RATIONAL GAUDISM
The Philosophy of Reason, For Norwegian version click here Preface Rational Gaudism is a complete
philosophical system with metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and politics, and
may shortly be summarized as follows: Metaphysics: Metaphysical ideas are cut down
to the absolute minimum that is necessary if further epistemological
progression is not to be meaningless / indeterminate. Epistemology: The epistemology is based on
strictly logical, rational and scientific principles. Ethics: All human actions are
self-happy-motivated, while the ethical guideline is the consequent use of
optimal rational evaluations, i.e. to maximize the probability of generating
the largest possible sum of self-happiness during life according to basically
the same principles as used by natural science. Politics: Let us imagine a hypothetical
and unlikely (but revealing) situation where the President and a unanimous
Congress decide to exterminate all Jews inside the Rational Gaudist politics means that neither
adult men's, nor children's, nor superior animals' nature-given rights may be
violated. This implies that neither the government nor any others may
initiate force against (adult) people. According to Rational Gaudism the
State are primarily to fund administration of justice, Police and defense,
but the State may also fund additional domains under the assumption that the
funds are not obtained by violating any nature-given rights. Thus, compulsory
taxes are excluded, and then State expenses will automatically be limited.
Honorable projects may include: supporting children's fundamental needs in low
income families, subsidizing social security benefits and health insurance
for low income groups, and funding some basic research programs. Rational
Gaudist politics may simplified be regarded as a hybrid between Objectivism
and social liberalism (about 3:1), where we retain the positive Objectivist
idea that no force may be initiated against the individuals, but at the same
time (in moderate form) embrace the idea of social liberalism that the State
if necessary / desirable may use funds to prevent disadvantaged groups from
“falling into the black hole”. In addition, Rational Gaudism shares the
social liberalist view that it is a State task to prevent animal cruelty. This book was written in the period 26th December 2003 – 2nd
April 2020. (First published version: 2nd September 2013) CONTENT I. Rational Gaudism in abstract II.
Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics 1. Metaphysics and Epistemology, Part A
1.1 The axioms of Rational
Gaudism 1.2 Senses, concepts and
definitions 1.2.1 Creation of concepts 1.2.1.1 Definitions 1.2.1.2 Objective and subjective concepts 1.5 Philosophy of Science
1.5.1 The hypothetical-deductive method (HDM) 1.5.2 The factors influencing the
well-foundedness of a hypothesis 1.5.2.1 Hypotheses
without observable consequences 1.5.3 Dethronement 1.5.4 The total well-foundedness 1.5.5 Limitations of
social science 1.5.6 Science and non-science 1.6 The hypothetical-deductive
method outside Science
1.6.1 An observation is essentially a hypothesis 1.6.2 Biological and technological evolution 1.6.3 Evolution of ideas 1.6.4 Evolution
of happiness in daily life 1.7 Subjective
and objective knowledge
1.7.1 Objective knowledge 1.7.2 Subjective knowledge 1.7.3 Intersubjective knowledge 1.7.4 Objective and subjective scientific
knowledge 1.7.5 The making of objectivity by changing
definitions 1.7.6 Summary of objective and subjective
knowledge 2.
Metaphysics and Epistemology, Part B
2.2 The consciousness of
individuals 2.2.1 Subjective / objective / intersubjective reality 2.2.2 Happiness 2.2.2.1 Why does perception of happiness exist? 2.2.2.2 Experiencing happiness is the only value 2.3 Supernatural reality
2.4.1 The fundamental nature of different objects 2.5.1 The
reality limits the realism of actions but not the free will 2.5.2 Animals
and “free will” 2.5.3 Man cannot choose
his own values 2.5.4 Predisposing
determinism 2.5.4.1 Time perspective 3. Ethics
3.1 Praxiological
fundament for rational ethics 3.1.1 Rational Gaudist ethics contra
philosophically “correct” ethics 3.2.1 Deliberately happiness-unprofitable action
choices are impossible 3.2.2 Can animals act morally? 3.2.3 Can organizations act morally? 3.3 Concrete ethical guidelines
3.3.1
The hypothetical deductive method as ethical guideline 3.3.1.1 Direct evaluation of probabilities and
consequences 3.3.1.2 Association-based action choices 3.3.2 Types of actions that practically always
are immoral 3.3.3 Tie-break 3.3.3.1 Life-elongating
actions 3.3.3.2 Strong,
short-term, direct perception of happiness 3.3.3.3 Choices of action with highest potentially
continuous use of HDM 3.3.4 Virtues 3.3.4.1 The virtues make a part of
the reality 3.4 Summary of
the ethical guidelines of Rational Gaudism
3.5 Subjective, objective and
intersubjective moral evaluations 3.6 Self-happy motivation and
how to consider other individuals 3.6.1 The role of the
State in ethics 3.7 Primary self-happy-motivated
actions 3.7.1 Instincts and habits 3.8 Secondary
self-happy-motivated actions 3.9 Tertiary
self-happy-motivated actions
3.9.1
Senses of duty and rational TEM actions 3.9.1.1 Senses
of duty against irrational actions (PMI) 3.9.1.2 Senses
of duty for rational actions (PFR) 3.9.1.3 Duties
of virtue 3.9.1.4 Summary
of duties and rational TEM actions 3.9.2 Implementation of a
sense of duty 3.10 Exchange of
different types of actions 3.10.1 Definition of erotic love 3.11 What are
actually “altruistic” actions? III. Politics
4.
Nature-given rights
4.1 Individual rights of adults 4.1.1 Right violations against adult
human beings 4.2.1 Why do not animals possess the right to
liberty? 4.2.2 The conflict between the rights of animals
and humans 4.2.2.1 Concrete
examples of non-right-violating treatment of animals 4.2.3 Can an animal violate human rights? 4.2.4 Summary of human and animals' rights 4.2.5 The distinction between rational and
non-rational beings 4.2.6 Artificial life and rights 4.3 Children's rights
4.3.1
Right violations against children 4.3.2 The beginning of life and abortion 4.3.3 The biological
mother's responsibility for the child 4.3.4 The biological
father's responsibility for the child 4.3.5 The State's responsibility for the child 4.3.6 Other persons under guardianship 4.4 The State
4.4.1 The right to rebel 4.4.2 Which actions may be subjected to punishment? 5.
Specification of nature-given rights
5.1.1 Property right is not based on initiation
of force 5.1.2
Working up property right in non-owned area 5.1.3
Property that lie fallow 5.1.4
Inheritance 5.1.4.1 Organ
donation 5.2.1 The right to use to forest 5.2.2
The right to use to fishing 5.2.3 The right to use to hunting 5.2.4 The right to use to oil 5.2.5 The right to use and property right in the
beach area 5.2.6 Diffuse, collective rights to use 5.3 Contractual freedom
5.3.1 Why is contract breach right-violating? 5.3.1.1 Sanctions against contract breakers 5.3.1.2 Private arbitrators and contract fees 5.3.2 When is a contract valid? 5.3.2.1 Rational voluntariness 5.3.2.2 Special contracts and obligation to inform 5.3.2.3 Slave, violence and death contracts 5.3.2.4 Presumptive contracts 5.3.2.5 Standard contracts 5.4.1 When
is an organization legitimate? 5.4.2 Citizenship 5.4.3 Living
together with a contract is an organization 5.4.4 Trade
unions 5.5 Free enterprise
5.5.1 Companies 5.5.1.1 The interaction between the company and the
employees 5.5.2 Monopolies 5.5.3 Price
settlement 5.5.4 Consumers' rights 5.5.4.1 Buying and selling of drugs 5.5.5 Monetary politics
and banking 5.5.5.1 Bankruptcy 5.5.6
Building permits 5.5.7 Enterprising activity and work for
foreigners 5.6 Freedom of speech
5.7 Which nature-given rights
are the most important ones? 5.7.1 Nature-given rights on
other person's property 6.
Fundamental politics on essential areas
6.1.1 Liberty-restricting punishment 6.1.2 Death penalty 6.1.3 Torture and uncivilized punishments 6.1.4 Evidences in criminal cases 6.1.5 Surveillance, search
warrants, interrogation, and Police custody 6.2 Self-defense
of nature-given rights 6.3 Military defense
6.3.1 Individual rights during military conflicts 6.3.1.1 Compulsory military draft 6.4.1 Passport and border control 6.4.2 Restriction on immigration 6.6.1 How can roads violate rights? 6.6.2 Speed limits 6.6.3 Road rights and pricing 6.6.4 Closed and unusable roads 6.7 Fire brigades and fire safety 7. The function of the State
7.1 The
obligatory function of the State
7.1.1
Laws 7.1.1.1 The 7.1.1.2 The General Constitution 7.1.1.3 The law 7.1.1.4 Supreme court 7.1.2 The State has some obligatory welfare tasks 7.2 The
empirical function of the State
7.2.1 How to carry
out the empirical function of the State? 7.3 What is the Rational Gaudist
sign of good politics? 7.4 Why shall the majority obey
the Superior Constitution? 7.4.1 Why become a political Rational Gaudist? 7.5 The
sovereignty of the State and the individual rights
7.5.1 Only the individual is sovereign 7.5.2 Payment
for the obligatory tasks of the State? 7.5.3 Absurd implications of the State
sovereignty 7.6 The State's income
7.6.1 Compulsory taxation 7.6.1.1 “Confiscation via collateral damage” 7.6.2 Mandatory Liability
Insurances 7.6.3 Income based on
natural monopolies 7.6.3.1 Road fees, electricity fee etc. 7.6.3.2 Transport fees resembling sales tax 7.6.3.3 Restricted
printing of money 7.6.4 The State Stock Fund 7.6.5 Taxation of
interactions with right-violating states 7.6.6 Environmental fines 7.6.7 Citizenship fee 7.6.8 Other
fees 7.6.9 Voluntary Citizen Contributions 7.6.10 Balance 7.6.11 Voluntary welfare system 7.6.11.1 An alternative to “The Voluntary
Insurance of Health Care” 7.6.12 “Altruistic” bloodsucking 7.6.13 The transition period towards the Rational
Gaudist society IV. Aesthetics
8. The Rational Gaudist view of art V.
Appendix
9. Appendix – Metaphysics, Epistemology,
Ethics 9.1 Level of
happiness and perception of happiness 9.2.1 The God hypothesis is de facto scientifically
falsified 9.2.1.1 The
well-foundedness of other religions, deism and atheism 9.2.1.2 Liberal Christianity 9.2.1.3 Respectable Christianity 9.2.2 Why is agnosticism wrong? 9.3
Can morality be completely objective? 9.4.1 Examples of
irrational TEM actions 9.4.1.1 The
effect of “a mouse piddling in the ocean” 9.4.2 Examples of senses
of duty and rational TEM actions 10.
Appendix – Politics
10.1 The right to
liberty implies the right to life 10.2 The relationship between
nature-given rights and ethics 10.2.1 Why should a supporter of Rational Gaudist
ethics become a political Rational Gaudist? 10.3 Nature-given rights in
emergency situations 10.3.1 Seeking emergency shelter in a mountain
cabin 10.3.2 Emergency break in for defense against
right violations 10.3.3 Cannibalism after plane crash in the 10.3.4 Shipwrecked seaman arrives hermit's island 10.3.5 Asylum seeker 10.3.6 Poor man 10.3.7 Lifejacket for a drowning person 10.3.8 Summary on emergency situations 10.4 Violence
10.4.1 Physical and
psychical violence 10.4.1.1 Temperament as psychical violence 10.4.2
The borderline between right-violating violence and accepted violence 10.4.3 Child rearing 10.4.4 Prostitution 10.5 New
acquisition of right to use to forest 10.6 Feminism
10.6.1 Female representatives in the boards of
private companies 10.7.1 Banking history 10.7.2 Concrete proposals for new banking and
monetary policy 10.7.3 Advantages with the new banking system 10.7.4 Growth in the money supply 10.7.4.1 Growth in the money supply for former
monopolistic and compulsory currencies 10.8 Motivation for charity
10.9 Rational egoism, altruism and Objectivism 10.9.1 Altruistic financing
of the State 10.10.1 Why vote for Rational Gaudism? 11. Appendix – Philosophy in general
11.1 Philosophical comparisons.
Are you a Rational Gaudist? 11.1.1 The differences between Rational Gaudism
and Objectivism 11.1.1.1 Objectivism and “the legitimate tasks of
the State” 11.2 Why should I care about
Philosophy? 12. Appendix – Definitions
I. Rational Gaudism in abstract
The human consciousness is
able to perceive and remember sounds, sights, smells, tastes and to sense pressure,
coldness and warmness, and will experience these with feelings of different
degrees of happiness – positive or negative. The human consciousness also has
the ability to speculate over the reasons for this. In order to progress in
the epistemological process Rational Gaudism introduces its three axioms: |
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1) |
The
sense perceptions of the consciousness are caused by influence of material
surroundings in (at least) three spatial dimensions and one time dimension. |
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2) |
The
human consciousness has the ability to choose between alternatives of action
(free will). |
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3) |
The
only way of obtaining knowledge about the reality is through the
consciousness' ability to logical thinking on the basis of the sense
perceptions. |
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On the basis of the
foregoing, observation, induction, deduction and the hypothetical deductive
method are the epistemological tools that the human consciousness has at its
disposal to achieve knowledge of the reality. We can only achieve knowledge
about the outer reality with degrees of certainty, but the uncertainty is
often so infinitesimal that it for all practical purposes may be disregarded.
HDM is the central process having progressed biological evolution, science,
technological evolution, evolution of happiness for the individual in the
daily life and the evolution of improved political solutions. For the
concrete description of the existence and functioning of physical, biological
and astronomical objects, Rational Gaudism refers to the international
frontier of science in the respective spheres. Experiencing happiness and
avoiding unhappiness are the only values. Superior animals are
happiness-perceiving beings, but they have a non-rational and mainly
instinctive nature, and are predetermined to follow these instincts in the
purpose of maximizing their happiness at the present moment. The human being
is a rational being with ability to experience happiness and unhappiness, and is predetermined to try to maximize
the sum of self-happiness during his life on the basis of the present
realities. However, we have free will to choose remedies and strategies for
this purpose. The ultimate objective and
value for the individual is to maximize his self-happiness during his life –
everything else is remedies in the pursuit of thereof. All this is
given in the fundamental human nature.
Therefore, the moral principles and standards of an individual form a
strategy for guiding him towards the maximization of his lifelong
self-happiness. Rational Gaudist ethics means to apply a
scientific-like method to consequently carry out optimal rational evaluations
(directly or indirectly) of the probability of the consequences of the action
alternatives to occur and what value these consequences will have for the
individual during his life span on the basis of the moral virtues acquired at
the time point for the choice of action; in this way a Rational Gaudist
pursue the maximization of his self-happiness in the life-long perspective. The concrete content in the strategy is mainly
based on the use of HDM on your own and others' life experiences in addition
to rational self-happy-motivated senses of duty, but deductions from the
fundamental human nature and logical consequences of the nature of HDM are
also used. The virtues needed for moral acting are deduced from the elements
that participate in the chain of reasoning leading to the definition of the
moral action pattern of Rational Gaudism. Any collection of fermions
and bosons being able to experience happiness/unhappiness has the right to
pursue happiness and to avoid unhappiness according to its nature. Superior
animals have a nature-given (innate) right to pursue happiness by following
their instincts. Any adult human has a nature-given (innate) right to pursue
happiness by following his rational nature, which implies the right to
liberty, life, property, right to use, free enterprise, organizing, entering
contracts and freedom of speech. Children have a nature-given right to parents in the sense that the
biological parents (or others who have adopted this function) are obliged to
develop the children's rational potential into an adult being able to use its
right to liberty as a tool for the pursuit
of happiness. The human beings inside a
given geographical area have the right to create a State since the right
to organize and the right to self-defense are nature-given rights. The State is a
rational institution since it is a prerequisite for realizing the rational
nature of the humans. The obligatory tasks of the State are Police, military
defense and administration of justice to defend the nature-given rights of
its individuals. Additionally, the State may take on further tasks as long as
the State can finance the tasks without violating the nature-given rights of
the individuals (including the property
right), and a HDM-like process is the guideline for which non-obligatory
tasks the State is to carry out in order to assist individuals in their
pursuit of happiness. There are too many examples
through history of seemingly good political hypotheses that mistakenly have
claimed to have the ability to “maximize the happiness of the society”; e.g.
National Socialism, Fascism, Marxism-Leninism, the ideology of Pol Pot and
Maoism. The testing of the hypotheses led to the most terrible crimes:
Holocaust, Moscow processes, killing fields and hunger. Almost all people
will agree that the means that were used for testing these hypotheses are
unacceptable. This shows that unrestricted utilitarianism is a bad idea.
Testing of hypotheses by putting different political ideas into practice is
very important, but it has to be a boundary for what kind of means that legitimately may be used in the
“experiments”. Rational Gaudism shows that it is contradictory to label
politics as “legitimate” if the nature-given rights are violated (see the
introductions to Chapter 4 and 7). Therefore, absence of violation of the
nature-given rights constitutes the widest boundary inside which political
testing of hypotheses legitimately
may take place. Political Rational Gaudism is the interior of this boundary. II. Metaphysics, Epistemology and Ethics
1. Metaphysics and Epistemology, Part A
Epistemology is the study of the
methods of acquiring knowledge. Metaphysics is the part of philosophy studying
the fundamental nature of the reality that observation or scientific methods
cannot detect. Since these two branches of Philosophy are partly interwoven,
Metaphysics and Epistemology are explained collectively over two chapters. What
kind of existence can I have absolutely certain knowledge of? In order to
answer this question it is important to precisely define the term “I”: “I” is
the consciousness; the consciousness is the element making the term “I”
meaningful. It is impossible to deny one's own existence. Let me assume the
opposite of what I want to prove, namely that I do not exist, i.e. that I
deny my own existence. Since I do not exist, I am not able to deny anything,
neither my own existence; I cannot even define the concepts “existence” and
“I”. But that is exactly what I do. The assumption that I do not exist led to
a contradiction; ergo, I exist! When I am able to deny my own existence, it
is an irrefutable proof of my existence. This applies only in the specific
moment (at present) when I deny my own existence, but it does not prove that
I existed before the present, or that I will exist in the future. It does not
even prove that time has existence in reality. In
the same present the consciousness (“I”) registers sense perceptions
(sights, sounds, tastes, smells and sensations of pressure, cold, heat,
etc.). In the present “I” (the consciousness) also register feelings
(perceptions of happiness/unhappiness) that accompany the sensory
impressions. The consciousness (“I”) also recognizes a touch of other
sensations and feelings than those above (which I will later describe as memory).
What may be the cause of these sensory impressions and feelings (both the
clear ones and the more diffuse ones), I basically do not know, but at
present “I” register that I have the ability to think and ponder
over this and over what has value (i.e. what the consciousness wants to
achieve). I know all this without having adopted any epistemological axioms. However, I register that I
completely obviously and automatically believe that the sensory impressions
are caused by the influence of material surroundings in a three-dimensional
space. Similarly, I believe that the hints of other sensations and feelings
are due to memories of something that has affected my consciousness at an
earlier stage, i.e. I believe that I have existed before the present so that time
is a real concept. To
get on with the epistemological process I need to introduce three simple
axioms: 1.1 The axioms
of Rational Gaudism
An axiom is defined as a basic truth that is absolutely unavoidable if further
epistemological progression is not to become meaningless / indeterminate and
that all further knowledge acquisition has to build on. It is logically possible
to deny an axiom, but without the axiom further knowledge acquisition becomes
meaningless / indeterminate. The following axioms are considered to be the
only rational metaphysical fundament: Axiom 1 (the reason for the sense
perceptions): The sense perceptions of the consciousness are caused by influence of
material surroundings in (at least) three spatial dimensions and one time
dimension. The
material surroundings have independent existence from the consciousness; the
consciousness does not just produce an illusion of an outer material reality
in time and space.
These material surroundings, together with those processes making the
consciousness, have real existence in The
Reality. Axiom 2 (free will): The human consciousness has the ability
to choose between alternatives of action (free will). Axiom 3 (fundamental epistemological axiom): The only way of achieving
information about the reality is through the consciousness' ability to
logical thinking on basis of the sense perceptions. On axiom 1:
Without the
introduction of axiom 1, the content of the consciousness could have been
consequences of a kind of virtual reality game with “God” and/or “Satan” as
participants, and where “I” is a projection of their immaterial nature into a
non-divine dimension. The first axiom of Rational Gaudism excludes this
possibility, and without this axiom further epistemological progression on a
material reality would have been meaningless. If
I had not introduced axiom 1, only the present might exist without time
before and after, so that remembrance necessarily has to be a fantasy.
Another possibility would be that time exists, but that I can not remember –
the perceived remembering back in time is just imagination in the
present. God, Satan or The Flying Spaghetti Monster may be double-crossing me
to believe that I have memory of the past. On axiom 2:
Free will is a consciousness' ability to choose between alternatives
of action. To answer the question if Homo sapiens has free will, we
have to examine our own consciousness. By extrospection I observe
something that I (completely obviously and automatically) believe is caused
by material surroundings influencing my senses and consciousness. The
existence of material surroundings was stated through axiom 1 as a
fundamental and epistemologically unavoidable truth that all further
knowledge has to be based on. By introspection I observe something that I
(completely obviously and automatically) believe is “free will”. Similarly, Rational Gaudism
introduces “free will” through axiom 2 as a fundamental and unavoidable truth
that all further knowledge has to be based on since the
hypothetical-deductive method (see Section 1.5.1) presupposes that the human
consciousness is able to choose to
carry out experiments, and in the scientific process (and in epistemological
processes in general) you have to choose
the most well-founded one of the competing hypotheses as explanatory model
(see also Section 2.5)). Therefore, it is
also impossible to prove “free will” scientifically since HDM presupposes
namely “free will”. Without “free will” ethical evaluations will become
meaningless since moral choices
also presuppose “free will”. If being sufficiently philosophically stubborn,
it may be objected that each choice is just an illusion – perhaps
there is a “God” or a chain of apparently incomprehensible causes that 100 %
forces me to make the actual action “choice”, but then all further
epistemological progression become meaningless. The
human consciousness has the ability to start its own chain of causes, as a
local “prime mover”, even if there usually will be a number of factors
influencing my consciousness to choose one alternative over another. On axiom 3:
Through axiom 1 it was established that the sensory perceptions are
caused by a material reality, and axiom 3 are introduced in order to obtain
knowledge about this material reality. Without the introduction of this axiom
we could e.g. imagine that the true knowledge about reality came falling down
on silver platters through a divine revelation in a way that we are not able
to imagine. There is high probability that we had to wait very long before
such a revelation came true – probably we had to wait forever, and besides,
there is a risk that an alleged revelation would be pure fraud. If a true
divine revelation really was to occur – in spite of all improbability – it
will not be damaging to acquire knowledge from our senses and brains in the
meantime. Axiom 3 is the basis of the scientific method, included induction,
deduction and the hypothetical-deductive method (see paragraphs 1.3 to 1.6),
and thus is the basis of all the knowledge we currently have about the
external reality. Axiom 2 (free will) is a prerequisite for the use of these
epistemological means. Rational Gaudism is completely based on the
introspective knowledge of the consciousness and these three axioms. In the
rest of this chapter it is demonstrated how to obtain knowledge by using this
framework. Firstly, I induce the very well-founded hypothesis that all other
human beings' consciousnesses have the same basic qualities as my own (see
also Section 2.2). 1.2 Senses,
concepts and definitions
Some knowledge is genetically
determined; how to breath and scream, how to get milk from the mamma as a
newborn etc. It is also claimed that small babies have a genetic instinct for
swimming. Apart from this, all knowledge is supposed to originate from our
senses. But does not thinking function independent of the senses? If an
individual had not been exposed to a single sense perception, he would not
have been able to think. The
humans obtain information about the outer reality through their senses (axiom
1). They are vectors for projecting the outer reality into the consciousness.
Technology (e.g. a telescope) is a link between the outer reality and the
senses and is able to improve the ability of the consciousness to perceive
the reality. Our senses give us observations. The
humans are rational beings and therefore, our consciousness has another tool,
namely reason. Our reason can be used for converting the sense perceptions
into concepts and thereby be a basis for further knowledge (axiom 3). The
basis for the creation of a concept is two or more sense perceptions that are
alike in some respects. Our reason extracts these similarities and makes an
abstract concept from the similarities; we induce a general concept from
several individual observations. The concept is often assigned a definition
(explicitly or implicitly). In
order to achieve knowledge from the reality exceeding the pure observations,
our reason can use induction, deduction and the hypothetical
deductive method (HDM); see Section 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5.1). Concepts and
their definitions are prerequisites for a rational use of these methods for
scientific purposes, and at the same time, induction and HDM are tools in the
creation of concepts. 1.2.1 Creation of concepts Each individual, except for sufficient small children,
has a pool of concepts in his “memory bank”. Before this pool is established
there are no concepts in this “bank”. Pre-concept children receive sense
perceptions from the outer reality. Some perceptions are grasped to have
significant similarities, while other perceptions are perceived as different.
Elements that create sufficiently similar sense perceptions (axiom 1) in a
given context are induced into a general concept (categorization). Elements
creating perceptions that are perceived as sufficiently different in a given
context are induced into different concepts and are placed in different
categories. Thus, a
pool of concepts arises in the “memory bank” by induction from a waste number
of sense perceptions from the reality. The magnitude of this pool expands rapidly
in childhood and continues to increase the rest of life but with decreasing
slope. Elements that are categorized in the same category in one context may
be categorized in different categories in another context. Such categories
often have subcategories, which again has its subcategories and so on, until
we arrive at a category that only consists of individual elements. The latter
are not concepts. We are able to observe similarities and differences between objects because this has had significance for the survival of our species. Our senses have the ability to perceive the combination of those fermions and bosons making sheep as similar, wolfs as similar and sheep and wolfs as different. An individual lacking this ability would walk to a wolf and hug it. He would be eaten, and his genes would not be preserved in the evolutionary process. Similarly, we have the ability to distinguish colors. Individuals who were not able to distinguish red from green developed reduced survival since finding berries in a jungle of green leaves was more difficult. Thus, concepts like sheep, wolf, green and red arose.
Figure 1: Schematic drawing of a
fish Elements moving in the water and
showing sufficient similarities with fig. 1 are named and categorized as
“fish” based on induction from some individual observations. This includes a
hypothesis that there exists more of its kind. We have the following knowledge:
elements showing sufficient similarities with fig. 1 are associated with
“movement in water”. We examine 1000 figure-1-like elements moving in the
water closer and observe that absolutely everyone have vertebrae. We adopt
the hypothesis that all elements corresponding to “fish” (as defined above)
have vertebrae. The hypothesis continuously resists attempts of falsification
when we in the future examine more elements of the type “fish”. Then we know
that it is highly probable that an element of the category “fish” has
vertebrae. Our acquired knowledge is that elements moving in the water and
resembling fig. 1 have large probability for having vertebrae. After some
time we are so convinced that all elements belonging to the concept “fish”
(as until now defined) have vertebrae, that we adopt this as a part of the
definition of the concept “fish”. We have not acquired any new knowledge by
taking “presence of vertebrae” to be a part of the definition of “fish”. We
have only become more confident of the association between (1) resemblance
with fig. 1, (2) movement in water, and (3) vertebrae, but this is
independent of the adoption of vertebrae as a part of the definition of the
concept “fish”. Our acquired knowledge is that these three relations are associated.
