action. Based on the positivity or negativity of the values of the consequences of historically chosen alternatives of action and how often these consequences actually occurred, the performer of action can estimate the S and V values of the different consequences of the different action alternatives in the new situation of action choice. After having estimated these S and V values, he can estimate the R-values of the different alternatives of action, and then he will choose to carry out the alternative of action (Hy) with the largest estimated R-value. Thus, the hypotheses is that Syj = syj and Vj = vj for all j = 1,2,…..∞, implying that Rx = My making Hy the best alternative of action (see Section 3.1). This also implicitly induces the hypothesis that the alternative of action Hy will be the best choice in situations very similar to the present one (see also Section 3.3.1.2). The effectuation of action Hy (experiment) may be partly regarded as a testing of these hypotheses. The consequences caused by the action may partly be regarded as results that may dethrone, weaken or strengthen the hypothesis, and will also contribute to the fundament of experiences when he (and others) is to make choices of action later on. If we consider the consequences (Kj for the actual values of j) of the chosen action alternative that implied more positive effect than expected, the hypotheses will next time be that Syj = syj+∆syj, and/or that Vj = vj+∆vj. If we consider the consequences (Kj for other values of j) of the chosen action alternative that implied more negative effect than expected, the hypotheses will next time be that Syj = syj-∆syj, and/or that Vj = vj-∆vj.

 

3.3.1.2 Association-based action choices

 

When a person repetitively carries out the same type of successful action alternative as the answer on the same type of situation of action choice, the brain will later on associate this type of situation of action choice with this particular alternative of action. The more frequently the performer of action successfully carries out the same type of action alternative when facing similar situations of action choice (or observes that others do), the stronger the brain's positive association becomes between this type of situation of action choice and the actual type of action alternative. This type of action alternative, as an answer on the actual situation of action choice, has resisted significant attempts of dethronement. If the performer of action has repeated experiences with his own or other's unsuccessful actions as answers on a certain type of situation requiring choice of action, an association will occur in the brain between this type of situation of action choice and the avoidance of carrying out the actual type of action. Along with the ageing of the individual an increasing pool of such associations will be created in the brain.

      The use of such associations will give an implicit but faster evaluation of probabilities, values and consequences than if you were to estimate these directly for each possible action alternative and thus, the choices of action may (often?) be better and more rapid. The alternative of action that is estimated to have the highest R-value is stored in the brain, ready to use when its associated situation of action choice occurs and therefore, the performer of action does not need to perform significant thinking when the choice of action is to be taken. If the strength of the association multiplied by the degree of similarity with the imminent situation of action choice exceeds a given threshold, the associated action alternative is automatically performed (if the threshold is not exceeded, the method from Section 3.3.1.1 has to be applied). The task of the consciousness' free will is to estimate (based on the principles Section 3.3.1.1) where this threshold should be, and this is done prior to the imminent action choice. The better the consciousness is able to estimate this threshold value, the more moral / rational the evaluation is, and the more moral / rational is the association-based action choices that follow thereof.

      Thus, the use of association-based action choices is a rational tool in order to minimize the misjudgments, Gu, connected to the random action choice Qu (see Section 3.1), and thus, a rational means in the pursuit of minimizing Glife, which is the sum of all misjudgments connected to all action choices during the whole life. The association-based action choices may sometimes occur so extremely fast that it presents itself as intuition. If the association between the situation of action choice and the actual type of action alternative becomes extremely strong and the choice situation occurs frequently, habitual actions originate (see Section 3.7.1).

       Sometimes we may face a situation of action choice only briefly resembling situations that we earlier have attended ourselves or observed other to be in, but at the same time it is very difficult to directly estimate the values and probabilities of the consequences of the action alternatives. Then it may sometimes be better to retrieve an association from an experienced situation of action choice that is least different from the present one in stead of evaluating probabilities and consequences until you drop (if so, the threshold has to be set low). The similar approach will be even more important if we are in situations where we do not have enough time to relatively time-consuming evaluations of values and probabilities of the possible consequences of the action alternatives.

 

Actions may also be carried out as a combination of association-based actions and “evaluative actions” where a certain type of situation of action choice is associated with a little group of action alternatives. Facing a concrete situation of action choice, values and probabilities are evaluated only for the possible consequences of these action alternatives, and one alternative is chosen from this relatively small group on the basis of the principles of Section 3.1.

 

In the ways mentioned in Section 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.2 humans use the hypothetical deductive method in order to maximize the sum of happiness during their life spans. Some individuals may be lucky and produce significant amount of happiness by coincidence (e.g. find $3 million in a suitcase in the forest). But HDM is “the safe way” for each individual to maximize the happiness during their lives. In total for all humans in the long-term perspective HDM will be the best method in the pursuit of maximization of happiness.

 

 

3.3.2  Types of actions that practically always are immoral

 

Associations can be created between an action alternative with a high degree of irrationality and a type of situation of action choice. If you begin to steal in situations where it is unlikely to be discovered, you can easily develop an association between theft and situations where stealing is possible. You then obtain an action pattern of thieving. Statistically, you will be captured some time, and besides such an action pattern increases the probability of inflicting negative social sanctions. Therefore, when considering what action alternative to perform in a given situation, you must also consider the action patterns (associations) you may expect to develop – for better or worse.

 

To what extent can Rational Gaudism predict if certain types of actions are to be consequently avoided?

      Let us consider theft as an example. Each theft is performed in different situations, by different humans, with different outcome etc. But considering theft as a concept, it may be said to be immoral with high degree of objectivity (see Section 3.5). The reason for stating this is empirical testing (HDM): Considering the average change in the life-long sum of happiness that all committed burglaries have caused for the thieves themselves, we can with high degree of certainty say that this change is negative. Therefore, based on empirical testing we may say that theft has high degree of immorality at a safe level of significance. Another way of putting it is to say that the hypothesis of immorality of theft has resisted intense attempts of dethronement to such a degree that the hypothesis is promoted to a theory and therefore not subjected to further empirical testing. Similarly, murder, rape, violence, swindle and other strongly right-violating actions are immoral – in practice irrespective of the situation of action choice. They would be even more immoral if the punishment for such crimes was increased and the clear-up mechanisms were improved (see Section 3.6.1 and 6.1.4). In a similar way, e.g. drug and alcohol abuse are considered to be immoral types of actions even if they are not right-violating. One mechanism for avoiding such actions is mentioned in Section 3.9.1.1 and is called PMI (“sense of duty against irrational actions”). PMI may function as an inhibitor against negatively habitual association-based action choices.

 

When you face a choice of action and are to evaluate (“scan”) the different possible action alternatives, the following question therefore ought to be asked: Is the considered type of action consequently immoral according to the guidelines in this section? If the answer is “consequently immoral”, do not carry out the action; the situations where such actions ought to be performed are so infrequent that we ought to forget it under normal circumstances (see also Section 3.6.1). If the considered action alternative is not consequently immoral, you have to perform a through-thinking according to the principles of Section 3.3.1.

 

 

3.3.3  Tie-break

 

When a potential action performer faces a choice of action, we have pointed out that he has to consider what kinds of action alternatives that historically have given him happy consequences. He also has to consider what kinds of action alternatives that have given other people happy consequences when they have carried out similar actions, and often he has to weigh this consideration in the direction of personality resemblance with himself. In this section we will derive principles for action choices if such information is inconclusive or more or less is absent.

 

3.3.3.1  Life-elongating actions

 

The individual's own survival is a prerequisite for obtaining positive self-happiness, and the factors that increase the ability of survival may also be expected to influence positively on the life quality. Besides, you will obtain a longer life span for summing up happiness. Therefore, we deduce that life-elongating actions statistically will promote the life-long happiness, and “life-elongating” is more objective than “happiness-promoting”. The following should be done when facing a choice of action: If none or little historical information is present regarding the consequences of the realistic alternatives of action, or if such information is ambiguous, one ought to choose the alternative of action that is expected to have the largest life-elongating effect. This means that each individual ought to establish a positive association in the brain between “situations of action choice with scarce or ambiguous historical information about consequences” and the action alternative “life-elongating action” (see Section 3.3.1.2).

      Life-elongating actions are not to be sorted out for slavishly performance, but as a rational procedure for a quick search for well-suited hypotheses of action. By following the procedure of performing life-elongating actions consequently, suicide will never be rational, but it is rather obvious that suicide sometimes in very special situations may be relatively happiness-profitable. If a life-elongating action implies highly negative consequences after its performance, this type of action ought to be considered rejected at future choices of action. Eating orange is a life-elongating action, but you are not to continue eating orange if you experience allergic reactions against this fruit.

      Examples of life-elongating actions are: healthy living, eating fruit and vegetables, physical exercise, no smoking. Another example follows here:

 

Man as a successful, productive being: Homo habilis differed from earlier hominoides by its use of technological tools. The reason for this was the increased capacity of rational thinking that led to the production of tools. The genes being prerequisites for producing tools had been evolutionary promoted because weapons were advantageous for the survival in the competition against other primates and for the efficiency in the hunting process. Thus, producing is the fundament for human existence. The genetic changes that made the early man able to produce weapons and other implements, and which really had positive impact on the survival of the species, also had evolutionary unintended side effects: It is reasonable to assume that a prehistoric human being felt happiness when he watched his self-produced weapon. If he had felt neutrality or unhappiness, the motive power for weapon production would have been reduced, and that would have been evolutionary disadvantageous. When the competitors were (temporarily) conquered and sufficient amount of food was ensured, the prehistoric humans remembered the happiness of watching their newly produced weapons, and the early human entities wanted this perception of happiness to continue and to be enhanced. Therefore, they produced cave paintings, jewelries music etc, and obtained happiness by having the power to produce things originally thought out in their brains (self-realization). The perception of happiness is expected to be even stronger if other people admire the product. In the process toward the final product there is a continuously increasing level of happiness implying positive perception of happiness during this time (see Section 9.1).

     Therefore, evolutionarily considered it is reasonable to believe that self-realization implies perception of happiness. Such happiness comes in addition to the happiness that potentially follows the product's practical use value or profit. Creative/productive activity may be to succeed at work, to develop a new product, to make a research discovery, to create a good home or social relations.    

     The evolutionary cause for human perception of happiness by performing successful production is now explained. But are such actions well-suited tools in the pursuit of maximization of the probability of gaining the largest sum of self-happiness during life? Statistically, individuals with the highest incomes (the most productive ones) have significantly higher life expectancy than low income persons. Thus, high productivity implies an increase in life expectancy. Therefore, productivity is a type of life-elongating actions. Productivity is also a virtue (see Section 3.3.4). Gallup polls show that individuals create long-term self-happiness when they succeed with their achievements. Thus, HDM and deduction from fundamental human nature lead to the same conclusion, which strengthens the statement that it is morally correct to be a productive human being and immoral to choose to be a non-producing human being.

 

3.3.3.2  Strong, short-term, direct perception of happiness

 

Superior animals have the ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness because it has been evolutionary favorable (see Section 2.2.2.1), and the objective for the individual animal is to maximize its immediate self-happiness. The animals are “machines” used by the DNA molecule in order to maximize the total mass of DNA in the world. When an animal performs an action that is advantageous with respect to the maximization of the total mass of DNA in the world, the animal obtains an immediate perception of happiness (pleasure). In the opposite case the animal obtains an immediate feeling of unhappiness (pain). Since animals are not rational beings, they will almost “automatically” perform those actions which are advantageous with respect to the maximization of the total mass of DNA in the world within the limitations of the present environment. A human being is also the result of evolution, but he is a rational, happiness-perceiving being, and his objective is to maximize his self-happiness by his thinking – not to be a slave for the DNA-molecule. Strong short-term perceptions of happiness are used by the DNA-molecule to cheat us into performing actions leading to the maximization of its total mass in the world. The individual should use his rationality to avoid being cheated by the tyranny of the DNA molecule, and in stead perform those actions, which within the present realities, will maximize the probability for obtaining the largest possible sum of self-happiness during the life span.

      Since strong short-term profit of happiness is used by the DNA-molecule to cheat us to be its slaves, we ought to be especially skeptical against performing actions that are expected to have strong short-term value profit. Such actions ought to be considered only if they obviously are not long-term unprofitable with respect to happiness. If you have the choice between two alternatives of action apparently being approximately equal in rationality (see Section 3.1), you ought to choose the alternative that is expected to give the least short-term perception of happiness. We may fail to perform the best suited actions (in the pursuit of the maximization of the ultimate value) by having such an approach on short-term strongly value-profitable actions, but the probability of failure is assumed to be significantly larger if we consider otherwise.

 

3.3.3.3  Choices of action with highest potentially continuous use of HDM

 

The fundamental nature of HDM is testing and failure. We define the concept “fatal consequence”: A possible consequence from a hypothesis of action that will exclude testing of alternative hypotheses in the future if the consequence really occurs.

      A person makes a choice of action and chooses the alternative of action (hypothesis) H. A non-improbable negative consequence of the action is the negative consequence X. This consequence has a serious character, and he will be attached to it the rest of his life. If X occurs, H is in practice falsified, and he will want to test another hypothesis. Based on his misjudgment he will theoretically be able to produce a new hypothesis of action in his consciousness. But he is unable to test the hypothesis in practice since X directly prevents him from doing that, and he is stuck with the falsified hypothesis. We call H a “dead-end” hypothesis. A banal example of this is a person who believes he will produce more life-long happiness by cutting off his legs than by keeping them. More realistic examples are getting married without option for divorce or electing a president for life time dictator.

      We ought to avoid such “dead-end” hypothesis unless the probability of occurrence of their fatal consequences is very small. The logical continuation of this is the following ethical guideline: Perform the alternative of action that is expected to have consequences allowing the longest potential ramification of practical possible testable alternative hypotheses. This philosophical statement is considered to be logically deduced from the fundamental nature of HDM.

 

 

3.3.4  Virtues

 

Virtues are the human qualities needed by the individual for the maximization of his sum of self-happiness during his life span, i.e. for living a moral (rational) life. Thus, rationality becomes the arch virtue, and the virtues are those human qualities that in sum constitute rationality. When deducing the real human virtues it is necessary to consider each and one of the elements in the sections 3.1–3.3 influencing the rational choice of action, and then deducing implications from these elements. These elements are numbered 1-10 below:

 

 

1)

The length of the time horizon for maximization of the happiness. A rational action pattern requires that we rationally consider the entire life (and this does not include religious eternal life) as the time horizon when we are to choose alternatives of action in the pursuit of happiness. The objective is not to maximize the happiness next week and then underestimate the effects of the consequences on the rest of the life. Self-discipline and patience are virtues needed for this purpose.

 

 

 

 

2)

The probability of positive consequences to occur: Here, the virtue self-confidence is to be considered. Exaggerated self-confidence may lead to an overestimating of the probability of positive consequences of an alternative of action to occur. If an individual has exaggerated self-confidence, he will probably attain a lot of negative consequences during life that he ought to have avoided. Too little self-confidence will lead to an underestimation of the probability of positive consequences of an alternative of action to occur. Many positive consequences will be avoided that ought to have occurred. Therefore, it is important to achieve a golden mean between too much and too little self-confidence.

 

 

 

 

3)

The probability of negative consequences to occur: If you are foolhardy, you will underestimate he probability of negative consequences to occur, and in practice you will obtain a lot of negative consequences that ought to have been avoided. If you are cowardly, you will overestimate the probability of occurrence of negative consequences. In practice you will lose a lot of positive consequences that ought to have occurred. The virtue to pursue is courage, the golden mean between foolhardiness and cowardice. Thus, courage and self-confidence are of a piece.

 

 

 

 

4)

Assign correct value to the possible consequences of an alternative of action. When facing a choice of action where different alternatives (hypotheses) may be chosen, you have to make a realistic evaluation of how the consequences will influence your sum of happiness during your life span. It is important to know what makes you happy but also what historically has made other people happy (and especially persons resembling yourself). Therefore, analytic ability and psychological insight are important virtues. If you more or less consequently underestimate the absolute value of the consequences throughout your life, the result is that too few actions are carried out – doing nothing is much too often the preferred hypothesis. Unawareness, indifference and laziness become the result. Therefore, the golden mean of willingness to make efforts, activity, passion and awareness are also important virtues.

 

 

 

 

5)

For how long are we to keep on to a hypothesis of action before adopting a new one? Having chosen a hypothesis of action, unpredicted negative consequences may arise during the “practical testing”, or predicted negative consequences may be larger than anticipated. Given such a situation, a turn-around to an alternative hypothesis of action may be carried out, or it may be rational to keep on to the original hypothesis. Thus, flexibility and integrity are important virtues. They are the golden means between stubbornness and fickleness. Integrity is an important virtue for maintaining rational senses of duty (see Section 3.9.1).

 

 

 

 

6)

How quickly is the choice of action to be made? Some choices of action ought to be taken very rapidly, whilst others ought to be taken after long consideration. If all realistically achievable relevant information already is present in the brain, the brain may have solved the problem on beforehand at earlier, similar situations. The answer lies latently in the brain and pops up as an immediate solution to the present problem – further thinking will only delay the process without giving any better choice of action alternative (see Section 3.3.1.2). Therefore, determination is an important virtue, while its extremities are supereagerness and action paralysis.

 

 

 

 

7)

The amount of alternatives of action present. When facing a situation where an action is required, it may be important to have relevant alternatives of action to choose between. Therefore, it is important to have the ability to discover different alternatives of action. Thus, ingenuity is a virtue.

 

 

 

 

8)

Collecting information about the consequences of the actions of other people. When evaluating the probability of different consequences to follow from different alternatives of action, it is important to be aware of what kind of consequences similar alternatives of action historically have given other action performers (and especially persons resembling yourself). Thus, social intercourse (also via Internet) becomes an important virtue.

 

 

 

 

9)

Remembering consequences of my own actions. Similarly as in item 8; when you are to evaluate the probability of different consequences to follow from different alternatives of action, it is important to remember what kind of consequences similar alternatives of actions historically have given you. Therefore, good memory is a virtue.

 

 

 

 

10)

Keep on to the reality. The evaluation of the probability for consequences to occur has to be considered according to the existing reality, and not according to your own dreams. It is neither rational to consider generation of happiness after death (eternal life). Therefore, honesty and ability to grasp the reality are virtues. If you are stuck in drug or alcohol inebriation, you will have significantly reduced ability to grasp the reality, and the probability of performing rational actions is reduced. The use of drugs and alcohol at a level where the reality disappears more or less constantly is very immoral on a deductive basis. This is also in accordance with the observation that many drug addicts and alcoholics are unhappy.

 

Summing up into three groups we have the following personal qualities that will help the individual in the pursuit of maximizing the sum of happiness during his life:

 

Character strength: self-discipline, patience, self-confidence, courage, determination, flexibility, integrity, honesty, awareness

Acquisition of knowledge: analytic ability, psychological insight, good memory, ingenuity, ability to grasp the reality, social intercourse

Productivity: willingness to make efforts, activity, passion

 

 

3.3.4.1  The virtues make a part of the reality

 

If an individual has too little of one of these virtues, the shortage has to be regarded as a negative predisposing determinant; e.g. a part of the reality influencing negatively on a consciousness' choices of action. A missing virtue is a part of the personality and cannot be immediately chosen by the individual. The personality is created through influence of heritance, environment (parents included), coincidences and not at least your own choices. However, the personality can only be changed through laborious self-efforts during a long period of time. Having changed one's personality in the direction of increased amount of the virtue, the reality (which limited his realistic possibilities of success with an alternative of action) is changed (see Section 2.5, 2.5.4 and 3.2.1). He will have a better potential for creating happiness in the future. A person having too little courage does not act immorally if he avoids performing an action that requires a lot of courage, but it has been immoral to reject the performance of those actions which earlier in his life would have given him a more courageous personality. It is important to establish good virtues at young age when the time perspective, which the happiness is to be maximized over, is at its largest. Similarly, the importance of establishing or reinforcing virtues will decrease in line with increasing age.

      If a person has one or more virtues being too weak, he ought to make self-efforts to gradually strengthen the virtue(s) and/or seek a psychologist to get help. But be aware of the fact that changing the personality (strengthen the virtues) is a process that may be very laborious, and the individual should have the realistic view that the process of changing may have a cost-benefit ratio > 1.

 

 

3.4  Summary of the ethical guidelines of Rational Gaudism

 

This section is a short, summarized overview of the Rational Gaudist principles for moral choice of action. Based on the self-happy-motivated nature of the human being the individual is predetermined to try to maximize his sum of self-happiness during his life span. The ethical principles of Rational Gaudism are to maximize the probability for best success in this attempt.

 

Prior to a choice of action you ought to have acquired the virtues (see Section 3.3.4) that per definition are the qualities needed for maximizing the ability to perform the process here described. You also ought to have implemented rational senses of duty prior to the action choice. The choice of action is governed by the principles in Section 3.1. Considering the best and most efficient way of minimizing Glife (see Section 3.1), the individual ought to follow these rules with his acquired virtues and rational senses of duty at the time point for the choice of action (see Section 3.3 supplemented by 3.9.1):

 

 

1)

During the choice of action you first ought to listen to eventual strong, rational associations between the present situation of action choice and a certain alternative of action or a rational sense of duty. If the strength of this association exceeds an earlier chosen threshold, the action alternative is to be performed without considering other alternatives (see Section 3.3.1.2). If the association implies a PFR or a duty of virtue, the alternative of action is also to be carried out immediately without further considerations (see Section 3.9.1.2 and 3.9.1.3). Performing an association-based action can strengthen or weaken the association depending on the magnitude of the experienced happiness effect of the consequences of the action.

 

2)

If no sufficiently strong rational association is found between the actual situation of action choice and a certain alternative of action, a sense of duty or a PFR, you have to evaluate (scan) each of the other possible alternatives of action. If an alternative of action is an implemented PMI, the action alternative has to be automatically discarded without further considerations. If no PMI is involved, each of the possible alternatives of action has to be directly evaluated with respect to expected happiness effect, R (see Section 3.1) according to the following principles:

 

 

 

 

 

a)

Which values (v) have the possible consequences of the action alternative given the performer, and with what frequencies (s) have these consequences occurred when the present performer of action historically has chosen similar action alternatives? Performing the action is partly regarded as a testing of the hypothesis that the estimation of S and V represents (HDM).