The concept “fish” is something we use as a tool in order to keep track on
this association against other associations that do not resemble fish. This
makes it easier to acquire new knowledge (i.e. association between different
elements and attributes) in the future. Why is it so important to convert
collections of individual observations into concepts? It is because this
strategy has resisted intense attempts of rejection. The strategy of using
concepts, not at least in social contexts, has had huge importance for the
survival of the species Homo sapiens. More primitive primates with
significantly less capacity for concept production were ousted. The result
has been that all humans make use of concepts. The concepts are converted
into words and sentences, which in turn are transformed into writing. Printed
matter may be conserved through the centuries, and this is very important for
building up increased knowledge through the generations and over geographical
distances. The faster and more efficient the information can be spread, the
larger potential for increased knowledge and technology is present;
digitalization and Internet are the newest and best means in this respect.
Concepts and their elongations give the basis for increased survival and better
opportunities for creating happiness and avoiding unhappiness. 1.2.1.1 Definitions The creation of a concept results
in a definition uniting the similarities. The definition contains other
concepts with their own definitions. In this way, a concept may be defined in
a long chain of gradually simpler concepts, or the concept may be at risk of
being defined into a circle that returns to the original concept. When a
concept is to be defined into simplicity, we have to end up with some
intuitive concepts – concepts being so self-evident that they do not need to
be defined. Without the use of intuitive concepts all creation of concepts,
and accordingly all use of human reason, is impossible. Chapter 12 is a list
of definitions of several important concepts used in the description of
Rational Gaudism. 1.2.1.2 Objective and subjective concepts The basis for forming a concept is to
co-categorize elements that give rise to sufficiently similar perceptions,
and induce them into a general concept while other elements are excluded from
the same category (see Section 1.2.1). Sometimes, a high degree of intersubjective agreement will exist on what “sufficient
similarity” means in practice, while in other cases there will be
considerable intersubjective disagreement about this. This gives rise to
objective and subjective concepts. An objective concept is a concept whose
content does not give room for subjective interpretations. A subjective
concept is a concept whose content gives substantial room for subjective interpretations.
The concept “justice” is a very subjective term, e.g. a communist will mean
something completely different with this concept than a liberalist. The
concept “elephant”, however, provides little room for subjective
interpretations. If you are asking for an elephant, different people will not
serve you different animals. All concepts can be placed on a scale between
absolute objectivity and absolute subjectivity. However,
a subjective concept can be objectivized by attaching an unequivocal definition
of the concept. Then everyone will clearly understand what is meant by the
concept leaving no room for subjective interpretations. It is possible to commit long-term
argument manipulation by redefining concepts. There is something, X (e.g.
opposition to the left-winged gender politics) that the manipulator does not
like, and he describes it with a familiar concept, B (e.g. male chauvinism),
which most people regard as unambiguously negative. However, most people have
historically a somewhat different and more positive perception of X in their
consciousness. But when people repeatedly observe B defined as X, they will
sooner or later perceive X as negative since their minds are stuck in the
old, traditional, negative definition of B. 1.3 Induction
Induction is a process where
knowledge of individual observations (axiom 1) is converted into an abstract
concept of the general case (axiom 3). We observe that many different objects
fall towards the earth according to the formula s = 5t2. We induce the general hypothesis
that this is valid for all objects. All humans observed consist of cells.
Then we induce the hypothesis that all humans consist of cells (“hypothesis”
is here used somewhat absurd-philosophically). We may also induce into the
definition of the concept “human being” that consisting of cells is a
criterion for being a human. If so, a human being is per definition an object
consisting of cells and no hypothesis. Thus, both abstract concepts and
hypotheses may be produced by the use of induction. The
nature of induction is to generalize from information of individual cases.
Presupposing a potential for an unlimited amount of cases, then,
independently of the number of individual cases making the basis for the
inductive conclusion, there may exist – now or in the future – cases that
have not been used for producing the inductive result. There is no guarantee
that the inductive result is correct for these new cases. But the more individual
cases the inductive result is based on, the better these individual cases are
distributed, and the less inaccuracy of each observation, the more correct
the inductive result is expected to be. The accuracy of an inductive result
based on numeral observations is proportional to the square root of the
number of observations and inversely proportional to the standard deviation
of the observations. 1.4 Deduction
A deductive process is based on
one or more premises from which the conclusion arises logically with absolute
certainty. The deduction occurs in our consciousness and therefore, the
deduction will be independent of the axioms of Rational Gaudism. In pure
mathematics, which is a deductive discipline, we deduce that if 2 + x = 4
then x = 2. This is 100 % accurate knowledge. Mathematics is used for
inducing a systematic coherent hypothesis from similar, but not identical,
measurable individual observations. The mathematical correlation may later on
be used for testing the validity of the hypothesis. When the hypothesis has
resisted a waste number of attempts of rejection, it can be promoted into a
theory, and it can be used for predicting events in the future. But the
observed values, which are put into the formulas, are associated with a level
of uncertainty, and the theories of natural science are theoretically always
associated with somewhat uncertainty since they basically are founded on
induction. A deductive process in “real life”
is based on the concepts in which the sense perceptions are categorized, and
then we deduce logical consequences from this. I see flames on a field. Then
I deduce that the temperature has to be high in the area around the flames
since flames per definition are warm. What
really happens is the following: I observe something on a field fitting very
good to the concept of “flames”. Then I produce a hypothesis stating that
there are flames on the field. If this hypothesis is correct, the temperature
around the area, which I perceive as flames, will be high. Usually, the sight
of flames will be so clear cut and certain that we for all practical purposes
can disregard the uncertainty. Considering the following
deduction: All boys love chocolate. Hans is a boy. Consequently, Hans loves
chocolate. One possibility is that the
concept “boy” has its usual definition (and this definition does neither
include “loving chocolate” nor exclude it). Then a large, but limited, number
(n) of boys have been observed, and all of them love chocolate. The following
inductive conclusion are made; “all boys in the world love chocolate”. But
this inductive conclusion includes a non-insignificant source of uncertainty
since the fact that a number of n boys love chocolate, does not exclude the
existence of one or more boys outside the observed group not loving
chocolate. The first premise is a hypothesis produced from a limited number
of individual observations. If we observe boy NN, we can with a relatively
high degree of probability conclude that he loves chocolate. If he really
likes chocolate, the hypothesis is strengthened since it has resisted an
attempt of falsification. Another
possibility is that the concept “boy” among other criteria is defined to be a
creature loving chocolate. If so, the chocolate-loving tendency is implicitly
included in the premise “Hans is a boy”. This means that the conclusion is
already implicitly incorporated in that premise. A
third possibility is that all boys really are observed to love chocolate, but
in that case Hans is also included. Then the conclusion is implicitly
included in the premise “all boys love chocolate”. This
kind of Aristotelian logic does not give other knowledge about the reality
then what is given by the implicit induction of the premises. This is a
method that is correct in the “world of the consciousness”, but like
mathematical methods the uncertainty in the induction or the observations is
not eliminated. It may also be regarded as a game with concepts where the
conclusion is already included in one of the premises, but deduction will
often clear up the content in the premises in such a way that their content
is made explicit for the human consciousness. Strictly speaking, deduction only works
for considerations in our own consciousness (e.g. mathematical parameters or
abstract hypothesis – as the premises in the Aristotelian logic really are).
Concepts, definitions and hypothesis are all based on induction. But the
induction supporting the premises is often so good that we for all practical
purposes can say that the deductive conclusion is accurate. Therefore, we
often choose to “forget” the uncertainty introduced by the induction;
otherwise we would be completely restrained in both our daily life and
science. Deduction
has its best practical function when reversing the Aristotelian logic by
assuming (in our consciousness) that the first premise (hypothesis) is true.
When the second premise is an unequivocal observation and exemplification of
the general component in the first premise, the conclusion will follow
logically. But if the conclusion does not appear in real life (results from
experiments), the first premise (hypothesis) has to be wrong. This principle
is used in the hypothetical-deductive
method. 1.5 Philosophy of Science
1.5.1 The
hypothetical-deductive method (HDM) The hypothetical-deductive method (HDM)
is fundamentally regarded based on a number of individual observations (axiom
1). Then we induce a
hypothesis in order to give an explanation of the phenomenon (”Ding an sich”)
which the observed data are exemplifications of (axiom 3). The next step is to deduce
logical consequences from this hypothesis (axiom 3). Then we carry out
experiments (axiom 2) to observe if these consequences really occur. If so,
the hypothesis is strengthened. Otherwise the hypothesis is falsified. A
theory is a hypothesis that extraordinarily has resisted intense attempts of
rejection. The promotion of a hypothesis into a theory is subjected to
intersubjective judgments. Usually, a hypothesis is declared as a theory when
most of the research community accepts it as a sufficiently probable
explanation and useful tool for making predictions. Because of the induction
problem (see Section 1.4) theories are still attached with a certain degree
of uncertainty (even though sometimes being only “absurd-philosophical”), and
are in this respect a special type of hypotheses; thus, there is a gliding
transition between theories and non-theory-hypotheses. A hypothesis may arise by being
necessary for a main hypothesis to avoid falsification; it is called an auxiliary
hypothesis to the main hypothesis. Thereafter, the (auxiliary) hypothesis
ought to show its justification (well-foundedness) by strengthening its
empirical basis. A hypothesis may also be deduced from one or more
theories; and then often as peripheral parts of the theories where the
theories until now have been exposed to little or no empiricism. A hypothesis that makes statements
about a limited number of cases can be verified. Examples of such hypotheses
are: “More than 10 % of all current residents in nursing homes in area Y have
the diagnosis Alzheimer's disease”. “More than 50% of all rapists convicted in the years
1990-2005 had brown eyes”. When such hypotheses are verified, they are not
hypotheses anymore, but observations (but strictly speaking, an observation
is also a hypothesis – see Section 1.6.1). A
hypothesis that makes statements about an unlimited number of cases can never
be verified since a limited number of observations supporting the hypotheses
do not exclude a future observation contradicting it. The hypothesis “there
is life on Mars” is obviously impossible to falsify, but it may be verified
since it makes statements about a limited number of cases as a minimum (one
or several cases of life). The hypothesis “there is not life on Mars” can be
falsified (if we consider the observations as accurate and impregnable even
by extreme ad hoc hypotheses) but cannot be verified since verification
requires an unlimited number of negative searches for life. Usually,
a hypothesis can not be directly falsified since auxiliary hypotheses (often
more or less ad hoc) almost always can be produced for defending the
main hypothesis. Therefore, the idea of a hypothesis being scientific only if
it is falsifiable and the idea of a hypothesis' quality depending on its
ability to resist attempts of falsification are too easy. HDM is the method of choice for
science to asymptotically approach the truth of different processes in
nature. Knowledge from many different single processes may be integrated, and
a more general view of nature is achieved. HDM will be the safest method for
collecting knowledge about nature. We can also achieve knowledge about single
processes in nature by guessing on a theory and insist on it as a dogma. But
it will only be “good luck” if we approach the truth about a process by using
this method. HDM is “the safe way”. If we consider the sum of all knowledge
about all single processes in nature (almost an infinite amount) corrected
for its quality, HDM is the method maximizing this sum. This is a generally
accepted principle in natural science. Let us initially adopt the
hypothesis that HDM is a well-suited tool for solving integrals. When this
hypothesis is tested in practice, the hypothesis will be rejected. But then
we have used HDM for rejecting the use of HDM for this specific purpose.
Therefore, we can say that HDM stands by its own strength (opposed to
something falling by its own weight). The use of HDM is safely based since
its fundamental principle is self-correcting. 1.5.2 The factors
influencing the well-foundedness of a hypothesis Continuously expansion of the induction basis: A hypothesis is characterized as well-founded when it estimates “Ding
an sich” of the outer reality well; an absolutely true hypothesis has a
well-foundedness equalizing 1, while an absolutely false hypothesis has a
well-foundedness equalizing 0. A hypothesis is (usually) initiated by
induction on the basis of observations – observations that would have been
logical consequences of the hypothesis if the hypothesis was already
produced. After the hypothesis is initiated, we will seek to expand its
induction basis. Then we deduce observable consequences from the hypothesis
and examine if such consequences are observed in practice. The hypothesis is
gaining well-foundedness in step with an increasing induction basis, i.e.
increasing number of observed hypothesis consequences. The increase in
well-foundedness is larger the more unique the observed hypothesis
consequences are compared to earlier observed consequences, i.e. the more of
the hypothesis' “nooks and corners” that are covered by the induction basis
the more well-founded the hypothesis will become. The scope of a hypothesis is the totality of its logical consequences. A
nook/corner is a subcategory of the hypothesis' scope where its logical
consequences are considered internally similar while consequences in
different nooks/corners are considered non-similar. We let the
factor ‘φ’ denote how large share of the
“nooks and corners” of the hypothesis that are covered by the induction
basis, and will e.g. decrease in step with “cherry picking” and lacking
systematic in the observation basis. Increased number of observed hypothesis
consequences in each “nook and corner” will also strengthen the well-foundedness,
but in an asymptotical manner (repeating the same experiment three times with
hypothesis-compatible result, will increase the well-foundedness somewhat,
but repeating the same experiment one million times beyond this, will not
result in a noteworthy further increase). Accuracy / objectivity: The hypothesis' well-foundedness
will increase in step with the accuracy / objectivity (sj) to
each (claimed) observed hypothesis consequences in the induction basis (the
use of technological tools and their quality will often influence this
accuracy positively). The basis for the existence of inaccuracy is the fact
that an observation basically is a hypothesis (see Section 1.6.1), but the
inaccuracy / uncertainty may sometimes be present at an absurd-philosophical level. Auxiliary hypotheses: Often, hypotheses are not
building its well-foundedness only on observations of hypothesis
consequences, but also on the basis of other hypotheses, called auxiliary
hypotheses, which the main hypothesis depends on in order to be able to keep
its claim. Sometimes, an auxiliary hypothesis resembles absolute truth
because of its high degree of well-foundedness, while other auxiliary
hypotheses are extremely far-fetched. The well-foundedness of a hypothesis
increases when the product of the well-foundedness of its auxiliary
hypotheses (Пvi)
increases (presupposed that the auxiliary hypotheses are mutually
independent; if they are not, the product has to be adjusted for the degree
of dependency). Avoiding falsification is only a matter of introducing
fitting auxiliary hypotheses; in this way, attempts of falsifying a main
hypothesis will always fail. However, introduction of auxiliary hypotheses
may reduce the well-foundedness of the main hypothesis because of possibly
low well-foundedness of the auxiliary hypotheses. Alternative hypotheses may
then become more well-founded than this main hypothesis. Therefore, in the
continuation we will use the terms “dethronement” (see Section 1.5.3) and “de-facto-falsification” (see Section
1.5.6) instead of "falsification). The
substance of auxiliary hypotheses may be included in the main hypothesis.
Then the number of auxiliary hypotheses, which the main hypothesis depends
on, is formally reduced. But the more far-fetched this substance is, the more
ad hoc the main hypothesis will
become (i.e. more detached from already existing theories), and the less
well-foundedness will be “inherited” from already existing theories. Thus,
the main hypothesis will of course not become more well-founded if the substance
of auxiliary hypotheses is included in the main hypothesis. The
larger number of other theories disagreeing with the main hypothesis and the
more well-founded they are, the less well-founded the main hypothesis is. In
such a case we have to introduce auxiliary hypotheses more or less ad hoc stating that the (supposed)
well-founded theories are wrong in spite of the previous opposite
presumption. Therefore, this means that the product of the well-foundedness
of the auxiliary hypotheses decreases, and is therefore included in the
preceding paragraphs. Extrapolation from existing theories:
If a hypothesis H arises by extrapolation (deduction) from other, more
well-founded hypotheses, theories or theory networks (let us call the
gathering of them ‘G’), hypothesis H will inherit some well-foundedness from
G (since H in one way is a “nook” in G) even if H is untested or inferiorly
tested. We may say that the observed hypothesis consequences that are the
basis of G's well-foundedness, will “shine through” to H's scope and give
rise to a certain well-foundedness also for H. The more well-founded G is,
the larger H's inheritance becomes. If H had stood alone without being matted
by G, H would have been more ad hoc
and without inherited well-foundedness; more empirical observations would
have been required in order to gain the same degree of well-foundedness
(“extraordinary claims need extraordinary proofs”). With similar
argumentation a hypothesis explaining a given issue P, but additionally also
explaining the issues Q and R (larger prediction potential), will be a more
well-founded explanation model for P than an alternative, competing
hypothesis explaining only P (given that the hypotheses otherwise are equally
well-founded). 1.5.2.1 Hypotheses without observable
consequences A hypothesis H, which by its nature has no
observable logical consequences, and which is neither supported by
extrapolating existing, well-established theories, obviously has no empirical
induction basis as mentioned in the beginning of Section 1.5.2. Consequently,
the hypothesis will achieve zero well-foundedness through empirical
induction; it has only an irrational probability (à la 10-10) of being true. It is not the case that the hypothesis is considered
well-founded because we have failed in intense attempts of finding observable
logical consequences that might falsify it or its auxiliary hypotheses.
Resisting attempts of falsification is, in a sense, only a method of
expanding the induction basis. However,
a hypothesis H2 may “inherit” (g) some
well-foundedness as mentioned in Section 1.5.2 through extrapolation of
already established, more well-founded theories. But since these theories
(obviously) do not have any of their induction basis in the scope of
hypothesis H2, the well-foundedness will often become rather thin. Example: A hypothesis states
that there are fish-like creatures on many planets in solar systems far away.
It is difficult to see how we (in foreseeable time) are able to observe
consequences of this hypothesis. But we have well-established and
well-founded theories for how life has evolved on Earth, we know that there
are both water and “atoms of life” on other planets in our own solar system,
and we know that planets exist in inhabitable zones around other stars. The
extrapolation of these theories gives certain well-foundedness to the
hypothesis. 1.5.3 Dethronement Scientifically, a hypothesis,
which at a given time point is the most well-founded one, cannot be adopted as
the favorite hypothesis for all future. One has to constantly search for
observations (experiments) that potentially can make it less well-founded
than its competitors; i.e. that we have to try to expand the induction basis
to ever larger parts of its scope's “nooks and corners”. The wish is to make
the favorite hypothesis even more well-founded both absolutely and relatively
to its competitors, or that its favorite status is taken over by an even more
well-founded (or more simplistic) competing hypothesis. We
have a hypothesis about a phenomenon. A logical consequence of the hypothesis
is deduced, i.e. an element in the scope of the hypothesis. If the logical
consequence is observed in practice, the hypothesis has gained
well-foundedness through an increased induction basis. Otherwise, we have to
introduce auxiliary hypotheses in
order to explain the discrepancy. If
observable logical consequences of the hypothesis are not observed in
practice, it does not necessarily imply falsification since we (probably
always) are able to introduce one or more auxiliary hypotheses (often more or
less ad hoc) in order to rescue the
main hypothesis so that it is not in conflict with any of the observations
(as mentioned in Section 1.5.2). But after such a process it may happen that
the combination of auxiliary hypotheses supporting the favorite hypothesis
has so low degree of well-foundedness that the hypothesis originally being
the favorite is no longer the most well-founded one (according to the
principles of Section 1.5.2) to explain the phenomenon. The original favorite
hypothesis has been weakened, and one of the other hypotheses has been
(relatively regarded) strengthened, and this one will now be the new favorite
hypothesis (it may also be “shared throne” between several favorite hypotheses where no
significant differences with respect to well-foundedness exist between
them). The original favorite hypothesis is said to be dethroned. It may also happen that a completely new hypothesis is
shown more well-founded than all the original competing hypotheses after
considering the new observations. Such a new hypothesis may e.g. be the same
as the original favorite hypothesis but with an inherent restriction of the
original scope in such a way that the observable consequences of the
hypothesis, which were not observed, are excluded from the original scope. However,
the old favorite hypothesis may have a comeback if one or more of its
auxiliary hypotheses in the future may be shown to be more well-founded than
previously thought, if it gains increased well-foundedness through further
increasing of the induction basis in the absence of ill-founded auxiliary
hypotheses, or if the new favorite hypothesis in the future is sufficiently
weakened through the same test procedure that dethroned the old favorite
hypothesis. The amount of inherited well-foundedness (g) will also be able to
influence which hypothesis to obtain the favorite status. If
the original favorite hypothesis is strengthened by the test procedure mentioned
above, it has resisted an attempt of
dethronement. The larger number and the more intense, serious attempts of
dethronement a favorite hypothesis is able to resist, the more well-founded
(strong) the hypothesis is – absolutely regarded. Preferably, we want one
favorite hypothesis to become so well-founded that it resembles a fact and at
the same time the competing hypotheses to be so poorly-founded that they de facto are considered falsified. If
there is no significant difference in well-foundedness between two or more
competing hypotheses, the favorite hypothesis is to be chosen by largest
possible simplicity. Resisting such attempts of dethronement is also an
important tool for ranking different favorite hypotheses, which seek to
explain completely different phenomena, with respect to well-foundedness (see
Section 1.5.2 and 1.5.4). 1.5.4 The total well-foundedness The definition of
“the most well-founded hypothesis” includes the term to be defined, namely
the well-foundedness of the auxiliary hypotheses
(see Section 1.5.2). Thus, we end up in a system of “Russian nested dolls”
(matryoshka doll) defining into a spiral where the definition of a
hypothesis' well-foundedness always contains the term to be defined, namely
the well-foundedness of the auxiliary hypotheses. If you break up all the “Russian dolls”
and release the contents, the well-foundedness of a hypothesis will be
basically and implicitly a function of the number of observations that the main hypothesis, its auxiliary
hypotheses and their possible “testators” are induced from or tried dethroned
by, the extent to which these observations are representative for their
hypotheses's “nooks and corners”, the accuracy of each observation, and the
ability of the consciousness to systematically make and compare continuously
improved abstractions of the similarities in these observations. Since an
observation, strictly speaking, also is a hypothesis induced from quantified
sense perceptions (see Section 1.6.1), the quality of a hypothesis is fundamentally
resting in the ability of the sense perceptions to represent the outer
reality (axiom 1), and the human consciousness' ability to systematically
make and compare continuously improved abstractions of the similarities in
these sense perceptions. From the above statements and the
parameters of Section 1.5.2 the the total well-foundedness of a hypothesis
may be expressed in the following way:
The function f increases in step with increasing n, with increasing sj (j = 1,2,….n) and with increasing φ and g;
the function f also includes statistical tools. The function f and vi (i = 1,2,….m) have their range of values
between 0 and 1 (n is
the number of observations that actually have been completed inside the scope
of the hypothesis; sj expresses the accuracy /
objectivity of the j-th observation
for j = 1,2,.....,n ; vi expresses the well-foundedness of
the i-th auxiliary hypothesis for i
= 1,2,......,m , where m is the number of auxiliary
hypotheses which the main hypothesis depends on; ’g’ is possible
“inheritance” of well-foundedness from other, more established and
well-founded hypotheses, theories or theory networks which the hypothesis is
extrapolated from; for more info about ’g’
and ’φ’ see Section 1.5.2). The formula
presupposes that the auxiliary hypotheses are mutually independent; if they
are not, the product of vi (i = 1,2,….m) has to be adjusted
for the degree of dependence. The formula is not useful in practice but
illustrates the theory. As
illustrated by the formula above the well-foundedness of a hypothesis never
become larger than the product of the well-foundedness of its auxiliary
hypotheses (absolute truth = 1 and
absolute untruth = 0). If this product falls under the threshold for de-facto-falsification (see Section
1.5.6), the main hypothesis will never be able to crawl over the threshold
again by resisting new attempts of dethronement – recrossing the threshold
can only be achieved by improving the well-foundedness of its auxiliary
hypotheses. 1.5.5
Limitations of social science If we carry out the same
experiment of physics in 2013 or in 1890, or if it is carried out in USA or
Uganda, we may expect the same result. Testing a hypothesis of social science
in 2013 gives completely different test conditions than in 1890, and we
cannot necessarily expect the same results; similarly if it is tested in
Uganda instead of in USA. We may say that hypotheses of social science have
an extra dimension of “nooks and corners” in the form of time and location
(includes culture). Thus, the hypothesis will often have to contain very many
“nooks and corners” if it claims to be very general. Because of the location-
and time aspect it will also be very difficult to know which “nooks and
corners” the hypotheses should contain when the hypotheses are produced. When
we carry out experiments, it will be difficult to cover the large number and
the uncertain identity of “nooks and corners” with observations. Therefore,
the factor φ easily become small, and i.a. for
that reason hypotheses of social science often have less degree of
well-foundedness than hypotheses of natural science. The security of their
predictions is accordingly, and the generalization of theories of social
science will be more intricate. Another reason for this is the fact that the observations in social
science often are not so easy to measure objectively and are consequently
more likely to be influenced by the subjective political preferences of the
researchers, and thus, the degree of objectivity (sj) in the observations becomes small
(sometimes social research may be difficult to distinguish from political
propaganda). A more
sneaky way of avoiding falsification is to redefine sub-objective concepts
that are incorporated in the hypothesis. Because
of the time dimension, it is also difficult to know for how long time we are
to test e.g. political and economic “hypotheses” before we dethrone them. Some
difficult short-term impact does not necessarily imply dethronement, but
rather that the hypothesis has not been in operation long enough before the
real positive, long-term consequences show up. Some simple theories in such
fields may basically be regarded as accurate and time-independent (e.g. about
the fundamental nature of the human being), and it may sometimes be better to
draw logical consequences of such theories than testing elaborate social
hypotheses. 1.5.6 Science and non-science According to standard
theory of science, a hypothesis is unscientific if it is not falsifiable. The
problem is that a hypothesis which apparently is falsified can be rescued by
introducing one or more auxiliary hypotheses (often more or less ad hoc)
that support the main hypothesis in such a way that it become consistent with
all the observations from the test panel. Thus, hardly any hypothesis is
falsifiable. A crack-pot's epistemological processing ultimately ends up in a
rotten claim that is supported by auxiliary hypotheses which either
themselves lack the potential for empirical testing or which depend on being
supported by such to avoid falsification. As the ultimate ad hoc
hypothesis, one may state
that an unknown physical force interferes with the experiments making the
results appear differently than they should have done. It is more correct to
speak of a gradual transition from very poorly-founded hypotheses to very
well-founded hypotheses. If we are to use the term ‘falsification’, we have
to set a cut-off for how low degree of well-foundedness a hypothesis can have
and still be worthy of participation in the scientific process; if the
well-foundedness of the hypothesis is less than this cut-off, it could in
practice be considered falsified. But not even this will absolutely exclude the possibility that the
future will reveal observations making the hypothesis more well-founded so
that it exceeds this cut-off (e.g. because some auxiliary hypotheses, which
it relies on, are found more well-founded); therefore, it also has to be very unlikely
that the hypothesis in the future may become so much more well-founded that
it crawls above this cut-off before we in practice can regard it as
falsified. We call this de-facto falsification. According to Rational Gaudism, Science is “the process pursuing to estimate ‘Ding an
sich’ of the reality with maximum accuracy, i.e. pursuing to identify the
most well-founded hypotheses (‘Ding für mich’) to give answers on ‘Ding an
sich’-questions with fundament in observations in a process where such
hypotheses are exposed to constant and maximum intense and sincere attempts
of dethronement”.