 

 

b)

Which values (v) have the possible consequences of the action alternative given the performers, and with what frequencies (s) have these consequences occurred when other people historically have chosen similar action alternatives, and which the present performer of action is aware of? The performer of action will often have to assign more weight to persons resembling him and less weight to persons differing strongly from him. Performing the action is partly regarded as a testing of the hypothesis that the estimation of S and V represents (HDM).

 

 

 

 

3)

If point 2 is inconclusive or such information is more or less absent, the two following principles may be helpful:

 

 

 

 

 

i)

Deductions from the fundamental human nature (life-elongating actions, anti-short-term happiness).

 

 

ii)

The consequences of the action alternative are to avoid preventing HDM as much as possible in the future.

 

The consequences actually realized after carrying out an action will for the future enter the pool of experiences, primarily for the performer himself, but also for other people obtaining knowledge of these consequences.

 

 

3.5  Subjective, objective and intersubjective moral evaluations

 

The fundament of Rational Gaudist ethics is that experiencing happiness is the only valuable aspect of the reality. Therefore, it is objectively morally correct to perform those actions that are rationally expected to maximize one's self-happiness during the life span. In order to create surplus of happiness in the future, you have to perform those fundamental actions needed for sustaining your life. But even the question of the moral correctness of sustaining your life is to a certain degree (usually so very low degree that it resembles absurdity) subjected to subjective evaluations since the judgment that future positive creation of self-happiness is impossible / improbable cannot theoretically be excluded whatever situation being considered. Strictly speaking, the question of the morality of sustaining life is subjected to an intersubjective evaluation, but usually the answer is “yes” with that high degree of intersubjective consensus that it resembles objectivity. When considering how to sustain life and especially how to maximize the sum of self-happiness during life, the degree of subjectivity in the intersubjective evaluations increases. Of course, the degree of subjectivity depends on the type of action to be considered. The only absolute objective is that it is morally correct to perform those actions which rationally are expected to maximize the sum of self-happiness during the life span.

      Regarded from a Rational Gaudist perspective, the moral quality of an alternative of action is basically estimated from the frequencies (s) that the possible consequences historically have occurred with from the actual alternative of action and which values (v) these consequences historically have given action performers during their life spans. These frequencies, consequences and values are (have been) a part of the reality – they are not subjective wishes, whims and dreams of the present action performer – and therefore they make an objective dimension. Thus, the reality's corresponding probabilities (S) and values (V) are not absolutely known for the action performer and have to be estimated by his consciousness, and this is the subjective dimension of the Rational Gaudist ethics. The latter gives the basis for a rational variation in the moral judgements from Rational Gaudist ethics among persons evaluating the same alternative of action in the same situation of action choice.

 

On the basis of the text above, we can never completely objectively (independent of the observing subjects) establish if a choice of action was immoral (irrational) or exactly how immoral/irrational it was. The best evaluation we are able to make is an intersubjective judgment by an “expert panel” whose degree of consensus estimates the degree of objectivity, presupposed that the evaluations are carried out on the basis of the philosophical considerations of Section 3.4 (see also Section 9.3 for extensive text). The larger standard deviation in the “experts'” judgments, the more subjective the morality/rationality of the action choice usually is. The smaller standard deviation, the more objective the morality (rationality) of the action choice usually is.

 

 

3.6  Self-happy motivation and how to consider other individuals

 

Self-happy motivation: The individual performs an action where the final purpose is to create happiness for himself.

 

Altruism: The individual performs an action where the final purpose is to create happiness for others without considering his self-happiness.

 

Each human action is self-happy-motivated because the individual is the only human unit having the ability to perceive happiness; the nation, family, social class or race are not elements with the ability to perceive happiness (see Section 2.2.2.2 and 2.5). Therefore, “altruistic” actions do not exist in spite of the fact that some actions may seem altruistic. Altruism only exists as an ethical ideal in many people. But essentially, “altruism”, as defined above, is hypocrisy or ignorance. Altruism is “the emperor without any clothes”.

 

Considering the concept “egoism”, Rational Gaudism uses the definition that corresponds to the general understanding among people: An egoistic action is an action where the purpose obviously is to create happiness for the performer, but at the same time there is large probability for significant negative consequences for other people or happiness-perceiving animals. Egoism is an action pattern including a lot of egoistic actions.

 

All individuals are always self-happy-motivated when performing their actions; sometimes they are aware of it (conscious self-happy motivation), while other times they are not (unconscious self-happy motivation). A Rational Gaudist is always conscious that his and others' actions are self-happy-motivated, and his ethical ideal is to always be rational (from the description in the sections 3.1 – 3.4) in his conscious self-happy motivation (rational conscious self-happy motivation).

 

When an individual performs an action, the final purpose behind the action is always to create self-happiness. Miscalculations may be performed in connection with a choice of action (wrong thinking, too little thinking, gather too little information about the reality etc.), which may contribute to making the consequences different from the purpose at the time point of the action choice. But the motive power (the expected happiness effect that the performer subjectively believes in at the time point of action choice; i.e. the M-value) is all the same self-happy-motivation. All human actions can be distributed into three groups: primary, secondary and tertiary self-happy-motivated actions (see Section 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9). Self-happy motivation is an attribute of the fundamental human nature and not an ethical guideline; the ethical guideline of Rational Gaudism is rationality as described in the Sections 3.1 – 3.4 and 3.9.1.4. Since the description of moral and immoral actions interact significantly with the different types self-happy-motivated actions, it is most appropriate to address self-happy motivation in the chapter of ethics.

 

A natural question arises: “Are we to consider what kind of negative or positive consequences our actions cause for our fellow men?”

      The answer is as follows: A human being ought to consider his action's consequences for other people (and the probabilities at which these are expected to occur) to the extent the consequences of the action secondary or tertiary return him positive or negative feed-backs. Additionally, if a human being makes interhuman considerations, it is done because the performer of action (at the time point of the choice of action and given the present reality) believes in significantly more self-happiness during his life span compared to what he would have produced if he had not been considerate towards his fellow men. This is a consequence of the fact that individuals are predetermined to perform only self-happy-motivated actions.

 

If a person makes an optimal rational evaluation from the existing reality and concludes that he will create more happiness during his life span by killing a human than by avoiding the murder, it is not immoral to kill that human. But usually, the existence of a State that punishes murderers is a part of the reality. If the killing of a human being is to be morally acceptable, the killer has to consider the probability for the killing to be cleared up by the Police and the strong potential negative value of the punishment. Revenge from the friends and family of the victim has to be considered together with the interior fear of being punished. Additionally, we have some basic “instincts” giving us an immediate feeling of unhappiness when we consider committing a murder (see Section 3.7.1). Under normal circumstances it is very unlikely that killing a human being is morally (rationally) acceptable and therefore, such an alternative of action ought to be consequently avoided (see Section 3.9.1.1). Exceptions are in self-defense, war and anarchy. There are probably some murderers who have produced significantly more self-happiness during their life spans by committing a murder than by avoiding it. But usually, this “happiness” has not arisen as a consequence of a rational evaluation, but by “being in good luck” after a very bad evaluation (see the example with red and green balls in Section 3.9.1.1). Such production of self-happiness “by luck” is not in accordance with a moral action pattern.

 

The considerations may be different in anarchy or war. In anarchy there is no State punishing killers (but gangs being friendly to the victim may take revenge); you may have to kill in order to survive. In a war you will not be punished for killing the enemy (maybe you will be punished if you refuse to kill the enemies), and then killing is not necessarily immoral. Intuitively, most people will agree to the non-immorality of killing in war or anarchy. Thus, the ethics of Rational Gaudism implies this intuition without creating special moral rules in war for making killing morally acceptable.

 

 

3.6.1  The role of the State in ethics

 

The State has an important ethical role in influencing the reality. On the basis of its rational nature, each human being has certain nature-given (innate) rights (see chapter 4 and 5). The State is obliged to ensure that these rights are not violated; nature does not automatically prevent right violations since other individuals are predetermined to try to make choices of action in the pursuit of maximizing their self-happiness during their life spans. The State, contrarily, has to ensure that other individuals do not invalidate these nature-given rights (life, liberty, happiness and all logical consequences thereof) (see Section 4.4). Therefore, the State has an obligation to make the mechanisms of crime resolving and punishment so firm that a person will commit an immoral act (see definition in Section 3.1 – 3.4) if he violates the nature-given rights of another individual. Thus, the mechanisms of punishment from the State will force a moral/rational action to correspond with the nature-given rights of the individual.

      The Rational Gaudist society will include such mechanisms for crime resolving and punishment that the probability for right-violating actions to succeed becomes close to zero (see Section 6.1). The probability for right-violating actions to maximize the self-happiness for a potential criminal during his life span will be so tiny that it will not be rational to consider right-violating actions (see also Section 3.9.1.1 on green and red balls). If the mechanisms for crime resolving and punishment are significantly more inferior than here described (e.g. a left-winged society being kind to a fault), it may be rational for potential criminals to consider the performance of right-violating actions, and the rationality in the performance of such actions will increase proportionally with the degree of anarchy in the society (but in sum the citizens will of course lose in such a semi-anarchistic system). On the other hand, it is somewhat weird to discuss rational actions in an irrational society.

      The presence of irrational senses of duty and metaphysical ideas may have certain positive effects for the society (e.g. Christians who believe they will arrive Heaven if behaving nicely in their life on Earth), but this presupposes a widespread presence of an irrational philosophical basis in the society. However, this philosophical irrationality is expected to have other, very negative effects overshadowing its moderate positive effects. For instance, an irrational expectation may easily arise among people that irrational senses of duty will be sufficient for solving social problems in situations where clear rational incitements are required. Therefore, the State ought not to stimulate such irrational ideas even if they may have certain short-term positive effects; contrarily, the State ought to refrain from this.

 

 

3.7  Primary self-happy-motivated actions

 

These actions give the performer directly happiness as a consequence of the action. When you breathe, eat, or take a walk in the forest, you perform primary self-happy-motivated actions (PEM actions), and these concrete examples are rational PEM actions. If you steal a wallet and use the money to buy something that gives you happiness you also perform a PEM action, but the rationality is dubious.

      PEM actions may often overemphasize the short-term positive effect of an action and give too little consideration for the secondary negative effects. The problem with some PEM actions is the following: A person performs a PEM action that he expects to obtain positive effects from. These effects may completely or partly be absent. But the action may also have negative effect for other persons, and they may secondarily cause him consequences of larger negative value than the value of the original positive consequences. Thus, such actions may be immoral to different degrees if the performer of action has made miscalculations considered in the light of the present reality. Egoistic actions are often, but not always, irrational (immoral) PEM actions. Life-elongating actions are rational and primary self-happy-motivated in tie-break (see Section 3.3.3.1).

 

 

3.7.1  Instincts and habits

 

Homo sapiens has some instincts (e.g. maternal instinct, the instinct of the child to take milk from the breast, sex, the female tendency to prefer strong men, and effects from mirror neurons). These instincts have been acquired by the humans because they were important for the survival of our species; if the human race had not possessed these instincts, extinction would have been the result. If we act against our instincts, we obtain an immediate feeling of unhappiness. If we act in accordance with our instincts, we obtain an immediate feeling of happiness. The basic human instincts may be regarded as predisposing determinants influencing the free will. A mother being instinctively caring towards her child obtains a good inner feeling. If the mother avoids following this instinct, she will obtain a bad inner feeling. Sex in its explicit form is a PEM action, and children follow as a side effect from that PEM action (of course, the child may have been planned from a rational evaluation, and then it is secondary self-happy motivation).

      Instinctive actions are PEM actions where the positive effect for the species occurs as a side effect of the PEM action. It will often be value-profitable to make a hard rational evaluation and act against the instincts because the instincts are aimed towards the quantitative maximization of the DNA-molecule in the world given the environment that existed on Africa's savannas for many ten thousands years ago, and not towards the maximization of life-long self-happiness for the individual who performs the action. Sensation of empathy is not to be obeyed blindly, but ought to be an incitement to undertake a rational evaluation of the situation. If the sensation of empathy and the sensation of rationality correspond, follow the empathy. If there is discrepancy, rationality ought to rule over empathy.

      Superior animals are supposed to perform only PEM actions since such animals mostly are instinctive beings (see also Section 2.5.2); with the possible exception of the most advanced apes, which perhaps additionally perform some SEM actions (see Section 3.8). Immediate individual perception of happiness is the motive power that makes the animal act in accordance with the long-term survival of the species and thereby contributing to the maximization of the total mass of the DNA-molecules in the world. The consciousness of the animal wants to achieve a sensation of happiness (pleasure); the individual animal is indifferent with respect to the long-term survival of the species. Beings that do not possess the ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness do not have any self-happy motivation, and accordingly they do not perform PEM actions but automatic actions.

 

Humans (and animals) can learn to perform actions in such a way that habits are developed (see also Section 3.3.1.2). The mechanism is that you perceive a psychological feeling of unhappiness by omitting the performance of a habitual action where the learning dictates you otherwise. Therefore, the mechanism for habitual action is primary self-happy motivation after the same pattern as for instinctive actions. Habits may be regarded as “acquired instincts”. Habitual actions are very strong association-based actions (see Section 3.3.1.2) whose correlated situations of action choice occur frequently. Other association-based actions (not PFR actions) contain progressively larger degree of primary self-happy motivation in line with stronger association between the situation of action choice and the action alternative.

 

 

3.8  Secondary self-happy-motivated actions

 

These are actions which create happiness in another human being than the performer (or alternatively, in an animal). But the motive power is not to make that person happy. The motive power behind the action is to obtain positive feed-backs from the other person (or from other people observing the action). These positive feed-backs are expected to have larger positive value for the performer of action than the loss of freedom (= potential loss of happiness) by performing the secondary self-happy-motivated action (SEM action) have in negative value (eventually, the motive power may be to avoid negative feed-backs). There is an adage saying that “the greatest obtainable pleasure is to make others happy”. This emphasizes the essence of secondary self-happy motivation.

 

A person P considers performing a primary self-happy-motivated action H1 that he expects to gain some positive consequences from. But the action may have negative consequences for other people, and they (or observers of the action) may secondarily provide him with consequences of larger negative value than the original consequences of action H1 offered him in positive value. The awareness of this may convince person P to avoid the performance of action H1. Another possibility is that H1 does not affect any other individual at all, but person P is observed by a person Q. From empirical information person Q knows that actions of type H1 statistically are associated with actions of type H2 which are generally disreputable for having negative consequences for other human beings. Therefore, it is rational for person Q to be skeptical towards person P out of fear for the consequences from the potential actions of type H2. The awareness of this makes up a rational motive power for person P to avoid the performance of actions of type H1. The avoidance of performing action H1 is in both cases secondary self-happy-motivated.

      If you perform an action that clearly has destructive effect on other people in about 500 years, but which you profit from right now, you will obviously not feel the consequences of the future humans' negative feed-backs. What is the rational motive power to stay away from carrying out such an action? When you perform an action that harms future people, contemporary observers of your action may think that there are underlying qualities in you that is the reason for the action, and the implication of these qualities is that you are more likely to perform negative actions also against today's people. Your current fellows may become skeptical about you as a person and may give you negative feed-backs, which may have negative consequences for your life-long sum of self-happiness. But we should be aware that the effect mentioned in the preceding sentence is limited.

 

A capitalist produces products of good quality for the market, but the motive power or final purpose is not to please the market, but making good products is a necessity for obtaining positive feed-backs from the market in terms of economical profit. We often hear capitalists say that the prices are reduced in order to please the customers. This is hypocrisy. It is a tool for generating more economical profit in the long-term perspective than what would be achieved without reducing the prices.

 

 

3.9  Tertiary self-happy-motivated actions

 

These actions do not create positive, primary perception of happiness in the performer (but can often imply primary perception of happiness in another human or animal), but the motive power is the expectation of positive feed-backs from his inner consciousness. Tertiary self-happy-motivated actions (TEM actions) may often seem not to be self-happy-motivated, and may therefore be wrongly regarded as altruistic (but some SEM and PEM actions may also seem altruistic).

      The mechanism when performing a TEM action is as follows: A person considers performing an action in the outer reality. This action is projected into his consciousness, and he put the projected action into his own inner reality where he has certain thoughts about how he wants to regard himself – this is called his self-picture. If the projected picture of the action is strongly in conflict with his self-picture, the positive self-picture is completely or partly destroyed, and his self-esteem is reduced. A consequence of this is a negative feed-back from the self-picture in his consciousness, and this gives a perception of unhappiness. To avoid this perception of unhappiness the person must omit the performance of the actual action in the outer reality. Oppositely, if he carries out an action strengthening his self-picture, his consciousness will give him a certain feeling of happiness or at least absence of unhappiness. TEM actions are motivated by an inner sense of duty attempting to maintain the positive self-picture. Examples of TEM actions are given in Section 9.4.

 

 

3.9.1  Senses of duty and rational TEM actions

 

When a person performs a TEM action, the purpose is to contribute in the best possible manner to maximize the happiness during his life span. But a person can be indoctrinated or indoctrinate himself to have whatever self-picture, and such self-pictures may even be seriously perverted (e.g. Germans who killed Jews as a duty towards “Der Führer” even if they felt disgust by doing so, Pol Pot's soldiers who felt killing as a holy duty, persons who donate all their assets as part of a religious duty). Irrational TEM-actions often underestimate the long-term negative consequences of the alternative of action and overestimate the long-term positive consequences by sustaining the self-picture (see Section 9.4.1). Considering all TEM actions that are being performed in today's society, they will probably more often be based on miscalculations than the other types of actions. Thus, they are rather often immoral. The question needed to be answered is the following: “Which criteria are to be followed in order to perform rational TEM actions?” Firstly, we have to figure out which senses of duty being rational. The starting point for all rational patterns of action is that the only objective of the individual is to maximize the sum of self-happiness during his life span. Rational duties have to be elements included in the strategy of achieving this objective (see also Section 3.1.1) and are described in Section 3.9.1.1 – 3.9.1.3.

 

3.9.1.1  Senses of duty against irrational actions (PMI)

 

We ought to build up senses of duty against actions that on rational basis and beyond reasonable doubt are proven to be non-profitable with respect to happiness in the long-term perspective (PMI). This includes PMI against narcotic substances, abuse of alcohol, and smoking. These are global PMIs since these types of action are uniformly happiness-unprofitable for all individuals. An individual may also have local PMIs; senses of duty against types of action that repeatedly have been shown to be happiness-unprofitable in the life of this individual. The motive power to omit the performance of an irrational action through PMI, even if you have a desire to carry it out, is the self-picture giving you the feeling of being a mega-asshole when you consider its performance. This will be a significant incitement to avoid highly irrational actions. PMI may function as an inhibitor against negatively habitual association-based action choices (see Section 3.3.1.2): PMI may stimulate a habit with avoiding a certain irrational action alternative by gradually skipping the sense of duty giving rise to a strong, direct association between all situations of action choice and the avoidance of this special irrational action alternative (see also 3.9.1.2).

      The probability for a right-violating action pattern to be happiness-profitable in the long-term perspective is very small (except in anarchy-like situations and in situations where right-obedience implies fatal consequences for one self). This knowledge is established through empirical testing (HDM) by regarding a waste of humans having had such an action pattern. This will especially be the case in a Rational Gaudist society since it contains adequate punishments and crime clear-up mechanisms. Therefore, each human being – from childhood and ahead – ought to build up and sustain a picture of right-violating actions as consequently irrational (see also Section 3.3.2).

 

The rationality in establishing and sustaining PMI may be illustrated by game theory. Having a box with 98 red balls and 2 green balls we ought to go for “red” if we are offered $1500 for guessing the color of a randomly drawn ball. We ought to repeat this choice consequently each time we are presented for this offer (drawing with subsequent hand back) since the probability for a green ball to be drawn is so small. Correspondingly, a rational human being does not waste time on the evaluation of performing irrational actions, right-violating actions included.

 

3.9.1.2  Senses of duty for rational actions (PFR)

 

We ought to build up senses of duty (PFR) for types of actions that beyond reasonable doubt have been proven to be very rational in the long-term perspective, i.e. that have resisted intense attempts of dethronement. PFR makes you immediately feel as a good human being when you act in accordance with it. PFR may be e.g. physical exercising, eating fruit and vegetables and being cleaver at school when you strongly dislike doing it at the present time point. If there exist an association between a situation of action choice and a PFR, carry out the corresponding action immediately without considering other alternatives of action. We may have both global and local PFRs in the same way as for PMI as explained in Section 3.9.1.1. Implementation of too many PFRs may remove the attention away from the real important duties.

      PFR actions are always linked to relevant situations of action choice, and this may also be the case for PMI actions, but often PMI actions are to be consequently avoided irrespective of the situation of action choice. The difference between association-based actions (see Section 3.3.1.2) and PFR actions is that the former action choices involve an association (which may be very strong or less strong) between situations of action choice resembling the present one and a certain alternative of action. Contrarily, a PFR action involves an association between situations of action choice resembling the present one and a certain sense of duty, and further there is an association between this sense of duty and an action alternative where the sense of duty claims you to be an asshole if you do not carry out that particular action alternative. A PFR action is no habitual action by itself (see Section 3.7.1), but PFR may function as a stimulator for positive habitual action choices by gradually skipping the sense of duty so that action choices originally based on PFR are transferred into habitual actions with a direct association between the actual type of situation of action choice and the rational action alternative.

 

3.9.1.3  Duties of virtue

 

All individuals ought to build up the virtues in Section 3.3.4 to senses of duty since the virtues per definition are the qualities enabling the individual to perform the process in connection to a choice of action in an optimally rational manner. Each individual ought to have the self-picture of a courageous person, and then he will obtain a kick of happiness in terms of increased self-esteem when performing a brave action even if he do not gain primarily or secondarily from that action. He will exercise his personality until the day when he really needs courage to gain primary or secondary self-happiness. Correspondingly, we ought to have senses of duty for self-confidence, self-discipline honesty, determination, integrity, acquisition of knowledge, willingness to make efforts etc. During the build up of a rational duty of virtue we ought to be aware so it is not reduced by an enclosed irrational duty. When building up a virtue of duty, we have to remember that a virtue often consist of a golden mean; during the build up of the virtue “courage” it is recommended not to be so supercourageous that the result becomes foolhardiness.