Another way of
stating this is that we pursue the most well-founded hypotheses in a process
where we constantly try to obtain observed hypothesis consequences covering
more and more “nooks and corners” of the scope of such hypotheses. Thus, a
scientific hypothesis is a hypothesis that makes statements over “Ding an
sich” of the outer reality with the purpose of estimating them as accurate as
possible. A
hypothesis does not need to be (directly) falsifiable in order to be
scientific. A scientific hypothesis is not to be adopted because it
necessarily represents the Truth, but because it is the best one of the
available hypotheses to explain the observed data, and the adoption must take
place in a process with constant and intense attempts of dethronement.
Non-science is defined as “the choosing of an explanatory model of a ‘Ding an sich’ issue when
there are alternative hypotheses being significantly more well-founded in
this respect (by the considerations in Sections 1.5.3 and 1.5.4) or
reluctance against serious attempts to dethrone the most well-founded
hypotheses” (the
latter equalizes “reluctance against attempts of observing hypothesis
consequences in all ‘nooks and corners’ of such hypotheses”). Therefore, whether a hypothesis
is scientific or not has to be considered in relation to the process that it
is intended to participate in. A non-scientific hypothesis is a hypothesis
that is intended to take part in a process where the objective is not
to choose the most well-founded of the competing hypotheses in a
dethroning-oriented atmosphere as the general explanation of the issue. From this perspective, we may say that no
hypothesis in itself is scientific or unscientific, but science or lack
thereof is defined by the process that the hypothesis takes part in. 1.6 The hypothetical-deductive method outside
Science
1.6.1 An observation is
essentially a hypothesis When is a statement about an object an
observation, and when is it a hypothesis? When are we able to say that an
object is a stone, a lion or a magpie? When all criteria of the (more or less
explicit) definition of the concept x are securely satisfied, we have a
secure observation of the object X being an x, and no hypothesis. We see a
black and white object of magnitude 40-50 cm with wings. We believe that it
is a magpie since the elements of the observation (black/white, magnitude,
and wings) satisfy the definition of a magpie. We believe that we have
observed wings, black-white color and approximately the right size, but how
can we be really sure? Then we have to consider the definition of e.g. a
wing, and examine if the criteria of “a wing” is satisfied. Theoretically, we
can continue in this way until the definitions bite themselves in the tail
into a ring or until we find something that is self-evident without
definition. But how are we going to deal with the uncertainty in the
observations? 0.03 seconds is the shortest time lag that is
needed for a human being to observe a perception of sight (Goos, 1999).
In this way, a visual observation can be regarded to be quantified. An
observation lasting for 3 seconds consists of 100 different continuous
perceptions of sight, each with duration of 0.03 seconds. A person A sees an
object X. The perception of sight number 1 from X (with duration 0.03 sec)
enters A's consciousness. A has a pool of concepts in his brain's memory bank. He produces (very rapidly) the
hypothesis that X fits concept z. The perception of sight number 2 arrives
from X, but hypothesis no. 1 is rejected. Then he produces the hypothesis
that X fits concept y. The perception of sight number 3 arrives from X, but
hypothesis no 2 is also rejected. …This process progresses until he arrives
at perception of sight no N where he produces the hypothesis that X fits the
concept x. For each new perception of sight from N+1 this hypothesis resists
all attempts of dethronement. At last, the uncertainty connected to the
hypothesis is infinitesimal, and A can for all practical purposes say that he
is sure that the object X is an x. Then we have obtained an observation (even
though it is theoretically a hypothesis with an uncertainty attached). Therefore, an observation is a
hypothesis that is induced very quickly from many individual sense
perceptions and tested very quickly against a pool of concepts in the brain's
memory bank, and this hypothesis has resisted intense attempts of
dethronement. Goos L. An evolutionary based investigation
of facial expression perception. Annual meeting, Human Behavior and
Evolutionary Society, Utha (1999). 1.6.2 Biological and technological evolution Newer and improved species have
developed during the evolution, and the principle of “survival of the
fittest” is very similar to HDM, even if it is meaningless to assign nature
epistemological attributes: The establishment of the hypothesis occurs through
coincidences; the hypothesis is that the new mutation will breed a new or
improved species being better fitted for survival in the present environment;
the deduction is included in the hypothesis, and the testing occurs by
“examining” to what extent the new or improved species manages in its
environment. The motive power in the biological evolution has been the
pursuit of maximizing the total mass of DNA in the world. This process has
been slow, and has been going on for hundreds of millions of years and in the
last 50-100 thousand years the process has culminated in the modern human
being. Homo sapiens is the ultimate result of nature's HDM. When
considered in a human time perspective, this evolutionary process progresses
extremely slowly. The humans have started their own
process of evolution. In this process improved technology is evolved in stead
of improved organs, senses and limbs. These technological improvements are
the fundament for better goods and services giving the humans increased
feeling of happiness. In the same way as the motive power in the biological
evolutionary process is the pursuit of maximizing of the total mass of DNA in
the world, an important incitement in the technological evolution is the
human pursuit of maximizing the economical profit (which in turn is a tool
for achieving happiness). In this way, money and DNA have the same role in
their respective processes of evolution. Therefore, technological progresses
(= materialized knowledge) is nothing but a continuation of the biological
evolutionary process fitted to the human time perspective. The
hypothesis is that a new product (or technology) will be a success in the
market. The hypothesis has been induced on the basis of knowledge of already
existing products (technologies). We can deduce that if the hypothesis is
correct, the introduction of the product (technology) in the market will
generate significant profit. Then we test the hypothesis by producing and
marketing the product (technology). If the product (technology) gives significant profit, the hypothesis
is strengthened; oppositely it is dethroned (or at least weakened). 1.6.3 Evolution of ideas Evolution of ideas includes the
development of the knowledge that has driven the technological progresses
described in the previous section, development of knowledge of the existence
and behavior of different objects and not at least development of which
political ideas being best suited for governing a society (see Section 7.2).
These ideas have to a large extent progressed by HDM. We have an idea
(hypothesis) obtained from individual observations and foregoing ideas. The
quality of this idea is determined through the ability of the materialized
idea to influence the reality in positive direction or if the consequences of
the idea are in accordance with test results from the reality. 1.6.4 Evolution
of happiness in daily life The sense
perceptions may affect my feelings in such a way that I obtain a more or less constant
state of unhappiness, and by logical thinking my consciousness ought to
achieve the knowledge that my action pattern is wrong, and that it ought to
be changed so I can obtain more happiness in the future. Since
nature has optimalized its work by creating the Homo sapiens by HDM, it is rational to assume that the human
beings can maximize their self-happiness by the use of HDM. We often use a
HDM-like process in our daily life without being aware of it. Paul produces a
hypothesis from his own observations at school and from the experiences of
others that being a teacher is a good profession. The hypothesis is as
follows: If Paul becomes a teacher, he will produce significantly more
self-happiness during his life span compared to the amount of happiness
obtained by choosing another profession. He tests the hypothesis by taking
teacher education and becoming a teacher. The consequences of the hypothesis
testing are detected by observing how happy he becomes as a teacher. If he
obtains sufficient amount of happiness by being a teacher he will remain in
this profession. If Paul produces a too small amount of happiness or too
large amount of unhappiness as a teacher, he may reject the hypothesis and
start as a jointer in stead (adopt the jointer hypothesis), and then he will
observe to what extent he becomes happy by carrying on that profession. 1.7 Subjective and objective knowledge
1.7.1 Objective knowledge If we present an elephant to 100 people and ask
them what it is, everyone will say that it is an elephant. This knowledge is
independent of the subject who observes – the knowledge does not depend on
“the eye that sees”. We say that this knowledge is objective, which
equivalently is knowledge that is consistent with “Ding an sich” of the
reality. Lions
eating Zebras and the existence of the sun are realities not depending on the
subjective senses of humans. A person's weight of 120 kilograms (with a
little level of uncertainty in the measurement) is an objective fact since
his weight is independent of the observing subjects. Those are objective
facts (axiom 1). The basis for claiming this to be objective knowledge is
that the concepts “elephant”, “lion”, “zebra”, “eat”, “sun” and “kilogram”
are so precisely defined that there is in practice no basis for subjective
interpretations. In addition, there are many and very truthful observations
of zebra-eating lions (see Section 1.6.1). If you prefer the philosophical
considerations of absurdity, you can also say that the observations of an
elephant are dependent on human consciousness. Perhaps there is a person who
seriously believes that it is a car and not an elephant – how can we be sure
that it really is an elephant? If DNA measurements can determine that it is
an elephant, the wrangler can still argue that the result depends on people
reading the results correctly. Such theoretical philosophical subjectivity
will always be present, but for all practical purposes we can say that
absolutely objective knowledge of an elephant is present. Whether it is an
elephant, a car or anything else, the existent is what it is independent of
what the human consciousness believes (axiom 1). 1.7.2 Subjective knowledge If we ask 100 people about what they like
best of sausages or hamburgers, we get very different answers. In a similar
way we will obtain very different answers if we ask the same people who are
the most handsome of Barack Obama and Bill Clinton. Assertions of the type “sausage is better
than hamburger” or “Clinton is more handsome than Obama” is basically
subjective knowledge because it does not exist any “Ding an sich”, but
basically only a “Ding für mich”. This kind of knowledge depends very much on human beings' subjective
consciousnesses. The basis for stating this knowledge to be subjective is
that the concepts “good food” and “pretty” is not precisely defined, which
gives wide spaces for subjective interpretations. In
a large test panel a narrow majority will perhaps prefer hamburgers in favor
of sausages. Thus, there is a certain amount of objectivity in the sense that
the flavor molecules in the hamburger have a slightly greater ability to
affect the taste cells positively than the flavor molecules in the sausages.
But this degree of objectivity is so small that the knowledge for all
practical purposes is subjective. If we hold the absurdities outside,
hamburger is objectively better than cyanide (unless the purpose is to commit
suicide). It is an objective fact that the body can make use of the meat, but
not the cyanide – the human body is just built this way regardless of what
the human mind thinks. A
person's dreams at night are perhaps the most subjective existing
“knowledge”, but even these have a weak reference to events from the reality,
and therefore contain a theoretical touch of objectivity. 1.7.3 Intersubjective knowledge If 100 persons are to evaluate the
attractiveness of Miss Universe, someone will claim that she is 90% pretty,
others will claim her to be 100% pretty and the average will perhaps be 95%
pretty with a standard deviation of 4%. We say that Miss Universe is intersubjectively 95% pretty, and the
intersubjective consensus of the measurement is inversely proportional to the
standard deviation. The attributes of an old woman in a nursing home do not
have the same temptation on the same people (she is perhaps 5 % pretty with a
standard deviation of 4%). We may intersubjectively
say that Miss Universe is significantly prettier than the old lady with a
statistical p-value < 0.0001. According
to axiom 1, the attributes of Miss Universe and the old female have objective
existence in the reality (independent of individual consciousnesses), and
their ability to influence the happiness of others does exist because of
evolutionary selection mechanisms, which also have objective existence
independent of human consciousness. Those are the objective components
in the individual judgments and are the basis for the intersubjective
consensus; claiming that only subjective criteria exist for deciding the
attractiveness of people is wrong. It
is impossible to determine how pretty Miss Universe is compared to others
without the judgments from human consciousness; that is the subjective
component in such knowledge. Often, the degree of consensus in the
intersubjective judgments reflects the degree of objectivity provided that
the observers relate honestly and rationally to the reality. Another
example of intersubjectivity is a person weighting 120 kilograms and
measuring 175 cm in height; he can intersubjectively be regarded as fat with
high degree of objectivity. The thick fat layer has objective existence in
the reality and should evolutionarily be a buffer in times of scantiness of
food and represents therefore the objective component, while the subjective
component is due to the fact that the concept “fat” is not precisely defined. 1.7.4 Objective and subjective scientific
knowledge If only a few observations of a nature phenomenon
exist, this will lay the ground for subjective descriptions of the general
nature phenomenon and thus, many hypotheses will be “on the market” for
giving a general explanation of the phenomenon (the reasonable creativity of
the individual consciousness, i.e. the subject, have relatively large space). The more and trustier observations and the
larger range of the observations, the smaller basis exists for subjective
adjustments of the general description of the nature phenomenon (the increase in test results /
observations will tighten the limits for individual reasonable cretivity).
The objectivity increases and the subjectivity decreases in step with the
progressing of the scientific process. 1.7.5 The making of objectivity by changing
definitions The
absence of objective knowledge and presence of subjective or intersubjective
knowledge may often be regarded as a problem of defining concepts (see also
Section 1.7.2). |
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Let us define pretty woman as follows: “a woman with that numerical mamma size and that
numerical curving of the hips.” Then we may carry out instrumental
measurements and objectively say that Miss Universe is pretty. |
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Let us define fat man as follows: “a man with a BMI higher than 25”. A man with
weight 120 kilograms and height 175 cm is objectively fat according to this
definition. |
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If we make the definition that all criminal
actions always are immoral, each criminal action will automatically be
objectively immoral. |
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Let us make the definition of good politics
as follows: “the present politics of the Democratic Party”. According to this
definition, the citizens of the USA are objectively always under the
influence of good politics when a Democratic president rules the USA. |
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In this way we can create
objectivity, but what really happens is that we falsely give knowledge more
authority than it deserves. Which objective criteria to enter the definitions,
depend on the subjective consciousness making the definitions. Besides, such
defining is often an insincere way of doing argument manipulation (see
Section 1.2.1.2). 1.7.6 Summary of objective and subjective
knowledge All knowledge of the reality contains certain
components of objectivity and certain components of subjectivity. However,
one of the components may sometimes be present in such a tiny amount that it
is only of absurd-philosophical interest. Thus, there is a gradual transition
from absolute objective knowledge to absolute subjective knowledge, and
between the two theoretical extremes all mixing ratios of the two components
are possible. The
degree of intersubjective consensus (in the most relevant academic
communities and that shows the strongest integrity towards rational
epistemological principles) will often be able to estimate the degree of
objectivity in the knowledge. 1.8 Accurate knowledge
What is accurate knowledge about
the reality? Can we claim accurate knowledge about an element if many
observations give the same result and no contradictive observations exist? That could have been the case if
the knowledge was based on an infinite number of observations (and if we
disregard the uncertainty, which according to Section 1.6.1 is present in the
observation itself).
But the number “∞” does not exist in the world of reality. Since a
limited number of observations are to be considered, knowledge of an element
Q is only accurate with an uncertainty q (even if the results from all
observations are cohering, it does not exclude the arising of diverging
results in the future). Having measured the distance from Sun to Earth and
the distance from Moon to Earth and their corresponding standard deviations,
the result is that “the Earth is farther from the
Sun than from the Moon” with statistical p-value < 10-100 or something like that.
Theoretically, we do not have absolute accurate knowledge, but for all
practical purposes we have accurate knowledge (i.e. the knowledge can be
trustworthily used for predictions). The certainty increases proportionally
with the square root of the number of observations and inversely
proportionally with the standard deviation. This is objective knowledge – the
fact that the distance from Earth to Sun is larger than the distance between
Earth and Moon does not depend on the observing subject. Socrates said to his critics: “You
claim to know nothing with certainty. How can you then be certain that you do
not know anything with certainty?” The answer of Rational Gaudism is as
follows: Induction is an abstract concept in our
consciousness that we have absolutely certain knowledge about; in the same
way as we have accurate knowledge of mathematical concepts like derivation,
multiplication and the area of a circle. Therefore, deductive conclusions
made on the basis of the principles of induction have to give absolute
certainty. Assuming that induction has given the 100 % accurate knowledge
that element X behaves in way x. Then element X has to behave in the x-manner
tomorrow, but we cannot be sure of that since nobody has observed tomorrow.
We have obtained a contradiction. Therefore, we do not have 100 % accurate
knowledge that element X behaves in way x. The basis for stating that
induction cannot give 100 % accurate knowledge is that ∞ is not a
natural number. Absolutely
accurate knowledge about phenomena in the outer reality with infinite
observation potential can only be achieved by A) obtaining the ability to
observe infinitely into time and space, B) other fundamental methods than
induction that have not yet been discovered by any human being (e.g. true
divine revelations). Therefore, in the future it may theoretically happen that
we will obtain absolutely accurate knowledge about some elements in the outer
reality, but then either A or B has to be fulfilled. Thus, we cannot for sure
know that we never can know anything for sure, but it is extremely unlikely.
On the other hand, most of the commonly accepted theories in nature science
are accompanied with very small uncertainties. Today, I know with absolute
certainty that I do not have any absolutely certain knowledge of the outer
reality since neither A nor B is fulfilled. However, I know something for
sure about my own consciousness, namely what is mentioned in the beginning of
chapter 1. We
can have absolutely accurate knowledge about phenomena in the outer reality
that refers to a finite observation potential if each observation is
considered absolutely accurate (see Section 1.5.1). But an observation is,
strictly speaking, a hypothesis attached with uncertainty (see Section
1.6.1), and strictly speaking we do not have absolutely accurate knowledge in
such cases either. In medical
research, a statistical p-value < 0.05 is usually thought to be an
adequate certainty for publishing a scientific result. In a worst case
scenario this means that for each twentieth published research paper we may
expect to have one case with faulty knowledge. It is very dangerous for the
philosophy to say that since all knowledge fundamentally is based on
observations and induction with uncertainty attached, we really cannot know
anything – therefore we may jump into wild religious and metaphysical
speculations. Rational philosophy of science ought to be the less
gambling-directed method of gathering knowledge of the reality. When this
book mentions knowledge of the reality as “certain”, “accurate”, “facts” etc.,
the very small uncertainty being induction-theoretically present is
disregarded for simplicity. 2. Metaphysics and Epistemology, Part B
Metaphysics is the part of philosophy
studying the fundamental nature of the reality that observation or scientific
methods cannot detect. Fundamentally, Rational Gaudism accepts only the
minimum of metaphysics presented in the principles which are absolutely
unavoidable if further epistemological progression is not to become meaningless
/ indeterminate and that all further acquiring of knowledge has to build on;
i.e. what is described in Chapter 1 before Section 1.2. Additional
metaphysical speculations are subjective fantasy and will reduce the
probability of approaching the reality's “Ding-an-sich”-values to the
absurd-philosophical level. Everything mentioned in this chapter is
recognized through the epistemological principles described in chapter 1. The reality is separated in two parts: 1) the
outer reality, and 2) the consciousness of individuals. 2.1 The outer reality
The outer reality is matter (moons, stars,
planets, cars, trees, humans, animals) and physical forces like electromagnetism,
gravitation, electricity etc. Knowledge of these objects is obtained by HDM.
In physical terms the outer reality consists of all collections of fermions
and bosons of the Universe, and this outer reality exists independently of
our senses and consciousness. This is the essence of axiom 1. In
the year 1000 AC no human being was aware of the existence of the dwarf
planet Pluto. The perception of this astronomical object was not inside the
consciousness of any man at that time. But of course, Pluto existed all the
same because scientists can prove its existence at that time by the use of
adequate technology. The human genome (genetic code) existed as an object in
the outer reality both before and after 1953, though it was in this year that
scientists decoded the genetic code. The
outer reality exists the way it exists (Ding an sich), 100% objective;
independent of the observing subject (axiom 1); we disregard “bizarre”
quantum effects at the particle level. We can asymptotically approach knowledge
of this reality with gradually decreasing degree of uncertainty (see Section
1.5.1). For the description of the
existence and function of physical, biological and astronomical objects,
Rational Gaudism refers to the frontier of science on the actual topic –
especially the most acknowledged journals in their respective areas (Science, Nature, The New England Journal
of Medicine, The Lancet etc.). If anything in this book should be
proven not to be in accordance with generally acknowledged science, Rational
Gaudism accepts the new, scientific knowledge if this clearly is the most
well-founded one (see Section 1.5.3 and 1.5.4). 2.2 The consciousness of individuals
The consciousness is the sum of
all biological functions in the nerve system that makes an organism perceive
happiness/unhappiness. Such functions may be sense perceptions, remembering,
choice of action and thinking. What functions to use depends on the degree of
evolution of the consciousness. The input of the consciousness always starts
directly or indirectly with sense perceptions. An organism that is able to
receive perceptions from the surroundings, but does not possess the ability
to perceive happiness/unhappiness, does not have a consciousness. The human
consciousness also includes being self-aware. According to the introduction of
chapter 1, the content of my consciousness is my only source of absolutely
accurate knowledge. I observe a body always following “me”, and I call this
“my body”. I also observe other collections of fermions and bosons that are
very similar to me and my body, and I induce these into a concept: “human
beings”. Furthermore, I induce the well-founded hypothesis that their
consciousnesses have the same basic nature as my own consciousness. The
outer reality is transferred into the consciousness of the individuals with
the senses as vectors (axiom 1). Additionally, the humans have developed a
lot of technology as links between the outer reality and the human senses
(see Section 1.6.2). The human consciousness arises as a consequence of a
nerve system carrying out biological processes (Koch & Greenfield,
2007). The consciousness has to be an element in the definition of the
concept of a human being. An individual
can create a correct picture of the reality in his consciousness, and he can
perform an action as a consequence of thinking from that picture. This action
may change the outer reality (e.g. hewing a tree). In this way, the
consciousness will indirectly influence the outer reality. The
consciousness of an individual may produce a wrong picture of the reality,
e.g. by gathering deficient information about an object. But this incorrect
picture exists – even if we do not like it. All humans dealing with this person
(the person himself included) have to deal with the part of the reality
represented by the mispicture and its influence on the rest of the reality.
On the other hand, the part of the reality represented by the mispicture may
be changed and brought into accordance with the outer reality. In
our consciousness we can have our own “fantasy world” of thoughts, dreams,
and views, and by thinking or dreaming we can have experiences in this world
of fantasy (axiom-independent knowledge) that undoubtedly may influence our
happiness in positive or negative direction even if the corresponding objects
do not exist in the outer reality. We can also perform actions as a
consequence of the “fantasy world”, and this may obviously influence the
outer reality. Considering the functioning of the
consciousness, Rational Gaudism refers to the frontier of sciences in
neurophysiology, neuropsychology etc. – especially the most acknowledged
journals in their respective areas. The present description of Rational
Gaudism does not differentiate between consciousness and subconsciousness –
both are described by the same concept “consciousness” without considering
the differences between these. Koch C, Greenfield S. How does consciousness happen?
Sci Am. (2007) 297, 76-83. 2.2.1
Subjective / objective / intersubjective reality The outer reality is objective
(independent of the observing subject). How a consciousness perceives the
outer reality, depends on the individual consciousness observing, i.e.
subjective perception of the reality. Observing a salt herring will give my
consciousness negative associations; observing the same fish will give my
mother positive associations. Observing a red flag will give a former
prisoner of GULAG negative associations; observing the same flag will give
Fidel Castro positive associations. Nevertheless, the judgments of
individual consciousnesses have an inherent component of objectivity since
the outer reality is the same independent of the observing subject and since
there is a common objective evolutionary mechanism that has selected all the
senses and consciousnesses of all human beings. Therefore, a large degree of
consensus often (but not always) exists when different individuals transfer
an object in the outer reality into their consciousnesses by use of their
senses. The subjective perceptions of different consciousnesses may differ
somewhat and this is caused by different bases of experiences and different
genes. 2.2.2
Happiness Happiness is defined as profit from the
feelings. Each human feeling has a degree of value of happiness; positive or
negative. Negative happiness is also named unhappiness. One feeling can never
have neutral value of happiness, but two or more feelings may in summation
have neutral value of happiness. Sometimes a collection of feelings may seem
as one single feeling. Therefore, such a multiple feeling may have neutral
value of happiness. The death has neutral value of happiness. The value of
happiness is the valuation of human feelings in the similar way as dollars
are the valuation of accumulated work. Positive expectations mean to borrow
happiness that later on has to be paid back in terms of disappointments or
reduced happiness. Happiness is produced in the consciousness of individuals
(see also Section 9.1). Rational Gaudism adopts the sensible hypothesis that
superior animals also have the ability to experience happiness and
unhappiness (see Sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.2). 2.2.2.1 Why does perception of
happiness exist? The fundamental reason for the existence of
perception of happiness is that certain types of actions have caused
consequences statistically being evolutionary profitable with respect to the
maximization of the total mass of DNA (the survival of the species) in the
world. The individuals who experienced happiness by the consequences of such
actions were more eager to perform similar actions in the future than
individuals without the ability to perceive happiness in such situations.
Thus, the former individuals were selected in the evolution. In a similar
way, certain types of actions have caused consequences statistically being
evolutionary unfavorable. Individuals who perceived unhappiness for such
consequences were not keen to carry out similar actions in the future. These
individuals were also selected during the evolution. Therefore, humans (and
superior animals) have the ability to experience happiness and unhappiness
for different consequences of actions. Perception of happiness is a “carrot”
used by the DNA-molecule in order to double-cross the individual to act in
the direction of the DNA-molecule's quantitative maximization. A sea lion is
not interested in making tricks for the sake of the spectators but in getting
fish as reward. If the sea lion had got the fish without doing the tricks, it
would not have carried them out. Perception
of happiness is a prerequisite for human life. If the ancestors of the Homo
sapiens had not felt happiness by having sex, the sexual act would have
been skipped, and consequently the human beings would not have existed today.
Therefore, happiness implies human life. The human life is founded on
perceiving happiness, and without the existence of happiness the evolution of
Homo sapiens had been impossible. 2.2.2.2 Experiencing happiness is the only value What is valuable for me; i.e. what
do I want to achieve? To answer this question it is important to be aware of
the meaning of “I”. “I” is the consciousness. The consciousness has five
tasks: perception of senses, memory, thinking, making choices of action and
experience of happiness and unhappiness; additionally it coordinates these
five tasks. Let us assume the opposite of what is to be proven, namely that
there are other aspects than perception of happiness and avoiding unhappiness
that are valuable for the consciousness. Consequently, either perception of
senses, remembering, thinking, or making choices of action or a combination
of these is valuable in themselves for the consciousness. Sense perceptions and memory are remedies for performing
actions fitted to the reality and whose consequences are expected to give the
consciousness perceptions of happiness or avoidance of unhappiness. Sense
perceptions and memory can also be obtained without being accompanied by
action; e.g. by watching a good movie or remember good memories. But
perceptions of continuous pictures or memories are not primary values of the
consciousness. Perception of happiness as a consequence of the continuous
pictures is its value. Similarly,
thinking is a tool for fitting the choices of action to the
reality so the consciousness can perceive happiness from their consequences. Thinking
can also be used for solving completely theoretical problems in our
consciousness, which results in a perception of happiness by having achieved
something (see also Section 3.3.3.1). But neither thinking nor making choices
of action are objectives in themselves for the consciousness; only tools
for achieving happiness or avoiding unhappiness. It
is also important for the consciousness to make choices of action in order to
ensure its own existence, but its existence has no value in itself; it is
only a tool for perceiving happiness (there is no potential for perception of
happiness without existence). Perception of happiness and avoidance of
unhappiness are correctives for the consciousness in order to make the best
possible choices of action in the future, and in that respect they are
also tools for secondarily achieving more happiness and to avoid further
unhappiness. Perception
of senses, memory, thinking, and making choices of action are not valuable in
themselves for the consciousness. Since these are the only activities
performed by the consciousness in addition to the perception of happiness and
unhappiness (even if absurd-philosophical considerations may not exclude that
the consciousness may get other tasks in the future), we have shown that
perception of happiness and avoidance of unhappiness are the only valuable
aspects of the consciousness (= I = the individual). Disproving this requires
at minimum the detection of one single case of something else than happiness
that the consciousness wishes to achieve and which is not simultaneously a
means in the pursuit of creating self-happiness or avoiding self-unhappiness.