 

3.9.1.4  Summary of duties and rational TEM actions

 

In summary, the following types of rational senses of duty exist:

 

 

1)

Senses of duty against actions that beyond reasonable doubt have been proven to be irrational, included right-violating (PMI).

 

2)

Senses of duty for actions that beyond reasonable doubt have been proven to be rational (PFR).

 

3)

Senses of duty for the different virtues in Section 3.3.4 (duties of virtue).

 

A TEM action is rational only if it is driven by a rational sense of duty. We ought to only have those senses of duty mentioned above (1, 2 and 3) since the consciousness is supposed to be able to contain only a limited number of senses of duty; there are limits for how many “pixels” our self-picture can contain. Therefore, we have to choose only those senses of duty that potentially give rise to maximum happiness. The above mentioned rational senses of duty give: (i) negative primary effects + (ii) positive feed-back effect from the self-picture + (iii) potential positive effects in the future (e.g. the consequences of stronger virtues). Other senses of duty also give (i) and (ii) but de facto nothing more. It is believed to be a waste of time to perform the latter type of duty-based actions since it will be more profitable to use the time to carry out rational PEM or SEM actions. Besides, irrational senses of duty can remove focus from the rational ones. Thus, you ought to implement a sense of duty against irrational senses of duty. Examples of different rational senses of duty are described in Section 9.4.2.

 

 

3.9.2  Implementation of a sense of duty

 

A sense of duty is not prearranged in the human nature. Thus, at one or another time point the sense of duty has to be implemented into the consciousness. A sense of duty is not prearranged by nature. Parents, priests, politicians, family and friends will often try to influence us to implement self-pictures with corresponding senses of duty. But we have the final choice whether the self-picture and the sense of duty are to be implemented in our consciousness; eventually if we are to choose to discard it (if e.g. our parents already have implemented it). The decision of implementing a rational sense of duty into the consciousness is to follow from a rational understanding that its expected happiness effect (R) makes implementation happiness-profitable during the life span. Therefore, the decision of implementing a rational sense of duty is a rational PEM or SEM action. But when we obey the implemented rational sense of duty in the daily life, we perform rational TEM actions. An implemented sense of duty may be regarded as a predisposing determinant that cannot be changed immediately, but it can be altered over time.

 

 

3.10  Exchange of different types of actions

 

A throughout fear existed in Stalin's Soviet. If a person was dictated to give his farm to the State, he answered “yes”. This is secondary self-happy motivation. He gives something to the State in order to avoid a negative feed-back (to be killed). When we obey the government (or a bunch of criminals) forcing us to sacrifice values for the common good (or the thieves), we perform SEM actions in response to the PEM actions of the government.

       A henpecked husband performs actions to please his wife, and the objective is to get positive reactions in response, i.e. secondary self-happy motivation. But the wife responds by yelling and shouting because he does not obey her enough, i.e. primary self-happy motivation. The henpecked husband continues to be kind to a fault to avoid further negative feed-backs.

 

When two persons fight physically, they perform PEM actions against each other, and it is usually difficult to see positive side effects for other people. Similarly, if two countries are at war, they perform PEM actions against each other, and positive side effects may come by the war stimulating new inventions having beneficial value for civilian purposes. When two capitalists compete over the favor of the market, they exchange PEM actions, and this has positive side effects for the market in terms of reduced prices.

 

A business man reduces the prices of his products because he expects positive feed-backs from the market in terms of profit. This is secondary self-happy motivation. In a love relation we observe mutual exchange of SEM actions (see Section 3.10.1).

 

Some usual combinations of types of action between initiator and respondent are listed below.

 

 

 

Self-happy motivation of the initiator

Self-happy motivation of the respondent

Tyranny

primary

secondary

Henpecked husband, “altruism 2”

secondary

primary

War, competition

primary

primary

Love, price reductions

secondary

secondary

“Altruism 1”

tertiary

- - - - - - - - - - - -

 

 

3.10.1  Definition of erotic love

 

Appreciating another human being is a feeling that appears as a consequence of creating distinguishably more self-happiness in his/her presence (physically or mentally) than in his/her absence.

      To be in love with another person is a feeling that appears as a consequence of currently creating significantly more surplus of self-happiness in his/her presence (physically or mentally) than what you normally generate in presence of other persons you appreciate, and you have an untested (or inferiorly tested) hypothesis that this feeling may be transformed into real love as defined in the next sentence.

      To really love another person deeply is a feeling that appears as a consequence of creating significantly more self-happiness in his/her presence than in his/her absence as described in the points 1 and 2 below, and the hypothesis that this situation is to sustain in the long-term/middle-term perspective has resisted significant attempts of dethronement. Real love can also exist in a situation where you temporarily create significantly less self-happiness in his/her presence than in his/her absence, but you have a well-founded hypothesis that this deficit of happiness will turn into a surplus of happiness according to point 1 and 2 below.

 

 

1)

When A exposes his/her attitudes, actions and strategy for maximization of self-happiness towards B, B returns positive feed-backs, and A becomes happy as a consequence of B's feed-backs. Such feed-backs penetrate the relationship between A and B (SEM). On this basis A creates significantly more self-happiness i B's presence than in his absence.

 

2)

A perceives a sexual attraction from B as a consequence of the excess of happiness mentioned in point 1, and sexual actions are performed or wanted by A because of this. It is not sufficient to feel an attraction from a sexy body.

 

3)

A has a love relation of optimal quality with B if point 1 and 2 are fulfilled and it additionally does not exist a partner C with the following qualities: A can realistically capture C into a love affair, and A may expect to create significantly more self-happiness together with C than with B.

 

As a single, each individual has a strategy for maximizing his self-happiness during his life span. This strategy will vary somewhat from person to person depending on adolescence, genes and previous personal choices. This strategy contains a lot of elements (personal interests) which are expected to influence the total life-long sum of happiness in positive direction.

      When a single considers entering a marriage or cohabitation, the purpose is to create significantly more self-happiness as wife/husband than as a single, and there are two ways of increasing the sum of self-happiness during the life span: 1) adopting new personal interests – i.e. adding more elements to the strategy, 2) reinforcing the personal interests that he/she had as a single – i.e. increasing the degree of happiness of each of the already existing elements of the strategy.

      The number of interests attainable for an individual is limited (it is only room for a limited number of elements in the strategy of maximization of self-happiness). If the hypotheses (i.e. the interests of a person as a single) have resisted intense attempts of dethronement, it is inferiorly rational to throw these away. Oppositely, a cohabitation or marriage may be difficult if both partners mostly are occupied with different interests. Therefore, it is rational to pursue a partner having approximately the same interests as oneself, and possibly supplement the strategy with some new interests. Primarily, a good marriage/cohabitance ought to increase the happiness effect of each element in your happiness strategy – supplementing the strategy with more elements is secondarily; the importance of this increases with increasing age.

 

 

3.11  What are actually “altruistic” actions?

 

“Altruism”, negatively regarded by e.g. Objectivists, is according to Rational Gaudism the following: Irrational TEM, SEM or PEM actions (frequency in that order) where the performer of action strongly underestimates the negative value of the primary consequences and strongly overestimates the positive consequences (feed-backs) from his own consciousness or from other persons.

      “Altruism” can also be observed in animals in their natural environment. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that “altruism” to a certain extent may be a kind of instinct in humans. The mechanism for performing “altruistic” actions instinctively is as follows: The performance of the “altruistic” action gives us a pleasant, instinctive feeling. The avoidance of performing the action gives us an unpleasant, instinctive feeling. We perform the “altruistic” action to achieve the good feeling and to avoid the unpleasant one; this is a PEM action. The evolution has promoted this “instinct” because “unselfish” helpfulness has ensured the long-term survival of our species and the maximization of the total mass of DNA in the world, especially with respect to care for the children (see also Section 3.7.1).

      “Altruism” can have elements of tertiary, secondary and primary self-happy motivation. The tertiary self-happy motivation is assumed to be the strongest one, and originates from irrational philosophical influence. The reasoning of Immanuel Kant is that an action is moral only if it has been performed through a sense of duty. In a Rational Gaudist translation Kant would have said that an action is moral only if it is tertiary self-happy-motivated.

 

If persons performing “altruistic” actions are to be converted to a rational action pattern, they ought to pursue better analytical ability and psychological insight (self-insight included) and eliminate negative senses of duty as mentioned in Section 3.9.1.4 and 9.4.1. Powerful people often held up altruism as a moral ideal to try to cheat human beings to perform “altruistic” action, but they are forgers setting false values on expected consequences. Forgery, swindle and lies do not pay off in the long-term perspective since it means avoiding the reality. See also Section 10.9.

           

Objectivism: Having accepted altruism you will obtain good consciousness by donating to everyone who do not deserve the gifts. The answer of Rational Gaudism: Yes, but in that case the objective of the “altruist” is to achieve good consciousness, not to help other humans. He obtains good consciousness in exchange for giving away money. The “altruist” has performed a self-happy-motivated action that he, around the time point for the choice of action, believed to be the best possible element in the pursuit of maximization of self-happiness during his life span. But this does not make the action rational since a miscalculation led to its effectuation. Thus, Rational Gaudism and Objectivism disagree on the nature of altruism:

      Objectivism: Altruistic actions exist according to its definition, and they are performed with the purpose of serving other humans without considering one's self-happiness. Rational Gaudism: “Altruistic” actions do not exist in the outer reality, only as fiction in the consciousness of some humans. What are called “altruistic” actions are irrational, unsuccessful attempts of maximization of self-happiness through feed-backs from the performer's consciousness, from other human beings or through primitive obedience of evolutionarily based “instincts”. Still, these two philosophies have a correspondingly negative view on “altruism”.

 

Supporters of altruism as a moral code demand that the individual is obliged to serve his fellow men. Many human beings will refuse to be such servants since these individuals understand that they create significantly more self-happiness by adopting another action pattern. Then the guardians of the high altruistic morality will change this, and they have to make the “altruistic” actions relatively less unprofitable by introducing sanctions and punishment in order to make people act “altruistically”. But the ones, who now start acting “altruistically”, do so in order to avoid the sanctions and punishment. Then we leave “altruism” even in Rational Gaudist translation and arrive into rational secondary self-happy motivation inside the new reality created by the sanctions and punishment (But it is really difficult to talk about rational actions when the State has introduced right-violating punishment and sanctions). Thus, the motive power to follow the altruistic moral code is too weak since it does not comply with the fundamental nature of the individual human being. It will be far better to adopt a self-happy-motivated moral code in the pursuit of making progress in society instead of wasting time and resources on testing altruism.

      An altruistic moral code may therefore put the concept of ethics / morality in danger of being undermined in favor of a pattern of behavior with no clear guideline for human action where short-term pleasure and avoidance of short-term discomfort reign. Altruism prescribes that the duty of the individual human being is to serve some higher purpose than self-happiness, and this gives a basis for people in power to commit cruel violations against the individuals in the pursuit of making them act in accordance with this “higher purpose”, which in practice often means to serve the interests of an oppressor.

 


 

 

 

 

III.  Politics

 


 

4.  Nature-given rights

 

 

Jurisprudence is essentially occupied with detecting the philosophical basis for claiming that certain permissions, prohibitions, decisions and actions are not to be rejected/hindered in their pursuit of values. When a permission, prohibition, decision or action is in accordance with this philosophical basis, it is defined as legitimate (in the jurisprudential sense). Each permission/prohibition/action is either legitimate or illegitimate, and we assume that the philosophical basis of legitimacy is given. A permission/prohibition/decision/action is then legitimate if it is given / carried out without violating already legitimately assigned permissions/prohibitions/decisions, and is not legitimate (illegitimate) if it violates already legitimately assigned permissions/prohibitions/decisions. This implies that nobody may legitimately hinder/reject a legitimate action/permission, and on this unavoidable principle all Rational Gaudist politics is built. But the recipient may (though not always) renounce it, and the donor may have a clause included in the permission that the permission may be withdrawn at a later stage. Elements without free will cannot be accused of illegitimacy since they cannot act otherwise than told by their instincts.

 

Rights: A right is a permission to which an object is legitimately assigned in order to pursue its values, and the right is assigned by providing powers (tools) or liberties for realizing the values. According to the previous paragraph, nobody may legitimately remove the right – unless the paragraph's specific prerequisites are fulfilled. (Example: A man gives three boys permission to play football in a garden. If the man has legitimate ownership [or other legitimate right] of the garden, a real right of the boys is present. The boys have a right to play in the garden, and no other than the man himself may legitimately deprive the boys this right. The tools granted by the man to enable football playing are the lawn and two soccer goals.)

 

Nature-given rights: A nature-given right of an object is a permission to which the object is legitimately assigned by nature in the pursuit of its values; corollaries to directly nature-given rights are also referred to as nature-given rights. No other than nature or the object itself may eventually deprive the object of its nature-given rights without being accused of illegitimacy. According to Rational Gaudism, “perceiving happiness” is the only value (see Section 2.2.2.2). Therefore, an object that does not possess the ability to perceive happiness or unhappiness has no nature-given rights whatsoever.

      A nature-given right of a human being is what nature allows the human being to perceive of happiness through the powers (tools) that nature legitimately has given the human being for perceiving this. A nature-given right of an animal is what nature allows the animal to perceive of happiness through the powers (tools) that nature legitimately has given the animal for perceiving this. An animal that does not have the ability to perceive happiness or unhappiness has no rights.

 

Nature's permissions are legitimate: The only tools and powers given to humans and animals by nature (through millions of years of evolution) are non-processed natural resources and their genes (in addition you have other humans to interact with); the fundamental nature of a human being or an animal is implied by its genes. It is impossible to claim that the natural resources or the genes of humans and animals are not legitimately assigned by nature by the following chain of reasoning: A legitimately assigned permission is a power/liberty that has been assigned without violating other legitimately assigned permissions (to pursue value) during the assignment. Nature cannot have violated other legitimately assigned permissions since the evolution until the occurrence of the human genes took place in a time period when nobody but nature was capable of assigning permissions; besides, by definition the elements of nature do not have free will and therefore, accusing nature of behaving illegitimately would be nonsense.

      We have shown that permissions (to pursue value) given by nature obviously are legitimate, ergo these are nature-given rights. Therefore, no other permissions, prohibitions or actions may be legitimate if they violate nature-given rights. Thus, human beings and animals may have nature-given rights to use their genes and natural resources for pursuing values. In the following sections we will detect which nature-given rights human beings and some animals possess.

 

 

4.1  Individual rights of adults

 

Definition of rationality: The ability to understand, draw conclusions and think.

Definition of a rational being: A being that has the ability to process the sense perceptions by logical thinking in order to choose to perform actions so the being can influence its own destiny through technological evolution and thereby liberate itself from its natural instincts (see Section 2.4.1). The human being is the only known rational being. This recognition has been acquired by induction from observations of many individuals and also through introspection of one's own consciousness.

 

 

1)

The human being has the ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness, i.e. nature has assigned to us those genes needed for perception of happiness/unhappiness, especially genes which are expressed in those parts of the brain being occupied with perceiving happiness/unhappiness. This only applies to the individual; the nation, race, family, social class etc. does not have the ability to perceive happiness. Thus, nature has assigned us, as individuals, with the permission to perceive happiness – yes, more to it; we are predetermined to pursue happiness and to avoid unhappiness. From the definition of the concept “right” we have a nature-given right to pursue happiness.

 

2)

Question: Which tools (powers) has nature given us in order to pursue happiness and to avoid unhappiness?

 

3)

Answer: Our rational nature. Nature provides its raw natural resources to disposal for the fundamental genetic nature of Homo sapiens. The individual man has (a) those genes which are necessary for performing choices of action by rational evaluations and (b) those genes which are necessary for using his muscles – i.e. to act (muscles controlling language and handiness included). Thus, the individual man is by nature assigned with the permission to perform actions based on his rational evaluations. This means that the individual has the following nature-given right: “Liberty to think up and to choose to perform those actions which are necessary in the pursuit of maximization of self-happiness during the life span”. Nobody (except for nature itself) is to refuse any human being this right. The right to liberty has been established, and this right is the human tool in the pursuit of happiness. This is the only directly nature-given right of the individual; other rights being referred to as “nature-given” in the continuation are simply logical consequences (corollaries) of this one. It also has to be mentioned that humans have some basic “instincts”, which are motive powers for action, but the individual has the power of rationality to evaluate if it is profitable with respect to long-term happiness to follow the “instincts” or not.

 

4)

Question: Do the humans possess the right to life? (Right to life = “right to perform those actions which are needed to survive”).

 

5)

Answer: Since the human being has the right to liberty to act in the pursuit of maximization of self-happiness during the life span, the humans also possess the right to perform those actions needed for survival since survival is a precondition for creating positive happiness (the right to life is thus a subgroup of the right to liberty). Killing another human will exterminate all his options to use his liberty for performing those actions needed for the pursuit of happiness.

 

 

According to the statements above, the individual human being has nature-given rights in a double sense of the concept “nature”. Firstly, the individual human being has nature-given rights in the sense that nature has assigned the genes to the human being through evolution. Secondly, the individual human being has nature-given rights in the sense that the tools that the rights are based on (our genes for perceiving happiness, rationality and use of muscles and the consequences thereof) are inherent in the fundamental human nature, and thus, the rights are implied (given) by our fundamental nature. If nature had been an element with free will, it would have committed a right violation by withdrawing a nature-given right since it is implicitly inherent in our fundamental nature, unless nature simultaneously altered our fundamental nature in the direction of being compatible with the withdrawal of the right. If so, a rockslide would have committed a right violation by breaking the leg of a human being. But “nature” is by definition the collection of all elements in the Universe lacking free will (and not being created by elements with free will) and accordingly, accusing nature of behaving illegitimately by withdrawing nature-given rights, which are implicitly incorporated in the human nature, would be nonsense.

 

A particular individual has life. To perceive happiness (and to avoid unhappiness) is the only valuable aspect of the reality, and everything else is means in the pursuit of that objective. If the individual, according to a rational evaluation and given the present preconditions of the reality, realizes that he cannot use his liberty for creating positive surplus of self-happiness the rest of his life, there is no reason for sustaining life. Then it is rational to use his liberty to commit suicide.

      If he realizes that there is a rational possibility for generating positive surplus of happiness during the rest of his natural life length, he has to use his liberty primarily to perform those actions being necessary for sustaining his life. Furthermore, the individual has to use his liberty to perform those actions which rationally are expected to maximize the surplus of happiness during his life span.

 

Women have of course the same nature-given rights as men – the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness and all logical consequences thereof. Exceptions from this are special rights that are directly attached to the female genetic nature as child bearing beings (e.g. self-determined abortion – see Section 4.3.2). All kinds of State inflicted “feminism” exceeding equal nature-given rights for men and women are rejected (see also Section 10.6).

 

 

4.1.1  Right violations against adult human beings

 

Since all (adult) humans have the same right to liberty, this right is expressed in the following way in a social context: “the right to think up and to choose to perform those actions which are necessary in the pursuit of maximization of self-happiness during the life span as long as one does not violate the similar right of others or other nature-given rights or their logical consequences”. Formulated in this way, the right to liberty is an absolute right without limitations. But one question arises: How can an individual violate the right to liberty of other people or other nature-given rights?

 

Considering how the right to liberty can be violated, each element in its definition has to be considered: (1) carry out actions, (2) choices of action (“think up to choose”).

 

 

1)

The performance of the action can be violated by initiation of physical force including murder, violence, assaults, rape, unauthorized imprisonment, vandalism, theft, occupation against owner's wish, hindrance of established use of natural resources.

 

2)

Choices of action can, in addition to physical force, be violated by the initiation of psychical force defined as the use of non-physical activity for preventing a person from using his rational abilities during a choice of action. This includes (i) all forms of non-physical activity directly addressed against another individual that this individual clearly has marked that he does not accept or which the performer ought to know that he would not accept, and which this individual has to do something actively to avoid (threats of physical violence, screaming, scolding, roaring, exaggerated sharp tone, defamation etc.), (ii) contract breach and swindle, (iii) significantly perilous activities which, alone or as a participant in a sum, inflict other human beings with well-founded fear for manifestation of other right violations even if such violations do not appear in practice; see also Section 6.1.1 (you are forced to take unwanted precautions); also including sincere planning for other right violations even if no violation is realized.

 

When physical force is initiated against the individual, it is obviously not the individual who uses his free will to hurt himself or his property. When a human is exposed to frightening activity as mentioned in point 2i, the individual does not use his free will to choose to be frightened. It is a reflex from the spinal cord originating from the time when the humans were located on the savanna being exposed to lion attacks. Those who were not frightened by lion roars were easier eaten by the lions than those who were frightened. Thus, the genes encoding this reflex from the spinal cord were promoted in the evolution.

       Psychical force often means initiation of non-rational activity (screaming, scolding, roaring, exaggerated sharp tone etc.) in order to impose psychical pain on another person in the pursuit of achieving a value tool from this person, not by exchanging value tool against value tool, but by getting the other person to “give away a value tool” in order to avoid the psychical pain. You receive a negative value (psychical pain) that you have not chosen to receive. Then you have to give away a positive value tool for getting rid of the negative value, i.e. you make a forced choice of action in order to re-establish the normal situation. In this way psychical force violates the choice of action and thereby violates the right to liberty.

      Common for both physical and psychical force is that the aim is to frighten the opponent from using his liberty to think rationally during a choice of action. The use of physical and psychical force may be free of punishment in self-defense, but will be right-violating if significantly more force than necessary is used for the self-defense. In certain cases the use of physical force may be free of punishment in self-defense against psychical force. Criminalization of psychical force is assumed to have a civilizing effect upon the society (see also Section 10.4.1).

 

It is right-violating to participate in a right violation as a part of a sum even if your part does not trigger the violation by itself. In order to be regarded as a participant it has to be proven beyond rational doubt that the action contributes logically to the right violation beyond a right-violator letting himself influence by it as a passive action. Providing – deliberately or through gross negligence – objects that are subsequently used for a right-violating action is regarded as participation in the right violation if and only if you knew or ought to have known that the objects would be used in a right-violating manner or that the danger thereof was threshold-exceeding. Soliciting a right-violating action in a situation where the solicitation may be expected to be realized is regarded as participation in a right violation. Alterations in prices, profits etc. due to the sum of voluntary market interactions are not right violations and thus, not a valid reason for regulating the market participants.