As long as this has not been detected, self-happiness is considered factually
as the only value. Since perception of happiness has value, more
happiness has even greater value, and the ultimate value of the consciousness
is the maximization of the sum of the perceptions of happiness during the
life span; or more precisely to maximize the surplus of happiness
(eventually to minimize the deficit) where the surplus of happiness = S(happiness) - S(unhappiness). When this book
speaks of “maximization of happiness” or “the sum of happiness”
etc., it always refers to S(happiness)
- S(unhappiness). Some religious persons may include “eternal life”
in the concept “life span”, but Rational Gaudism does not consider life after
death a part of the reality. The
reality (all human consciousnesses included) is a tool for a given individual
to achieve happiness. The reality itself is irrelevant; it is the reality's
ability to influence my sensation of happiness that is relevant for me. But objects in the reality (and
the consciousness itself) are important tools for producing happiness for the
individual consciousness. The reality is a “necessary evil” for a consciousness to realize
happiness. Each fermion and boson or whatever collection of these are
considered to be tools for maximizing my self-happiness. I respect that all
other individuals regard the same fermions and bosons in the same way. Imagine that humans were able to
produce happiness without a life. Then life would be unnecessary. Muslims
believe that a man produces happiness in Heaven after death if he sacrifices
his life in “Holy war”. Buddhists wish to avoid unhappiness by annihilating
in Nirvana. In the world of reality neither Heaven nor Nirvana exist, but
atheistic death does exist. If (maintenance of) life had been more important than happiness, it would have been rational
to maintain life in a situation where the rest of the life is expected to
give larger deficit of happiness (= surplus of unhappiness) than death. Based
on the thought that one's own experiences of happiness are the only valuable
aspects in the Universe, maintenance of life can never be more important than
generating happiness / avoiding unhappiness during the life span. But
producing relative happiness (avoiding unhappiness) may be more important
than maintaining life if one realistically may expect to generate major
deficit of happiness in the remaining lifetime. An example is a 12 weeks old
embryo having defects that will imply a hell of pain after birth; then
abortion (total life happiness = 0) is a better alternative than to be born
(total life happiness strongly negative). 2.3 Supernatural reality
Does anything exist in addition to
the outer reality and the consciousness of individuals? Superior animals have
consciousness, but this is already included under “individual
consciousnesses”. There are probably a lot of objects in the outer reality
that have not yet been transferred to any individual consciousness (e.g. many
planets probably exist in orbits around distant stars without having been
discovered yet), but these are included in the concept “outer reality”. What
about God, Satan, goblins, fairies, effect of homeopathy beyond the placebo
effect, the fourth space dimension, the existence of the consciousness
independent of the body etc.? As long as there are no scientific evidences
for such supernatural elements they are supposed to not be existent (see
Section 9.2). Rational
Gaudism will accept the existence of such elements if the hypothesis of their
existence can get “on the throne” and further on resist sufficiently intense
attempts of scientific dethronement (see Section 1.5.3). According to
prominent physicists, experiments will be carried out in order to test the
hypothesis of the existence of a fourth space dimension (MacRobert, 2003;
Steinhardt & Turok, 2002). If the hypothesis of the existence of this
new dimension can get “on the throne” and further on resist sufficiently
intense attempts of dethronement, Rational Gaudism will accept the fourth
space dimension as a part of the reality. When facing observations, a waste number of
hypotheses will be able to explain the observed data. A scientific approach
means to adopt the explanatory model that explains the observations by the
least help of far-fetched auxiliary
hypotheses (see Section 1.5.2 , 1.5.3 and 1.5.4). If I observe something that clearly looks like a car, this
observation can be explained by the
object being an elephant, but my senses are for some reason distorted in such
a way that it appears falsely as a car. The alternative hypothesis is that
the object is a car. The scientific approach is to adopt the hypothesis that
the object is a car. Rationally, it
is difficult to assign any respect to the elephant hypothesis. Similarly, the
reality presents a large number of observations that nowadays very well can
be scientifically explained (the age of Earth, evolution, laws and rules in
society etc.). Explaining
this with the existence of (the Abrahamitic) God is as epistemologically
dubious as explaining a clear cut observation of a car by being an elephant. Epistemologically regarded
neither the elephant hypothesis nor the religion hypothesis deserves serious
consideration. Religion and science are basically
preoccupied with the same interest: presenting models for explaining
phenomena of the reality. Religion contra atheism is basically a question whether we are to
keep tight to a beloved hypothesis which is strongly depending on many
far-fetched ad hoc hypotheses, or
if we are to adopt hypotheses which do not need far-fetched auxiliary hypotheses as crutches for avoiding
falsification (see also Section 9.2.1). By using an epistemological process
that accepts far-fetched ad hoc
hypotheses you will achieve the results of your whims and hopes. It will tell
something about the content of your consciousness, but hardly anything about
the reality outside your own skull, i.e. pure subjectivism. Let us consider the hypothesis 1: “God
exists”. In order to avoid direct falsification this hypothesis has to be
supported by very active use of far-fetched ad hoc hypotheses (see
Section 9.2.1). Consider a “hypothesis 2” in the regular scientific area, and
let us imagine that this hypothesis has to be supported as intensely by ad
hoc hypotheses as hypothesis 1. Then the product of the well-foundedness
of the auxiliary hypotheses is extremely small. If it shall be meaningful to
talk about “falsification” (for hypotheses with an infinite observation
basis), we have to set a lower limit for this product where the hypothesis in
practice is considered falsified if the product falls behind this limit (see
Section 1.5.6). Hypothesis
2 would in practice undoubtedly have been described as falsified – especially if there are more
well-founded alternative hypotheses. Thus, hypothesis 1 will also necessarily
be considered falsified, i.e. the hypothesis of the existence of God has been
scientifically falsified de facto. If a scientist is religious, that
is one contra-argument against his
professional quality (but other arguments may exist pointing in his favor).
He keeps on to a beloved hypothesis (God's existence) that depends on many
and far-fetched ad hoc hypotheses
for avoiding falsification in spite of the fact that the observations of the
reality very well can be explained by hypotheses that do not need far-fetched
auxiliary hypotheses as crutches. When a scientist uses such dubious
hypothesis adoption on one area, it is possible that it originates from a bad
scientific attitude that also can infect his scientific work. The validity of
this argument is stronger the more fundamentalist he is, and may vary with
his area of science. MacRobert AM. A Cyclic
Univerce? Sky & Telescope. Steinhardt PJ, Turok
N. A Cyclic Model of the Universe. Science (2002) 296, 1436-1439 2.4 Identity and nature
A specific stone (a collection of fermions
and bosons that e.g. is hard) is a stone (fits the concept “stone”) because
it has the attributes satisfying the implicit definition of the concept
“stone”. We observe a stone falling towards Earth. This is an observation and
according to axiom 1, this event has existence in the outer reality. Why does
the stone fall towards Earth? It is explained by the well-justified
hypothesis that the large mass of Earth attracts the stone with a
gravitational force with acceleration = 9, 81 m/s2. The specific stone is a
collection of fermions and bosons that had those attributes needed for
falling towards Earth (at least at that particular moment when it actually
fell); that is a fact from axiom 1. All other collections of fermions and
bosons belonging to the concept “stone” have observationally been shown to
fall towards Earth (as far as I am concerned). Theoretically, the principle
of induction does not give a 100% guarantee that all collections of fermions
and bosons belonging to the concept “stone” will fall towards Earth (unless
“falling towards Earth” is taken to be one of the elements in the definition
of the concept “stone”). A fundamental philosophical
question: Does a stone have a nature, an identity? We cannot be 100% sure of
that unless “the nature” of the stone is included in the definition of the
concept “stone”: |
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1) |
Considering a stone, we can predict (with
high degree of statistical certainty) that the stone will behave in a
particular way (i.e. fall towards Earth) because on beforehand a hypothesis
has been induced (from knowledge from the behavior of other stones) stating
that all stones behave this way, and this hypothesis has to an extreme extent
resisted intense attempts of dethronement). The hypothesis may be formed as
follows: “it is the nature of stones to fall towards Earth”. |
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|
2) |
A stone is dropped from a height of one meter
and we observe that the stone falls towards Earth. We repeat the experiment
10000 times with the same stone and the result is always the same. Then we can
induce the hypothesis that it is the nature of this stone to fall towards
Earth. Since the hypothesis is produced by induction, we can theoretically
not exclude that the stone will rise into the sky at the next experiment, but
the probability is extremely small (perhaps something like 10-300). Still, it is very rational to
adopt the hypothesis that the nature of this stone is to fall towards Earth. |
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3) |
Considering a particular stone. We can
predict the behavior of the stone (or its particular qualities) because the
actual behavior is included in the definition of the concept “stone”. If
“falling towards Earth” is included in the definition of the concept “stone”,
the particular stone is guaranteed to fall towards Earth. If the object was
not to fall towards Earth, it was no stone after all. |
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|
Rational Gaudism does not consider
“A=A” as an axiom but as a hypothesis with more or less uncertainty attached
depending on the object under examination. Generally, an object in the outer reality
may be estimated to have an identity (a nature) at a particular level of
certainty if we have performed a corresponding lot of adequate observations
(see Section 1.5.2). Rational Gaudism states that most objects have an
identity (nature) since the uncertainty often can be disregarded for all
practical purposes. We may also choose to give a concept an identity/nature
by including the actual qualities into the definition of the concept, but
such ad hoc definitions will often be somewhat dubious epistemology. Considering the question whether all events
have a cause, the answer is a consequence of the text above: when observing
an event H, we may say that H is caused by X with probability S. A stone's
fall towards Earth is with extremely large probability caused by the
gravitational force of the Earth's mass pulling the stone towards Earth. 2.4.1 The
fundamental nature of different objects A stone's nature is to be influenced by chaos
and physical laws (e.g. the gravitational force) or by a man or an animal
moving it. Other non-living inorganic and organic objects have the similar
nature. The
evolution of life began with an aqueous soup of organic molecules that
gradually started to replicate. After millions of years the environment made
it favorable to form a cell membrane to protect the replicating molecules. In
this way, the first cells originated and through “survival of the fittest”
gradually more complex life forms were developed. The maximum of the
evolution is Homo sapiens – the modern human being. Lower
life forms: Plants' nature is to use biochemical processes for growth and
multiplying. The plant is a medium used by the DNA molecule in the pursuit of
maximization of the total mass of DNA in the world. Bacteria, virus, fungi
and lower multicell animals like jelly-fishes, starfish and sea urchins have
a similar nature. The perception of happiness and unhappiness is not the
nature of these lower organisms' nature. Mean
advanced animals: These animals (fish, amphibians) are driven by instincts,
have no or negligible ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness, and have no
consciousness (Cabanac, 1999; Rose et al., 2014). It is believed that
the first amniotes (tetrapod vertebrates that have terrestrially adapted
eggs) were the first animals to have the ability to experience
happiness/unhappiness; i.e. they had consciousness (Cabanac et al., 2009).
The first amniotes arose in the evolution 325 million years ago. Thus, it is
assumed that the evolutionary distinction between happiness-perceiving and
non-happiness-perceiving animals goes between amphibians and reptiles. This
means that animals that are amphibians or evolutionary more primitive than
these are non-happiness-perceiving, while animals that are evolutionary more
advanced than the amphibians, are happiness-perceiving. An exception from
this is probably octopus, which seems to have signs of consciousness (Mather,
2008). Superior
animals (mammals, birds and reptiles) have consciousnesses with different
degrees of complexity. These animals have individual pursuit of happiness and
avoidance of unhappiness in the instant moment as their objectives. It is
believed that reptiles have weaker and more primitive ability to this than mammals
and birds. It is the genetic instincts and the taught habits that tell the
animal how to obtain feelings of happiness and how to avoid unhappiness. When
the animal uses its instincts and taught habits, the result will point
towards the long-term survival of the species within the present external
environment and towards the maximization of the total mass of DNA in the
world. Happiness is mainly represented by sexual pleasure while unhappiness
most often is represented by hunger, fear (e.g. for being attacked by other
animals) or physical pain. Pursuit of happiness and avoidance of unhappiness
in the instant moment through their genetic instincts is the fundamental
nature of superior animals. The
human beings have the most advanced consciousness. The only objective of the
individual is to maximize his self-happiness during his life span. The human
way of doing this is to think and then choose to perform those actions that
are expected to maximize their self-happiness during their life spans, i.e.
through a rational process (see also Section 4.1). The use of this rational
process will not necessarily maximize the number of individuals – even if it
historically has done so. Pursuit of happiness and avoidance of unhappiness
by the use of rationality in the life-long perspective is the human nature.
Cabanac M, Cabanac AJ, Parent A. The emergence of consciousness in
phylogeny. Behav Brain Res (2009) 198: 267-272 Cabanac M. Emotion and phylogeny. Jpn J Physiol (1999) 49: 1-10 Rose JD, Arlinghaus R, Cooke SJ, Diggles BK, Sawynok W, Stevens ED,
Wynne CDL. Can fish really feel pain? Fish and Fisheries (2014) 15, 97-133 Mather JA. Cephalopod consciousness: behavioural evidence. Conscious
Cogn. (2008) 17(1):37-48 2.5 Free will
Free will is the ability of a
consciousness to choose between different alternatives of action, and
according to axiom 2 the human consciousness has this ability. If
assertions about the outer reality (knowledge) arrive as a consequence of
bosons and fermions interacting passively with my consciousness without “I”
considering and choosing to reject the bad ideas in favor of the good ones,
all alternative hypotheses (assertions) about a phenomenon will basically
have the same credibility. Explanation models that have existed through human
beings' evolutionary period, will mainly converge towards being good means in
our species' pursuit of survival, but will not necessarily estimate “the
truth” (i.e. “Ding an sich”). But since we have lived and functioned
evolutionarily in the world of reality, is it possible that a few
simple evolutionarily tested explanation models may estimate “the truth”
anyway even without the presumption of “free will”. Explanation models not
having lived through significant parts of human beings' evolutionary history
or not having relevance for our survival, will be completely meaningless. The
probability of obtaining success with our actions is limited by the
conditions of reality. Some actions are less probable to be successful than
others. This fact will influence the actual choice of action, but it does not
prevent the consciousness from choosing to try to perform an apparently impossible action. This refers to a
real, genuine attempt where the performer of action actually believes that he
can succeed (and not a false attempt). Natural
compulsion is
conditions in the reality that make certain consequences and corresponding
probabilities strongly advantageous for choosing a specific alternative of
action (i.e. that humans have to works for their survival). Of course, the
natural compulsion will influence the consciousness when making choices of
action, but the natural compulsion does not change the fundamental qualities
of the consciousness, and free will is such a quality. If you are to remove
the free will, you have to hit a person's head so hard that he obtains a severe
brain damage destroying completely/partly the consciousness. The fact that we
“have to” work (in order to survive) is completely natural and does no way
mean that the consciousness is so destroyed that it is not capable of
carrying out choices between alternatives of actions and thus, the free will
is not reduced. 2.5.1 The
reality limits the realism of actions but not the free will I want to fly, but no other human
being has ever performed a flight with his own limbs. But I have free will in
the sense that I can try to perform
those actions needed for flying (gene manipulation perhaps?). I want to run
100 meter at 9 seconds, but no man has ever run so fast. But I have free will
to try to run that fast. A son of a
violent homeless father has free will to try
to become a respectable citizen, and that is realistically not impossible.
But the probability of being a homeless person himself is larger than the
probability for the son of a doctor to be the same. A
person with a desire of traveling to a distant star can theoretically try to
perform this alternative of action tomorrow. But because of technological
limitations in the present reality, we can (for all practical purposes) with
certainty can say that he will not succeed. This knowledge makes it extremely
unlikely that he will try. Theoretically, this person may try to change the
future reality by inventing technology that increases the probability of a
successful star journey. A
woman is being raped by a huge, strong man. The woman understands with her
rational mind that if she could hit him into fainting, she would avoid the
very unpleasant experience of a rape. She can use her consciousness to choose
to try to hit him into fainting,
but for all practical purposes we can for certain say that she will not
succeed because of her physically weakness. The present reality limits her
realistic chance to succeed. This knowledge makes it unlikely that she will
try. In the future she may try to change the reality by exercising karate and
thereby having realistic expectations to knock out a future rapist. A
third person wants to buy a new Ferrari, but he does not have enough money,
and the bank is not willing to give him a loan. But he can try to haggle about the price to $20
and thereby buy the car. But the present reality limits his realistic chance
to succeed with the car purchase. This knowledge makes it extremely unlikely
that he will try. But in the future he may work harder or save more money and
thereby change the reality making a Ferrari purchase more realistic. Some
parts of the reality can easily be changed by a person, but other parts of
the reality can not realistically be changed by the individual. The present
reality experienced by an individual is a result of external circumstances
and earlier choices made by the individual. The individual human being has
unlimited free will in the sense that he always can choose to try to perform whatever alternative of
action that he is able to think up, but the present reality will set
limitations for what kind of action alternatives he realistically can succeed
with, and this will influence the choice of action. In this way, a
predisposing determinism exists accompanying our free will (see Section
2.5.4). Strictly
speaking, it is impossible “to choose to perform an action”. The choice of
action is made in the consciousness, and the consciousness can “choose to try to perform an action”. Just
after the choice of action (we can change our mind until a few nanoseconds
before performing the action) follows “the attempt of performing the action”.
The attempt is carried out by the nerve system and the muscles, and by the
time it will be apparent if the attempt was successful. 2.5.2 Animals
and “free will” When the lion “Simba” observes a zebra, an
instinct tells him that it is food. Simba has observed that his parents have
relatively short distance to the zebra when attacking. Repeated observations
of this kind in combination with own experiences have taught Simba that he
needs to have short distance to the zebra before attacking. This wisdom
refines Simba's hunting qualities, originating from the genetic instinct, and
he becomes a better hunter compared to an untrained lion. Simba has to
evaluate if he is to attack when he is 10, 15 or 20 meters away from the
zebra. There is no genetic automatic telling him to start the attack at a
distance of 12.37 meters. In this respect the lion has a
certain choice. Thus, the lion's consciousness has a little ability to choose
between alternatives of action; a little degree of free will. But the choices
are strongly limited by the fact that the lion has an approximately
zero-dimensional time perspective for its choices of action; i.e. the lion
can only choose between alternatives of action in the pursuit of maximization
of happiness and avoidance of unhappiness in the present; long-term
evaluation in the lifelong perspective is not a part of the lion's nature.
Thus, it is impossible for the lion to initiate a technological evolution
since it requires advanced thinking beyond the instant moment (plus handiness
and language). The lion cannot disobey its instincts, only evaluate which
instinct it is to follow and against what in the pursuit of maximization of
happiness or minimization of unhappiness in the instant moment. The
lion does not have the ability to evaluate if it will produce more happiness
in the lifelong time perspective by omitting to obey the instincts (e.g. by
starting to grow corn in stead of hunting zebras). The lion can never make
the choice of “trying to travel to the Moon” because its genome implies so
low brain capacity that the lion never will be able to understand neither
moon, nor rocket engine nor landing vehicle since this requires long-term
intelligent thinking both in the future and the presence. Besides, handiness
and language must probably be present in front of an intelligent mutation in
order for the mutation to be promoted in the evolution – an intelligent brain
is useless if you do not have practical skills to carry out the technological
progresses thought out by the brain. Theoretically, man has the ability
(freedom) to choose to try to perform any alternative of action that the
human consciousness can imagine, and which the consciousness genuinely
believes that the individual can succeed with (even if the probability of
success sometimes may be infinitesimal). Considering a hypothetical
alternative of action that the human consciousness is not able to
imagine (but we do not know if such actions exist) the human does not
have free will to choose this alternative. The corresponding reasoning
applies to a lion, but we (humans) know that there are a lot of alternatives
of action that a lion cannot imagine – those alternatives of actions which
require advanced evaluations beyond the instant moment and which thus are not
implied by its instincts. Rational Gaudism assumes that many
animals with nerve system exceeding a certain limit have a certain, but very
little ability to choose between alternatives of action, and this ability
decreases proportionally with the inferiority of the consciousness. It is
assumed to be a very moderate increase in “free will” from birds to
chimpanzees, but an extreme increase in “free will” from chimpanzees to human
beings. Animals do not have significant degree of “free will” since their
consciousnesses are so limited that they are predetermined to be slaves of
their instincts; they have only insignificant degree of “free will” in the sense
that they can choose which instinct they are to follow and what to direct
their instinct against in the present (will a hungry and potent male lion
choose to have sex with a female lion or will it hunt down the zebra when the
two animals appear simultaneously for the male lion). Animals' learning rule
is quite automatic. There is no intelligence built in, and no significant
degree of “free will” that guides learning. The rule just says that if
activity in one neuron is soon followed by activity in a second neuron, then
the connection from the first to the second should be strengthened (Biegler,
2004). A being has significant degree of “free will” if it is capable of
carrying on a technological evolution and thereby liberate itself from its
natural instincts. Chimps have been shown to make primitive spears for
killing their preys, and thus, these primates have almost a tiny “significant
degree of free will” (Pruetz & Bertolani, 2007). Beings living
exclusively at the automatic instinctive level without perceiving
happiness/unhappiness (amphibians and lower) are not supposed to have any
“free will” at all. Biegler R. Network models of
memory. NTNU Lecture. (2004) Spring, pp 2 Pruetz JD, Bertolani P. Savanna Chimpanzees,
Pan troglodytes verus, Hunt with Tools. Current Biology (2007) 17, 412–417 2.5.3 Man
cannot choose his own values Value is what a consciousness
wants to achieve. Experiencing happiness is the only value. Considering a consciousness
with the ability to make choices of action, value is what the organism wants
to achieve with its actions. Accordingly, perception of happiness is the only
motive power for human actions. We are talking about perception of happiness
for the individual who performs the action because it is the individual who
is the only human element capable of perceiving happiness; the nation, the
race, the family or the social class does not have the ability to perceive
happiness or unhappiness. If e.g. the nation had been an element capable of
perceiving happiness, producing happiness for the nation would have been a
motive power for action in itself. In the same way as a muscle cell is a
slave for the human consciousness for contributing to the consciousness'
happiness, the individual man would be a slave in the nation with the job of
serving the nation with happiness. Having made a choice of action
confirms that in the very moment before carrying out the action, the
performer believed that no other alternative of action was better fitted in
the strategy for achieving the ultimate value (= maximizing of the
perceptions of happiness during the life span). The individual human being is
predetermined to try to maximize the sum of his own perceptions of happiness during
his life span. We may say that “pursuit of happiness in the life-long
perspective” is the fundamental human “instinct”. The individual cannot act
in another way than what he believes will obtain the ultimate value, but both
subjectively (in the future) and intersubjectively (both in the moment of
action choice and in the future) the action may be considered to be
inferiorly adequate (see chapter 3). Thus, the individual human cannot choose
his own values, but he has “free will” to evaluate what tools/means will be
best suited in the strategy towards the ultimate value. The individual man can only
perform self-happy-motivated actions. Self-happy motivation is an attribute
of the fundamental human nature and not an ethical dimension. There are 3
types of actions: primary, secondary and tertiary self-motivated actions. All
these types of actions can be rational or irrational to different degrees.
Since the description of the self-happy motivation interacts significantly
with the ethics, self-happy motivation is considered closely under “Ethics”
in chapter 3. 2.5.4
Predisposing determinism A person A is put into prison by a
totalitarian regime and cannot be blamed for his stay in prison. His
consciousness has the same qualities as before he was imprisoned; the ability
to choose between alternatives of action (free will) included. Thus, he has
the ability to make the following choice of action: “I will try to perform
those actions needed for escaping from jail.” The probability of success is
perhaps small but not zero since there are several examples of escaped
prisoners. Given this situation, is it appropriate to say the following?
“Shut up and do not complain! You have free will to choose to escape. It is
your own fault that you are still in prison.” Another
person B has been born into extreme poverty in the ghetto with bad parents
and bad friends. During his youth, formally until he comes of age, person B
is not responsible for living in these surroundings. His consciousness has
the same qualities as if he had lived in a royal castle; the ability to
choose between alternatives of action (free will) included. Thus, he has the
ability to make the following choice of action: “I will try to perform those
actions needed for escaping from the ghetto and become a successful
businessman.” The probability of success is perhaps small, but not zero,
since there are several examples of businessmen originating from the ghetto.
Given this situation, is it appropriate to say the following? “Shut up and do
not complain! You have free will to choose to work yourself out of the
ghetto. It is your own fault that you are still living in the ghetto.” As these two examples show, it is
not sufficiently to refer to the free will of the humans when evaluating if a
person is to be blamed (or praised) for his own life situation or not. But
oppositely, if the humans did not have free will at all, no individuals would
ever be to blame (or praised) for anything. To
evaluate if an individual is to be blamed or not for his life situation,
Rational Gaudism introduces the concept “predisposing determinism”.
This concept is defined as “the influence that (elements in) the reality
performs on the choice of action of a consciousness”. Thus, a predisposing
determinant is an element of reality influencing the choice of action of a
consciousness. An individual is predetermined to
try to perform alternatives of action (H) in the pursuit of maximization of
his sum of self-happiness during his life span from (1) the probabilities (S)
for being hit by the consequences of elements in the reality and (2) the
value (V) that these consequences are expected to have for him during his
life span (value = the ability of the consequences to influence his long-term
sum of happiness); for more on S- and V-values see Section 3.1. An
individual, P, faces a choice of action. For each alternative of action, Hi (i = 1,2,..., ∞), the
possible consequences are Kj (j = 1,2,..., ∞), and for
each Kj the corresponding Sij and Vj exist.