      Remaining passively to other humans or animals that want your services will never be right-violating unless you on beforehand voluntarily have committed to something else or your efforts are demanded as a consequence of a right-violating act that you have performed against them.

 

We have now established how the individual right to liberty of an adult can be violated. Considering violation of other nature-given rights, it is the rights of animals, children, mentally disabled and persons under guardianship that is to be regarded. How these rights can be violated is mentioned in the Section 4.2.2 and 4.3.1.

 

 

4.2  Animals' rights

 

The human being is a rational species, which means that humans have the ability of rationality in their genes. As mentioned above, this implies that the individual human being has the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. The individual human being has a nature-given right to live according to its genetic nature. We have already stated in the beginning of chapter 4 that a being which does not have the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness does not have nature-given rights whatsoever. What kind of nature-given rights does a happiness/unhappiness-perceiving animal possess? Animals are mostly instinctive, non-rational beings, i.e. happiness and unhappiness arrives as a consequence of instincts (see Section 2.4.1 and 2.5.2). The animals' happiness is often sexual pleasure, and their unhappiness is pain, fear or hunger.

 

 

1)

The animal has the ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness, i.e. nature has assigned the animal with those genes needed for perceiving happiness/unhappiness, especially genes which are expressed in those parts of the brain being occupied with perceiving happiness/unhappiness. Thus, nature has assigned the animal with the permission to perceive happiness. From the definition of the concept “right” the animal has a nature-given right to pursue happiness (This is valid only for superior animals with the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness).

 

2)

Question: Which tools (powers) has nature given the animal in order to pursue happiness and to avoid unhappiness?

 

3)

Answer: The animal's instinctive nature. Nature provides its raw natural resources to disposal for the fundamental genetic nature of the animal. The individual animal has those genes which its instincts are based on and those genes which are necessary for using its muscles. Thus, the animal is by nature assigned with the permission to perform actions based on its instincts. This means that a happiness-perceiving animal has the following nature-given right: “The right to act in accordance with its fundamental instincts”. Nobody (except for nature itself) is to refuse any happiness-perceiving animal this right. The animals' “right to act in accordance with its fundamental instincts” has been established, and this right is the animal's tool in the pursuit of happiness. Thus, to act in accordance with its fundamental instincts is an equally fundamental nature-given right for the animals as the right to liberty is for the human beings. The animals do not have the genetic structure that is necessary for carrying out a rational process; therefore, the right to liberty is NOT a nature-given right for the animals. The instincts are the animals' slave driver.

 

4)

Question: Do animals possess the right to life?

 

5)

Answer: Let us assume the opposite of what is to be proven, namely that animals do possess the right to life. Then, the State has to prevent the lion from eating the zebra, the cat from eating the mouse, the lynx from eating the deer etc. That will imply the death for the lion, the wild cat and the lynx. Accordingly, the right to life for the preys implies violation of the right to life for the predators. We have reached a contradiction; ergo at least the victims of predators do not possess the right to life. A lion killing a zebra cannot be regarded as a violation of the fundamental instincts of the zebra since “survival of the fittest” is the fundamental principle of nature (a zebra may also partly thank the lions for its existence since the lions kill other species that compete with the zebras over scarce nutrition). Thus, it is in accordance with the instincts of the zebra to be eaten by the lion. And it would be a violation of the lion's right to act in accordance with its fundamental instincts if the lion was denied killing zebras. Regarded from the preys' point of view it does not matter whether they are killed by a predator or a human being as long as we do not expose the animals to more painful treatment than what is normal in the evolutionary process.

      But what about the lion and other predators being at the top of the hill – do they possess the right to life? It is completely in accordance with the principles of the evolution, and thereby with the nature of predators, that predators are being exposed to deadly competition from other predators (e.g. lion and hyena). Many examples show that at one stage in the evolution predators may be at the top of the hill, but at a later stage another predator may arise eating the first predator (e.g. raptors and predatory fishes). Therefore, being exposed to deadly competition or being regarded as a prey by the human being is not in conflict with the fundamental nature of predators. But the human is a rational being and is elevated over the natural Darwinism as pointed out above (see Section 1.6.2), and one cannot use this argumentation to deny the humans right to life.

      The conclusion is that animals do not possess the right to life.

 

The right to act in accordance with its fundamental instincts is valid only for somewhat superior animals, which possess the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness. Plants, inferior animals and mean advanced animals do not perceive happiness/unhappiness, and accordingly they do not possess any nature-given rights whatsoever. These life forms may be treated in the same way as non-living resources as iron ore, oil and water. All animals that are amphibians or evolutionary more primitive than these, are assumed to be non-happiness-perceiving, while all animals that are evolutionary more advanced than the amphibians, are assumed to be happiness-perceiving (see Section 2.4.1).

 

 

4.2.1  Why do not animals possess the right to liberty?

 

The animals are tied up by their genetically settled instincts, which are developed and are developing through biological evolution (even if some skills are taught from the parents to the children for superior animals – Section 2.5.2). A moose running in the forest is not free but is enslaved by its instincts. Positive alterations in the animals' ability to improve their life happens practically only through biological evolution. The human genetics imply the ability to rational thinking (and additionally language and handiness), and this gives the humans liberty to commit their own evolution of technology and ideas in order to improve their lives. Therefore, the human beings are free (from the tyranny of evolution) because of their genetically encoded ability for rationality. Consequently, the evolution of the human beings has gradually left the biological evolution, and improvements of human life occur today through technological evolution and not through biological evolution. The contribution of the latter is in practice zero compared with the contribution from the technological evolution even if the biological evolution perhaps progresses at least as rapidly as earlier. If the individuals of a species are to possess the right to liberty and the right to life, they have to possess intelligence and rational abilities at such a level that they can break out of the slavery of the biological evolution and start their own technological evolution. Even if chimpanzees are intelligent in comparison with other animals, and even if they have 98% of the genes in common with Homo sapiens, they do not have a brain potential at such a level that they can start their own technological evolution. Therefore, Homo sapiens is the only species having the right to liberty and the right to life.

 

 

4.2.2  The conflict between the rights of animals and humans

 

Since animals do not possess the right to life and liberty, it is acceptable to keep animals in custody and to kill them (e.g. for eating them or taking their fur). But the humans do not have the right to use their liberty to keep the animals in custody in such a way that their fundamental instincts are violated since the “right to act in accordance with their instincts” for animals and the right to liberty for humans are defined at the same level (compare point 3 in Section 4.1 and 4.2). Human sadism against animals is not in accordance with the nature of the animals since sadism does not occur in nature; it is not evolutionary profitable. The lion does not torture the zebra for fun but kills it as fast as possible in order to eat it. But the animals' instincts are not to be respected in such a way that the animals obtain the right to live “freely” untouched by humans because that would be a violation of the right to liberty (to improve their lives/happiness) of the humans. Which fundamental instincts each animal possess will to a certain extent be a subject for doubt and has to be decided by some section of the State in cooperation with experts.

 

Let us illustrate the above statements with an example: The human being “A” has basically unlimited freedom when living in his own apartment – e.g. to play music. The human being “B”, living in the neighboring apartment, has exactly the same right to liberty – e.g. to sleep at the middle of the day. But when both A and B are living there simultaneously, the situation becomes different. B may not demand complete silence the whole day, and A may not invade B's apartment with sound waves whenever he likes. Ultimately, the relationship between A and B has to be regulated by the juridical system even though such cases seldom reach the courts. An intersubjective judicial evaluation has to be the basis for the estimation of the border line for violation of the other's rights in this case (see Section 5.7).

      In the similar way: An animal has the right to act in accordance with its fundamental instincts but does not possess the right to liberty. The animal has the right to expose its instincts in the “free nature of God”. If a human being enters this area, he has the right to liberty and has the right to do exactly as he likes. But when animals and humans stay in the same area, the situation becomes different. The human may use the animal (e.g. keep it in custody) but in such a way that the fundamental natural instincts of the animal are not violated. To unite this potential clash of interests the relationship between the animal and the human being has to be regulated by the law in such a way that the estimation of the border line for violation of the other's rights is based on an intersubjective judicial evaluation. The fundamental instinctive nature of the animal is not the same as completely “free” life untouched by humans.

 

It may be objected that the animals cannot possess rights since the animals do not have the ability to create a State that is able to defend their rights. Firstly, nature-given rights are given by the fundamental nature of the being (which is provided by nature through evolution), and consequently their existence is not depending on the presence of a State, but the State is a necessity for defending nature-given rights against beings with free will (i.e. humans). Secondly, a predator does not violate the nature-given rights of its hunting object when eating it since this is in accordance with the nature of both of them. If we imagine that a lion had imprisoned a zebra and was torturing it cruelly for fun, it would have been a violation of the rights of the zebra. But this does not happen in real life because the lion does not have the genetic structure (free will) that is needed for violating the zebra's rights in this way – and no other animals do either. Therefore, animals' rights can be violated only in coexistence with humans, and the animals do not need an Animal State in order to defend their rights when living in the “free” nature far away from the humans. Only humans can use their liberty to torment animals if we believe that we create more self-happiness by tormenting them than by not tormenting them. Therefore, the State of rational humans is obliged to defend the nature-given rights of the animals. The basic principle is that all beings, humans and animals, possess the right to pursue happiness in accordance with their nature. The human right to liberty is defined at the same level as the animals' right to live in accordance with their instincts.

 

Why are the self-happy-motivated humans to avoid violating the fundamental instincts of the animals if the humans create significantly more happiness by violating them? The humans need their nature-given rights and a State to defend them. But the fundamental philosophical principles implying the nature-given human rights also imply certain nature-given rights for the animals. The rights of the animals arrive as logical side-effect of that chain of argumentation which leads to the discovery of the nature-given human rights. Thus, the self-happy-motivated humans have to avoid violating the fundamental instincts of the animals otherwise we will undermine those rights which we ourselves are depending on. If the State does not defend this principle for the animals, the principle will weaken, and it will only be a matter of time before the principle is weakening for humans.

 

4.2.2.1  Concrete examples of non-right-violating treatment of animals

 

It is not in accordance with a chicken's nature to fly. Accordingly, it is OK to keep it inside a cage. But it is not in accordance with the chicken's nature to be kept in a small cage of 10x10 cm. The chicken has to be kept in custody in such a way that it is able to move around. Flying is one of the most fundamental instincts of the canaries. Therefore, it ought to be illegal to keep such birds in cages.

      Cows, sheep, pigs, dogs etc. have been bred during centuries to be domestic animals in custody. Therefore, it is completely in accordance with their nature to be held by humans. If the sheep was to live “freely” in nature, its wool would grow and become so long that the sheep would stumble in it. Therefore, it would be cruelty against sheep to have them living “freely” in nature. Cows should not be standing in a narrow cow pen all the time. The cowshed should be built in such a way that the cows can move freely.

      If an animal cannot be in custody without violating its fundamental instincts, it should be illegal to keep such an animal in custody (e.g. birds in cages).

 

Regarding animal experiments, laws have to ensure that the sufferings of the animals are minimized. The more advanced consciousness the animal has for perceiving happiness/unhappiness, the higher threshold for the researchers' freedom of action. Animals without ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness ought to be used as far as possible. Drosophila, angleworms, nematode worms etc. may be treated completely freely by the researchers since these animals are not supposed to have any ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness. Mice and rats may be used for medical research but only if their fundamental instincts are not violated during the experiments. The great apes are almost semi-rational beings, and they may only be used for medical experiments in rare, exceptional cases, and they have to be handled with special respect.

 

It is impossible to reflect on all animals and situations in these examples, but the point is that it is a legitimate task for the State to estimate what is in accordance with the animals' instincts. Laws have to ensure the nature-given rights of animals in human custody. Considering uncertainty about a species' ability to experience happiness and unhappiness, the applicable principle is innocence until the contrary is proven. This means that man is innocent in maltreatment of animals unless it has been proven as (at least) predominantly probable that the species has the ability to experience happiness and unhappiness.

 

 

4.2.3  Can an animal violate human rights?

 

Question: A lion has the right to act in accordance with its instincts, and if the lion's instincts tell it to eat a human being, the lion should have the right to do that. This ought to imply that we cannot legitimately stop a lion's killing of a human being. On the other hand, human beings have the right to life. Therefore, the lion should not have the right to kill and eat a human being, and we should have the right to stop the killing. How can these contradictions be united?

      Answer: A lion trying to kill a human being only follows its fundamental instincts and thus, it does not act illegitimately (neither does a bacterium or virus). Therefore, the victim may not legitimately retaliate by limiting the lion's fundamental instincts (as we do when a murderer is imprisoned). He may e.g. not put the lion into a small cage and expose it to torture. But it is not against the lion's nature to be killed (it does not have the right to life), nor that the preys hits back (e.g. gnus sticking their horns into the lion). Thus, the attacked person or other bystanders may legitimately kill the lion, whip it in order to make it flee or catch it and send the lion to a quality zoo where its fundamental instincts are not violated.

 

Question: What should the State do with a lion that has eaten a human being?

      Answer: Theoretically, the State is not obliged to “execute” or “imprison” the lion in a zoo since it has not acted illegitimately, but the State may do so as a part of its non-mandatory tasks. If a lion kills a human being, this does not mean absence of illegitimacy in the sense that the State defends the lion against revengeful humans who want to “lynch” the lion. Whoever may legitimately kill a human-eating lion (lions do not have the right to life). A murderer is privileged in comparison; only the judicial system is allowed to punish him.

 

Question: What happens if somebody owns the lion?

      Answer: Then the owner has committed homicide with gross negligence with especially dangerous weapon. In this case anyone may not execute the lion (except from in direct self-defense). The owner has to be punished by the judicial system, and the Police have to neutralize the “weapon”.

 

 

4.2.4  Summary of human and animals' rights

 

All beings have the right to pursue happiness (and to avoid unhappiness) according to their fundamental genetic nature; humans according to their rational nature, animals according to their instinctive nature. Beings without the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness do not have any rights at all.

      Establishing the rights of the animals as described above will also strengthen the respect for the individual human rights. If we claim that animals do not have nature-given rights according to their nature (non-rational, instinctive), we cannot expect to be taken seriously when claiming that the human being has rights according to his nature (rational).

 

 

4.2.5  The distinction between rational and non-rational beings

 

When we are to evaluate whether a being has the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, we have to examine if the being has the ability to process natural resources from their natural condition in such a way that we can observe the tendencies to a technological evolution. The making of “technological products” indicates that the being has the ability to liberate itself from its natural instincts, i.e. it has rationality. It is assumed that a species' use of abstract concepts is a prerequisite for being able to produce and to use technological tools in such a way that the being can liberate itself from its natural instincts. Additionally, in order to have the right to liberty the being has to possess a level of intelligence making it rationally capable not to violate the rights of others since “not violating the rights of others” is an ingredient in the definition of the right to liberty. Thus, a being's ability to create “technological products” (e.g. arrow tips or axes of stone) and IQ > 55 (Syse, 2006) are necessary and sufficient preconditions for deciding that the being has the right to liberty and the logical consequences thereof.

 

Syse A. Strafferettslig utilregnelighet – juridiske, moralske og faglige dilemmaer. Tidsskrift for strafferett (2006) 6(3), 141-175.

 

 

4.2.6  Artificial life and rights

 

Imagine that we could construct a robot that had the ability to think up and choose alternatives of action (included those actions needed for sustaining its own existence), and the ability to produce new robots of the same kind. Would this robot have the right to liberty and life as nature-given rights? No, the robot has to possess the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness in order to have rights. A machine can never feel happiness or unhappiness and therefore, it does not have any rights at all. If such a “robot” was to perceive happiness/unhappiness, it had to be a biological being, and in that case it would theoretically possess the right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness since the genes for rationality, use of muscles and perception of happiness are inherent in the nature of the being. The being is created by humans, and one could imagine that the rights were “given by humans” and not by nature, but such rights are deduced from the being's fundamental nature, i.e. the fundamental qualities used by the being's consciousness in the pursuit of its values (happiness). If the humans legitimately are to deprive the beings of its rights, its fundamental nature has to be altered by gene manipulation in such a way that absence of the right does not violate its nature.

 

 

4.3  Children's rights

 

A child has the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness (the only valuable aspect of the reality). Therefore, it is meaningful to ask the following question: “Do children possess rights and if so, what kind of rights?” A nature-given right for a child is what nature allows the child to experience of happiness. Which tools does nature give the child in order to experience happiness? The tools are the human genes of the child and natural resources in the outer reality. Additionally, nature provides the child with another tool, namely parents. All children are from nature equipped with a biological mother at birth (the father might have died between the conception and the birth).

 

 

1)

The child is a being that possesses the ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness. That is, nature has assigned the child with those genes needed for perceiving happiness/unhappiness, especially genes which are expressed in those parts of the brain being occupied with perceiving happiness/unhappiness. Thus, nature has assigned the child with the permission to perceive happiness. From the definition of the concept “right” the child has a nature-given right to pursue happiness.

 

2)

Question: Which tools has nature given the child in order to pursue happiness and to avoid unhappiness?

 

3)

Answer: Follow its nature. Basically, nature provides its raw natural resources to disposal for the fundamental genetic nature of the child. The nature of the child is a potential rational being, but it does not have the capacity to use the gene products for processing the natural resources. But additionally, nature assigns the child with another tool in the pursuit of happiness, namely parents. The parents are to be a link between the natural resources and the genetic equipment of the child. The following nature-given right for children is established: “right to parents” in the sense that the biological parents (or others who have adopted this function) are obliged to be leaders for the child in order to develop its inborn rational genetic potential into an adult human being who is able to use the right to liberty for maximizing its self-happiness during its life span.

 

4)

Question: How can the parents develop the innate human genetic potential?

 

5)

Answer: Through natural biological development, upbringing and fundamental education. These factors are achieved by maintenance and care. The parents are obliged to provide the child with maintenance, care, natural biological development (health), upbringing and fundamental education. The child has a right to get these goods from its parents.

 

6)

Question: Does the child possess the right to life?

 

7)

Answer: Yes, the right to life for a child means the right to survival by the maintenance and care of the parents within the scope of reasonable technology. To kill a child means an illegitimate withdrawal of nature's entitlement to develop its potential rationality into a rational being.

 

8)

Question: Does the child possess the right to liberty?

 

9)

Answer: No, only individuals with developed rationality possess the right to liberty (to think up and to choose to perform those actions being necessary in the pursuit of maximization of self-happiness during their life spans). Children do not possess the right to liberty. Therefore, the parents may initiate force against their children, but only for developing its rational potential so it becomes able to use its right to liberty as an adult for generating self-happiness. In the process of raising the child it ought to be gradually accustomed to more freedom.

 

In summary, children have the following nature-given rights: right to pursue happiness, potential right to liberty, and right to parents (the latter implies further right to life, maintenance, care, natural biological development [health], upbringing, and fundamental education; thus, these rights are rights that children have through their parents' duties).

 

The State is obliged to defend the nature-given rights of all individuals, and the children's rights are no exception. The State is obliged to ensure that the child has parents who act in accordance with the definition of parents, i.e. comply with the duty to give the child maintenance, care, natural biological development (health), upbringing, and fundamental education. How the State ought to defend these rights in practice is stated in Section 4.3.5. The precise minimum limit for maintenance, care, natural biological development (health), upbringing, and fundamental education has to be estimated in the best possible manner by the State in cooperation with experts (see Section 5.7). Fundamental education ought to include teaching in the scientific method (and other rational epistemological principles) and rational course of action and excludes indoctrination with anti-knowledge as e.g. resides in irrational religious metaphysics. The State also ought to spread adult enlightenment against religious crackpot and its alike (astrology, homeopathy, fortunetellers etc.) since this has a blurry interface with swindle.

 

 

4.3.1  Right violations against children

 

Children have the “right to pursue happiness”, “potential right to liberty” and “right to parents” (“right to life” included) as their nature-given rights. A parent is defined as an adult who has taken on the responsibility to be a leader for the child in order to develop its inborn rational genetic potential into an adult human being who is able to use the right to liberty for maximizing self-happiness. The parent does this by maintenance, care, natural biological development (health), upbringing, and fundamental education.

 

 

1)

A parent violates the nature-given rights of a child by not acting in accordance with the definition of a parent. The parents (and other persons) violate the child's rights by carrying out force (physically or psychically) against the child that do not contribute to fulfill the criteria of the definition of a parent unless in self-defense (see also Section 10.4.3).

 

2)

Other persons violate the child's rights and parental right of the parents by carrying out force against the child even if the purpose is to comply with the criteria of the definition of a parent. Exceptions are self-defense, emergency situations for preventing the child from hurting itself when the parents are not present, or if the parents have approved the use of force.

 

The parents have the official responsibility for effectuating those actions needed to ensure the nature-given rights of the child in the daily life. The parents of the child may be assisted by others to effectuate these rights (relatives, friends, cohabitant, or other volunteers). The parents of the child should be registered in The National Register. The State is obliged to defend the nature-given rights of the child. If the parents violate the nature-given rights of the child, the State has to intervene; in a worst case scenario the State has to find somebody else who can fulfill the parental duties until the child reaches the age of majority (foster parents, adoptive parents or orphanage).

 

Since the parents only may initiate force against their children in the pursuit of developing their inherent rational potential, child labor for upholding itself and the family is basically right-violating, but it is legitimate and beneficial to let the child work for learning responsibility and willingness to make efforts. Nevertheless, in extreme cases it may be legitimate for the parents to force the child to contribute to uphold itself and/or the family if the parents are so poor that absence of the child's labor will imply death, essential health problems or significant damage for the ability to have its rational potential developed as an adult.

 

 

4.3.2  The beginning of life and abortion

 

Considering the legitimacy of abortion, the central question is as follows: When does life start? If a new human life is defined to start when the egg cell and sperm cell fuse, abortion will always be right-violating against the embryo unless the life of the mother is at stake. If we were to accept this definition, it would mean that we ought to rescue one hundred fertilized egg cells from a building on fire in stead of saving one adult individual. You also ought to be punished as a mass murderer if you put a reagent vial with 100 zygotes into the trash.

      Each collection of matter that does not possess the ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness does not have (independent) nature-given rights at all (see Section 4.1 and 4.2.4). A fertilized egg does not possess the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness (e.g. pain), and does not have any independent rights. This situation continues until the time point when the neuronal system has developed in such a way that the embryo has obtained the ability to perceive conscious feelings, i.e. perception of happiness/unhappiness. It is assumed that pain is the embryo's first primitive conscious feeling. The mother and father “own” the non-happiness-perceiving embryo, but an owner (here: the mother/father “co-ownership”) does not have the right to keep his belongings on another person's territory. Until the day for the beginning of the embryo's ability to perceive pain the woman has unlimited right to do as she likes with the embryo, and self-determined abortion is a matter of course.

      After the embryo has obtained the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness (starts with absence of pain contra pain) the embryo has rights, and self-determined abortion is no matter of course. What kind of rights does it possess? Does it possess the right to liberty? No, but neither born children have that right. Is the embryo alive at this stage? Yes, otherwise it could not be happiness-perceiving. A living, happiness-perceiving baby has the right to life. Imagine an argument A saying that a happiness-perceiving embryo does not have the right to life. Then it is difficult to avoid concluding that argument A also implies that a born, happiness-perceiving baby does not possess the right to life. But such a baby has the right to life as a potential rational human being. We have reached a contradiction. Consequently, an happiness-perceiving (pain-perceiving) embryo has the right to life. The woman has to give such an embryo sufficient time to leave her body (i.e. until the time point of natural birth or caesarean section), and this initiated, happiness-perceiving life may not be terminated at will.

 

Pain perception requires conscious recognition or awareness of a noxious stimulus. Neither withdrawal reflexes nor hormonal stress responses to invasive procedures prove the existence of fetal pain, because they can be elicited by non-painful stimuli and occur without conscious cortical processing. Fetal awareness of noxious stimuli requires functional thalamocortical connections. Thalamocortical fibers begin appearing between 23 to 30 weeks’ gestational age, while electroencephalography suggests the capacity for functional pain perception in preterm neonates probably does not exist before 29 or 30 weeks (Lee et al., 2005).

      If a woman is to be guilty of murdering her embryo, it has to be proven beyond rational doubt that she has killed a happiness-perceiving human individual. If so, it has to be at least predominantly probable that the embryo has signs of consciousness at the time of abortion. According to Lee et al. (2005) it is less than predominantly probable that the fetus has consciousness before the 29th week of gestation. Thus, a woman who chooses provoked abortion in the 28 first weeks of gestation has not committed a right-violating action. Therefore, the time limit for self-determined abortion ought to be set until the end of the 28th week of gestation. After this time point abortion is only legitimate if the mother's life or health is in danger, or if the child's outlook obviously is a non-viable pain hell.

 

Someone may argue that the fetus is without any rights until birth, but immediately after it has left the womb, it has the same rights as a child. It is implicit in this notion that a being's nature-given rights depend on its geographical location (here: in or outside the uterus). This is fundamentally wrong. A being's nature-given rights arise from the fundamental nature of the being's consciousness. There are only differences of a few minutes between “inside and outside the womb”, and no fundamental change in the nature of the consciousness occurs when the “heartbreaker” passes the birth canal. Someone may falsely claim that the child is able to exist independently of the mother after the umbilical cord is cut and is able to breathe on his own and take food by mouth. The reason why this is wrong is due to the fact that the child is still totally dependent on its parents for survival – not least by getting breast milk. The child does not become independent by getting food through the breast rather than through the umbilical cord, and no change occurs in the fundamental nature of the consciousness.

 

Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence. Lee SJ, Ralston HJP, Drey EA, Partridge JC, Rosen MA. JAMA. 2005;294(8):947-954.

 

 

4.3.3  The biological mother's responsibility for the child

 

After the starting point for perceiving happiness/unhappiness, the embryo has independent rights as a child (see Section 4.3), and the biological mother may not do as she pleases with it. Children have the potential right to liberty and to pursue happiness but are not able to care for themselves. As explained above, the child has a nature-given right to at least one parent. Since the child naturally is in its mother's custody already from the start of life (when the embryo develops the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness), the State may not withdraw her parental custody unless she violates the nature-given rights of the child since that would be initiation of force. If the mother just leaves the child, it means that she violates its right to parents since the child is not able to obtain new parents by itself, and considered this way the mother is obliged to maintain the parental custody until other volunteers take on the responsibility (and the State always ought to be such a volunteer of last resort – see Section 4.3.5). But the mother may have an agreement with (normally) the biological father over sharing the parental responsibility.

 

 

4.3.4  The biological father's responsibility for the child

 

When a man and a woman meet at a discotheque and have casual sex without contraception afterwards, the intention is obviously not to have children, but to feel good for a short time. The presumptive agreement (see Section 5.3.2.4) in a case like this can not be “acceptance of maintaining and caring for a child until it is of age”, but on the contrary, that the woman shall have an abortion if pregnancy becomes the result or that she takes emergency contraceptive pills after the coitus. Violations of this presumptive contract – i.e. bringing the pregnancy into a child birth – implies that she has to maintain and care for the child by herself (or together with other volunteers) until the child is of age. In such a case the woman unilaterally – and through a contract breach – decides to bring birth to a child; it is not the man and woman who bilaterally choose to have children when they have casual sex without using contraception. Since the male does not make the choice to have children (on the contrary, he has been the victim of a contract breach), he may not be forced to take on parental responsibility unless he voluntarily signs a contract stating his liability. If the man could have taken regret pill or abortion in the same way as the woman, the case would have been different, but this is biologically impossible. The case would also have been different if regret pills and abortion did not exist. In the case of an abortion the man, having made the woman pregnant, has to pay the complete costs of the abortion since he is guilty in the existence of the embryo and additionally, he has to pay a lump sum to the woman for tort and pain in connection with the abortion.

 

The National Register administers a document called “The Child Treaty”, which the biological mother and father voluntarily may sign. This treaty includes that the mother and father are to be equally important parents and that they are obliged to fulfill the fundamental rights of the child as described in the Child Law. The Child Treaty ought to state that if the parents stop living together, shared custody arises unless the parents agree on something else or if one of the parents is declared incompetent by the court. If only one of the parents gets the custody after a split up including a Child Treaty, the other one has to pay maintenance.

      If man and woman lives together, it is not unnatural to have a contract of marriage or cohabitation that automatizes the Child Treaty. Alternatively, the pregnant woman tells the potential father that she is pregnant, and proposes at the same time that they are to sign the Child Treaty. The potential father may decide not to be the father for the child by refusing to sign the Child treaty. The content of the Child Treaty will be effectuated if the woman gives birth to a common child during the present pregnancy. A corresponding treaty may be signed after the baby is born if this has not been done before. But regarded from the female point of view the Child Treaty ought to be signed before the deadline for abortion runs out. If man and woman have not signed the Child Treaty together, the child will be registered with only one parent in the National Register. This single parent may of course find an adoptive parent of the opposite sex to sign the Child Treaty later on.

Thus, different scenarios may arise:

 

 

1)

The man does not sign the Child Treaty before the abortion deadline expires, and the woman chooses to give birth to the baby: The biological father does not have any economical or other responsibilities for the child, and he does not have any rights connected to the child. The biological father may change his mind and sign the Child Treaty later on (if the mother accepts it).

 

2)

The man does not sign the Child Treaty before the abortion deadline expires, and the woman chooses to take abortion: The man has to pay for the abortion and additionally pay a lump sum for tort and pain.

 

3)

The man signs the Child Treaty before the abortion deadline expires, and the woman chooses to give birth to the child: The man and the woman are 100 % equally responsible parents.

 

4)

The man signs the Child Treaty before the abortion deadline expires, but the woman chooses to take abortion anyway. No punishment will be directed against the woman, but the man does not need to pay for the abortion.

 

5)

The man wants to sign the Child Treaty, but the woman refuses. The man will then have no formal parental function, and point 1 or 2 is applicable.

 

Ideally, the child ought to have one “boss” in the same way as a company has one CEO, but biologically, two persons of opposite sexes are necessary for making a child. Besides, the child ought to have parents of both sexes in consideration to its development and maturing. Therefore, the State has to give opportunities for having two parents (bosses) with equal responsibility: mother and father. Thus, having a system that refuses two females or two males (or more than two persons) to be officially registered as the child's parents, is not right-violating. The father may be registered as the only parent if the mother and father agree, or if a court order states this.

 

 

4.3.5  The State's responsibility for the child

 

The State is obliged to ensure that the child has parents who fulfill the parental obligations. How to do this in practice has to be decided by empirical testing (HDM).

      From a strict nature-given right reasoning the State could say as follows: The parents made the decision of giving birth to a baby, and then they have to face the consequences themselves or eventually with other volunteers. If they physically refuse to be parents or are incompetent, the State has to provide the child with adoptive parents or orphanage and finance this process at their expense.

       This is not considered to be a good way of defending the child's nature-given rights. The State ought to give child benefit in order to contribute to help the parents with their heavy parental responsibility. If the mother and father have signed the Child Treaty, half of the benefit ought to be paid to each of the parents. The child benefits should be inversely proportional with the income of the parents; parents with economy exceeding a specified limit will receive zero State support. The State ought to assist and support persons who want to adopt away their children regardless of the children's age. The State is not obliged to implement these to benefits, but this ought to be done as long as the benefits may be financed without violating the nature-given rights of the individuals. If the parent(s) of the child do not fulfill its fundamental rights adequately, failure of care arises. The State has to intervene to find new parent(s) for the child or use the Child Care Authority in another way. The original parent(s) may be held economically responsible for a period of time.

       It is assumed that a birth rate at a suitable level will contribute to maximize the long-term happiness for most individuals weighted against how strong non-right-violating influence they are able to perform on the State executives (see Section 7.2). Therefore, the tendencies of alteration in the annual birth rate ought to be one indicator settling the magnitude of the child benefits. High birth rates imply low child benefit. Low birth rates imply high child benefit.

       The parents – eventually with help from other volunteers – are responsible for using their own money plus child benefit for the maintenance, education and upbringing of the child. Since the child has the right to life (survival) and health on the parents' expenses, a part of the child benefit ought to be used for a health and disabling insurance and insurance against decease of the parents. Sufficiently well-situated parents may be imposed to pay such insurances completely with their own funds. If the child becomes medically disabled before he comes of age, he shall be able to survive from this insurance the rest of his life with normal length. If the parent(s) want, they may of course insure the child additionally.

 

 

4.3.6  Other persons under guardianship

 

What kind of rights is provided for mentally disabled and others who cannot live without guardianship after reaching age of majority? These people will continue to have rights as children: “right to parents” who are obliged to provide them with maintenance, survival (life), health, care. They will possess these rights until they are mature enough to achieve complete liberty, eventually the rest of their lives. The parent(s) of a disabled child may choose to continue their function and receiving child benefit. Alternatively, she/he/they may renounce the responsibility, and the State has to find another guardian, eventually put the non-mature individual in an institution on the State's expense.

       Medical research provides better opportunities for detecting mental disabilities in the early embryo. Therefore, in the future fewer mentally disabled are expected to be born since the mother often will abort a genetically damaged embryo.

       Adults, who become psychically ill or mentally retarded over a certain limit, will be denoted as potential rational. They will temporarily lose the right to liberty, and will obtain rights as children. They will be put under guardianship.

       Imagine a person who is not conscious, and who is in a condition where it is beyond all reasonable doubt that he never can become conscious ever again. Thus, absence of conscious is his nature. According to his nature he does not have the ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness, and therefore, he does not have the right to life.

 

 

4.4  The State


When a human being walked alone on Africa's savannas in ancient times, he could use his freedom to pursue happiness without any fear of violations of this right. When more people arrived (and became aware of each other's existence), the situation became different. The permissions assigned by nature to the humans (the nature-given rights) can unfortunately not be defended by nature against right-violators. Therefore, the need for a State in its most primitive form arises. Individuals living inside a certain geographical area have a nature-given right to organize (see Section 5.4) and a nature-given right to defense of their nature-given rights (see Section 6.2). The combination of these two nature-given rights implies the legitimacy of the State as an organization that is to defend the nature-given rights of the individuals. A group of persons having interests inside a geographical area without governmental authority, including nature-given rights that can be violated, have a nature-given right to establish a State in this area.

 

Firstly, let us establish the legitimacy of the monopoly of the State on system of justice, Police and military defense inside its territory: Competing systems of justice will give rise to huge problems when the defendant/suspect and the plaintiff/victim are members of different judicial systems, and establishing prosecuting authority will be chaotic. Chaotic conditions will also arise with competing systems of Police and/or military forces with large probability for “tribal wars”. The systems of justice and public order will go into an anarchic chaos, and the nature-given rights cannot be defended. Thus, presence of competing systems of justice, Police and armed forces inside the same geographical area violates the nature-given right of organized defense of the individual rights; one does not have the right to organize in such a way that the nature-given rights of others are violated. Accordingly, we cannot have competition on the obligatory tasks of the State; by its nature the State must have monopoly inside its geographical area. Since one State already exists defending the rights of all individuals inside the actual geographical area, the individuals' nature-given right to organized defense of their rights is not violated even if they are forbidden to start alternative systems of justice, Police and armed forces. Establishing a competing system of administration of justice, Police or military defense in a Rational Gaudist society is right-violating because this will obviously afflict the population with well-founded fear for anarchy-like conditions (i.e. initiation of psychical violence)and thus, well-founded fear for violation of the right to organized self-defense of the natural rights.

      The first “protection organization” to offer protection of the nature-given rights (without violating of the same rights) inside a given geographical area has the “right” of being the State (first come, first served). This is parallel to a situation where a farmer has established property right on a piece of land – then no other farmers may compete over sowing corn on the same patch of field (only on the neighboring fields). This State monopoly does not exclude the existence of private security firms as long as their activities are strictly regulated by the State. Private arbitrators may also function as voluntary settlers in civil disputes as explained in Section 5.3.1.2.

 

Since the State has to have monopoly on those institutions being necessary for defending the nature-given rights of the individuals (system of justice, Police, military defense), the group establishing the State is obliged to defend the nature-given rights of all persons inside the territory of the State. This is because the right to self-defense and the right to organize are nature-given rights, and the others without such defense would otherwise have the right to establish their own State, which is a contradiction to the fact that the State from its nature has to be a monopoly.

     

The State is a necessary precondition for us to use the powers and tools that nature has assigned to us. The State is to ensure that the permissions (rights) legitimately assigned to us by nature are not illegitimately withdrawn – i.e. by others than nature itself. These rights are based on a genetically determined rationality, and a little jocularly we may say that a germ to the existence of the State is resting inside the human genome. We also observe from the ancestors of the humans and the first primitive humans that it is the human nature to live in groups (“states”) in order to obtain internal and external protection.

       At first in the history of mankind, the State was not so clever in defending the nature-given rights of the individuals, and the State performed many right violations itself. But gradually, the humans started to learn how to use the genetic germ for rationality, and they became aware of how the State should work in order to realize the rational human nature. In 1776 the American founding fathers acknowledged the fundamental function of the State by the use of their rational abilities and experiences. Similarly, DNA has always been in our cells, but first in 1953 the humankind became aware of its fundamental function. See also Section 4.5 and chapter 7.

 

 

4.4.1  The right to rebel

 

Individuals have a nature-given right to self-defense and to organize. This is also valid if the existing State violates the individual rights or largely ignores or fails to defend them. If a group of individuals are to defend themselves against the right violations from their own State (after having failed in trying the judicial system), civil disobedience, armed rebellion or the establishment of a new State on parts (or the whole) of the country's territory may be acceptable options. In order to be legitimate such a rebellion has to lead to less violation of nature-given rights (collateral damage) in the long-term perspective than those violations which the rebellion is trying to defend the individuals against. You also have to take into account the likelihood of the insurgency to fail – if the battle is lost, you may be unfortunate enough to get lots of collateral damage in addition to the old regime continuing or increasing their infringements. In order to start an armed rebellion, you should be very sure of a relatively quick success on beforehand – sacrificing you own life is not rational; unnecessary sacrificing of third parties' lives is right-violating. If the old regime use right violations of moderate degree (e.g. compulsory taxation), it will be cruelly right-violating if rebels carry out fatal or crippling attacks even against the supreme leaders. A prime minister in a Western democracy of today does not deserve the “death penalty” (see section 6.1.2) because he fronts a regime engaging in compulsory taxation (which after all, to a significant extent, is used for compulsory insurances and useful infrastructure). Armed rebellion in today's Western democracies is completely illegitimate; besides, a hypothetical group being able to organize a successful, armed rebellion in a Western democracy, is necessarily so strong that it will be significantly easier for the group to gain governmental power through democratic elections (by similar argumentation tax evasion etc. is not an acceptable way of fighting right-violating taxation in Western democracies; the correct way is to vote for parties whose politics is located inside the borders of Rational Gaudism). However, it can not be 100 % ruled out that a majority regime performs so grave right violations that it justifies armed rebellion (an extreme example of this is Nazi Germany in the 1930s where Hitler came to power through democratic elections and in accordance with the Constitution). It is under no circumstances legitimate to rebel or make civilian disobedience against a State that does not violate the nature-given rights of the individuals. A legitimate state has the right to exercise self-defense against rebels, but the right violations that may be expected following the defense, have to be significant less in the long-term perspective than those right violations expected to be imposed on the citizens by the rebels; thus, capitulation may not be absolutely disregarded as an option.

 

 

4.4.2  Which actions may be subjected to punishment?

 

An action is punishable only if it is right-violating (see also Section 6.1). If an individual performs an action that violates the rights of another individual, organization of individuals, child or animal, the Police and judicial system is obliged to stop and/or punish him in order to prevent him from carrying out or repeating such actions. If a person, according to a rational evaluation and given the present reality, may expect to create significantly more self-happiness in the long-term perspective by violating the nature-given rights of others, it is not necessarily directly immoral to do so (see Section 3.6 and 9.4.2). In this case the State has committed a neglect of duty by not implementing punishments and crime clear-up rates/mechanisms of such a character that crimes do not pay off (see Section 3.6). The latter is to ensure that crimes become immoral based on the principles in Section 3.1-3.3. Thus, in a rational and legitimate state roughly all criminal actions will be immoral, and each individual ought to establish a sense of duty against right-violating actions (see Section 3.9.1.1). But in the light of the reality we have to realize that a very few persons may become happy as a consequence of performing criminal actions, even though it is not morally acceptable: The criminal may be lucky and avoid being caught, and at the same time be so cold or stupid that the fear of being seized is small.

 

 

4.5  World wide Superstate

 

When several human beings are living together on a limited area, the State is obliged to defend their nature-given rights (in this context an extended family, tribe etc. may also be a kind of State in a primitive society). This is important since we are rational beings, and governmental authority is a prerequisite for the defense of those rights which are necessary for the humans to fully practice their rational nature.

      But what about the relationship to the neighboring state? How small or large ought a state to be? Imagine that each “state” consisted of ten people, making the total number of states in the world 600 millions. That would be a very ineffective system with many neighbor quarrels. The individual rights would be ensured inside the “state”, but the potential for violations of liberty and life by wars and conflicts would be large.

 

A nation or people do not have any innate importance. The important consideration is that the State defends the nature-given rights of all individuals in an adequate manner inside its geographical area (where within it obviously must have physical control), that it does not violate any of these rights, and that it does not attack likeminded states. Such a state is called a legitimate State. Nobody has the right to force a legitimate State to fuse or enter into a union. A geographical area inside a legitimate State does not possess the right to break away to create a new state. On the other hand, a geographical area inside an illegitimate state has the right to break away if the purpose is to establish a new, legitimate State.

      A legitimate state may legitimately invade a right-violating (illegitimate) state in the one and only purpose of establishing a regime with significantly increased respect for the nature-given rights of the individual (see Section 4.4.1), but the legitimate state is not obliged to do so. In order to be legitimate such an invasion has to cause fewer and less severe violations (summed both under the invasion and in the long-term perspective afterwards) than those right violations which the invasion is trying to free the individuals from; thus, one ought to be very cautious with invading other countries. Rationally regarded, the legitimate state should only undertake an intervention if it is in accordance with the self-interests of its own citizens in the long-term perspective.

 

We are living in a semi-anarchistic global system where different states keep safety and ensure rights inside their own borders. The thought is that these states are to cooperate harmonically together. This works to a certain extent, but there is a lot of chaos. There are also many states cruelly violating the nature-given individual rights, and these have to be regarded as bunches of criminals and not as legitimate states. Since gradually more of human action occurs globally, it would be rational if the legitimate states in the world created a world wide Superstate which is to ensure that:

 

(a) legitimate states are not violated, (b) the states are not violating the nature-given rights of their inhabitants, (c) states keep their contracts with other states, foreign individuals and their organizations, (d) international crimes are stopped (environmental crimes included), (e) property rights and other rights on international territory are respected (international waters, The Antarctic etc.).

 

The Superstate's military machinery may not be used without the approval of the General Assembly of the Superstate, which is pointed out by the member states. The task of this military force is to stop and punish criminal states which attack other, respectable states, or which commit violations against the nature-given rights of their own inhabitants (when exceeding a certain limit) and to eliminate their governments.

      The long-term objective is to get as many countries as possible to voluntarily join the Superstate. These states will be sovereign members of the Superstate, a sovereignty which is only limited by the points (a-e) above. No legitimate states are to be forced into the Superstate, and legitimate states may withdraw from the Superstate.


 

 

 

5.  Specification of nature-given rights

 

 

In this chapter we are to explore more rights being subgroups or direct logical consequences (corollaries) of the right to liberty. These “new” rights also fit into the concept of nature-given rights (see also Section 5.7) since they are logical consequences of rights given by nature; they are not social “rights” upheld by violating some of the nature-given ones:

 

 

5.1  Property right

 

When the human being uses his right to liberty to perform actions in the pursuit of creating self-happiness, physical manifestation in the form of property arises since he has processed non-owned and unused natural resources away from the natural state into a state of increased usability; the human being has by its nature the genes that are needed for creating property (genes for the use of muscles, rationality, free will, language and handiness). Since the natural resources used for creating the product are non-owned and unused, he does not violate anyone's rights by creating the product. From the definition of legitimacy (see chapter 4) the producer's use/disposition of the product is also legitimate since nobody's rights are violated by using or disposing the product. Consequently, he has the right to use and to dispose his property (included to let it be untouched), and the property right is established as logical consequence of the nature-given right to liberty.