For each alternative of action the same series of theoretically possible
consequences with the same values exists, but the probability for the
consequences to take place depends on the choice of action. Sij and Vj are metaphysical
parameters with existence in the reality, but their exact values are hidden
for us. The reality
directs its predisposing determinism through these parameters. The reality
has a determining effect of The
individual consciousness has the ability (free will) to evaluate the ability
(Vj) of the consequences to influence his sum of
self-happiness during his life span, and the probability (Sij) for
consequence Kj to occur for each alternative of action (Hi). And
the individual consciousness is predetermined to try to find the values of Sij and Vj. The
estimates actually found by the individual consciousness are named sij and vj. The
parameters for Sij and Vj are
metaphysically given and not under our control (see Section 3.1). Thus, it is
the differences | SijVj – sijvj| that the individual
consciousness is responsible for, and these differences are the fundament settling to what extent we are
to be blamed (or praised) for the consequences of our choices of action. The lower difference, the better
job is performed by the consciousness. But when the consciousness faces a
choice of action, not only the potentially chosen alternative of action Hn is to be evaluated; all
alternatives of action Hi (i = 1,2,..., ∞) have to be evaluated. Therefore, the
consciousness is assigned the following total blame/credit for a choice of
action:
The rest is assigned to
other humans and/or coincidences (chaos). Example: Person A is imprisoned and he is
to stay in jail for one more year. The fact that he imprisoned is a part of
the reality influencing the probability of performing alternatives of action
and realistically, the imprisonment excludes a successful journey to Mallorca
next year. The probability (S1) for a Mallorca-trip-attempt to fail is very
large and the value (V1) of the consequences of such a failure is expected to be strongly
negative. The probability (S2) for succeeding escaping to Mallorca on
vacation is very small and the value (V2) of the consequences is expected
to be moderately positive. The stay in prison has a very high determining
effect (S1.V1 + S2.V2) on “not attempting to travel to
Mallorca” the next year. Theoretically,
he has free will to choose si and vi in such
a way that S(si.vi) becomes favorable for the escaping attempt. But if he really makes
this choice, it is because he believes that he has found the best values for
Si and Vi, but in that case his
consciousness has performed bad thinking. 2.5.4.1 Time perspective The reality can have so low
determining effect on Hn within a time perspective of “a”
time units that Hn (realistically) is excluded. But
within a time perspective of “b” (b>a) time units, the reality can have so
much larger predisposing effect that Hn becomes a realistic alternative
of action. If we consider a time perspective of 0 time units (t = 0), the
reality excludes all alternatives of action with 100 % certainty. When t =
0.0000001 seconds, for all practical purposes the reality will exclude all
alternatives of action. When t = 1 week, the reality excludes a series of
alternatives of action, whilst others may be realistic to perform. 3. Ethics
Morality is a set of norms and principles for
the guiding of human actions. Ethics is the branch of philosophy that is occupied
with discovering and defining such sets of norms and principles. To make
morality meaningful for this definition, the following fundamental question
is crucial: What is the purpose of the actions of the individual? Having
defined this purpose, it is meaningful for ethics to ask which norms and
principles (morality) humans are to base their actions on in order to achieve
this purpose in the best possible way. 3.1
Praxiological fundament for rational ethics
If considerations of morality contra
immorality are to be meaningful, the consciousness needs to have the ability
to choose between alternatives of action (free will). The free will of humans
is stated in axiom 2. The only valuable aspect in the Universe is happiness
(see Section 2.2.2.2). The individual is the only human element with
happiness-perceiving consciousness with ability to make choices of action;
the nation, the race or the social class does not have such consciousness.
The purpose of an individual human being is to maximize his self-happiness
during his life span. The moral principles/norms are to guide an individual
to maximize his sum of self-happiness during his life span. The individual is
predetermined to try to achieve this ultimate value, but the norms and
principles to use in this pursuit, are not predetermined (see Section 2.5.3). When an individual is to make a choice of
action Qu, the
individual has to evaluate what kinds of effects the actual alternatives of
action Hi (i =
1,2,..., ∞) may have on the sum of self-happiness during his life span.
He has to ask the following question: “what consequences may be expected as a result of the alternative of
action, Hi?” and
“which value (= degree of
happiness) may these consequences be expected to have for me in the life-long
perspective?” and “what is the probability
for the consequences to occur?” We sum up these factors in one word: the motive power for choosing that
particular alternative of action. For each alternative of action Hi (i = 1,2,..., ∞) the same
possible consequences Kj exists (j = 1,2,..., ∞), and for each Kj the corresponding Sij (the real probability, “Ding an
sich”, for the consequence Kj to occur by carrying out the alternative of
action Hi – i.e.
the probability that the performer of action realistically ought to predict
at the time point for the choice of action) and Vj (the value of consequence Kj for the action performer that he
optimally ought to foresee at the time point of the action choice – not what
he believes about the value on beforehand). Even if we had known all
factors influencing an action choice, we had at the time point for the choice
of action not been able to calculate the consequences with absolute certainty
because of quantum mechanical uncertainty effects. At that time point the
consequences are not present as “Ding an sich”. Additionally, the performer
of action can, realistically considered, never gain knowledge of all factors
influencing during an action choice. Therefore, we have to consider the
probabilities Sij. From the statements above the expected
happiness effect (Rui) of choosing to perform the alternative Hi in connection with the choice Qu is defined by:
when we assume that the alternative of action
has an infinite amount of theoretically possible consequences (for very many
of these consequences the probability of occurrence will for practical
purposes be zero, and therefore, in practice the alternative Hi has a finite number of realistic,
possible consequences). The performer of action will always choose
the alternative of action that he believes
to have the highest value of R. An alternative of action Hx exists (”Ding an sich”) whose
expected happiness effect, Rux, is larger than or equal to Rui for all i = 1,2,...., ∞.
The performer of action wants to find this alternative of action Hx. He does not know Vj and Sij and therefore, he has to estimate
these values as close as possible to the real ones with basis in the existing
reality at the time point for the choice of action Qu with the objective of finding Hx. The values that he finally
reaches are denoted vj and sij (Ding
für mich). Therefore, the motive power for choosing an alternative of action
Hi for i = 1,2,...., ∞ is:
He will choose the alternative of action Hy that gives the largest M-value (Muy) (motive power), and at the time
point of the choice of action the performer believes that Hy= Hx. If there exist other action
alternatives that also come out with an M-value of Muy, the consciousness draws lots
among these. The quality of the performer's thinking in
the evaluation of the alternative of action Hi in connection with the choice of
action Qu is
given by:
and the less this difference is, the better
thinking has been carried out. But since Sij and Vj are “Ding an sich”-values, we may
very seldom with absolute certainty calculate this difference (except in
simple game theory). But
the performer is not only to evaluate one alternative of action, but all Hi for i = 1,2,...., ∞.
Therefore, the quality of the performer's thinking in connection with the
whole choice of action Qu is given by:
The less Gu, the better quality of thinking
has been carried out in connection with the choice of action Qu. When
we are to evaluate to what extent a person has made a rational choice of
action, we have to base the evaluation on consequences that the performer of
action realistically ought to predict at the time point for the choice of
action and not the consequences that the action really implied. If a person
has performed an optimal evaluation in order to find the alternative of
action Hx with
the highest value of R, he has per definition made an optimally rational
choice of action. The individual will make very many choices of
action through his life (the number is denoted “n”). When he consequently
through his life makes optimal evaluations for finding the alternatives of
action with largest R-value for each choice of action, he has an optimally
rational action pattern (see Section 3.3 and 3.4). Glife is defined as the sum of all
misjudgments connected to all action choices during his whole life. The less
Glife, the better quality of total
thinking has been carried out through his life:
All humans are predetermined to
try to choose alternatives of action in such a way that Glife becomes as small as possible (see
Section 2.5.3). 3.1.1 Rational Gaudist ethics
contra philosophically “correct” ethics The ethical principle of Rational Gaudism is
to maximize the sum of self-happiness of the individual during his life span
by minimizing the value of Glife according to the principles described in
Section 3.3 and summed up in Section 3.4, which fundamentally have the same
content as the principles that natural science is built on (see Section 1.5).
Actions performed on the basis of these norms and principles are moral
according to Rational Gaudist ethics. You may be lucky and make more total
happiness in life by using the principles of other philosophies, but the
ethical guidelines of Rational Gaudism will maximize the probability
of minimizing Glife and thereby maximizing the probability of creating as much
self-happiness as possible during life. This
may be compared with a ski jumping competition in Planica. All the jumpers
want to jump 250 meters, but they may have different strategies for reaching
this objective. A good coach, good training based of their own and others'
experiences with ski jumping, and implications of scientific theories for
aerodynamics will be important elements in a rational strategy for maximizing
the probability for jumping 250 meters. Other strategies may involve trusting
in Mrs Fortuna and advantageous wind conditions, prayers to God or getting
drunk for feeling as a World Champion before jumping. A participant may win
the competition by using such strategies, but the probability of success is
significantly higher by using the rational strategy. In this book the concept “rational action” is
used for describing an action that is based on good thinking. An
optimally rational choice of action occurs when a person has performed an
optimal evaluation in order to find the alternative of action with the
highest expected happiness effect (R value). Thus, actions may have different
degrees of rationality. The term “irrational action” is used for describing
an action that is based on inferior thinking. A maximum irrational
choice of action occurs when a person do not think at all when making a
choice of action, e.g. acts wildly after having used narcotics. Thus, actions
may have different degrees of irrationality. “Correct” philosophers claim a rational
action pattern to be the following: |
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(1) |
Examine if there exists an ethically
mandatory action alternative associated with the present situation of action
choice; if so, this has to be promptly chosen without further evaluation, and
(2) and (3) do not come into effect. |
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(2) |
Ask if the alternative of action is ethically forbidden – usually from an altruistic moral code. If so, you are not to proceed to (3), but this alternative of action is to be discarded. If being ethically permitted, you are to proceed to (3). |
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(3) |
Examine if it is value-profitable compared to
other alternatives of action from a probability-consequence-value evaluation
(see Section 3.1). If so, this alternative of action is to be chosen. |
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But the question is as follows: Why are you
to accept the ethical command if rejecting it is significantly more
value-profitable. What is the motive power to accept the ethical command? Is
it the fear for punishment (from God, authorities, relatives, friends) if you
do not accept it? If so, this is included in (3) and does not concern the
non-value-profitable ethical evaluation in (1) and (2); thus, this
explanation is not good enough. Then
it seems obvious to follow Kant: you are to accept ethical commands through
an inner duty. But at one or another time point you have to have implemented
this duty in your consciousness – eventually under (often strong) influence
of parents, authorities, priests etc. Next
question follows: Why are you to accept the implementation of this duty in
your consciousness (you
have “free will” to choose to not implement it or to throw it out – even if
the latter may be somewhat difficult)? What is the motive power? Actually, the
last question has only been delayed in time. The only rational answer is that
the motive power to accept this is that you expect to produce significantly
more values during your life by implementing the duties than by not
implementing them. Then a lot of duties ought not to be implemented, namely
the irrational duties of Section 3.9.1. Thus, you ought to implement those –
and only those – senses of duty that maximize the probability of creating as
much value as possible in the long-term perspective. But then we return to
the result that the motive power is included in (3), and consequently only
(3) is really relevant. The only logical approach is to
fuse (1), (2) and (3), and stating that the ethical norm for a human being is
to be guided towards the maximization of his life-total value profit (and
experiencing happiness is the only real value). You may choose between
several moral codices. The rational choice has to be to choose the codex
giving the highest probability for maximizing the lifelong sum of happiness;
i.e. Rational Gaudist moral code. 3.2 Moral and immoral actions
If an individual performs an action without
making a good evaluation (see Section 3.1.1), he has performed an inferiorly
rational action. Such an action may of course imply positive consequences for
the person in the future. But the probability for such an action pattern to
maximize the sum of happiness of the person during his life span is very
small. Such an action pattern is per definition immoral. If an individual
carries out an action choice without thinking, he has performed some thinking
at one or another time point before the action choice anyway (except for
genuine instinctive or reflexive actions); he has thought out the conclusion
that he will not think in that situation of action choice (e.g. thinking may
seem too laborious). Thus, even a
seemingly thoughtless action is to a certain extent based on evaluations by
thinking. Nevertheless, we choose to define an irrational action to be
an action that is based on inferior thinking. Absence of thinking may often
be a bad choice, but if you suddenly have a lion in front of you, please do
not sit down and think, but follow your escape instinct! There
is a difference of degree in bad evaluation, and the poorer evaluation, the
larger potential for unhappiness. Thus, if it may be recognized that a person
made a somewhat poor evaluation (regarded from the reality existing in
connection to the choice of action) he has performed a somewhat immoral
action (from 0 % immoral to 100% immoral). See also Section 3.5 and 9.3. At the first glance, one could
perhaps believe that the previous text in this chapter implies the immorality
of performing an action with lower long-term expected happiness than the
alternative actions (i.e. that obtains a lower M-value than the
alternatives). But if the performer of action carries out an evaluation and
chooses one alternative of action in preference to others, it proves that he believes, consciously or not, (at
least at the very time point of the action choice) that the chosen action
alternative is the one contributing optimally in the pursuit of maximizing
the sum of self-happiness during his life span (see Section 2.5.3). Given
the existing reality, it is impossible to choose an action alternative that
the performer of action (at the time point for the choice of action) believes give lower happiness during
his life span than an alternative action (see Section 2.5.4 and 3.2.1). But
it may have been a severe (or less severe) miscalculation during the choice
of action (e.g. perhaps the person overestimated the value of a consequence).
It is miscalculations of the expected happiness effects (R-values) considered
in the light of the existing reality that makes an action immoral. Lessons in
the form of consequences from miscalculations are to be used as a base of
experience when one later on is to make new choices of action (see Section
3.3.1). Moral or
immoral action depends on the quality of the job done by the action
performer's consciousness in connection with the action choice – given the
existing reality of that time – in estimating the action's expected happiness
effect (R) on him during his life span. 3.2.1
Deliberately happiness-unprofitable action choices are impossible Shortly after a choice of action a person
says that he believes he would have generated greater sum of life-long
happiness by performing action alternative H1 than H2, but
he performed H2 anyway. Why did he choose this
option? Soon after (perhaps even before, and long after) the action choice,
he thought that performing H1 would be more
happiness-profitable, but at the very time point of the action choice he
believed that H2 was a more suitable element in
his strategy to maximize his lifetime sum of happiness. The
reason for this is that chronological immediate consequences tend to be
assigned larger absolute values by the consciousness than what the reality may
account for. To avoid
such miscalculations, it is important to strengthen a number of virtues;
especially self-discipline, patience, self-confidence
and courage (see Section 3.3.4). Another
person realizes over a long period of time that he may expect to
significantly increase his lifetime sum of happiness if he carries out action
alternative H, but he chooses to avoid performing H during this period. The
reason for this may be as follows: at each possible time point for choosing H
he believes that he will generate a little more lifetime sum of happiness if
he delays the choice of action somewhat. Finally, the reality may have
changed in such a way that he can no longer use H as a rational means to
increase the life-long sum of happiness. In this example the person should
seek to strengthen the virtue of determination (see Section 3.3.4). 3.2.2 Can animals act morally? From the introduction of this
chapter and Section 3.1 a moral code is a set of norms and principles for
guiding a being's actions. To make morality meaningful for this definition,
the following fundamental question is crucial: Based on its fundamental
nature, what is the individual animal's purpose with its actions? Having
defined this purpose, it is meaningful for the philosophy branch “ethics” to
try to answer the question: “Which norms and principles (morality) are
animals to base their actions on in order to achieve this purpose in the best
possible way?” The
only valuable aspect for any being is happiness. The purpose of an individual
happiness-perceiving animal is to maximize its immediate self-happiness (or
minimize its unhappiness) on basis of its instincts. When the philosophy
branch ethics is to answer the
question above, the answer is directly given by the animal's fundamental
nature: The animal can only use its instincts for guiding its
performance of actions – other alternatives do not exist. Accordingly, the
instincts of the animal are the animal's moral guideline. Since the animal is
predetermined to follow its instincts, a happiness-perceiving animal only
carries out moral actions. An animal cannot perform immoral actions. An
animal without the ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness has no
values or objective, and the concept “morality” becomes meaningless in the
same way as for a stone falling to earth. Superior
animals have a certain, but very little, ability to choose between
alternatives of action, but we denote this ability as insignificant since it
is bound by the animals' instincts (see Section 2.5.2). Theoretically, we
could say that such animals have a certain ability to distinguish between
moral and immoral action, but for all practical purposes this ability may be
denoted as insignificant. 3.2.3 Can
organizations act morally? Organizations (in this context companies are
also included) do not have consciousness with the ability to generate
self-happiness, and thus have no direct ability to act morally, but
there is an indirect approach. Organizations have certain objectives, which directly or
indirectly are expressed through their constitution (statutes) (se Section
5.4). These objectives express what its members, owners or founders want to
achieve through the organization, which in turn are tools in the pursuit of
maximization of their total sum of happiness during their lives. Thus, having
ethical guidelines directly or indirectly included in the organization's
constitution will be rational, and the path of thinking is that if the
guidelines are followed by the employees, owners, leaders, members etc., it
will optimally contribute to promote the objective. The individual
participant may choose to include the ethical guidelines into his moral code,
and usually he ought to do so; if he acts against them, he has committed
contract breach (see Section 5.3.1). The consequences of acting against the
guidelines ought to deter the individual participant from doing so; this may
be direct consequences of contract breach (see Section 5.3.1.1) or different
social discomfort. The individual participant may find it rational to
establish a sense of duty against violating the ethical guidelines (PMI – see
Section 3.9.1.1), giving him bad consciousness if he considers breaking the rules. 3.3 Concrete ethical guidelines
In Section 3.3 and 3.4 we will
consider how to minimize the value of Glife (see Section 3.1) through a
rational assessment of action alternatives and choices of action; to be
precise, we will consider the way to act for an individual in order to
maximize the probability for obtaining the largest possible sum of
self-happiness during his life span (it is considered impossible to generate
self-happiness after death). 3.3.1 The
hypothetical deductive method as ethical guideline 3.3.1.1 Direct evaluation of
probabilities and consequences When a person faces a situation
where a choice of action is required, he has to use both his own and other's
earlier experiences as fundament for estimating the expected happiness effect
(R-value) of the present alternatives of action. Based on the positivity or
negativity of the values of the consequences of historically chosen
alternatives of action and how often these consequences actually occurred,
the performer of action can estimate the S and V values of the different
consequences of the different action alternatives in the new situation of
action choice. After having estimated these S and V values, he can estimate the
R-values of the different alternatives of action, and then he will choose to
carry out the alternative of action (Hy) with the largest estimated
R-value. Thus, the hypotheses is that Syj = syj and Vj = vj for all j = 1,2,…..∞,
implying that Rx = My making
Hy the best alternative of action
(see Section 3.1). This also implicitly induces the hypothesis that the
alternative of action Hy will be the best choice in situations very similar to the present one
(see also Section 3.3.1.2). The effectuation
of action Hy
(experiment) may be partly regarded as a testing of these hypotheses. The
consequences caused by the action may partly be regarded as results that may
dethrone, weaken or strengthen the hypothesis, and will also contribute to
the fundament of experiences when he (and others) is to make choices of
action later on. If we consider the consequences (Kj for the actual values of j) of
the chosen action alternative that implied more positive effect than
expected, the hypotheses will next time be that Syj = syj+∆syj, and/or that Vj = vj+∆vj. If we consider the consequences
(Kj for
other values of j) of the chosen action alternative that implied more
negative effect than expected, the hypotheses will next time be that Syj = syj-∆syj, and/or that Vj = vj-∆vj. 3.3.1.2 Association-based action
choices When a person repetitively carries
out the same type of successful action alternative as the answer on the same
type of situation of action choice, the brain will later on associate this
type of situation of action choice with this particular alternative of
action. The more frequently the performer of action successfully carries out
the same type of action alternative when facing similar situations of action
choice (or observes that others do), the stronger the brain's positive
association becomes between this type of situation of action choice and the
actual type of action alternative. This type of action alternative, as an
answer on the actual situation of action choice, has resisted significant
attempts of dethronement. If the performer of action has repeated experiences
with his own or other's unsuccessful
actions as answers on a certain type of situation requiring choice of action,
an association will occur in the brain between this type of situation of
action choice and the avoidance of
carrying out the actual type of action. Along with the ageing of the
individual an increasing pool of such associations will be created in the
brain. The
use of such associations will give an implicit but faster evaluation of
probabilities, values and consequences than if you were to estimate these
directly for each possible action alternative and thus, the choices of action
may (often?) be better and more rapid. The alternative of action that is
estimated to have the highest R-value is stored in the brain, ready to use
when its associated situation of action choice occurs and therefore, the
performer of action does not need to perform significant thinking when the
choice of action is to be taken. If the strength of the association
multiplied by the degree of similarity with the imminent situation of action
choice exceeds a given threshold, the associated action alternative is
automatically performed (if the threshold is not exceeded, the method from
Section 3.3.1.1 has to be applied). The task of the consciousness' free will
is to estimate (based on the principles Section 3.3.1.1) where this threshold
should be, and this is done prior to the imminent action choice. The better
the consciousness is able to estimate this threshold value, the more moral /
rational the evaluation is, and the more moral / rational is the
association-based action choices that follow thereof. Thus,
the use of association-based action choices is a rational tool in order to
minimize the misjudgments, Gu, connected to the random action choice Qu (see Section 3.1), and thus, a
rational means in the pursuit of minimizing Glife, which is the sum of all
misjudgments connected to all action choices during the whole life. The
association-based action choices may sometimes occur so extremely fast that
it presents itself as intuition. If the association between the situation of
action choice and the actual type of action alternative becomes extremely
strong and the choice situation occurs frequently, habitual actions originate
(see Section 3.7.1). Sometimes
we may face a situation of action choice only briefly resembling situations
that we earlier have attended ourselves or observed other to be in, but at
the same time it is very difficult to directly estimate the values and
probabilities of the consequences of the action alternatives. Then it may
sometimes be better to retrieve an association from an experienced situation
of action choice that is least different from the present one in stead of
evaluating probabilities and consequences until you drop (if so, the
threshold has to be set low). The similar approach will be even more
important if we are in situations where we do not have enough time to
relatively time-consuming evaluations of values and probabilities of the
possible consequences of the action alternatives. Actions may also be carried out as
a combination of association-based actions and “evaluative actions” where a
certain type of situation of action choice is associated with a little group
of action alternatives. Facing a concrete situation of action choice, values
and probabilities are evaluated only for the possible consequences of these
action alternatives, and one alternative is chosen from this relatively small
group on the basis of the principles of Section 3.1. In the ways mentioned in Section
3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.2 humans use the hypothetical deductive method in order to
maximize the sum of happiness during their life spans. Some individuals may
be lucky and produce significant amount of happiness by coincidence (e.g.
find $3 million in a suitcase in the forest). But HDM is “the safe way” for
each individual to maximize the happiness during their lives. In total for
all humans in the long-term perspective HDM will be the best method in the
pursuit of maximization of happiness. 3.3.2 Types
of actions that practically always are immoral Associations can be created
between an action alternative with a high degree of irrationality and a type
of situation of action choice. If you begin to steal in situations where it
is unlikely to be discovered, you can easily develop an association between
theft and situations where stealing is possible. You then obtain an action
pattern of thieving. Statistically, you will be captured some time, and
besides such an action pattern increases the probability of inflicting
negative social sanctions. Therefore, when considering what action
alternative to perform in a given situation, you must also consider the
action patterns (associations) you may expect to develop – for better or
worse. To what extent can Rational
Gaudism predict if certain types of actions are to be consequently avoided? Let
us consider theft as an example. Each theft is performed in different
situations, by different humans, with different outcome etc. But considering
theft as a concept, it may be said to be immoral with high degree of
objectivity (see Section 3.5). The reason for stating this is empirical
testing (HDM): Considering the average change in the life-long sum of
happiness that all committed burglaries have caused for the thieves
themselves, we can with high degree of certainty say that this change is
negative. Therefore, based on empirical testing we may say that theft has
high degree of immorality at a safe level of significance. Another way of
putting it is to say that the hypothesis of immorality of theft has resisted
intense attempts of dethronement to such a degree that the hypothesis is
promoted to a theory and therefore
not subjected to further empirical testing. Similarly, murder, rape,
violence, swindle and other strongly right-violating actions are immoral – in
practice irrespective of the situation of action choice. They would be even
more immoral if the punishment for such crimes was increased and the clear-up
mechanisms were improved (see Section 3.6.1 and 6.1.4). In a similar way,
e.g. drug and alcohol abuse are considered to be immoral types of actions
even if they are not right-violating. One mechanism for avoiding such actions is
mentioned in Section 3.9.1.1 and is called PMI (“sense of duty against
irrational actions”). PMI may function as an inhibitor against negatively
habitual association-based action choices, which means establishing a sense
of duty against performing actions that contribute to establish action
patterns or habits which obviously are negative with respect to one's
long-term maximization of self-happiness. Similarly, we may consider a sense
of duty in favor of actions that contributes to establish obviously
positive patterns / habits (PFR, see Section 3.9.1.2). When you face a choice of action
and are to evaluate (“scan”) the different possible action alternatives, the
following question therefore ought to be asked: Is the considered type of action
consequently immoral according to the guidelines in this section? If the
answer is “consequently immoral”, do not carry out the action; the situations
where such actions ought to be performed are so infrequent that we ought to
forget it under normal circumstances (see also Section 3.6.1). If the
considered action alternative is not consequently immoral, you have to
perform a through-thinking according to the principles of Section 3.3.1. 3.3.3 Tie-break When a potential action performer faces a choice
of action, we have pointed out that he has to consider what kinds of action
alternatives that historically have given him happy consequences. He also has
to consider what kinds of action alternatives that have given other people
happy consequences when they have carried out similar actions, and often he
has to weigh this consideration in the direction of personality resemblance
with himself. In this section we will derive principles for action choices if
such information is inconclusive or more or less is absent. 3.3.3.1 Life-elongating actions The individual's own survival is a
prerequisite for obtaining positive self-happiness, and the factors that
increase the ability of survival may also be expected to influence positively
on the life quality. Besides, you will obtain a longer life span for summing
up happiness. Therefore, we deduce that life-elongating actions statistically
will promote the life-long happiness, and “life-elongating” is more objective
than “happiness-promoting”. The following should be done when facing a choice
of action: If none or little historical
information is present regarding the consequences of the realistic
alternatives of action, or if such information is ambiguous, one ought to
choose the alternative of action that is expected to have the largest
life-elongating effect. This means that each individual ought to establish a
positive association in the brain between “situations of action choice with
scarce or ambiguous historical information about consequences” and the action
alternative “life-elongating action” (see Section 3.3.1.2). Life-elongating
actions are not to be sorted out for slavishly performance, but as a rational
procedure for a quick search for well-suited hypotheses of action. By
following the procedure of performing life-elongating actions consequently,
suicide will never be rational, but it is rather obvious that suicide
sometimes in very special situations may be relatively happiness-profitable.
If a life-elongating action implies highly negative consequences after its
performance, this type of action ought to be considered rejected at future
choices of action. Eating orange is a life-elongating action, but you are not
to continue eating orange if you experience allergic reactions against this
fruit. Examples
of life-elongating actions are: healthy living, eating fruit and vegetables,
physical exercise, no smoking. Another example follows here: Man as a successful, productive
being: Homo
habilis differed from earlier hominoides by its use of technological tools. The reason for this was the
increased capacity of rational thinking that led to the production of tools.