      If other persons use/take/dispose the product without the consent of the owner, they violate the property right. By depriving or impairing a person's property, he is forced to work a period of time for replacing the property to reconstruct the situation before the violation. Thus, he has his right to liberty violated in this period of time as a consequence of the property violation. If the product is permanently abandoned and without a known owner, new property right may be established according to the principle of “first come, first served”.

 

Basically, the property right is based on processing non-owned and unused natural resources away from the natural state into a state of increased usability, but the creator may transfer the property right to others as a consequence of the contractual freedom being a nature-given right (see Section 5.3).

      The basis of the property right is the difference between the processed state (state of increased usability) and the natural state, and the economic value is defined by the market's willingness to pay for this difference. A vein of gold lying in the underground has no value in its natural state; the value arrives when somebody digs out the gold and produces gold jewelers, tooth fillings or gold coins. A natural resource being in its natural state may not be claimed to be anybodies property. Fencing in a non-owned field of land without processing it duly is a violation of the right to liberty of other individuals. In order to establish property right, the natural state has not only to be altered, but it has to be altered into a state of increased usability. You may not carpet-bomb or asphalt a huge non-owned and unused area for obtaining property right by claiming that the bombing or asphalting is not the work of nature. These are attempt of preventing other person's right to travel, to use or to establish property rights on non-owned and unused areas (see also Section 5.1.3).

      It is not correct to say that we have property right to our own body because property right requires that we have processed something away from the natural state, and that is not the case for the human body. But the right to liberty directly gives us the right to dispose our own body (the genes for rationality and use of muscles are legitimately assigned to us by nature).

 

It is also possible to achieve property rights to intellectual property as outlines of non-trivial product ideas, music, film etc. since the producer has created it with his own brain and experiences legitimately acquired from others. In that way the producer has created intellectual products, which did not exist in natural state. No other than the producer has the right to these products, but others may take part in such products on the premises set by the producer. Therefore, patents, registered trademarks, design protection and copyrights are legitimate instruments for defending the property right. When a product idea has appeared in materialized form in the market for a long time, the product idea is gradually transformed into triviality, and consequently the patent rights logically disappear over time. Therefore, it is legitimate to limit a patent's validity to a certain number of years.

 

If a human being hunts down a wild moose on non-owned property, he has worked up property right for the moose meat. A lion may kill a zebra, and one should perhaps believe that the lion obtains property right to the zebra meat. But the lion does not possess the right to liberty since it is not a rational being (the concrete proof for that is the fact that no lion has ever showed any sign of creating “technological products”), and it is the right to liberty that implies the property right.

 

The property right can be violated by vandalism, theft and by staying on another person's property against his will. Vandalism and theft mean that the thug physically has destroyed/removed property in such a way that the owner cannot carry out his actions of choice with his property. Staying on an owner's property against his wish means that the intruder prevents the owner from effectuating the choice of letting the property stay untouched. The property right can also be violated by contract breach (see Section 5.3.1). All kinds of confiscation or expropriation of private property is absolutely forbidden whatsoever; it is only nature (elements without free will) that may withdraw this nature-given right without being accused of illegitimacy.

 

Since all humans have the same property right and the same right to liberty in other respects, the property right is expressed as follows: “The right to acquire property and to dispose this property as long as the owner does not prevent the similar right of others or violates other nature-given rights or their logical consequences.” Expressed this way the property right is a non-violable right without any limitations (see also Section 5.1.2 for working up property right). But one question arises: How can a property or its use violate other people's property right or other nature-given rights?

      Considering “the use of property in such a way that other person's use of their property is prevented”, the first person having initiated his use has the right on his side. You may not shoot out of your own window with your own shotgun risking harming persons on the street. You may not play rock music at maximum sound level in such a way that you invade the neighboring apartment with sound waves making it impossible for the neighbor to sleep. You may not drive your car in 200 kilometers per hour in a crowded city in such a way that people can be killed or property is at stake of being destroyed. A factory owner may not emit poison gases in such a way that the life and health of its neighbors are violated.

      If reduction in the value of an already established usage of a property arises through objectively measurable physical burdens or obstructions from neighboring activity or new constructions, those who caused this have to pay at least full compensation for the loss of estimated market value. If an already established usage of the property de facto becomes impossible, the burdens / obstructions have to be prohibited or reversed. However, this does not mean that you may demand compensation for disliking the color of the house or skin of your neighbor; neither that a new competitor has to pay compensation for reducing the value of already established companies.

 

 

5.1.1  Property right is not based on initiation of force

 

Doubt over a person's property rights may sometimes arise. Has person A processed a certain land area away from the natural state in such a way that property right is present, or has he fenced in the area in such a way that the public's right to liberty on non-owned area is violated? If the judicial system concludes in favor of A, the authorities have to use force against those (B) who do not respect the decision. Is this initiation of force or self-defense?

      When the judicial system has stated that A has property right, B initiates force if he violates A's property (similarly for other nature-given rights). The existing legitimate State has monopoly on Police and judicial system, settling disputes included; anything else would be a contradiction to the individuals' right to organize self-defense (see Section 4.4). Thus, eventual use of force by B will mean that he participates as a part of a sum to violate the individuals' right to organized self-defense of their nature-given rights. The decision of the judicial system has to be respected if it is in accordance with the nature-given rights of the individual. However, B has the right to use civil disobedience or rebellion if the nature-given rights of the individual obviously is violated, but only if the severity of the realistically expected third-party damages of the rebellion is less than the severity of the right violations in the long-term perspective (see Section 4.4.1). Organizing a rebellion with this argumentation on the basis of a peripheral disagreement on the interpretation of the criteria for property right is practically impossible.

 

 

5.1.2  Working up property right in non-owned area

 

There are not so much non-owned areas today as it was in the USA several hundreds of years ago, but it is still interesting to consider the principles for civilized establishing of property rights on non-owned land areas.

      Non-owned areas are not the property of the State, and the State may not sell something that it does not own. All human beings have the right to liberty, and the State is obliged to defend this right. All humans in the world have the same inherent genetic nature and thus, they have the right to try to work up property right on non-owned area (but foreign citizens may be refused to stay on State property, included car driving on roads in exceptional cases – see Section 5.5.7). A person who wants to work up property right for an area ought to start processing the area first. Then, as soon as possible, he ought to send a claim to the State on the right to use (see Section 5.2) for processing this area away from the natural state in such a way that property right arises. If two or more persons make claim on the same area simultaneously, a lot drawing ought to be carried out between the claimants. The State is to accept the claim unless it is predominantly probable that the planned activity will violate the rights of others. The claimant has a protected right for e.g. 5 years to process the area in such a way that property right arises, and no others may perform activities preventing this processing. During these 5 years he has to process this area away from the natural state into a state of increased usability in such a way that the property right to the area (or parts of it) arises. If he does not, the field will stay non-owned area, and others may claim the right to work up property right for it.

      Some limits ought to exist for how large area you may claim for the right to use of establishment of property right for a given purpose; if it is predominantly probable that the claimant is not able to establish property right over the whole area within the specified period of time, he will violate the right of others to try to establish property right on parts of the same non-owned area. The claimant ought to pay a fine for the part of the area that he is not able to work up the property right for.

 

 

5.1.3  Property that lie fallow

 

A property can go back to the non-owned state if nature re-establishes a state similar to the natural state. Imagine a man A entering a non-owned land area. A clears the field and cultivates corn for two years. He has now worked up property right (and not only right to use) for this field. Then he moves from his field. Twenty years later A returns, but one year ago another man B had arrived and re-cleared and re-cultivated the area. Just before B's work the field was approximately as wild and untidy as when A originally cleared it 21 years ago. In this situation it is reasonable to say that A legitimately has lost the property right to that land, and that B has carried out a legitimate acquisition of property. The principle may be that if more that 15 years have passed since the field was cultivated (corn, potatoes, hay etc.), the field returns to non-owned area.

      In a similar way a large garden around a building (or without building) that has been turned into a tangle during e.g. 15 years will no longer be regarded as the property of the original owner but as a non-owned area. The same principle will apply if the garden is not a tangle, but where the tangle effect, which develops by long-term unused state, has been hidden by asphalting, artificial turf, lawn mowing etc. The owner still has property right over the building (unless it has been left vacant for a similar period of time and is tangle-like). Then, another person may apply for working up property right around the house (perhaps except 4-5 meters from the building).

      Let us consider a building that has been left vacant for more than e.g. 15 years and resembles an uninhabitable ruin. The building represents something that is processed away from the natural state, but not into a state of increased usability, and the property right to the building will also disappear and turn into a non-owned state. The similar principle may apply for factory halls, airfields, overgrown roads, commercial building, blocks of flats etc. It is nature by the ravages of time that withdraws the property right in these cases. Section 10.5 describes a principle for transition between the states “in use” and “unused” for forest.

 

If a person discovers a land area or building which he means has laid fallow for a sufficient long time (e.g. 15 years for former cultivated fields, left building, empty house, garden around a house etc.; for forest see Section 10.5), this person may go to an court-like office (property right office) for demanding the right to work up property right according to the principles of Section 5.1.2. Then this office has to consider if the criteria for fallow is present. The judicial office has to prove as predominant probable that the original owner has neglected the property. If so, the former property is declared as non-owned, and the new person may work up property right. This will prevent feudal” conditions. It also emphasizes that the area itself is nobody's property, but difference between the processed state and the natural state is. Prices on building sites and land areas are expected to be reduced as a consequence of these principles.

 

 

5.1.4  Inheritance

 

Considering the distribution of an estate of a deceased person, the principle has to be that the one having processed the natural resources away from the natural state (directly or indirectly) into the actual property is the one to decide the distribution of the inheritance. It is the testator who has performed this effort, and accordingly his testamentary decision is the law for the distribution of his property left. Each individual, who is not under guardianship, has the right to transfer his property to anyone he may prefer, and he also has the right to decide when this transfer is to occur; something else would be a violation of his property right. By a testamentary decision he may decide that the transfer of the property right to his belongings is to occur at his death and who to be the beneficiaries. Philosophically, “at his death” will mean “infinitesimally before the time point of his death” since a deceased person does not have any rights.

      When a person dies without leaving a formal testament, one has to consider a presumptive testament (see Section 5.3.2.4); i.e. the testament that the deceased most probably would have composed if he should have expressed his last will at the very moment before his death. In order to bring such presumptions into civilized forms the Law prescribes that the children/parents are the primary heirs; secondarily the children/parents of the primary heirs. A presumptive testament will naturally have the content that an eventual spouse / cohabitant will inherit in a way that depends on how long time they have lived together. Cohabitants / spouses may also have a binding inheritance clause in their living-together contract. If other persons mean that they were equally close or closer to the deceased than those mentioned above, they have to make this claim for a court within a specified time after the death, and the burden of evidence is resting upon them. It may also happen that e.g. one of the children claims to be significantly closer to the deceased than other children, and if this is proven as predominant probable in the court, he may get more of the inheritance than the other children. When a person dies and does not leave any children, parents, siblings, testament or contract of marriage/cohabitation with inheritance clause, the property is considered as non-owned property. All non-owned properties of this kind are distributed among random nationals of the State by drawing lots each year. Archaeological discoveries are – as the main rule – entirely the property of the finder (see also Section 5.1). Exceptions from this are present when the owner is known and still exists (e.g. a state or a very long-lived company), then the law may specify a reward for the finder while the owner gets the rest.

      When the testator obtains unlimited right to decide over his left property, it may be used as an age insurance. The future testator may enter a contract with one or more persons (or a company) on getting nurse and care – with parts of or the whole inheritance as service in return.

 

5.1.4.1  Organ donation

 

According to Rational Gaudism, an individual obviously decides over his organs and body as long as he is alive. He cannot transfer his organs or body to others “infinitesimally before the time point of his death” in the same way as mentioned for inheritance of assets. As a dead person, he cannot transfer anything since zero rights apply to elements that do not have the ability to perceive happiness. His dead body is taken over by those who are believed to be most interested in it, which will be his heirs (funeral) unless otherwise is obviously rational. The latter will be relevant for medically well-founded or forensic autopsy, and his heirs cannot refuse. Obviously, people who need transplants have more interest in kidney, lung or heart than the heirs. Therefore, medical staff may take donor organs from e.g. traffic victims in order to save the lives of others without the formal permission of the deceased or his heirs.

 

 

5.2  Right to use

 

Each individual has the right to use an untouched and unused natural resource since such use does not violate the rights of other individuals; this is one of the tools which nature includes in the right to liberty. A resource that has been processed away from the natural state into a state of increased usability is owned by the owner, and no other person may touch this property without consent of the owner. But who has the rights to a resource that is already being used, but is not processed away from the natural state? Since the resource has not been processed away from the natural state, the user does not possess property right to the resource. A human being who initiates the use of a natural resource does not commit any right violation by doing so. Accordingly, he has the right to continue this use; i.e. others may not violate his use. If somebody uses the same natural resource in such a way that the initiator's use is prevented, it is right-violating. If somebody uses the same natural resource in such a way that the initiator's use is not prevented, it is not right-violating. In practice, determining “preventing” may sometimes be somewhat difficult, and therefore, an intersubjective judicial evaluation has to be the base for the estimation of the limits in this respect. This may be specified in the Law and settled by the courts according to earlier court practice. If the legitimate user of the natural resource ends his use, another person may legitimately and free of cost restart the use since he does not prevent anyone's use, and new right to use is established. Of course, one person may sell his right to use to others.

      A banal example follows: If you sit on a bough in an non-owned tree, nobody has the right to force you down, but when you have left the bough, you may not refuse others to sit down since your use of the bough has not made it more useable for sitting (your sitting has not processed the bough away from the natural state into a state of increased usability). In Section 5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 these principles for right to use are applied on forestry, fishing and hunting.

      It is not possible to achieve rights on another person's property by prescription through continuing use. Right to use other person's property may only be achieved by an accepting agreement with the owner.

 

 

5.2.1  The right to use to forest

 

Right to use to forest arises when a lumberman enters a non-owned and non-used forest area and hews a tree. Then he works up the right to forestry inside a circle with the tree stump as centre and radius similar to the length of the hewed tree. A forester has the right to use to a forest area since he (or those he has bought or inherited the area from) historically has performed forestry in the area. But he does not possess property right to the forest area since the area is not processed away from the natural state into a state of increased usability. In fact, the usability of the area for forestry has decreased since several trees have disappeared following the hewing. The forester achieves property right to those logs which actually have been hewed.

 

Since the forester does not have the property right to the area, he may not rebuff activity in the forest that does not go against his forestry. When a person makes a walk in the forest, he does not violate the right to use of the forester since walking does not interfere negatively with forestry. Therefore, the forester may not refuse a tourist to walk between the trees, and he may not refuse a hunter to go hunting there (see also Section 5.2.3). One may raise tents between the trees as long as the forester's right to use is not violated (not in a planting area – the small trees will be violated). Cultivated fields appear differently because it is impossible to walk without violating the corn straws, which is the farmer's property. A random person may not hew trees in the forest to build a house because the forester's right to use to forestry is violated. However, the forester may build e.g. a house in the forest and work up property right to a garden around it since he does not violate anybody's rights by doing so. If a forester has built a road in the forest, he has the complete property right over it because he has processed the area away from the natural state and into a road.

 

Local people will often have worked up right to use to walking in the forest. Therefore, the forester may not exterminate forest to such an extent that the right to use to walking is violated. Similarly, a large forester may not exterminate forest en mass in such a way that the stock of moose disappears or becomes strongly reduced from the area. That would violate the hunters' right to a worked up hunting quota which is expressed in a share of the yearly increase of moose (see Section 5.2.3).

      If the extermination of the world's forests should occur in such a tempo that it is predominant probable to threat the level of oxygen in the atmosphere, a supranational court of the Superstate may impose hewing restrictions or timber taxes upon all foresters of the world with the argument that each forester participates as a part of a sum to threat the right to life (see Section 6.5).

 

A forester has the right to use to a forest area because he (or those he has bought or inherited the forest from) historically has performed forestry in that area. If the forester is lazy and does not keep up the forestry, his right to use will logically withdraw, and the area will again become unused and non-owned. Then, other persons may pursue the establishing of right to use to the field according to the principles of Section 10.5.

 

 

5.2.2  The right to use to fishing

 

Imagine a stock of fish consisting of 1 million fish, which is not necessarily located inside a sharply limited area since the fishes are swimming over large distances. The annual increase is 200,000 fish. Person A (or a fishing company) has historically caught 20,000 fish each year. Thus, he uses 10 % of the stock (100,000 fish) for cultivating those 20,000 fish that he actually catches each year. Nobody has the right to force him away from using these 100,000 breeding fish for breeding new fishes as long as he actually keeps up the use (the fishing activity). This means that each year he has the right to fish a quota of 10 % of the annual fish increase, i.e. the surplus of fish that his breeding stock annually gives. Similarly, we imagine Person B having a quota of 60% (uses 600,000 fish for breeding those 120,000 fish which he catches annually), while C's quota is 30 % (uses 300,000 fish for breeding those 60,000 fish which he catches annually). If other fishermen catches fish from the “breeding stocks”, they violate A,B,C's right to use. The State is obliged to defend this right to use in such a way that one fisherman does not “steal” from another one by overfishing. Fishing boats may work up right to use to fish resources still being unused. This may occur by discovering a fish resource which has not been historically exploited, or if the annual increase of a known fish resource is not fully exploited by existing users.

      If A catches 40,000 fish one year, it means that he either steals from the annual quotas of B and C, or that he catches 20,000 fish from the total breeding stock. The latter means that he catches 2000 of his own breeding stock (and that is not right-violating), but he also catches 12,000 from B's breeding stock and 6000 from C's breeding stock, and that is a violation of their right to use. If A had been the only fisherman, he had been able to legally overfish as much as he had liked without violating anybody's rights, but it would have been stupid in the mean and long term perspective since he would have sawn off the bough that he is sitting on.

      The 100,000 breeding fish that A uses are not his property since they have not been processed away from the natural state into a state of increased usability. The breeding stock is a non-owned resource that A has the right to use because he has historically used this non-owned resource, and because he still keeps up the use. However, he has property right to those fishes which he actually catches and later on processes further since these are processed away from the natural state into a state of increased usability.

 

An office in the Ministry of Justice will each year perform a scientific evaluation of the size of the total fish stock and its annual increase, and on this basis they will calculate how many fish (fish quota) each fisherman, fishing boat or fishing company has the right to catch. The task of this State office is not “to administer the joint fish resources of the society” but to ensure and enforce the right to use of the owners of the fishing boats. The fish quotas may be freely purchased and sold. In this way we obtain an ideologically correct definition of “the right to fishing” based on the fishermen's initiation and maintenance of the use of the fish stock, and not the socialist idea that the fish in the sea is “the joint property of the citizens”. If there is a large excess of fish compared to the total fishing activity, everyone may catch as many fish as they like without any quota regulations since no rights will be violated as a consequence thereof.

       A similar principle can be used for whales and other animal resources in the sea. Since the fishes swim between different nations' waters, nations ought to cooperate over establishing fish quotas. Enforcement of the right to use to fishing in international waters may be a task for the world wide Superstate.

 

Thus, fishermen can have right to use to a fish resource in a sea area. But the fishermen do not have property right to the sea floor or the water itself. If an oil company arrives pumping up oil in the area, it does not violate the fishermen's right to use to the fish resources (unless the oil company pollute in such a way that the stock of fish is eradicated or significantly reduced).

 

 

5.2.3  The right to use to hunting

 

Wild animals in the forest are not the property of the forester since he has not bred the animals away from the natural state (the animals are regarded as non-owned). The forester may not refuse hunters to walk in the forest between the trees since this is not a violation of the right to use to his forestry (see Section 5.2.1). Thus, he may not refuse them to hunt down the animals. Theoretically, he may refuse them to drive on his forest roads unless an explicit or presumptive contract stating otherwise.

      The hunters work up right to use by the fact that the individual hunter historically has shot a certain numbers of animals each year. Thereby, he has used a part of the total animal stock as breeding animals for producing the part of the annual increase that he has hunted down. Thus, he has worked up the right to use the same part of the animal stock as breeding animals also in the future as long as the use actually is sustained. The hunter obtains full property right to the meat, fur, horn etc. of the animals that he actually has killed. This is completely parallel to “right to use to fishing” in Section 5.2.2.

      The right to use ought to be defined in the same way as for fishing: Hunters who traditionally have hunted in the forest (often the forester included) have the right to a quota of the annual increase of the stock of the actual hunting object that is proportional to the size of each hunter's historical use. A State office calculates the annual increase of the stock, and the hunters' numerical quotas are calculated thereof. This office is also to ensure that the animals are not exposed to maltreatment during the hunting. If there is a large excess of wild animals compared to the total hunting activity, everyone may hunt down as many animals as they like without any quota regulations since no rights will be violated as a consequence thereof.

      The forester may not charge the hunters because he cannot sell something in which he does not have any rights, but he may of course sell his own hunting quota in the same way as the other hunters. He may also demand payment for the hunters' use of his forest roads.

 

If the forester severely exterminates forest to which he has right to use, moose, deer etc. will disappear and thus, extensive destroying of forest will be a violation of the established right to use of the hunters. The forester may not manage his forestry in such a way that the rights to use of others are violated. Thus, right to use to hunting will contribute to a natural preservation of the forests with positive consequences for environment, oxygen production and general well-being.

 

An indigenous tribe (may function as a kind of organization) or indigenous individuals may have the right to use to i.e. hunting and gathering in areas of forest, jungle etc. based on their prolonging use. This grants protection against companies or individuals that want to start other enterprises in these areas, but the right to use may of course be sold voluntarily. This does not apply for nomads moving from one place to another over long distances; when they have moved far away from an area and do not return for years, the right to use ceases logically, and others may establish right to use and/or property right there. It is important to emphasize that the right to use is not achieved on the basis of ethnicity; white people will of course have the same right to use if they have had the same prolonging use.