The genes being prerequisites for producing tools had been evolutionary
promoted because weapons were advantageous for the survival in the competition
against other primates and for the efficiency in the hunting process. Thus,
producing is the fundament for human existence. The genetic changes that made
the early man able to produce weapons and other implements, and which really
had positive impact on the survival of the species, also had evolutionary
unintended side effects: It is reasonable to assume that a prehistoric human being felt
happiness when he watched his self-produced weapon. If he had felt neutrality
or unhappiness, the motive power for weapon production would have been
reduced, and that would have been evolutionary disadvantageous. When the
competitors were (temporarily) conquered and sufficient amount of food was
ensured, the prehistoric humans
remembered the happiness of watching their newly produced weapons, and the
early human entities wanted this perception of happiness to continue and to
be enhanced. Therefore, they produced cave paintings, jewelries music etc,
and obtained happiness by having the power to produce things originally
thought out in their brains (self-realization). The perception of happiness
is expected to be even stronger if other people admire the product. In the
process toward the final product there is a continuously increasing level of
happiness implying positive perception of happiness during this time (see
Section 9.1). Therefore,
evolutionarily considered it is reasonable to believe that self-realization
implies perception of happiness. Such happiness comes in addition to the
happiness that potentially follows the product's practical use value or
profit. Creative/productive activity may be to succeed at work, to develop a
new product, to make a research discovery, to create a good home or social
relations. The
evolutionary cause for human perception of happiness by performing successful
production is now explained. But are such actions well-suited tools in the
pursuit of maximization of the probability of gaining the largest sum of
self-happiness during life? Statistically, individuals with the highest incomes
(the most productive ones) have significantly higher life expectancy than low
income persons. Thus, high productivity implies an increase in life
expectancy. Therefore, productivity is a type of life-elongating
actions. Productivity is also a virtue (see Section 3.3.4). Gallup polls show
that individuals create long-term self-happiness when they succeed with their
achievements. Thus, HDM and deduction from fundamental human nature lead to
the same conclusion, which strengthens the statement that it is morally
correct to be a productive human being and immoral to choose to be a
non-producing human being. 3.3.3.2 Strong,
short-term, direct perception of happiness Superior animals have the ability
to perceive happiness and unhappiness because it has been evolutionary
favorable (see Section 2.2.2.1), and the objective for the individual animal
is to maximize its immediate self-happiness. The animals are “machines” used
by the DNA molecule in order to maximize the total mass of DNA in the world.
When an animal performs an action that is advantageous with respect to the
maximization of the total mass of DNA in the world, the animal obtains an
immediate perception of happiness (pleasure). In the opposite case the animal
obtains an immediate feeling of unhappiness (pain). Since animals are not
rational beings, they will almost “automatically” perform those actions which
are advantageous with respect to the maximization of the total mass of DNA in
the world within the limitations of the present environment. A human being is
also the result of evolution, but he is a rational, happiness-perceiving
being, and his objective is to maximize his self-happiness by his thinking –
not to be a slave for the DNA-molecule. Strong short-term perceptions of
happiness are used by the DNA-molecule to cheat us into performing actions
leading to the maximization of its total mass in the world. The individual
should use his rationality to avoid being cheated by the tyranny of the DNA
molecule, and in stead perform those actions, which within the present
realities, will maximize the probability for obtaining the largest possible
sum of self-happiness during the life span. Since
strong short-term profit of happiness is used by the DNA-molecule to cheat us
to be its slaves, we ought to be especially skeptical against performing
actions that are expected to have strong short-term value profit. Such
actions ought to be considered only if they obviously are not long-term
unprofitable with respect to happiness. If you have the choice between two
alternatives of action apparently being approximately equal in rationality
(see Section 3.1), you ought to choose the alternative that is expected to
give the least short-term perception of happiness. We may fail to perform the
best suited actions (in the pursuit of the maximization of the ultimate
value) by having such an approach on short-term strongly value-profitable
actions, but the probability of failure is assumed to be significantly larger
if we consider otherwise. 3.3.3.3 Choices of action with highest potentially
continuous use of HDM The fundamental nature of HDM is
testing and failure. We define the concept “fatal consequence”: A possible
consequence from a hypothesis of action that will exclude testing of
alternative hypotheses in the future if the consequence really occurs. A
person makes a choice of action and chooses the alternative of action
(hypothesis) H. A non-improbable negative consequence of the action is the
negative consequence X. This consequence has a serious character, and he will
be attached to it the rest of his life. If X occurs, H is in practice
falsified, and he will want to test another hypothesis. Based on his
misjudgment he will theoretically be able to produce a new hypothesis of
action in his consciousness. But he is unable to test the hypothesis in
practice since X directly prevents him from doing that, and he is stuck with
the falsified hypothesis. We call H a “dead-end” hypothesis. A banal example
of this is a person who believes he will produce more life-long happiness by
cutting off his legs than by keeping them. More realistic examples are
getting married without option for divorce or electing a president for life
time dictator. We
ought to avoid such “dead-end” hypothesis unless the probability of
occurrence of their fatal consequences is very small. The logical
continuation of this is the following ethical guideline: Perform the
alternative of action that is expected to have consequences allowing the longest
potential ramification of practical possible testable alternative hypotheses.
This philosophical statement is considered to be logically deduced from the
fundamental nature of HDM. 3.3.4 Virtues Virtues are the human qualities needed by the individual for the maximization of his sum of self-happiness during his life span, i.e. for living a moral (rational) life. Thus, rationality becomes the arch virtue, and the virtues are those human qualities that in sum constitute rationality. When deducing the real human virtues it is necessary to consider each and one of the elements in the sections 3.1–3.3 influencing the rational choice of action, and then deducing implications from these elements. These elements are numbered 1-10 below: |
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1) |
The length of the
time horizon for maximization of the happiness. A rational action pattern
requires that we rationally consider the entire life (and this does not
include religious eternal life) as the time horizon when we are to choose
alternatives of action in the pursuit of happiness. The objective is not to
maximize the happiness next week and then underestimate the effects of the
consequences on the rest of the life. Self-discipline and patience
are virtues needed for this purpose. |
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2) |
The probability
of positive consequences to occur: Here, the virtue self-confidence is to
be considered. Exaggerated self-confidence may lead to an overestimating of
the probability of positive consequences of an alternative of action to
occur. If an individual has exaggerated self-confidence, he will probably
attain a lot of negative consequences during life that he ought to have
avoided. Too little self-confidence will lead to an underestimation of the
probability of positive consequences of an alternative of action to occur.
Many positive consequences will be avoided that ought to have occurred.
Therefore, it is important to achieve a golden mean between too much and too
little self-confidence. |
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3) |
The probability of negative consequences to occur: If you are foolhardy, you will underestimate he probability of negative consequences to occur, and in practice you will obtain a lot of negative consequences that ought to have been avoided. If you are cowardly, you will overestimate the probability of occurrence of negative consequences. In practice you will lose a lot of positive consequences that ought to have occurred. The virtue to pursue is courage, the golden mean between foolhardiness and cowardice. Thus, courage and self-confidence are of a piece. |
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4) |
Assign correct
value to the possible consequences of an alternative of action. When facing a choice of action
where different alternatives (hypotheses) may be chosen, you have to make a
realistic evaluation of how the consequences will influence your sum of
happiness during your life span. It is important to know what makes you happy
but also what historically has made other people happy (and especially
persons resembling yourself). Therefore, analytic ability and psychological
insight are important virtues. If you more or less consequently
underestimate the absolute value of the consequences throughout your life,
the result is that too few actions are carried out – doing nothing is much
too often the preferred hypothesis. Unawareness, indifference and laziness
become the result. Therefore, the golden mean of willingness to make efforts,
activity, passion and awareness
are also important virtues. |
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5) |
For how long are
we to keep on to a hypothesis of action before adopting a new one? Having chosen a hypothesis of
action, unpredicted negative consequences may arise during the “practical
testing”, or predicted negative consequences may be larger than anticipated.
Given such a situation, a turn-around to an alternative hypothesis of action
may be carried out, or it may be rational to keep on to the original
hypothesis. Thus, flexibility and integrity are important virtues.
They are the golden means between stubbornness and fickleness. Integrity is
an important virtue for maintaining rational senses of duty (see Section
3.9.1). |
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6) |
How quickly is
the choice of action to be made? Some choices of action ought to be taken
very rapidly, whilst others ought to be taken after long consideration. If
all realistically achievable relevant information already is present in the
brain, the brain may have solved the problem on beforehand at earlier,
similar situations. The answer lies latently in the brain and pops up as an
immediate solution to the present problem – further thinking will only delay
the process without giving any better choice of action alternative (see
Section 3.3.1.2). Therefore, determination is an important
virtue, while its extremities are supereagerness and action paralysis. |
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7) |
The amount of alternatives of action present. When facing a situation where an action is required, it may be important to have relevant alternatives of action to choose between. Therefore, it is important to have the ability to discover different alternatives of action. Thus, ingenuity is a virtue. |
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8) |
Collecting
information about the consequences of the actions of other people. When evaluating the probability
of different consequences to follow from different alternatives of action, it
is important to be aware of what kind of consequences similar alternatives of
action historically have given other action performers (and especially
persons resembling yourself). Thus, social intercourse (also via
Internet) becomes an important virtue. |
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9) |
Remembering consequences of my own actions. Similarly as in item 8; when you are to evaluate the probability of different consequences to follow from different alternatives of action, it is important to remember what kind of consequences similar alternatives of actions historically have given you. Therefore, good memory is a virtue. |
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10) |
Keep on to the
reality. The evaluation of the probability for
consequences to occur has to be considered according to the existing reality,
and not according to your own dreams. It is neither rational to consider generation
of happiness after death (eternal life). Therefore, honesty and ability
to grasp the reality are virtues. If you are stuck in drug or alcohol
inebriation, you will have significantly reduced ability to grasp the
reality, and the probability of performing rational actions is reduced. The
use of drugs and alcohol at a level where the reality disappears more or less
constantly is very immoral on a deductive basis. This is also in accordance
with the observation that many drug addicts and alcoholics are unhappy. |
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Summing up into three groups we have the
following personal qualities that will help the individual in the pursuit of
maximizing the sum of happiness during his life: Character strength: self-discipline,
patience, self-confidence, courage, determination, flexibility, integrity,
honesty, awareness Acquisition of
knowledge:
analytic ability, psychological insight, good memory, ingenuity, ability to grasp the reality, social intercourse Productivity: willingness
to make efforts, activity, passion 3.3.4.1 The virtues make a part of the reality If an individual has too little of one of
these virtues, the shortage has to be regarded as a negative predisposing determinant;
e.g. a part of the reality influencing negatively on a consciousness' choices
of action. A missing virtue is a part of the personality and cannot be
immediately chosen by the individual. The personality is created through
influence of heritance, environment (parents included), coincidences and not
at least your own choices. However, the personality can only be changed
through laborious self-efforts during a long period of time. Having changed
one's personality in the direction of increased amount of the virtue, the
reality (which limited his realistic possibilities of success with an
alternative of action) is changed (see Section 2.5, 2.5.4 and 3.2.1). He will
have a better potential for creating happiness in the future. A person having
too little courage does not act immorally if he avoids performing an action
that requires a lot of courage, but it has been immoral to reject the
performance of those actions which earlier in his life would have given him a
more courageous personality. It is important to establish good virtues at
young age when the time perspective, which the happiness is to be maximized
over, is at its largest. Similarly, the importance of establishing or
reinforcing virtues will decrease in line with increasing age. If
a person has one or more virtues being too weak, he ought to make
self-efforts to gradually strengthen the virtue(s) and/or seek a psychologist
to get help. But be aware of the fact that changing the personality
(strengthen the virtues) is a process that may be very laborious, and the
individual should have the realistic view that the process of changing may have a cost-benefit ratio > 1. 3.4 Summary of the ethical guidelines of
Rational Gaudism
This section is a short, summarized overview
of the Rational Gaudist principles for moral choice of action. Based on the
self-happy-motivated nature of the human being the individual is
predetermined to try to maximize his sum of self-happiness during his life span.
The ethical principles of Rational Gaudism are to maximize the probability
for best success in this attempt. Prior to a choice of action you ought to have
acquired the virtues (see Section 3.3.4) that per definition are the
qualities needed for maximizing the ability to perform the process here
described. You also ought to have implemented rational senses of duty prior
to the action choice. The choice of action is governed by the principles in
Section 3.1. Considering the best and most efficient way of minimizing Glife (see Section 3.1), the individual
ought to follow these rules with his acquired virtues and rational senses of
duty at the time point for the choice of action (see Section 3.3 supplemented
by 3.9.1): |
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1) |
During the choice of action you first ought
to listen to eventual strong, rational associations between the present
situation of action choice and a certain alternative of action or a rational
sense of duty. If the strength of this association exceeds an earlier chosen
threshold, the action alternative is to be performed without considering
other alternatives (see Section 3.3.1.2). If the association implies a PFR or
a duty of virtue, the alternative of action is also to be carried out
immediately without further considerations (see Section 3.9.1.2 and 3.9.1.3).
Performing an association-based action can strengthen or weaken the
association depending on the magnitude of the experienced happiness effect of
the consequences of the action. |
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2) |
If no sufficiently strong rational
association is found between the actual situation of action choice and a
certain alternative of action, a sense of duty or a PFR, you have to evaluate
(scan) each of the other possible alternatives of action. If an alternative
of action is an implemented PMI, the action alternative has to be
automatically discarded without further considerations. If no PMI is
involved, each of the possible alternatives of action has to be directly evaluated with respect to
expected happiness effect, R (see Section 3.1) according to the following
principles: |
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a) |
Which values (v) have the possible
consequences of the action alternative given the performer, and with what
frequencies (s) have these consequences occurred when the present performer of action historically has chosen
similar action alternatives? Performing the action is partly regarded as a
testing of the hypothesis that the estimation of S and V represents (HDM). |
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b) |
Which values (v) have the possible
consequences of the action alternative given the performers, and with what
frequencies (s) have these consequences occurred when other people historically have chosen similar action
alternatives, and which the present performer of action is aware of? The
performer of action will often have to assign more weight to persons
resembling him and less weight to persons differing strongly from him.
Performing the action is partly regarded as a testing of the hypothesis that the
estimation of S and V represents (HDM). |
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3) |
If point
2 is inconclusive or such information is more or less absent, the two
following principles may be helpful: |
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i) |
Deductions from the fundamental human nature (life-elongating
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ii) |
The consequences of the action alternative
are to avoid preventing HDM as much as possible in the future. |
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The consequences actually realized after carrying
out an action will for the future enter the pool of experiences, primarily
for the performer himself, but also for other people obtaining knowledge of
these consequences. 3.5 Subjective, objective and intersubjective
moral evaluations
The fundament of Rational Gaudist ethics is
that experiencing happiness is the only valuable aspect of the reality.
Therefore, it is objectively morally correct to perform those actions that are
rationally expected to maximize one's self-happiness during the life span. In
order to create surplus of happiness in the future, you have to perform those
fundamental actions needed for sustaining your life. But even the question of
the moral correctness of sustaining your life is to a certain degree (usually
so very low degree that it resembles absurdity) subjected to subjective
evaluations since the judgment that future positive creation of
self-happiness is impossible / improbable cannot theoretically be excluded
whatever situation being considered. Strictly speaking, the question of the
morality of sustaining life is subjected to an intersubjective evaluation,
but usually the answer is “yes” with that high degree of intersubjective
consensus that it resembles objectivity. When considering how to sustain life and especially how to maximize the sum of
self-happiness during life, the degree of subjectivity in the intersubjective
evaluations increases. Of course, the degree of subjectivity depends on the
type of action to be considered. The only absolute objective is that it is
morally correct to perform those actions which rationally are expected to
maximize the sum of self-happiness during the life span. Regarded
from a Rational Gaudist perspective, the moral quality of an alternative of
action is basically estimated from the frequencies (s) that the possible
consequences historically have occurred with from the actual alternative of
action and which values (v) these consequences historically have given action
performers during their life spans. These frequencies, consequences and
values are (have been) a part of the reality – they are not subjective
wishes, whims and dreams of the present action performer – and therefore they
make an objective dimension. Thus, the reality's corresponding probabilities
(S) and values (V) are not absolutely known for the action performer and have
to be estimated by his consciousness, and this is the subjective dimension of
the Rational Gaudist ethics. The latter gives the basis for a rational
variation in the moral judgements from Rational Gaudist ethics among persons
evaluating the same alternative of action in the same situation of action
choice. On the basis of the text above, we
can never completely objectively (independent of the observing subjects)
establish if a choice of action was immoral (irrational) or exactly how
immoral/irrational it was. The best evaluation we are able to make is an
intersubjective judgment by an “expert panel” whose degree of consensus estimates
the degree of objectivity, presupposed that the evaluations are carried out
on the basis of the philosophical considerations of Section 3.4 (see also
Section 9.3 for extensive text). The larger standard deviation in the
“experts'” judgments, the more subjective the morality/rationality of the
action choice usually is. The smaller standard deviation, the more objective
the morality (rationality) of the action choice usually is. 3.6 Self-happy motivation and how to consider
other individuals
Self-happy motivation: The individual performs an action where the final purpose is to
create happiness for himself. Altruism:
The individual performs an action where the final purpose is to create happiness
for others without considering his self-happiness. Each human action is
self-happy-motivated because the individual is the only human unit having the
ability to perceive happiness; the nation, family, social class or race are
not elements with the ability to perceive happiness (see Section 2.2.2.2 and
2.5). Therefore, “altruistic” actions do not exist in spite of the fact that
some actions may seem altruistic. Altruism only exists as an ethical ideal in
many people. But essentially, “altruism”, as defined above, is hypocrisy or
ignorance. Altruism is “the emperor without any clothes”. Considering the concept “egoism”, Rational Gaudism uses the
definition that corresponds to the general understanding among people: An egoistic
action is an action where the purpose obviously is to create happiness
for the performer, but at the same time there is large probability for
significant negative consequences for other people or happiness-perceiving
animals. Egoism is an action pattern including a lot of egoistic
actions. All individuals are always
self-happy-motivated when performing their actions; sometimes they are aware
of it (conscious self-happy motivation), while other times they are not
(unconscious self-happy motivation). A Rational Gaudist is always conscious
that his and others' actions are self-happy-motivated, and his ethical ideal
is to always be rational (from the description in the sections 3.1 – 3.4) in
his conscious self-happy motivation (rational conscious self-happy motivation). When an individual performs an
action, the final purpose behind the action is always to create
self-happiness. Miscalculations may be performed in connection with a choice
of action (wrong thinking, too little thinking, gather too little information
about the reality etc.), which may contribute to making the consequences
different from the purpose at the time point of the action choice. But the
motive power (the expected happiness effect that the performer subjectively
believes in at the time point of action choice; i.e. the M-value) is all the
same self-happy motivation. All human actions can be distributed into three
groups: primary, secondary and tertiary self-happy-motivated actions (see
Section 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9). Self-happy motivation is an attribute of the
fundamental human nature and not an ethical guideline; the ethical guideline
of Rational Gaudism is rationality
as described in the Sections 3.1 – 3.4 and 3.9.1.4. Since the description of
moral and immoral actions interact significantly with the different types
self-happy-motivated actions, it is most appropriate to address self-happy
motivation in the chapter of ethics. A natural question arises: “Are we to
consider what kind of negative or positive consequences our actions cause for
our fellow men?” The answer is as
follows: A human being ought to consider his action's consequences for other
people (and the probabilities at which these are expected to occur) to the
extent the consequences of the action secondary or tertiary return him
positive or negative feed-backs. Additionally,
if a human being makes interhuman considerations, it is done because the
performer of action (at the time point of the choice of action and given the
present reality) believes in significantly more self-happiness during his
life span compared to what he would have produced if he had not been
considerate towards his fellow men. This is a consequence of the fact that
individuals are predetermined to perform only self-happy-motivated actions. If a person makes an optimal rational
evaluation from the existing reality and concludes that he will create more
happiness during his life span by killing a human than by avoiding the
murder, it is not immoral to kill that human. But usually, the existence of a
State that punishes murderers is a part of the reality. If the killing of a
human being is to be morally acceptable, the killer has to consider the
probability for the killing to be cleared up by the Police and the strong
potential negative value of the punishment. Revenge from the friends and
family of the victim has to be considered together with the interior fear of
being punished. Additionally, we have some basic “instincts” giving us an
immediate feeling of unhappiness when we consider committing a murder (see
Section 3.7.1). Under normal circumstances it is very unlikely that killing a
human being is morally (rationally) acceptable and therefore, such an
alternative of action ought to be consequently avoided (see Section 3.9.1.1).
Exceptions are in self-defense, war and anarchy. There are probably some
murderers who have produced significantly more self-happiness during their
life spans by committing a murder than by avoiding it. But usually, this
“happiness” has not arisen as a consequence of a rational evaluation, but by “being
in good luck” after a very bad evaluation (see the example with red and green
balls in Section 3.9.1.1). Such production of self-happiness “by luck” is not
in accordance with a moral action pattern. The considerations may be different in
anarchy or war. In anarchy there is no State punishing killers (but gangs
being friendly to the victim may take revenge); you may have to kill in order
to survive. In a war you will not be punished for killing the enemy (maybe
you will be punished if you refuse to kill the enemies), and then killing is
not necessarily immoral. Intuitively, most people will agree to the
non-immorality of killing in war or anarchy. Thus, the ethics of Rational
Gaudism implies this intuition without creating special moral rules in war for
making killing morally acceptable. 3.6.1 The
role of the State in ethics The State has an important ethical role in
influencing the reality. On the basis of its rational nature, each human
being has certain nature-given (innate) rights (see chapter 4 and 5). The
State is obliged to ensure that these rights are not violated; nature does
not automatically prevent right violations since other individuals are
predetermined to try to make choices of action in the pursuit of maximizing
their self-happiness during their life spans. The State, contrarily, has to
ensure that other individuals do not invalidate these nature-given rights
(life, liberty, happiness and all logical consequences thereof) (see Section
4.4). Therefore, the State has an obligation to make the mechanisms of crime
resolving and punishment so firm that a person will commit an immoral act
(see definition in Section 3.1 – 3.4) if he violates the nature-given rights
of another individual. Thus, the mechanisms of punishment from the State will
force a moral/rational action to correspond with the nature-given rights of
the individual. The
Rational Gaudist society will include such mechanisms for crime resolving and
punishment that the probability for right-violating actions to succeed
becomes close to zero (see Section 6.1). The probability for right-violating
actions to maximize the self-happiness for a potential criminal during his
life span will be so tiny that it will not be rational to consider
right-violating actions (see also Section 3.9.1.1 on green and red balls). If
the mechanisms for crime resolving and punishment are significantly more
inferior than here described (e.g. a left-winged society being kind to a
fault), it may be rational for potential criminals to consider the performance
of right-violating actions, and the rationality in the performance of such
actions will increase proportionally with the degree of anarchy in the
society (but in sum the citizens will of course lose in such a
semi-anarchistic system). On the other hand, it is somewhat weird to discuss
rational actions in an irrational society. The
presence of irrational senses of duty and metaphysical ideas may have certain
positive effects for the society (e.g. Christians who believe they will
arrive Heaven if behaving nicely in their life on Earth), but this
presupposes a widespread presence of an irrational philosophical basis in the
society. However, this philosophical irrationality is expected to have other,
very negative effects overshadowing its moderate positive effects. For
instance, an irrational expectation may easily arise among people that
irrational senses of duty will be sufficient for solving social problems in
situations where clear rational incitements are required. Therefore, the
State ought not to stimulate such irrational ideas even if they may have
certain short-term positive effects; contrarily, the State ought to refrain
from this. 3.7 Primary self-happy-motivated actions
These actions give the performer
directly happiness as a consequence of the action. When you breathe, eat, or
take a walk in the forest, you perform primary self-happy-motivated actions
(PEM actions), and these concrete examples are rational PEM actions. If you steal a wallet and use the money to
buy something that gives you happiness you also perform a PEM action, but the
rationality is dubious. PEM
actions may often overemphasize the short-term positive effect of an action
and give too little consideration for the secondary negative effects. The
problem with some PEM actions is the following: A person performs a PEM
action that he expects to obtain positive effects from. These effects may
completely or partly be absent. But the action may also have negative effect
for other persons, and they may secondarily cause him consequences of larger
negative value than the value of the original positive consequences. Thus,
such actions may be immoral to different degrees if the performer of action
has made miscalculations considered in the light of the present reality.
Egoistic actions are often, but not always, irrational (immoral) PEM actions.