 

 

5.2.4  The right to use to oil

 

The State is obliged to defend the right to free enterprise (see Section 5.5). This means that any oil company, regardless of nationality, safely may search for oil on non-owned territory (as long as the company does not violate the nature-given rights of others). Before test-drilling, the company ought to carry out a process similar to the one mentioned in Section 5.5.6. If two or more companies demand to start test-drilling in the same area simultaneously, a lot drawing ought to be carried out between the claimants. When the company discovers oil (this may require a lot of searching, geological examinations and test drilling) and starts pumping it up, the company's right to use to oil activity in the field arises. Other oil companies are not allowed to pump oil from this field as long as the first company actually performs oil production there. The company has property right to the oil that actually is pumped up since it is processed away from the natural state into a state of increased usability. The company is not to pay compulsory taxes to the State (see Section 7.6.1). Thus, it is important that the State through the State Stock Fund (see Section 7.6.3) has significant shares of ownership in oil companies extracting oil from national and international territories. The State may also demand environmental taxes from oil activity if a court is able to prove that it is predominant probable that the consequences of the oil activity in sum will violate the nature-given rights of the individuals inside a geographical area equal to the jurisdiction of that court (see Section 6.5).

 

 

5.2.5  The right to use and property right in the beach area

 

If the local people traditionally have used a beach for sunbathing and swimming, they have established “right to use to sunbathing and swimming” on the beach. A beach existing in the natural state, cannot be regarded as property but as a non-owned area where it is possible to establish right to use to e.g. sunbathing and swimming. Nobody may legitimately violate an already established right to use by carrying out construction activity on the beach. On an unused beach where right to use has not been established, anybody may build anything as long as it does not violate the rights of others, and property right to the beach zone arises. When the beach has been processed away from the natural state by construction, nobody else may establish right to use to sunbathing and swimming.

 

 

5.3  Contractual freedom

 

Contractual freedom is freedom to renounce freedom if the individual believe that the contract, according to a total evaluation, gives more self-happiness during his life span than complete nature-given freedom. Thus, contractual freedom is obvious a subgroup of the general right to liberty as described in Section 4.1.1, and since the right to liberty is a nature-given right, the contractual freedom also has to be so. The contractual freedom naturally fits into the Superior Constitution (see Section 7.1.1.1), and no other law may infringe this fundamental right. Compulsory solidarity arrangements are right-violating and therefore, voluntary contracts between individuals and insurance company will take over much of the collective solidarity in the Rational Gaudist society (see e.g. Section 7.6.9).

 

 

5.3.1  Why is contract breach right-violating?

 

When two parties enter a contract, the parties agree upon how much value (materialized liberty) they are willing to transfer to the other party in order to obtain specified values from this party (the concept value is being used here and in the rest of Section 5.3 a little imprecisely in the meaning value toolhappiness is the only true form of value). If one party does not transfer the specified values in accordance with the contract, contract breach is present. If the other party has lost objective measurable values through the contract breach compared to if the contract had not been entered, he has been deprived of values against his will, and thus, a right violation is basically present. However, the contract breaker may avoid being identified as a right-violator by providing compensation by conciliation or by complying with a judicial decision on compensation. If committed by intent in the pursuit of profits, the contract breach may be theft by the use of the intellect instead of the hand (swindle, cheating).

      In addition to depriving the other party of positive value, the contract breaker may also cause the other person negative value; the other party may behave differently in the period from the contract entering until the contract should have been implemented compared to if the contract had not been signed. A failure to accomplish a one-sided contract stating that Peter will transfer $15,000 without any payback to Bill in three months, is not right-violating because Peter deprives Bill of values, but because Peter's contract signature causes Bill negative value. Bill may order a new car and start working on the house as a consequence of the contract entering. When Peter's capital transfer does not arrive, Bill will get into economic trouble; he receives a negative value. Thus, contract breach is often right-violating as a sum of depriving of positive values plus transfer of negative values.

      If the party, who complains about the implementation of the contract, either has been deprived of any objectively measurable positive value or has been inflicted any objectively measurable negative value, no right-violating contract breach is present, but only a subjective breach of confidence from the claimant's point of view.

 

5.3.1.1  Sanctions against contract breakers

 

If one party breaks a contract, the other party may not legitimately force him physically to fulfill the contract, but the judicial system may order him to compensate the other party's loss. Additionally, he may in certain cases be imposed “punishment” deterring him from committing contract breaches in the future.

      In the example in Section 5.3.1 Peter is judicially obliged to compensate for the negative value he has caused Bill; he has not been deprived of any positive value, so in that respect there is nothing to replace. This compensation will also have the function of deterring Peter from similar contract breaches in the future.

      George signs a contract to receive 10 cents today, and as a payback he is to transfer a Rolls Royce to Charles in three months time. George fails to deliver the car. Thus, he has unjustly received 10 cents and has to compensate for this. In addition, he is liable for the negative values which the contract violation has caused Charles, but George is not liable for the market value of the car.

      The party having been exposed to the contract breach may legitimately reject fulfilling some remaining parts of the contract, and this may have negative consequences for the contract breaker. Additionally, the contract breaker may have the following sanctions imposed by the courts: 1) compensation for the positive values that he has unjustly obtained from the other party, 2) compensation for the negative values that he has caused the other party, 3) sanctions to deter similar contract breaches in the future (if the deterrent effects of points 1 and 2 are insufficient) but only if it is a premeditated or grossly negligent breach of contract for profit purposes. In cases with only honest disagreement about a contract there shall never be any extra sanctions, but just compensation.

 

5.3.1.2  Private arbitrators and contract fees

 

When two (or more) parties enter into a contract, the parties may, as an element of the contract, agree on which arbitrator to judge over eventual future disagreements about the contract. Therefore, several private arbitrators can be present competing with public courts over this task. Since such arbitration does not become a State monopoly task, both the State and the private arbitrator companies may demand a fee when the contracts are entered, and these fees will partly finance the State judicial system and completely finance the private arbitrator companies (see Section 7.5.2). The fees may be regarded as insurance premiums making it economical possible for the arbitrator to settle eventual future contract disputes. Alternatively, the arbitrator companies and the State may demand a relatively high fee when a dispute over the contract eventually arises. The fees ought to be larger the more expensive the settling of potential contract disputes is supposed to be. The State may decide that certain contract types will be free from such fees at State courts. If a contract is signed without a specified arbitrator, the State automatically becomes arbitrator unless the parties agree on something else when a contract dispute arises; the plaintiff has to pay a relatively high fee for getting the State court to handle the case, and if he wins, the looser has to refund the fee. If a private arbitrator has made a decision over a contract dispute and the looser refuses to accept the decision, the State judicial system and Police will ensure that the decision is enforced upon the looser; exceptions apply if the settlement is in discordance with the principles of the Superior Constitution (see Section 7.1.1.1).

      Considering criminal cases, the State courts must have a monopoly on such lawsuits since it is the society per se that is to be protected against future crimes from the suspect; it is not only an internal affair between the suspect and the victim. Besides, a criminal has no nature-given right to indirectly choose his punishment by participating in electing court for his trial.

 

 

5.3.2  When is a contract valid?

 

Since all individuals have the same contractual freedom and liberty in other respects, the contractual freedom is formulated as follows: “The right to enter contracts as long as the one does not violate the similar right of others, other nature-given rights or their logical consequences.” Expressed this way the contractual freedom is a non-violable right completely without limitations. But one question arises: How can contractual freedom violate the contractual freedom of other people or other nature-given rights? This is described in the sections 5.3.2.1-5.

 

5.3.2.1  Rational voluntariness

 

The contractual freedom does not have any limitations, but a contract is not valid if it is written in such a way or entered into under such circumstances that one party is deluded into entering the contract abeam of his rational voluntariness (natural compulsion is not involuntariness). For instance, this may happen when one of the parties is not with all senses alert, has not reached the age majority, or when the producer of the contract has written important elements with very small font in the purpose of cheating the other party. If George signs a contract with Charles on selling a Rolls Royce for 10 cents, and George refuses to fulfill the contract, he has basically committed a contract breach. But it is good reason for asking if George was with all senses alert at the time when the contract was signed, or if there was any kind of cheating from Charles.

      The more biased a contract seems from an intersubjective perspective and the more serious restrictions in the nature-given rights it involves, the milder proofs are required from the regretting party if he wants to abolish the contract claiming absence of rational voluntariness (absence of rationality or claims on fraud) and the stronger the case of the regretting party stands. In simple cases this may be specified in the Law so the contract parties know under what circumstances the contract has to be agreed on in order to be considered juridical voluntary. The evaluations of the court with basis in practice of justice will be decisive in other cases. But intersubjective bias is not reason by itself for rejecting a contract; the absence of rational voluntariness has to be proven.

 

5.3.2.2  Special contracts and obligation to inform

 

If a contract text contains elements that seemingly are very unfair, unusual, dangerous or liberty-limiting, proportionally tough requirements on information to all contract parties are necessary if the contract is to be regarded voluntarily entered and thus judicially valid. If you download a program from the Internet, you often have to click on a button in order to accept certain terms. The software producer may not write buried in the contract text that the downloader is to pay $10,000 each month to his bank account the rest of his life. The producer may legitimately demand an extreme price, but the potential buyer has to be extremely well informed on this special price if the contract is to be judicially valid. But even if the customer is sufficiently informed about the extreme price, the customer will be imposed a relatively cheap compensation for the contract breach since the objectively measurable value that the software producer has been deprived of is small. This is due to the low probability for him to get the product sold to another customer at the similar price. But the customer must, of course, return and uninstall the software. See also Section 10.3.7.

       The general principle is as follows: When two (or more) parties enter into a contract, the entrance has to be voluntarily made by all parties in order to be valid. If there is a significant information asymmetry between the parties when a contract is signed, the “strong party” has an obligation to inform on important, but unusual issues that the “weak party” realistically can not be expected to know. Lawmakers or the judicial system have to estimate which information (and in which way) the “strong party” must have submitted to the other party prior to the signing in order to be a voluntary contract entering. The State may not include whatever of “desired” contract restrictions (as opposed to the illegitimate “automatic standard contracts” of Section 5.3.2.5), but only make a realistic assessment of which relevant information that could have prevented the “weak party” from entering of the contract.

 

We can imagine contract-like interactions where the content, circumstances and information asymmetry make the information obligation of one party's become so extreme that voluntariness in the interaction becomes virtually impossible. This will in practice resemble a legal ban and can be called a de-facto-prohibition (see e.g. Section 6.6.2). An extreme and weird example illustrating the principle follows: A grocery store wants to sell a cheese having 90 % probability of causing cancer death within 3 years if you consume more than 200 grams. Theoretically, the shopkeeper has the right to sell this cheese to consumers who voluntarily want to eat it, but he has to state the dangers very clearly; marking with small print is insufficient. In practice, the requirements ought to be as harsh as for euthanasia. Failure to comply with this information obligation could result in conviction for mass murder, and even if nobody should die or be injured, the seller may be convicted for grossly perilous action under particularly weighty circumstances. De facto, it will be illegal to sell the unhealthy cheese. Any degree of information obligation may exist – from none to de facto prohibition.

 

When entering contracts, one (or both) party of the contract may want to “squeeze in” very special conditions, and by alleging contract breach these may be very intricate to ‘investigate’. The main way to prevent this from turning into a disproportionate load on the treasury is described in Section 5.3.1.2, and essentially means that the contracting parties voluntarily and freely may choose private arbitrators to be “judge” of their contractual relationship (most likely to be agreed on at the entering of the contract). Firstly, the load on the State judiciary will be reduced. Secondly, the State may charge fees on its own arbitrator services since arbitration will not be a monopoly State task, and the fee should be larger the more costly the treatment of a possible future litigation about the contract is expected to be. The party being pinpointed as contract breaker by the court may be imposed court fees, and the charges will be larger the more serious and more expensive the contract breach is.

      The motive power to include very intricate contract terms will also be reduced by the fact that a contract breach is only right-violating if one party can prove that the breach of contract implies an objectively measurable loss (which in practice means a significant economic loss) compared to if the contract had not been signed (see Section 5.3.1). If there are no objectively measurable losses, only a subjective breach of trust remains, which will not be enforced by the courts.

 

5.3.2.3  Slave, violence and death contracts

 

A person who enters a very long-term contract of slave-like character ought to have the opportunity to break the contract without fear for judicial reprisals with the following rationale:

       The contract party has not been deprived of any positive values. However, he may have been imposed negative consequences by getting problems with keeping other contracts that were entered on the basis of the “slave contract's” extremely favorable terms. However, the contract party is assumed to be compensated already through the very favorable long-term conditions given to him by the “slave contract”. Besides, the danger of reiteration is assumed to be zero since the slave-like condition by itself is expected to have sufficient deterring effect on the “contract breaker” (see Section 6.1.1). Thus, a relatively long-term slave-like contract between two parties may be broken without danger of juridical reprisals.

       An employment contract with normal salary conditions but very long term of notice may be broken by the employee without being economically responsible for the total remaining term of notice. He is only responsible for the negative value that the employer has been imposed (he has not been deprived of any positive values), i.e. for the expected time loss and inconvenience by hiring a new, similar employee.

      The judicial system is not to enforce contracts where one of the parties has accepted death, physical or psychical violence as a part of the contract. To the contrary, the one committing violence against the other party abeam his will often be punished (see also Section 10.4.2). Contracts that are signed under physical force, threats thereof, or strong psychical force are to be declared invalid by the judicial system.

 

5.3.2.4  Presumptive contracts

 

When two parties interact voluntarily without the existence of any explicit agreement, disagreements may occur afterwards. When eventual disputes over the interaction are to be settled, one must primarily examine whether other parts of the right to liberty than the contractual freedom have direct logical implications in the present case; if so, this applies. If not, the applicable principle is that each of the parties are assumed to have interacted out of an unspoken voluntary agreement, each of them believing that they would generate significantly more happiness with this agreement than if there had been no interaction. But maybe one party had another agreement in mind than the other party when the interaction occurred, or perhaps they thought of the same agreement, but that one of the parties tries to withdraw from it in the pursuit of unjust gain. The legal system must, from an intersubjective legal assessment, estimate which agreement the defendant realistically ought to expect the complainant to accept given the moment and circumstances of their interaction. An explicit contract may be incomplete failing to cover the parties' interaction entirely, and then it may have to be supplied by a presumptive contract. The State may not include their own preferences in presumptive agreements (as opposed to the illegitimate “automatic standard contracts” of Section 5.3.2.5), but the judicial system (or the legislature if it is usual, recurrent interactions) is to estimate, based on a rational assessment of reality, which agreement the previous sentence means in practice.

 

5.3.2.5  Standard contracts

 

An “automatic standard contract” is a contract that is specified in a law, and which is considered valid between two or more parties unless the parties explicitly have agreed on something else (also called declarative law). In an automatic standard contract the State can basically include anything at will (as opposed to presumptive contracts of Section 5.3.2.4), and this will automatically apply to all contract conditions that are specified by the standard contract, even if the contract parties have not agreed to this. In order to cancel the contract, all parties of such an automatic contractual relationship voluntarily have to enter into a contra-contract canceling the automatic standard contract, and this contra-contract has to be designed in a manner specified in the automatic standard contract's accompanying text. Automatic standard contracts can easily be created in such a way that their content theoretically may be abolished by contra-contracts while it becomes impossible or very difficult to do so in practice, and thus, the right to liberty will easily be undermined. The State does not have the right to impose such automatic standard contracts with the following rationale: By entering a contract one renounces a little right to liberty in the pursuit of generating significantly more happiness in the long-term perspective by signing the contract than by relying on pure nature-given liberty. In an automatic standard contract the State forces a contract upon the parties, and they are forced to do something (e.g. signing a contra-contract) in order to obtain the nature-given right that complete liberty is. This is a contradiction to the definition of a nature-given (innate) right (chapter 4). All principles that shall have automatic validity without an explicit contract have to arrive as a logical consequence of the right to liberty or through presumptive contracts (see Section 5.3.2.4).

      Nevertheless, the State may make standard contracts that become valid if two or more parties sign the contract through an active, voluntary act, and which is not based on the principle of automatic validity unless active reservation is carried out (see also Section 5.5.4). This kind of standard contracts may be contracts of marriage/cohabitation, contracts between employer and employee, sales contracts and other commonly used contracts. The parties have complete freedom to choose other contracts than the standard contracts if they prefer so.

 

 

5.4  Right to organize

 

According to Rational Gaudism, perceiving happiness is the only value, and since an organization does not possess the ability to perceive happiness, it does not have any values or objectives by itself. Accordingly, an organization does not have any nature-given rights of it own (see introduction to chapter 4).

      Individuals have the right to liberty and thereby the right to gather with others into an organization and to try to use it in the pursuit of maximization of their self-happiness during their life spans. The members have the right to make decisions and effectuate them according to the constitution of the organization (as long as the nature-given rights of others are not violated). The constitution is a contract between the members and has to be accepted also by others who want to interact with the organization; this also applies for the decisions made in accordance with the constitution. The constitution does not need to be based on democratic principles. Decisions made in opposition to its constitution are considered to be contracts breaches (see Section 5.3.1) and will potentially be a case for the judicial system. If a sufficient number of members want to use the organization in the same direction, each and one of these individuals can generate significantly more happiness together than what they would have done outside the organization. If a member means that the organization does not any longer contributes positively in the pursuit of his ultimate value, he must have the opportunity to resign (see also Section 5.4.3). There exists no right to become member of a particular organization unless the existing members have made a decision in accordance with its constitution on something else. The State itself is an organization with certain modifications (see Section 4.4), and its primary task is to defend the nature-given rights of the individuals.

      A person of legal age has to actively accept a membership if it is to be legitimate. A person of legal age who has been enrolled in an organization as a child has to get a message (with a reasonable deadline, which is stipulated in the Law) from the organization shortly after reaching the age of majority where eventual obligations of continued membership are enlisted. The person may choose to renounce his membership before this deadline without being inflicted any obligations no matter what his parents have agreed with the organization earlier on.

      In the constitution of an organization the following paragraph can (and perhaps sometimes ought to) be present: “This organization, company, block of flats etc. comply with the State standard constitution (or the standard constitution to another certification firm). This paragraph may only be changed if absolutely all members agree.” It may also be specified that this apply to the standard constitution that the State/firm had valid at a certain time point – even if the State/firm should change these later on (see Section 5.5.1 and 5.5.4).

      An “organization” without a constitution is not considered to be an organization, but a loosely collections of individuals. In such a collection all decisions have to be made according to complete consensus since the majority does not possess any right to decide unless a contract (constitution) exists between the members on this. If it is not possible to make consensus decision on a particular case, status quo has to be sustained or the collection has to be dissolved. Nevertheless, a majority or a minority may start a new gathering immediately after the break up.

 

 

5.4.1  When is an organization legitimate?

 

As a consequence of the above statements an organization will function in the same way as if it had possessed those nature-given rights as mentioned in Section 4.1. Since all individuals have the same right to organize and the same right to liberty, the right to organize is formulated as follows: “The right to join organizations together with others and to manage the organization in such a way that one does not violate the similar right of others, other nature-given rights or their logical consequences.” Expressed this way the right to organize is a non-violable right completely without limitations. But one question arises: How can an organization or its use violate the right to organize of other people or other nature-given rights? The functioning and constitution of the organization may not disagree with the following:

 

An organization may not challenge the State monopoly on Police, military force and the administration of justice (see Section 4.4). An organization is not to be considered legal if its objective is to violate nature-given rights or solicit this in a situation where the solicitation may be expected to be pursued. All political organizations have to be allowed as long as they are not in conflict with the above limitations (see also Section 5.6). It has to be an absolute requirement that each member may resign if he means that the membership no longer promotes his happiness, but a civil dispute may arise over eventual outstanding economical obligations. The resigning is not to be followed by other obligations than those explicitly stated in the organization's constitution (contract) at the time when the member enrolled the last time or what he specifically and explicitly has signed later on. This also applies for the organization that living together represents.

 

 

5.4.2  Citizenship

 

The State has no nature-given duty to give citizenship to any individual, but it is reasonable that the Law offers citizenship to children if at least one parent is a national of that State unless the child already has another citizenship. The State is an organization (see Section 5.4). The constitution of an organization is a contract that a new member accepts when entering. A contract is defined by voluntary renouncing some liberty in exchange for the contract content, which is expected to give significantly more happiness during the life span than complete nature-given liberty. Therefore, forcing a contract (constitution) upon an individual is a violation of his nature-given rights, and this is valid even if the individual may resign at any time. Accordingly, no organization, the State included, may take in members without their consent. Children may acquire citizenship by birth as an accompanier to the mother's or father's citizenship since initiation of force against children under age is not right-violating if performed in their self-interest. A person of legal age has the right to renounce the citizenship immediately after reaching the age of majority without accruing any costs or obligations. If he renounces the citizenship, he ought to wait a certain time before he may reapply for citizenship.

      Any adult individual has the same right to liberty independent of geographical or ethnical origin, and the State is obliged to defend this right inside the State's territorial jurisdiction in order to legitimate the State monopoly on the obligatory tasks (see Section 4.4). Therefore, the State may not refuse a Chinese, African, Pakistani or stateless person access to its territory unless he has committed right-violating actions (but he may not intrude into another person's, organization's or company's property without the consent of the owner). An individual with citizenship of the State by birth who does not want to continue the citizenship as an adult may not be expelled from the country's territory or be deprived any nature-given rights against his will.

      Theoretically, the State may impose obligations upon a national of the State through the voluntary contract as the citizenship represents, but statistically, he ought to expect receiving goods of similar value as he loses from the obligations, otherwise the incitement to become and stay national of the State will vanish. Therefore, the use of such obligations (e.g. obligatory taxes) will make it difficult for the State to achieve large extra income or services that may be spent on others than those who carried through the obligations (see Section 7.6.6). Stateless individuals, who have possessed citizenship of the State as children, ought to receive documents from the State showing that this country is willing to take delivery of them unconditionally if other States want to expel them for one or another reason. The only advantages attached to the citizenship will be the right to vote, more easy and secure identification documents, help when staying abroad, certain employments in the Police, judicial system, military defense and State administration ought to be reserved for nationals of the State, and you will participate in the lot drawings over non-owned inheritance (see Section 5.1.4). For the single individual the right to vote is of limited importance (mouse-piddling-in-the-ocean effect). By the way, the right to vote is no nature-given right, but a legitimate and rational option in the General Constitution.