Life-elongating actions are rational and primary self-happy-motivated in
tie-break (see Section 3.3.3.1). 3.7.1
Instincts and habits Homo sapiens
has some instincts (e.g. maternal instinct, the instinct of the child to take
milk from the breast, sex, the female tendency to prefer strong men, and
effects from mirror neurons). These instincts have been acquired by the humans because they were
important for the survival of our species; if the human race had not
possessed these instincts, extinction would have been the result. If we act
against our instincts, we obtain an immediate feeling of unhappiness. If we
act in accordance with our instincts, we obtain an immediate feeling of
happiness. The basic human instincts may be regarded as predisposing
determinants influencing the free will. A mother being instinctively caring
towards her child obtains a good inner feeling. If the mother avoids
following this instinct, she will obtain a bad inner feeling. Sex in its
explicit form is a PEM action, and children follow as a side effect from that
PEM action (of course, the child may have been planned from a rational
evaluation, and then it is secondary self-happy motivation). Instinctive
actions are PEM actions where the positive effect for the species occurs as a side effect of the
PEM action. It will often be value-profitable to make a hard rational
evaluation and act against the instincts because the instincts are aimed
towards the quantitative maximization of the DNA-molecule in the world given
the environment that existed on Africa's savannas for many ten thousands
years ago, and not towards the maximization of life-long self-happiness for
the individual who performs the action. Sensation of empathy is not to be
obeyed blindly, but ought to be an incitement to undertake a rational
evaluation of the situation. If the sensation of empathy and the sensation of
rationality correspond, follow the empathy. If there is discrepancy,
rationality ought to rule over empathy. Superior
animals are supposed to perform only PEM actions since such animals mostly
are instinctive beings (see also Section 2.5.2); with the possible exception
of the most advanced apes, which perhaps additionally perform some SEM
actions (see Section 3.8). Immediate individual perception of happiness is
the motive power that makes the animal act in accordance with the long-term
survival of the species and thereby contributing to the maximization of the
total mass of the DNA-molecules in the world. The consciousness of the animal
wants to achieve a sensation of happiness (pleasure); the individual animal
is indifferent with respect to the long-term survival of the species. Beings
that do not possess the ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness do not
have any self-happy motivation, and accordingly they do not perform PEM
actions but automatic actions. Humans (and animals) can learn to
perform actions in such a way that habits are developed (see also Section
3.3.1.2). The mechanism is that you perceive a psychological feeling of
unhappiness by omitting the performance of a habitual action where the
learning dictates you otherwise. Therefore, the mechanism for habitual action
is primary self-happy motivation after the same pattern as for instinctive
actions. Habits may be regarded as “acquired instincts”. Habitual actions are
very strong association-based actions (see Section 3.3.1.2) whose correlated
situations of action choice occur frequently. Other association-based actions (not PFR
actions) contain progressively stronger primary self-happy motivation in line
with stronger association between the situation of action choice and the
action alternative. 3.8 Secondary self-happy-motivated actions
These are actions which create
happiness in another human being than the performer (or alternatively, in an
animal). But the motive power is not to make that person happy. The motive
power behind the action is to obtain positive feed-backs from the other
person (or from other people observing the action). These positive feed-backs
are expected to have larger positive value for the performer of action than
the loss of freedom (= potential loss of happiness) by performing the
secondary self-happy-motivated action (SEM action) have in negative value
(eventually, the motive power may be to avoid negative feed-backs). There is
an adage saying that “the greatest obtainable pleasure is to make others
happy”. This emphasizes the essence of secondary self-happy motivation. A person P considers performing a
primary self-happy-motivated action H1 that he expects to gain some
positive consequences from. But the action may have negative consequences for
other people, and they (or observers of the action) may secondarily provide
him with consequences of larger negative value than the original consequences
of action H1
offered him in positive value. The awareness of this may convince person P to
avoid the performance of action H1. Another possibility is that H1 does not affect any other
individual at all, but person P is observed by a person Q. From empirical
information person Q knows that actions of type H1 statistically are associated with
actions of type H2 which are generally disreputable for having
negative consequences for other human beings. Therefore, it is rational for
person Q to be skeptical towards person P out of fear for the consequences
from the potential actions of type H2. The awareness of this makes up a
rational motive power for person P to avoid the performance of actions of
type H1. The
avoidance of performing action H1 is in both cases secondary
self-happy-motivated. If
you perform an action that clearly has destructive effect on other people in
about 500 years, but which you profit from right now, you will obviously not
feel the consequences of the future humans' negative feed-backs. What is the
rational motive power to stay away from carrying out such an action? When you
perform an action that harms future people, contemporary observers of your
action may think that there are underlying qualities in you that is the
reason for the action, and the implication of these qualities is that you are
more likely to perform negative actions also against today's people. Your
current fellows may become skeptical about you as a person and may give you
negative feed-backs, which may have negative consequences for your life-long
sum of self-happiness. But we should be aware that the effect mentioned in
the preceding sentence is limited. A capitalist produces products of
good quality for the market, but the motive power or final purpose is not to
please the market, but making good products is a necessity for obtaining
positive feed-backs from the market in terms of economical profit. We often
hear capitalists say that the prices are reduced in order to please the
customers. This is hypocrisy. It is a tool for generating more economical
profit in the long-term perspective than what would be achieved without
reducing the prices. 3.9 Tertiary self-happy-motivated actions
These actions do not create positive,
primary perception of happiness in the performer (but can often imply primary
perception of happiness in another human or animal), but the motive power is
the expectation of positive feed-backs from his inner consciousness. Tertiary
self-happy-motivated actions (TEM actions) may often seem not to be
self-happy-motivated, and may therefore be wrongly regarded as altruistic
(but some SEM and PEM actions may also seem altruistic). The
mechanism when performing a TEM action is as follows: A person considers
performing an action in the outer reality. This action is projected into his
consciousness, and he put the projected action into his own inner reality
where he has certain thoughts about how he wants to regard himself – this is
called his self-picture. If the
projected picture of the action is strongly in conflict with his
self-picture, the positive self-picture is completely or partly destroyed,
and his self-esteem is reduced. A consequence of this is a negative feed-back
from the self-picture in his consciousness, and this gives a perception of
unhappiness. To avoid
this perception of unhappiness the person must omit the performance of the
actual action in the outer reality. Oppositely, if he carries out an action
strengthening his self-picture, his consciousness will give him a certain
feeling of happiness or at least absence of unhappiness. TEM actions are motivated by an
inner sense of duty attempting to maintain the positive self-picture.
Examples of TEM actions are given in Section 9.4. 3.9.1 Senses
of duty and rational TEM actions When a person performs a TEM
action, the purpose is to contribute in the best possible manner to maximize
the happiness during his life span. But a person can be indoctrinated or indoctrinate himself to have
whatever self-picture, and such self-pictures may even be seriously perverted
(e.g. Germans who killed Jews as a duty towards “Der Führer” even if they
felt disgust by doing so, Pol Pot's soldiers who felt killing as a holy duty,
persons who donate all their assets as part of a religious duty). Irrational TEM-actions often
underestimate the long-term negative consequences of the alternative of
action and overestimate the long-term positive consequences by sustaining the
self-picture (see Section 9.4.1). Considering all TEM actions that are being
performed in today's society, they will probably more often be based on
miscalculations than the other types of actions. Thus, they are rather often
immoral. The question needed to be answered is the following: “Which criteria
are to be followed in order to perform rational TEM actions?” Firstly, we
have to figure out which senses of duty being rational. The starting point
for all rational patterns of action is that the only objective of the
individual is to maximize the sum of self-happiness during his life span.
Rational duties have to be elements included in the strategy of achieving
this objective (see also Section 3.1.1) and are described in Section 3.9.1.1
– 3.9.1.3. 3.9.1.1 Senses of duty against
irrational actions (PMI) We ought to build up senses of
duty against actions that on rational basis and beyond reasonable doubt are
proven to be non-profitable with respect to happiness in the long-term
perspective (PMI). This includes PMI against narcotic substances, abuse of
alcohol, and smoking. These are global
PMIs since these types of action are uniformly happiness-unprofitable for all
individuals. An individual may also have local
PMIs; senses of duty against types of action that repeatedly have been shown
to be happiness-unprofitable in the life of this individual. The motive power to omit the performance of an
irrational action through PMI, even if you have a desire to carry it out, is
the self-picture giving you the feeling of being a mega-asshole when you
consider its performance. This will be a significant incitement to avoid
highly irrational actions. PMI may function as an inhibitor against
negatively habitual association-based action choices (see Section 3.3.1.2):
PMI may stimulate a habit with avoiding a certain irrational action
alternative by gradually skipping the sense of duty giving rise to a strong,
direct association between all
situations of action choice and the avoidance of this special irrational
action alternative (see also 3.9.1.2). The
probability for a right-violating action pattern to be happiness-profitable
in the long-term perspective is very small (except in anarchy-like situations
and in situations where right-obedience implies fatal consequences for one
self). This knowledge is established through empirical testing (HDM) by
regarding a waste of humans having had such an action pattern. This will
especially be the case in a Rational Gaudist society since it contains
adequate punishments and crime clear-up mechanisms. Therefore, each human being – from childhood and ahead – ought to
build up and sustain a picture of right-violating actions as consequently
irrational (see also Section 3.3.2). The rationality in establishing
and sustaining PMI may be illustrated by game theory. Having a box with 98
red balls and 2 green balls we ought to go for “red” if we are offered $1500
for guessing the color of a randomly drawn ball. We ought to repeat this
choice consequently each time we are presented for this offer (drawing with
subsequent hand back) since the probability for a green ball to be drawn is
so small. Correspondingly, a rational human being does not waste time on the
evaluation of performing irrational actions, right-violating actions
included. 3.9.1.2
Senses of duty for rational actions (PFR) We ought to build up
senses of duty (PFR) for types of actions that beyond reasonable doubt have been proven to be very
rational in the long-term perspective, i.e. that have resisted intense
attempts of dethronement. PFR makes you immediately feel as a good human
being when you act in accordance with it. PFR may be e.g. physical
exercising, eating fruit and vegetables and being cleaver at school when you
strongly dislike doing it at the present time point. If there exist an
association between a situation of action choice and a PFR, carry out the
corresponding action immediately without considering other alternatives of
action. We may have both global and local PFRs in the same way as for PMI as
explained in Section 3.9.1.1. Implementation of too many PFRs may remove the
attention away from the real important duties. PFR actions are always linked to relevant situations of action choice,
and this may also be the case for
PMI actions, but often PMI actions are to be consequently avoided irrespective
of the situation of action choice. The difference between association-based
actions (see Section 3.3.1.2) and PFR actions is that the former action
choices involve an association (which may be very strong or less strong)
between situations of action choice
resembling the present one and a certain alternative
of action.
Contrarily, a PFR action involves an association between situations of action choice resembling the present one and a
certain sense of duty, and further
there is an association between this sense
of duty and an action alternative
where the sense of duty claims you to be an asshole if you do not carry out
that particular action alternative. A PFR action is no habitual action by
itself (see Section 3.7.1), but PFR may function as a stimulator for positive
habitual action choices by gradually skipping the sense of duty so that
action choices originally based on PFR are transferred into habitual actions
with a direct association between the actual type
of situation of action choice
and the rational action alternative. 3.9.1.3 Duties of virtue All individuals ought to build up
the virtues in Section 3.3.4 to senses of duty since the virtues per
definition are the qualities enabling the individual to perform the process in
connection to a choice of action in an optimally rational manner. Each
individual ought to have the self-picture of a courageous person, and then he
will obtain a kick of happiness in terms of increased self-esteem when
performing a brave action even if he do not gain primarily or secondarily
from that action. He will exercise his personality until the day when he
really needs courage to gain primary or secondary self-happiness.
Correspondingly, we ought to have senses of duty for self-confidence, self-discipline
honesty, determination, integrity, acquisition of knowledge, willingness to
make efforts etc. During the build up of a rational duty of virtue we ought
to be aware so it is not reduced by an enclosed irrational duty. When
building up a virtue of duty, we have to remember that a virtue often consist
of a golden mean; during the build up of the virtue “courage” it is
recommended not to be so supercourageous that the result becomes
foolhardiness. 3.9.1.4 Summary of duties and
rational TEM actions In summary, the following types of
rational senses of duty exist: |
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1) |
Senses of duty against actions that beyond
reasonable doubt have been proven to be irrational, included right-violating
(PMI). |
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2) |
Senses of duty for actions that beyond
reasonable doubt have been proven to be rational (PFR). |
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3) |
Senses of duty for the different virtues in
Section 3.3.4 (duties of virtue). |
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A TEM action is rational only if it is driven by a rational sense of
duty. We ought to only have those senses of duty mentioned above
(1, 2 and 3) since the consciousness is supposed to be able to contain only a
limited number of senses of duty; there are limits for how many “pixels” our
self-picture can contain. Therefore, we have to choose only those senses of duty
that potentially give rise to maximum happiness. The above mentioned rational senses of duty give: (i) negative
primary effects + (ii)
positive feed-back effect from the self-picture + (iii) potential
positive effects in the future (e.g. the consequences of stronger virtues).
Other senses of duty also
give (i) and (ii) but de
facto nothing more. It is believed to be a waste of time to perform
the latter type of duty-based actions since it will be more profitable to use
the time to carry out rational PEM or SEM actions. Besides, irrational senses
of duty can remove focus from the rational ones. Thus, you ought to implement
a sense of duty against irrational senses of duty.
Examples of different rational senses of duty are described in Section 9.4.2. 3.9.2
Implementation of a sense of duty A sense of duty is not prearranged
in the human nature. Thus, at one or another time point the sense of duty has
to be implemented into the consciousness. A sense of duty is not prearranged
by nature. Parents, priests, politicians, family and friends will often try
to influence us to implement self-pictures with corresponding senses of duty.
But we have the final choice whether the self-picture and the sense of duty
are to be implemented in our consciousness; eventually if we are to choose to
discard it (if e.g. our parents already have implemented it). The decision of
implementing a rational sense of duty into the consciousness is to follow
from a rational understanding that its expected happiness effect (R) makes
implementation happiness-profitable during the life span. Therefore, the decision
of implementing a rational sense of duty is a rational PEM or SEM action. But
when we obey the implemented rational sense of duty in the daily life, we
perform rational TEM actions. An implemented sense of duty may be regarded as
a predisposing determinant that cannot be changed immediately, but it can be
altered over time. 3.10 Exchange of different types of actions
A throughout fear existed in
Stalin's Soviet. If a person was dictated to give his farm to the State, he
answered “yes”. This is secondary self-happy motivation. He gives something
to the State in order to avoid a negative feed-back (to be killed). When we obey the government
forcing us to sacrifice values for the common good, we perform SEM actions in
response to the PEM actions of the government. A
henpecked husband performs actions to please his wife, and the objective is
to get positive reactions in response, i.e. secondary self-happy motivation.
But the wife responds by yelling and shouting because he does not obey her
enough, i.e. primary self-happy motivation. The henpecked husband continues
to be kind to a fault to avoid further negative feed-backs. When two persons fight physically,
they perform PEM actions against each other, and it is usually difficult to
see positive side effects for other people. Similarly, if two countries are
at war, they perform PEM actions against each other, and positive side
effects may come by the war stimulating new inventions having beneficial
value for civilian purposes. When two capitalists compete over
the favor of the market, they carry out SEM actions benefitting the market
participants by reducing their prices because they expect positive feed-backs
from the market in terms of more profits compared to if the prices had not
been reduced. In a love relation we observe mutual exchange of SEM actions
(see Section 3.10.1). Some usual combinations of types
of action between initiator and respondent are listed below.
3.10.1
Definition of erotic love Appreciating another human being
is a feeling that appears as a consequence of creating distinguishably more
self-happiness in his/her presence (physically or mentally) than in his/her
absence. To
be in love with another person is a
feeling that appears as a consequence of currently creating significantly
more surplus of self-happiness in his/her presence (physically or mentally)
than what you normally generate in presence of other persons you appreciate,
and you have an untested (or inferiorly tested) hypothesis that this feeling
may be transformed into real love as defined in the next sentence. To
really love another person deeply is a feeling that appears as a consequence
of creating significantly more self-happiness in his/her presence than in
his/her absence as described in the points 1 and 2 below, and the hypothesis
that this situation is to sustain in the long-term/middle-term perspective
has resisted significant attempts of dethronement. Real love can also exist
in a situation where you temporarily create significantly less self-happiness
in his/her presence than in his/her absence, but you have a well-founded
hypothesis that this deficit of happiness will turn into a surplus of
happiness according to point 1 and 2 below. |
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1) |
When A exposes his/her attitudes, actions and
strategy for maximization of self-happiness towards B, B returns positive feed-backs,
and A becomes happy as a consequence of B's feed-backs. Such feed-backs
penetrate the relationship between A and B (SEM). On this basis A creates
significantly more self-happiness i B's presence than in his absence. |
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2) |
A perceives a sexual attraction from B as a consequence of the excess of
happiness mentioned in point 1, and sexual actions are performed or
wanted by A because of this. It is not sufficient to feel an
attraction from a sexy body. |
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3) |
A has a love relation of optimal quality with
B if point 1 and 2 are fulfilled and it additionally does not exist a
partner C with the following qualities: A
can realistically capture C into a love affair, and A may expect to create
significantly more self-happiness together with C than with B. |
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As a single, each individual has a
strategy for maximizing his self-happiness during his life span. This
strategy will vary somewhat from person to person depending on adolescence, genes
and previous personal choices. This strategy contains a lot of elements
(personal interests) which are expected to influence the total life-long sum
of happiness in positive direction. When
a single considers entering a marriage or cohabitation, the purpose is to
create significantly more self-happiness as wife/husband than as a single,
and there are two ways of increasing the sum of self-happiness during the
life span: 1) adopting new personal interests – i.e. adding more elements to
the strategy, 2) reinforcing the personal interests that he/she had as a
single – i.e. increasing the degree of happiness of each of the already
existing elements of the strategy. The
number of interests attainable for an individual is limited (it is only room
for a limited number of elements in the strategy of maximization of
self-happiness). If the hypotheses (i.e. the interests of a person as a
single) have resisted intense attempts of dethronement, it is inferiorly
rational to throw these away. Oppositely, a cohabitation or marriage may be
difficult if both partners mostly are occupied with different interests.
Therefore, it is rational to pursue a partner having approximately the same
interests as oneself, and possibly supplement the strategy with some new
interests. Primarily, a good marriage/cohabitance ought to increase the
happiness effect of each element in your happiness strategy – supplementing
the strategy with more elements is secondarily; the importance of this
increases with increasing age. 3.11 What are actually “altruistic” actions?
“Altruistic” actions, negatively regarded by
e.g. Objectivists, is according to Rational Gaudism the following: Irrational
TEM, SEM or PEM actions (frequency in that order) where the performer of
action strongly underestimates the negative value of the primary consequences
and strongly overestimates the positive consequences (feed-backs) from his
own consciousness or from other persons. “Altruistic”
actions can also be observed in animals in their natural environment.
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that “altruism” to a certain extent
may be a kind of instinct in humans. The mechanism for performing “altruistic” actions instinctively is as
follows: The performance of the “altruistic” action gives us a pleasant,
instinctive feeling. The avoidance of performing the action gives us an
unpleasant, instinctive feeling. We perform the “altruistic” action to
achieve the good feeling and to avoid the unpleasant one; this is a PEM
action. The evolution has promoted this “instinct” because “unselfish”
helpfulness has ensured the long-term survival of our species and the
maximization of the total mass of DNA in the world, especially with respect
to care for the children (see also Section 3.7.1). “Altruistic” actions can have
elements of tertiary, secondary and primary self-happy motivation. The tertiary self-happy
motivation is assumed to be the strongest one, and originates from irrational
philosophical influence. The reasoning of Immanuel Kant is that an action is
moral only if it has been performed through a sense of duty. In a Rational
Gaudist translation Kant would have said that an action is moral only if it
is tertiary self-happy-motivated. If persons performing “altruistic” actions
are to be converted to a rational action pattern, they ought to pursue better
analytical ability and psychological insight (self-insight included) and
eliminate negative senses of duty as mentioned in Section 3.9.1.4 and 9.4.1. Powerful people often
held up altruism as a moral ideal to try to cheat human beings to perform “altruistic” action, but they
are forgers setting false values on expected consequences. Forgery, swindle
and lies do not pay off in the long-term perspective since it means avoiding
the reality. See also Section 10.9. Objectivism:
Having accepted altruism you will obtain good consciousness by donating to
everyone who do not deserve the gifts. The
answer of Rational Gaudism: Yes, but in that case the objective of the
“altruist” is to achieve good consciousness, not to help other humans. He
obtains good consciousness in exchange for giving away money. The “altruist”
has performed a self-happy-motivated action that he, around the time point
for the choice of action, believed to be the best possible element in the
pursuit of maximization of self-happiness during his life span. But this does
not make the action rational since a miscalculation led to its effectuation.
Thus, Rational Gaudism and Objectivism disagree on the nature of altruism: Objectivism: Altruistic actions exist
according to its definition, and they are performed with the purpose of
serving other humans without considering one's self-happiness. Rational Gaudism: “Altruistic” actions
do not exist in the outer reality, only as fiction in the consciousness of
some humans. What are called “altruistic” actions are irrational,
unsuccessful attempts of maximization of self-happiness through feed-backs from the performer's consciousness, from other human beings
or through primitive obedience of evolutionarily based “instincts”. Still, these two philosophies have
a correspondingly negative view on altruism as moral code. Supporters of altruism as a moral code demand
that the individual is obliged to serve his fellow men. Many human beings
will refuse to be such servants since these individuals understand that they
create significantly more self-happiness by adopting another action pattern. Then the guardians of the high
altruistic morality will change this, and they have to make the “altruistic”
actions relatively less unprofitable by introducing sanctions and punishment
against “non-altruistic” actions. But the ones, who now start acting “altruistically”, do so in order
to avoid the sanctions and punishment. Then we leave “altruism” even in
Rational Gaudist translation and arrive into rational secondary self-happy
motivation inside the new reality created by the sanctions and punishment
(But it is really difficult to talk about rational actions when the State has
introduced right-violating punishment and sanctions). Thus, the motive power
to follow the altruistic moral code is too weak since it does not comply with
the fundamental nature of the individual human being. It will be far better
to adopt a self-happy-motivated moral code in the pursuit of making progress
in society instead of wasting time and resources on testing altruism. An
altruistic moral code may therefore put the concept of ethics / morality in
danger of being undermined in favor of a pattern of behavior with no clear
guideline for human action where short-term pleasure and avoidance of
short-term discomfort reign. Altruism prescribes that the duty of the
individual human being is to serve some higher purpose than self-happiness, and this gives a basis for people
in power to commit cruel violations against the individuals in the pursuit of
making them act in accordance with this “higher purpose”, which in practice
often means to serve the interests of an oppressor. III. Politics
4.
Nature-given rights
Jurisprudence is essentially occupied with
detecting the philosophical basis for claiming that certain permissions,
prohibitions, decisions and actions are not to be rejected/hindered in their
pursuit of values. When a permission, prohibition, decision or action is
in accordance with this philosophical basis, it is defined as legitimate (in
the jurisprudential sense). Each permission/prohibition/action is either
legitimate or illegitimate, and we assume that the philosophical basis of
legitimacy is given. A permission/prohibition/decision/action is then legitimate
if it is given / carried out without violating already legitimately assigned
permissions/prohibitions/decisions, and is not legitimate (illegitimate) if
it violates already legitimately assigned permissions/prohibitions/decisions.
This implies that nobody may legitimately hinder/reject a legitimate
action/permission, and on this unavoidable principle all Rational Gaudist
politics is built. But the recipient may (though not always) renounce it, and
the donor may have a clause included in the permission that the permission
may be withdrawn at a later stage. Elements without free will cannot be
accused of illegitimacy since they cannot act otherwise than told by their
instincts. Rights: A right is a permission to which an
object is legitimately assigned in order to pursue its values, and the right
is assigned by providing powers (tools) or liberties for realizing the
values. According to the previous paragraph, nobody may legitimately remove
the right – unless the paragraph's specific prerequisites are fulfilled.
(Example: A man gives three boys permission to play football in a garden. If
the man has legitimate ownership [or other legitimate right] of the garden, a
real right of the boys is present. The boys have a right to play in the
garden, and no other than the man himself may legitimately deprive the boys
this right. The tools granted by the man to enable football playing are the
lawn and two soccer goals.) Nature-given rights: A nature-given right of an object
is a permission to which the object is legitimately assigned by nature in the
pursuit of its values; corollaries to such directly nature-given
rights are also referred to as nature-given
rights (in the meaning nature-implied). No other than nature or the object itself may eventually deprive the
object of its nature-given rights without being accused of illegitimacy.
According to Rational Gaudism, “perceiving happiness” is the only value (see
Section 2.2.2.2). Therefore, an object that does not possess the ability to
perceive happiness or unhappiness has no nature-given rights whatsoever. A
nature-given right of a human being
is what nature allows the human being to perceive of happiness through the
powers (tools) that nature legitimately has given the human being for
perceiving this. A nature-given right of an animal is what nature allows the animal to perceive of happiness
through the powers (tools) that nature legitimately has given the animal for
perceiving this. An animal that does not have the ability to perceive
happiness or unhappiness has no rights. Nature's permissions are
legitimate:
The only tools and powers given to humans and animals by nature (through
millions of years of evolution) are non-processed natural resources
and their genes (in addition you have other humans to interact with);
the fundamental nature of a human being or an animal is implied by its genes.
It is impossible to claim that the natural resources or the genes of humans
and animals are not legitimately assigned by nature by the following
chain of reasoning: A legitimately assigned permission is a power/liberty
that has been assigned without violating other legitimately assigned
permissions (to pursue value) during the assignment. Nature cannot have
violated other legitimately assigned permissions since the evolution until
the occurrence of the human genes took place in a time period when nobody but
nature was capable of assigning permissions; besides, by definition the
elements of nature do not have free will and therefore, accusing nature of
behaving illegitimately would be nonsense. We
have shown that permissions (to pursue value) given by nature obviously are
legitimate, ergo these are nature-given rights. Therefore, no other
permissions, prohibitions or actions may be legitimate if they violate
nature-given rights. Thus, human beings and animals may have nature-given
rights to use their genes and natural resources for pursuing values. In the
following sections we will detect which nature-given rights
human beings and some animals possess. 4.1 Individual rights of adults
Definition of rationality: The ability to understand, draw conclusions
and think. Definition of a rational being: A being that has the
ability to process the sense perceptions by logical thinking in order to
choose to perform actions so the being can influence its own destiny through
technological evolution and thereby liberate itself from its natural
instincts (see
Section 2.4.1). The human being is the only known rational being. This
recognition has been acquired by induction from observations of many
individuals and also through introspection of one's own consciousness. |
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1) |
The human being has the ability to perceive happiness
and unhappiness, i.e. nature has assigned to us those genes needed for
perception of happiness/unhappiness, especially genes which are expressed in
those parts of the brain being occupied with perceiving happiness/unhappiness. This only applies to
the individual; the nation, race,
family, social class etc. does not have the ability to perceive happiness. Thus, nature has assigned us, as
individuals, with the permission to perceive happiness – yes, more to it; we are predetermined
to pursue happiness and to avoid unhappiness. From the definition of the
concept “right” we have a nature-given right to pursue happiness. |
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2) |
Question: Which tools (powers) has nature
given us in order to pursue happiness and to avoid unhappiness? |
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3) |
Answer: Our
rational nature. Nature provides its raw natural resources to disposal
for the fundamental genetic nature of Homo
sapiens. The individual man has (a)
those genes which are necessary for performing choices of action by rational
evaluations and (b) those genes
which are necessary for using his muscles – i.e. to act (muscles controlling
language and handiness included). Thus, the individual man is by nature
assigned with the permission to perform actions
based on his rational evaluations.
This means that the individual has the following nature-given right: “Liberty to think up and to choose to
perform those actions which are necessary in the pursuit of maximization of
self-happiness during the life span”. Nobody (except for nature itself)
is to refuse any human being this right. The right to liberty has been established, and this right is the
human tool in the
pursuit of happiness. This is the only directly nature-given right of
the individual; other rights being referred to as “nature-given” in the continuation
are simply logical consequences (corollaries) of this one. It also has to be
mentioned that humans
have some basic “instincts”, which are motive powers for action, but the
individual has the power of rationality to evaluate if it is profitable with
respect to long-term happiness to follow the “instincts” or not. |
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4) |
Question: Do the humans possess the right to life? (Right to life = “right to perform those actions which are needed
to survive”). |
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5) |
Answer: Since the human being has the right to liberty to act in the pursuit
of maximization of self-happiness during the life span, the humans also
possess the right to perform those actions needed for survival since survival
is a precondition for creating positive happiness (the right to life is thus a subgroup of the right to liberty). Killing another human will exterminate all his
options to use his liberty for performing those actions needed for the
pursuit of happiness. |
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According to the statements above,
the individual human being has nature-given
rights in a double sense of the concept “nature”. Firstly, the individual
human being has nature-given rights in the sense that nature has assigned the genes to the human being through
evolution. Secondly, the individual human being has nature-given rights in
the sense that the tools that the rights are based on (our genes for
perceiving happiness, rationality and use of muscles and the consequences
thereof) are inherent in the fundamental human nature, and thus, the rights are implied (given) by our
fundamental nature. If nature had
been an element with free will, it would have committed a right violation by
withdrawing a nature-given right since it is implicitly inherent in our fundamental nature, unless
nature simultaneously altered our fundamental nature in the direction of
being compatible with the withdrawal of the right. If so, a rockslide would
have committed a right violation by breaking the leg of a human being. But “nature” is by definition the
collection of all elements in the Universe lacking free will (and not being
created by elements with free will) and accordingly, accusing nature of
behaving illegitimately by withdrawing nature-given rights, which are
implicitly incorporated in the human nature, would be nonsense. A particular individual has life.