 

Concerning rights on State property, the following paragraph ought to apply in the General Constitution: “Everyone who are or have been nationals of the State shall have the same right to use State property (State roads included) – eventually against objective payment – to the purpose which the actual State property is intended unless the actual State property from its nature only can be used by State employees. None of the individuals mentioned in the first sentence are to be discriminated on basis of their ethnic origin, race, political views, philosophical ideas or appearance. The State may refuse whoever to use State property for right-violating action, use that the actual property is not intended for, or use which may harm the property, adjacent properties, other individuals or the reputation of the property. Usually, peaceful foreigners, who are not right violators or suspected for right-violating actions, will have the same rights as mentioned above, but in extraordinary cases the State may introduce limitations – included total refusal – for foreigners' access to State property, but not if the foreigner already has acquired a legitimate right to utilize the actual State property.”

 

 

5.4.3  Living together with a contract is an organization

 

Living together with another person (or several persons) also makes up an organization if they have a contract on their marriage/cohabitation. Private institutions will naturally grow up, and some of them will obtain significant social power through support of large parts of the population. Such private institutions may e.g. be life style or ethical organizations. These will take over a role in connection with contracts on marriage/cohabitation. Pure tailor-made juridical contracts for the actual couple (see Section 5.3) will also be commonly used according to the contractual freedom. If these contracts are to be named marriage, cohabitation or something else, will be up to the judgments of these organizations. There will be only in connection with contract breaches, which the private organizations cannot handle themselves, that the State needs to intervene with its monopoly of force to enforce the contract. The State ought not to have any particular matrimonial law, but the State may offer one or several standard contracts that voluntarily may be signed by people who want to live together. The contractual law will regulate such contracts. The term “marriage” will not exist in the official terminology. For or against gay marriage will not be a case for public discussion but eventually an internal discussion inside different organizations.

      Contracts of marriage/cohabitation explicitly forbidding divorce will not be enforced for several reasons: The fact that marriage/cohabitation is an organization implies that each party has the right to resign (see Section 5.4.1). If two persons living together break up, it is not a contract breach per se whatever causes or circumstances being present. The rationale is that when a person breaks off with another, the causes are very subjective. One breaks off because one expects to generate significantly more happiness without the partner than with the partner, and who is the “contract breaker”? Is it the initiator of the break up, or is it the one failing to make the partner happy? But the contract of cohabitation/marriage may specify certain things to happen during living together or at a break up, and in this respect there may be a contract breach if the contract is not obeyed.

 

 

5.4.4  Trade unions

 

If employees wants to be members of an “undemocratic” trade union governing everything from the top, that is all right. If this trade union wants to take decisions over strikes through a little border of 5 persons (or only by the leader), it is an internal case for the actual trade union. If the members do not like such centralism, they may resign from the organization or try to make it more democratic. If a trade union becomes too centralistic it is reasonable to believe that the members will dislike it over time. The knowledge of this will reduce the trade union's incitement to be centralistic. If the State was to introduce a law stating that the members of a trade union only are allowed to strike if there has been a general referendum among the members, it would be a violation of the right to organize.


Employees, regardless of whether they are trade unionists or not, can legitimately only strike if their employer on beforehand has signed a voluntary agreement with them on striking without being fired. Often, such a clause is embedded in a collective labor agreement. If such an agreement does not exist, and the workers still strike, the employer may fire them and they may additionally be judicially imposed compensation for contract breach. If this type of workforce is hard to acquire, firing may be an unintelligent approach even if it is legitimate. If they are easy to replace, it may be more rational to fire them. On the other hand, the environment in the company may be badly influenced if the employees feel that they can easily be fired, and this knowledge will make the company owner more restrained with respect to the use of such “macho” management.

       If the State by law is to prohibit a business owner to fire striking workers, apart from those agreements the owner voluntarily has signed, this will be a violation of the free enterprise. Both striking workers and lockout-horny employers have to face the consequences of their stubbornness or indulgence, and the fear of the consequences will hopefully be so large that the number of strikes is held relatively low. It is unacceptable that the trade unionists may strike as much as they desire supported by the authorities refusing business owners to let the trade unionists face the consequences. We emphasize that it is right-violating to make laws that force employers to enter into collective labor agreements with one or more trade unions. Both parties have to voluntarily enter into such agreements without being exposed to initiation of force by law or anything else.

 

 

5.5  Free enterprise

 

The consequences of the nature-given rights of the individual are that individuals or group thereof has the liberty to start and run companies in a free capitalist society; something else would violate the individual right to liberty. Companies owned directly or indirectly by individuals have similar rights as a consequence of the owners' nature-given right to manage their property and to enter contracts unless voluntary contracts (constitutions) on something else exist. As stated in Section 5.4, also the State has the right to be involved (directly or indirectly) in industry and trade. Since all humans have the same right to free enterprise and general liberty, the right to free enterprise is formulated in the following way: “The right to run one's enterprise as long as one does not violate the similar right of others, other nature-given rights or their logical consequences”. Expressed this way the right to free enterprise is a non-violable right completely without limitations.

      The State may impose trade boycott of dictator states as a strategy of “peaceful” warfare; trading with the dictator state will indirectly violate the nature-given rights of the suppressed people in that country (see also Section 7.6.4). Swindle is illegal: A company may not sell a product containing 60% fat if it is written on the packing that the content of fat is only 3 % (initiation of psychical force). Companies are of course not allowed to use physical force or threats thereof in order to prevent their competitors' access to the market; the similar principle applies for strong psychical force. The forming of monopolies (in the meaning “company with very strong market position”) is acceptable when they arise as a consequence of voluntariness in the market (see also Section 5.5.2).

      The State may not refuse the production or sale of sex, alcohol, narcotics, medicaments or other products (to persons not being under guardianship and with all senses alert who have been sufficiently informed on possible side effects – see Section 5.5.4.1) having potential negative effect only on the user. Drugs, which from its nature can harm other than the user, may be regulated through the Law (e.g. antibiotics promoting resistant bacteria).

 

 

5.5.1  Companies

 

If two or more people own something together, consensus is required in all decisions concerning the property. The reason for the consensus principle is that nobody has the right to decide over others property unless there is a voluntary contract stating otherwise; this is a logical consequence of the property right. If consensus is impossible, the co-ownership has first to be virtually dissolved and the values are distributed individually as ownership shares according to how much each of them has “contributed to processing the natural resources away from the natural state into a state of increased usability”. This is also a logical consequence of the property right. Then the group, which is largest with respect to shares and which simultaneously agree internally, has the right to buy out the others at the estimated market price. If several groups simultaneously are in the first place regarding size, lots will be drawn. If no one is willing to continue the co-ownership according to this principle, all assets have to be sold at market price and the economical outcome will be allocated according to the fraction of ownership. This break-up and distribution are considered to be made ​​from a presumptive agreement (see Section 5.3.2.4). The consensus principle will often be impractical, and it will be suitable to make a constitution (contract) for the co-ownership that states how to make binding decisions for its members/co-owners.

 

No particular legislation regulating the activity of companies will exist, except that they may not violate the nature-given rights of others. Basically, a company does not have any nature and it does not possess the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness. Rights are deduced from the fundamental nature of an element. The constitution of the company expresses its nature. Its rights originate in the moment when one or several humans make a constitution for the company. Company establishers have a nature-given right to liberty, and nobody may refuse them to make a constitution for the company as long as the constitution does not violate others' nature-given rights or logical consequences thereof, and consequently the company has the right to be run according to its constitution. We simplify by saying that a company has rights, but principally it is correct to say that the company acts as if it has rights since happiness-perceiving establishers/investors have rights through the contract represented by its constitution.

      The constitution is a contract between the different investors of the company, between the company and its employees, customers, creditors and others having relationships with the company. The State is obliged to defend its rights (see Section 7.5, 5.3 and 7.2). A company without a constitution is not regarded as a legal subject (unless there is one person running an enterprise in his own name), and each person claiming to represent the company will be held personal responsible in eventual legal disputes.

      In practice the constitution of the company ought to be registered at a State office and has to be available for the general public. According to the constitution, the ones contributing with the risk capital do not necessarily need to be the ones making the decisions. A company establisher may create a constitution stating that he is to be life-time dictator, but willing investors may invest in the firm and obtain economical profit according to the paragraphs in the constitution. Thus, it is not obvious that the company has owners at all – it all depends on the constitution of the company.

       The State, and probably also private certification firms, will make standard constitutions that ought to be rational for many companies to choose. This is important in order for customers, creditors, owners/investors, and employees etc. to easily have survey.

 

5.5.1.1  The interaction between the company and the employees

 

The employer and the employee have the complete freedom to agree on the working conditions. But the more dangerous and unusual working conditions, the stricter obligations on the employer to inform about the special conditions, and the heavier burden of evidence on the employer for proving voluntariness by the employee at the time point of entering the contract (see Section 5.3.2.2). If the employee is hurt and the employer did not comply with the obligation to inform and/or cannot give sufficient evidence for contractual voluntariness, the employer may be inflicted economical compensation or even criminal accusation. If the obligation to inform is kept and the contractual voluntariness is proven by the employer, he has no responsibility for the employee's damage.

      Peter is employed by an employer without any specific contract. What kind of rights do the employee and the employer have in such a case? Let us say that Peter has worked for one month without any contract. The employer is the buyer of labor, and Peter is the seller of this “product”. If Peter has never worked for this employer earlier, the average market price is the guideline (see Section 5.5.3) – the price which the buyer (employer) realistically could expect at the time point when the seller (Peter) accepted that the customer (employer) started the consumption of labor. Peter has to be paid an approximate average of what is common in the labor market in the actual geographical and professional area. Peter has no right to continue working in the company if the employer does not want so. Peter can not claim that he is about to “consume” employment in the workplace, and that he therefore has to be allowed to keep on doing so until he is finished with the consumption (i.e. until retirement). Firstly, the employer is the consumer (buyer) in this case (should the employer claim that Peter should be serf the rest of his working life!?). Secondly, an employee may not demand to use the working place for an indefinite time – in the same way as a friend of Peter, who stays one month at his place, may not demand to live in Peter's apartment the rest of his life. In this case it is other parts of the right to liberty than the contractual freedom that have direct implications, namely that the employer sovereignly disposes his property (company) and the employee is the sovereign chief of his body. Peter may be immediately fired, and he may quit instantly without compensating for any breach of notice period.

 

 

5.5.2  Monopolies

 

A monopoly is here defined as “a company with very strong market position”. Previously, there were many small grocery shops. It was relatively inefficient for each shop to make purchases from the wholesale dealers. The prices were high. Today, many of these small shops are history, and some large, nationwide supermarket chains have taken over. If the State had upheld the system with many small, independent shops with artificial means (e.g. by holding the big ones down), the price level on groceries would have been higher. If one large grocery chain was to buy up all the other chains, this large company would have to show price moderation all the same; otherwise a new competitor would emerge and threaten its monopoly.

      The presence of many competing units may be a waste of resources (with administration, offices etc.). In those cases where this is correct, capitalism will contain mechanisms ensuring that these units over time are merged. But the potential negative tendencies in a monopoly structure are balanced by the monopolist's fear of new competitors to arrive the market. Thus, private monopolies are not to be regulated; that would be a violation of the right to liberty. Natural monopolies (regardless of type of ownership) are deemed differently since they are characterized by de-facto-absence of fear for new competitors to enter the market (see section 5.5.3), and thus, the customers may be “trapped” in/of the monopoly if essential products are involved.

 

 

5.5.3  Price settlement

 

The price of a product or a service is defined by a contract (deal) between the seller and the buyer. A commodity or service does not have any natural, inherent, objective value. If a contract (deal) is not present, the applicable principle is the logical implication from the right to liberty that the one having produced the product has the property right. Therefore, the producer/seller may refuse to deliver the product or demand to get it back if the buyer does not accept his price. But if the product/service already has been consumed or is under consumption without an agreement on the price on beforehand, a problem may arise; examples are taxi tours and café customers drinking caffè latte without knowing the price on beforehand. Then the price in effect is settled by a presumptive agreement whose content is estimated by what the customer realistically could expect at the time point when the seller accepted the consumption to start (see Section 5.3.2.4). This means that the seller in such cases cannot legitimately claim payment significantly exceeding the accustomed price (old customers) or average market price (new customers); to not significantly exceed average market price means to reside within one standard deviation over average market price. If it's a long time since the old customer had his last purchase, “accustomed price” has to be adjusted for price increase in this specific product range. The seller may gladly charge a price that is extreme compared to the average market price or accustomed price, but this has to be made very clear to the customer on beforehand, and the more extreme price, the stronger demands have to be imposed on the seller's information.

 

Let us consider the situation where a product is under consumption, and where the price is not agreed on in advance for the entire consumption. Then the seller may not charge a significantly higher price than the accustomed price or the average market price even if he gives notice of higher price during consumption. If the seller is to charge a higher price legitimately, this has to be done before the seller accepts that the consumer starts the consumption. Examples of this follows:

 

If you drink a caffè latte without having agreed on the price in advance, we may imagine that the café host says the following when you have finished half the glass: “This caffè latte costs $1,500 per glass. You can pay average market price, $2, for the half glass that you already have drunk. You may choose whether to drink the rest of your caffè latte to the price of $750, or leave it at the table.” In such a case, the café guest may continue to drink the whole glass to average market price. In order to be legitimate, the extreme price must be agreed on before the seller accepts that the consumer starts his consumption.

      Two months ago a surgeon performed an operation on a patient, and the price he paid was $1,500. Now, the patient will have the same operation by the same surgeon once again, but they have not specifically settled any new price before the new operation. In the middle of the operation the surgeon says that the price of the operation has been put up to $1.5 million. Further, he tells his patient that either he pays the price; otherwise the patient has to leave the hospital with open abdomen. Of course, in such a case accustomed price ($1,500) applies.

      A house owner and a tenant enter into a rent contract where the tenant rents a small apartment for 5 years without the possibility of termination, but the price is not specifically stated. One month after moving in (i.e. while the product is under consumption) the house owner says that the tenant is to pay $150,000 per month in rent. In this case average market rent applies.

      A person has saved $150,000 in the bank on a high interest account during 10 years. In the saving period he is in the process of using the product “dollars”. Then the FED suddenly prints a lot of dollars so that the $150,000 in practice only is worth $1,500. This is a right-violating against the depositor. A currency issuer may legitimately make an intended hyper-inflation only if it is clearly specified in its constitution before the currency is introduced (see also Section 5.5.5).

      A taxi driver is to transport a person from Oslo to Bergen a winter evening, but the price is not agreed on in advance. When the taxi is in the middle of Hardangervidda, the taxi driver claims $150,000 for continuing the trip to Bergen; otherwise the passenger will be thrown out of the taxi. The taxi trip is under consumption. In such a case average market price applies to the whole trip, not only for the distance Oslo - Hardangervidda. Taking such an extreme price is only legitimate if the price for the whole trip is agreed on in advance, and the cab driver has extremely strong demands on information about this extremely unusual price (see also Section 5.3.2.2).

 

Similar principles will apply to situations where you are “trapped” in/of a natural monopoly: From the time point when the consumer became customer at the monopolist and until the customer quits his relationship with the monopolist (or dies) is regarded as a continuous consume, and therefore, the above mentioned price limitations applies. Thus, all customers who starts a consume and become “trapped” in a natural monopoly are to be regarded as “new customers”. Average market price will have a different meaning since market price is a unreal concept in a natural monopoly. The prices should be regulated according to the principle that the monopolist's quotient between profits (before repayments and interest) and invested capital, which is needed for creating the monopolized products, is not to be larger than one standard deviation over the similar average quotient in the industry being most like the monopolist's industry and where “trapping” market relationships are absent. The road net is an example of this, and is described in Section 6.6.3.

 

 

5.5.4  Consumers' rights

 

The consumers will be protected by the fact that swindle is right-violating. If a new product is sold without any particular contract, it has to be expected that the product functions for some years or months depending on the nature of the product via a presumptive contract (see Section 5.3.2.4). If the product is defect or becomes so rather soon, the seller/producer has to repair it or give a new, functioning product. If he refuses, he may be convicted for swindle in a worst case scenario. Generally, the seller's information obligation towards the customer is proportionally with the degree of controversy in the product (see Section 5.3.2.2); if this obligation is not fulfilled, the purchase may be completely or partly cancelled, or the seller has to pay compensation (see Section 5.3.1.1).

     If a new product is purchased with a contract explicitly stating that the product is bought without any obligations for the seller, it is the stupidity of the buyer if something goes wrong. The buyer has to take all the consequences himself.

      The seller/producer may of course use a contract where they take on more obligations than what would apply without a specified contract.

 

A system of governmental certification, but without the option to use force, ought to exist in order to help the customers. These certification agencies make rational rules for a group of products, services, companies etc. (e.g. doctors, butchers, groceries, and blocks of flats). These governmental certification agencies have an easily recognizable logo. The producer may choose to produce products/services according to these rules and if so, the producer may put the agency's logo on the product or claim the certification in other ways. Then the producer enters a contract with the customers where he guarantees that the product satisfies the requirements of the rules of the certification agency (see also Section 5.3.2.5). If the producer uses the logo or claims the certification without following the rules, he is a swindler and may be punished by the authorities. If the producer do not want to follow the rules of the State, that is all right, but then he cannot legally use the agency's logo or in other ways claim to be certified by them. Presumably, many customers will be skeptical towards buying products and services without logo. Private certification firms may also make their rules and similarly, producers may put the logo of the private certification firms on their products as a quality proof. Gradually, it is possible that the certification agencies of the State will be competed out by the private certification firms if the latter act sufficient trustworthy over time.

 

5.5.4.1  Buying and selling of drugs

 

Buying and selling of drugs are basically allowed, but there are some complicating factors. A person has used narcotic substances for a long time, and has been so addicted and psychically disturbed that his rationality has decayed to a level where he is no longer by all senses alert. Thus, he has logically lost (at least parts of) the right to liberty, and he may be (at least partly) put under guardianship. He may legally be refused buying narcotic substances, and sellers will not be allowed to provide him with drugs (in the same way as they are not allowed to sell drugs to children). Such an addict may also be legally imposed forced treatment.

      When a drug seller offers his products to his customers, he has a duty to inform them with respect to the drug's side effects (see Section 5.3.2.2). The State may propose as a legally preapproved standard that the buyer receives abundant information by a physician (or similar) on the drug's side effects and this is proven to the seller by a prescription. If the drug user is not “with all senses alert”, he will not receive such a prescription. Alternatively, the seller may use his own information, which he believes fulfils the requirements for valid voluntariness, but then he risks problems with the judicial system if his information retrospectively is shown to be substandard compared to the State preapproved standard. The drug buyer may summon the seller to a court if he claims to have got health problems because of inferior information. If the court supports his claim, the seller may be legally forced to pay for rehabilitating the drug user. Inferior informing means that the buyer takes on significant hazard beyond his informed approval, and this may also put punishment on the seller (grossly perilous action) even if no injury has been detected on the buyer. Since narcotic substances are very special products, they ought not to be sold at places where the informed approval of the user may be questioned. Thus, the State may specify special outlets that are guaranteed in advance to be safe for the seller with respect to reactions from the judicial system in this respect.

      A similar principle as here described may apply for non-trivial medicines.

 

 

5.5.5  Monetary politics and banking

 

According to the right to liberty, the State may not refuse private companies (banks) to issue their own money. Therefore, anyone may establish banks and issue their own money, and the market will decide to what extent the money will be used as exchange medium. But the State is obliged to prevent fraud. National Central Banks and some large private banks will probably be issuers of their own currencies. At least the latter will probably have to back up their currencies by precious metals (gold, platinum) or already existing national currencies in order to achieve sufficient confidence in the market (at least in a very long transitional period). There has to be a design protection of the design of the different bank notes so competitors cannot parasitize on generally recognized money issuers by plagiarizing their design.

      Private banks issuing their own currency ought to enter a contract (through its constitution) in their self-interest with the money users on the principles for the bank's business activity, including the growth in the money supply. This may be done by certification firms making standard contracts which the banks voluntarily may use as constitutions (see Section 5.3.2.5). Banks operating abnormal, but legitimate, business activity must have correspondingly strong demands on how they inform their customers on these peculiarities. If the constitution is broken, it is swindling and harsh punishment may be expected from the judicial system. If the constitution (statutes) does not say anything else, the currency may not be inflated significantly more than what the customers are used to; if the currency is newly-established, the inflation cannot be significantly larger than what is normal for commonly used currencies (see Section 5.5.3). If the currency legitimately is to be consciously and extensively inflated beyond this, the option for this has to be clearly stated in the constitution before the currency is introduced in the market for the first time. Currencies that have been compulsory tender or that have been monopolistic by law (or these currencies' successors) may legitimately never have an increase in the money supply beyond the real increase in GDP (see also Section 10.7.4.1).

      Banks may receive deposits and lend out money without any State regulations, but have to accept the rules of the money issuer (unless the bank issues its own currency) and that swindling may not occur. Banks that want to engage in deposit and loan activity with the State run currency have to accept the money issuer's (i.e. the State through the National Central Bank) rules that protrude from the explicit or presumptive statutes that underlie the currency. In a system with free currency enterprise, the State will not be able to implement any “dictatorship” in this respect.

      The State and the Central Bank should manage the monetary policy targeting stable production-adjusted money supply, and not by the desire to keep the consumer price index at a specified, low level or stable exchange rates. Thus, the State ought to pursue the growth in the money supply to match the annual increase in the real gross domestic product. Then the national currency will be competitive against private currencies backed by gold. Section 10.7 describes in more detail how Rational Gaudist banking and monetary politics may be designed.

 

5.5.5.1  Bankruptcy

 

If lenders have lent out money to a firm or a private person that are not able to pay back, the debtor has basically committed a right-violating act against the lenders. Usually, th