To perceive happiness (and to avoid unhappiness) is the only valuable aspect
of the reality, and everything else is means in the pursuit of that objective
(see Section 2.2.2.2). If the individual, according to
a rational evaluation and given the present preconditions of the reality,
realizes that he cannot use his liberty for creating positive surplus of
self-happiness the rest of his life, there is no reason for sustaining life.
Then it is rational to use his liberty to commit suicide. If
he realizes that there is a rational possibility for generating positive
surplus of happiness during the rest of his natural life length, he has to
use his liberty primarily to perform those actions being necessary for
sustaining his life. Furthermore, the individual has to use his liberty to
perform those actions which rationally are expected to maximize the surplus
of happiness during his life span. Women have of course the same nature-given
rights as men – the right to life,
liberty, and pursuit of happiness and all logical consequences thereof.
Exceptions from this are special rights that are directly attached to the
female genetic nature as child bearing beings (e.g. self-determined abortion
– see Section 4.3.2). All kinds of
State inflicted “feminism” exceeding equal nature-given rights for men and
women are rejected (see also Section 10.6). 4.1.1 Right violations against adult human beings Since all (adult) humans have the same
right to liberty, this right is
expressed in the following way in a social context: “the right to
think up and to choose to perform those actions which are necessary in the
pursuit of maximization of self-happiness during the life span as long as one
does not violate the similar right of others or other nature-given rights or
their logical consequences”. Formulated in this way, the right to liberty is an absolute right
without limitations. But one question arises: How can an individual violate
the right to liberty of other
people or other nature-given rights? Considering how the right to liberty can be violated, each element in its definition
has to be considered: (1) carry out actions, (2) choices of action (“think up
to choose”). |
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1) |
The performance of the action can be violated by initiation of
physical force including murder, violence, assaults, rape, unauthorized
imprisonment, vandalism, theft, occupation against owner's wish, hindrance of
established use of natural resources. |
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2) |
Choices of action can, in addition to physical force, be
violated by the initiation of psychical force defined as the use of
non-physical activity for preventing a person from using his rational
abilities during a choice of action. This includes (i) all forms of
non-physical activity directly
addressed against another individual that this individual clearly has marked
that he does not accept or which the performer ought to know that he would
not accept, and which this individual has to do something actively to avoid
(threats of physical violence, screaming, scolding, roaring, exaggerated sharp tone, defamation etc.),
(ii) contract breach and swindle, (iii) significantly perilous activities which, alone or as a
participant in a sum, inflict other human beings well-founded fear by having
significant danger of manifesting into physical right violations even if such
violations do not appear in practice; see also Section 6.1.1 (you are forced
to take unwanted precautions); also including sincere planning for physical
right violations even if no violation is realized. |
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When physical force is initiated against the
individual, it is obviously not the
individual who uses his free will to hurt himself or his property. When a
human is exposed to frightening activity as mentioned in point 2i, the
individual does not use his free will to choose to be frightened. It is a
reflex from the spinal cord originating from the time when the humans were
located on the savanna being exposed to lion attacks. Those who were not frightened by lion roars were
easier eaten by the lions than those who were frightened. Thus, the genes
encoding this reflex from the spinal cord were promoted in the evolution. Psychical force often means initiation
of non-rational activity (screaming, scolding, roaring, exaggerated sharp tone etc.) in order to
impose psychical pain on another person in the pursuit of achieving a value
tool from this person, not by exchanging value tool against value tool, but
by getting the other person to “give away a value tool” in order to avoid the
psychical pain. You receive a negative value (psychical pain) that you have
not chosen to receive. Then you have to give away a positive value tool for
getting rid of the negative value, i.e. you make a forced choice of action in
order to re-establish the normal situation. In this way
psychical force violates the choice of action and thereby violates the right to liberty. Common for both physical and psychical force
is that the aim is to frighten the opponent from using his liberty to think
rationally during a choice of action. The use of physical and psychical force
may be free of punishment in self-defense, but will be right-violating if
significantly more force than necessary is used for the self-defense. In
certain cases the use of physical force may be free of punishment in
self-defense against psychical
force. Criminalization of psychical force is assumed to have a civilizing
effect upon the society (see also Section 10.4.1). An action may be right-violating by
participating as a part of a sum in a right violation even if the part does
not trigger the violation by itself. In order to be regarded as a participant it has to be proven beyond
rational doubt that the action contributes logically to the right violation
beyond a right-violator letting himself influence by it as a passive action.
Providing – deliberately or through gross negligence – objects that are
subsequently used for a right-violating action is regarded as participation
in the right violation if and only if you knew or ought to have known that
the objects would be used in a right-violating manner or that the danger
thereof was threshold-exceeding. Soliciting a right-violating action in a situation where the
solicitation may be expected to be realized is regarded as participation in a
right violation. Alterations in prices, profits etc. due to the sum of
voluntary market interactions are not right violations and thus, not a valid
reason for regulating the market participants. Remaining passively to other humans or
animals that want your services will never be right-violating unless you on
beforehand voluntarily have committed to something else, yourself or your property poses a danger
to them, or your efforts are demanded to compensate for a right-violating act
that you have performed against them. We have now established how the
individual right to liberty of an
adult can be violated. Considering violation of other nature-given rights, it is the rights of animals, children,
mentally disabled and persons under guardianship that is to be regarded. How
these rights can be violated is mentioned in the Section 4.2.2 and 4.3.1. 4.2 Animals'
rights
The human being is a rational
species, which means that humans have the ability of rationality in their
genes. As mentioned above, this implies that the individual human being has
the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. The individual
human being has a nature-given right to live according to its genetic nature.
We have already stated in the beginning of chapter 4 that a being which does
not have the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness does not have
nature-given rights whatsoever. What kind of nature-given rights does a
happiness/unhappiness-perceiving animal possess? Animals are mostly
instinctive, non-rational beings, i.e. happiness and unhappiness arrives as a
consequence of instincts (see Section 2.4.1 and 2.5.2). The animals' happiness
is often sexual pleasure, and their unhappiness is pain, fear or hunger. |
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1) |
The animal has the ability to perceive
happiness and unhappiness, i.e. nature has assigned the animal with those genes
needed for perceiving happiness/unhappiness, especially genes which are
expressed in those parts of the brain being occupied with perceiving
happiness/unhappiness. Thus, nature has assigned the animal with the
permission to perceive happiness. From the definition of the concept “right”
the animal has a nature-given right to pursue happiness (This is valid only
for superior animals with the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness). |
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2) |
Question: Which tools (powers) has nature
given the animal in order to pursue happiness and to avoid unhappiness? |
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3) |
Answer: The animal's instinctive nature. Nature provides its raw natural resources to disposal for the fundamental genetic nature of the animal. The individual animal has those genes which its instincts are based on and those genes which are necessary for using its muscles. Thus, the animal is by nature assigned with the permission to perform actions based on its instincts. This means that a happiness-perceiving animal has the following nature-given right: “The right to act in accordance with its fundamental instincts”. Nobody (except for nature itself) is to refuse any happiness-perceiving animal this right. The animals' “right to act in accordance with its fundamental instincts” has been established, and this right is the animal's tool in the pursuit of happiness. Thus, to act in accordance with its fundamental instincts is an equally fundamental nature-given right for the animals as the right to liberty is for the human beings. The animals do not have the genetic structure that is necessary for carrying out a rational process; therefore, the right to liberty is NOT a nature-given right for the animals. The instincts are the animals' slave driver. |
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4) |
Question: Do animals possess the right to life? |
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5) |
Answer: Let us assume the opposite of what is
to be proven, namely that animals do possess the right to life. Then, the State has to prevent the lion from
eating the zebra, the cat from eating the mouse, the lynx from eating the
deer etc. That will imply the death for the lion, the wild cat and the lynx.
Accordingly, the right to life for
the preys implies violation of the right
to life for the predators. We have reached a contradiction; ergo at least
the victims of predators do not possess the right to life. A lion killing a zebra cannot be regarded as a
violation of the fundamental instincts of the zebra since “survival of the
fittest” is the fundamental principle of nature (a zebra may also partly
thank the lions for its existence since the lions kill other species that
compete with the zebras over scarce nutrition). Thus, it is in accordance
with the instincts of the zebra to be eaten by the lion. And it would be a
violation of the lion's right to act in
accordance with its fundamental instincts if the lion was denied killing
zebras. Regarded from the preys' point of view it does not matter whether
they are killed by a predator or a human being as long as we do not expose
the animals to more painful treatment than what is normal in the evolutionary
process. But what about the lion and other
predators being at the top of the hill – do they possess the right to life? It is completely in
accordance with the principles of the evolution, and thereby with the nature
of predators, that predators are being exposed to deadly competition from
other predators (e.g. lion and hyena). Many examples show that at one stage
in the evolution predators may be at the top of the hill, but at a later
stage another predator may arise eating the first predator (e.g. raptors and
predatory fishes). Therefore, being exposed to deadly competition or being
regarded as a prey by the human being is not in conflict with the fundamental
nature of predators. But the human is a rational being and is elevated over
the natural Darwinism as pointed out above (see Section 1.6.2), and one
cannot use this argumentation to deny the humans right to life. The
conclusion is that animals do not possess the right to life. |
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The right to act in accordance with its fundamental instincts is valid only for somewhat
superior animals, which possess the ability to perceive
happiness/unhappiness. Plants, inferior animals and mean advanced animals do
not perceive happiness/unhappiness, and accordingly they do not possess any
nature-given rights whatsoever. These life forms may be treated in the same
way as non-living resources as iron ore, oil and water. All animals that are
amphibians or evolutionary more primitive than these, are assumed to be
non-happiness-perceiving, while all animals that are evolutionary more
advanced than the amphibians, are assumed to be happiness-perceiving (see
Section 2.4.1). 4.2.1 Why do not animals possess the right to
liberty? The animals are tied up by their
genetically settled instincts, which are developed and are developing through
biological evolution (even if some skills are taught from the parents to the
children for superior animals – Section 2.5.2). A moose running in the forest
is not free but is enslaved by its instincts. Positive alterations in the
animals' ability to improve their life happens practically only through
biological evolution. The human genetics imply the ability to rational
thinking (and additionally language and handiness), and this gives the humans
liberty to commit their own evolution of technology and ideas in order to
improve their lives. Therefore, the human beings are free (from the tyranny
of evolution) because of their genetically encoded ability for rationality.
Consequently, the evolution of the human beings has gradually left the
biological evolution, and improvements of human life occur today through
technological evolution and not through biological evolution. The
contribution of the latter is in practice zero compared with the contribution
from the technological evolution even if the biological evolution perhaps
progresses at least as rapidly as earlier. If the individuals of a species are to
possess the right to liberty and
the right to life, they have to
possess intelligence and rational abilities at such a level that they can
break out of the slavery of the biological evolution and start their own
technological evolution that significantly exceeds the effect of biological
evolution on the beings' progression and future prospects. Even if chimpanzees are
intelligent in comparison with other animals, and even if they have 98% of
the genes in common with Homo sapiens, they do not have a brain
potential at such a level that they can start their own technological
evolution. Therefore, Homo sapiens is the only species having the right to liberty and the right to life. 4.2.2 The conflict between the
rights of animals and humans Since animals do not possess the right
to life and liberty, it is acceptable to keep animals in custody
and to kill them (e.g. for eating them or taking their fur). But the humans
do not have the right to use their
liberty to keep the animals in custody in such a way that their fundamental
instincts are violated since the “right to act in accordance with their
instincts” for animals and the right to liberty for humans are
defined at the same level (compare point 3 in Section 4.1
and 4.2). Human
sadism against animals is not in accordance with the nature of the animals
since sadism does not occur in nature; it is not evolutionary profitable. The
lion does not torture the zebra for fun but kills it as fast as possible in
order to eat it. But the animals' instincts are not to be respected in such a
way that the animals obtain the right to live “freely” untouched by humans
because that would be a violation of the right
to liberty (to improve their lives/happiness) of the humans. Which
fundamental instincts each animal possess will to a certain extent be a
subject for doubt and has to be decided by some section of the State in
cooperation with experts. Let us illustrate
the above statements with an example: The human being “A” has basically
unlimited freedom when living in his own apartment – e.g. to play music. The
human being “B”, living in the neighboring apartment, has exactly the same right
to liberty – e.g. to sleep at the middle of the day. But when both A and
B are living there simultaneously, the situation becomes different. B may not
demand complete silence the whole day, and A may not invade B's apartment
with sound waves whenever he likes. Ultimately, the relationship between A
and B has to be regulated by the juridical system even though such cases
seldom reach the courts. A best possible objective judicial evaluation has to be the basis for the estimation of
the border line for violation of the other's rights in this
case (see Section 5.7). In
the similar way: An animal has the right to act in accordance with its fundamental instincts but does not
possess the right to liberty. The animal has the right to expose its
instincts in the “free nature of God”. If a human being enters this area, he
has the right to liberty and has
the right to do exactly as he likes. But when animals and humans stay in the
same area, the situation becomes different. The human may use the animal (e.g. keep it in
custody) but in such a way that the fundamental natural instincts of the
animal are not violated. To unite this potential clash of interests the
relationship between the animal and the human being has to be regulated by
the law in such a way that the estimation of the border line for violation
of the other's rights is based on a best possible objective
judicial evaluation. The fundamental instinctive nature of the animal is not
the same as completely “free” life untouched by humans. It may be objected that the
animals cannot possess rights since the animals do not have the ability to
create a State that is able to defend their rights. Firstly, nature-given
rights are given by the fundamental nature of the being (which is provided by
nature through evolution), and consequently their existence is not depending
on the presence of a State, but the State is a necessity for defending
nature-given rights against beings with free will (i.e. humans). Secondly, a
predator does not violate the nature-given rights of its hunting object when
eating it since this is in accordance with the nature of both of them. If we
imagine that a lion had imprisoned a zebra and was torturing it cruelly for fun,
it would have been a violation of the rights of the zebra. But this does not
happen in real life because the lion does not have the genetic structure
(free will) that is needed for violating the zebra's rights in this way – and
no other animals do either. Therefore, animals' rights can be violated only
in coexistence with humans, and the animals do not need an Animal State in
order to defend their rights when living in the “free” nature far away from
the humans. Only humans can use their liberty to torment animals if we
believe that we create more self-happiness by tormenting them than by not
tormenting them. Therefore, the State of rational humans is obliged to defend
the nature-given rights of the animals. The basic principle is that all
beings, humans and animals, possess the right to pursue happiness in
accordance with their nature. The human right to liberty is defined at
the same level as the animals' right to live in accordance with their
instincts. Why are the self-happy-motivated
humans to avoid violating the fundamental instincts of the animals if the
humans create significantly more happiness by violating them? The humans need
their nature-given rights and a State to defend them. But the fundamental
philosophical principles implying the nature-given human rights also imply
certain nature-given rights for the animals. The rights of the animals arrive
as logical side-effect of that chain of argumentation which leads to the
discovery of the nature-given human rights. Thus, the self-happy-motivated humans
have to avoid violating the fundamental instincts of the animals otherwise we
will undermine those rights which we ourselves are depending on. If the State
does not defend this principle for the animals, the principle will weaken,
and it will only be a matter of time before the principle is weakening for
humans. 4.2.2.1 Concrete examples of non-right-violating
treatment of animals It is not in accordance with a
chicken's nature to fly. Accordingly, it is OK to keep it inside a cage. But
it is not in accordance with the chicken's nature to be kept in a small cage
of 10x10 cm. The chicken has to be kept in custody in such a way that it is
able to move around. Flying is one of the most fundamental instincts of the
canaries. Therefore, it ought to be illegal to keep such birds in cages. Cows,
sheep, pigs, dogs etc. have been bred during centuries to be domestic animals
in custody. Therefore, it is completely in accordance with their nature to be
held by humans. If the sheep was to live “freely” in nature, its wool would
grow and become so long that the sheep would stumble in it. Therefore, it
would be cruelty against sheep to have them living “freely” in nature. Cows
should not be standing in a narrow cow pen all the time. The cowshed should
be built in such a way that the cows can move freely. If
an animal cannot be in custody without violating its fundamental instincts,
it should be illegal to keep such an animal in custody (e.g. birds in cages). Regarding animal experiments, laws
have to ensure that the sufferings of the animals are minimized. The more
advanced consciousness the animal has for perceiving happiness/unhappiness,
the higher threshold for the researchers' freedom of action. Animals without
ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness ought to be used as far as
possible. Drosophila, angleworms, nematode worms etc. may be treated
completely freely by the researchers since these animals are not supposed to
have any ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness. Mice and rats may be used
for medical research but only if their fundamental instincts are not violated
during the experiments. The great apes are almost semi-rational beings, and
they may only be used for medical experiments in rare, exceptional cases, and
they have to be handled with special respect. It is impossible to reflect on all
animals and situations in these examples, but the point is that it is a
legitimate task for the State to estimate what is in accordance with the
animals' instincts. Laws have to ensure the nature-given rights of animals in
human custody. Considering uncertainty about a species' ability to experience
happiness and unhappiness, the applicable principle is innocence until the
contrary is proven. This means that man is innocent in maltreatment of
animals unless it has been proven as (at least) predominantly probable that
the species has the ability to experience happiness and unhappiness. 4.2.3 Can an animal violate
human rights? Question: A lion has the right to act in
accordance with its instincts, and if the lion's instincts tell it to eat
a human being, the lion should have the right to do that. This ought to imply
that we cannot legitimately stop a lion's killing of a human being. On the
other hand, human beings have the right to life. Therefore, the lion
should not have the right to kill and eat a human being, and we should
have the right to stop the killing. How can these contradictions be united? Answer:
A lion trying to kill a human being only follows its fundamental instincts
and thus, it does not act illegitimately (neither does a bacterium or virus).
Therefore, the victim may not legitimately retaliate by limiting the lion's
fundamental instincts (as we do when a murderer is imprisoned). He may e.g.
not put the lion into a small cage and expose it to torture. But it is not
against the lion's nature to be killed (it does not have the right to life),
nor that the preys hits back (e.g. gnus sticking their horns into the lion).
Thus, the attacked person or other bystanders may legitimately kill the lion,
whip it in order to make it flee or catch it and send the lion to a quality
zoo where its fundamental instincts are not violated. Question: What should the State do with a
lion that has eaten a human being? Answer:
Theoretically, the State is not obliged to “execute” or “imprison” the lion
in a zoo since it has not acted illegitimately, but the State may do so as a
part of its non-mandatory tasks. If a lion kills a human being, this does not
mean absence of illegitimacy in the sense that the State defends the lion
against revengeful humans who want to “lynch” the lion. Whoever may
legitimately kill a human-eating lion (lions do not have the right to life).
A murderer is privileged in comparison; only the judicial system is allowed
to punish him. Question: What happens if somebody owns
the lion? Answer:
Then the owner has committed homicide with gross negligence with especially
dangerous weapon. In this case anyone may not execute the lion (except
from in direct self-defense). The owner has to be punished by the judicial
system, and the Police have to neutralize the “weapon”. 4.2.4 Summary of human and animals' rights All beings have the right to pursue happiness
(and to avoid unhappiness) according to their fundamental genetic nature; humans
according to their rational nature, animals according to their instinctive
nature. Beings without the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness do not
have any rights at all. Establishing
the rights of the animals as described above will also strengthen the respect
for the individual human rights. If we claim that animals do not have
nature-given rights according to their nature (non-rational, instinctive), we
cannot expect to be taken seriously when claiming that the human being has
rights according to his nature (rational). 4.2.5 The distinction between
rational and non-rational beings When we are to evaluate whether a
being has the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness,
we have to examine if the being has the ability to process natural resources
from their natural condition in such a way that we can observe the tendencies
to a technological evolution. The making of “technological products”
indicates that the being has the ability to liberate itself from its natural
instincts, i.e. it has rationality. It is assumed that a species' use
of abstract concepts is a prerequisite for being able to produce and to use
technological tools in such a way that the being can liberate itself from its
natural instincts. Additionally, in order to have the right to liberty the being has to possess a
level of intelligence making it rationally capable not to violate the rights
of others since “not violating the rights of others” is an ingredient in the
definition of the right to liberty. Thus, a being's ability to create
“technological products” (e.g. arrow tips or axes of stone) and IQ > 55 (Syse,
2006) are necessary and sufficient preconditions for deciding that the
being has the right to liberty and the logical consequences thereof. Syse A. Strafferettslig utilregnelighet –
juridiske, moralske og faglige dilemmaer. Tidsskrift
for strafferett (2006) 6(3), 141-175. 4.2.6 Artificial life and
rights Imagine that we could construct a
robot that had the ability to think up and choose alternatives of action
(included those actions needed for sustaining its own existence), and the
ability to produce new robots of the same kind. Would this robot have the right to liberty and life as
nature-given rights? No, the robot has to possess the ability to perceive
happiness/unhappiness in order to have rights. A machine can never feel
happiness or unhappiness and therefore, it does not have any rights at all.
If such a “robot” was to perceive happiness/unhappiness, it had to be a
biological being, and in that case it would theoretically possess the right to life, liberty and pursuit of
happiness since the genes for rationality, use of muscles and perception
of happiness are inherent in the nature of the being. The being is created by humans,
and one could imagine that the rights were “given by humans” and not by
nature, but such rights are deduced from the being's fundamental nature,
i.e. the fundamental qualities used by the being's consciousness in the pursuit of its values (happiness). If the humans legitimately are to deprive the beings of its rights,
its fundamental nature has to be altered by gene manipulation in such a way
that absence of the right does not violate its nature. 4.3 Children's rights
A child has the ability to perceive
happiness/unhappiness (the only valuable aspect of the reality). Therefore,
it is meaningful to ask the following question: “Do children possess rights
and if so, what kind of rights?” A nature-given right for a child is what
nature allows the child to experience of happiness. Which tools does nature
give the child in order to experience happiness? The tools are the human
genes of the child and natural resources in the outer reality. Additionally,
nature provides the child with another tool, namely parents. All children are
from nature equipped with a biological mother at birth (the father might have
died between the conception and the birth). |
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1) |
The child is a being that possesses the ability
to perceive happiness and unhappiness. That is, nature has assigned the child
with those genes needed for perceiving happiness/unhappiness, especially
genes which are expressed in those parts of the brain being occupied with
perceiving happiness/unhappiness. Thus, nature has assigned the child with
the permission to perceive happiness. From the definition of the concept
“right” the child has a nature-given right to pursue happiness. |
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2) |
Question: Which tools has nature given the child
in order to pursue happiness and to avoid unhappiness? |
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3) |
Answer: Follow
its nature. Basically, nature provides its raw natural resources to
disposal for the fundamental genetic nature of the child. The nature of the
child is a potential rational being, but it does not have the capacity to use
the gene products for processing the natural resources. But additionally,
nature assigns the child with another tool in the pursuit of happiness,
namely parents. The parents are to be a link between the natural resources
and the genetic equipment of the child. The following nature-given right for
children is established: “right to
parents” in the sense that the biological parents (or others who have
adopted this function) are obliged to be leaders for the child in order to
develop its inborn rational genetic potential into an adult human being who
is able to use the right to liberty
for maximizing its self-happiness during its life span. |
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4) |
Question: How can the parents develop the innate
human genetic potential? |
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5) |
Answer: Through natural biological
development, upbringing and fundamental education. These factors are achieved
by maintenance and care. The parents are obliged to provide the child with
maintenance, care, natural biological development (health), upbringing and
fundamental education. The child has a right to get these goods from its
parents. |
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6) |
Question: Does the child possess the right to life? |
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7) |
Answer: Yes, the right to life for a child means the right to survival by the maintenance and care of the parents within
the scope of reasonable technology. To kill a child means an illegitimate
withdrawal of nature's entitlement to develop its potential rationality into
a rational being. |
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8) |
Question: Does the child possess the right to liberty? |
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9) |
Answer: No, only individuals with developed
rationality possess the right to
liberty (to think up and to choose to perform those actions being necessary
in the pursuit of maximization of self-happiness during their life spans).
Children do not possess the right to
liberty. Therefore, the parents may initiate force against their
children, but only for developing its rational potential so it becomes able
to use its right to liberty as an
adult for generating self-happiness. In the process of raising the child it
ought to be gradually accustomed to more freedom. |
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In summary, children have the following
nature-given rights: right to pursue
happiness, potential right to liberty, and right to parents (the latter implies further right to life, maintenance, care, natural biological development
[health], upbringing, and fundamental education; thus, these rights are rights that children
have through their parents' duties). The State is obliged to defend the
nature-given rights of all individuals, and the children's rights are no
exception. The State
is obliged to ensure that the child's parents act in accordance with the definition of parents,
i.e. comply with the duty to give the child maintenance, care, natural biological development (health),
upbringing, and fundamental education. How the State ought to defend
these rights in practice is stated in Section 4.3.5. The precise minimum
limit for maintenance, care, natural biological development (health),
upbringing, and fundamental education has to be estimated in the best
possible manner by the State in cooperation with experts (see Section 5.7). Fundamental education ought to include teaching in the scientific method (and other
rational epistemological principles) and rational course of action and
excludes indoctrination with anti-knowledge as e.g. resides in irrational
religious metaphysics. The State also ought to spread adult enlightenment
against religious crackpot and its alike (astrology, homeopathy,
fortunetellers etc.) since this has a blurry interface with swindle. 4.3.1 Right
violations against children Children have the “right to pursue happiness”, “potential
right to liberty” and “right to
parents” (“right to life” included) as their nature-given rights.
A parent is defined as an adult who has
taken on the responsibility to be a leader for the child in order to develop
its inborn rational genetic potential into an adult human being who is able
to use the right to liberty for maximizing self-happiness. The parent
does this by maintenance, care, natural
biological development (health), upbringing, and fundamental education. |
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1) |
A parent violates the nature-given rights of
a child by not acting in accordance with the definition of a parent. The
parents (and other persons) violate the child's rights by carrying out force
(physically or psychically) against the child that do not contribute to
fulfill the criteria of the definition of a parent unless in self-defense
(see also Section 10.4.3). |
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2) |
Other persons violate the child's rights and
parental right of the parents by carrying out force against the child even if
the purpose is to comply with the criteria of the definition of a parent.
Exceptions are self-defense, emergency situations for preventing the child
from hurting itself when the parents are not present, or if the parents have
approved the use of force. |
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The parents have the official
responsibility for effectuating those actions needed to ensure the
nature-given rights of the child in the daily life. The parents of the child
may be assisted by others to effectuate these rights (relatives, friends, cohabitant,
or other volunteers). The parents of the child should be registered in The
National Register. The State is obliged to defend the nature-given rights of
the child. If the parents violate the nature-given rights of the child, the
State has to intervene; in a worst case scenario the State has to find
somebody else who can fulfill the parental duties until the child reaches the
age of majority (foster parents, adoptive parents or orphanage). Since the parents only may
initiate force against their children in the pursuit of developing their
inherent rational potential, child labor for upholding itself and the family
is basically right-violating, but it is legitimate and beneficial to let the
child work for learning responsibility and willingness to make efforts.
Nevertheless, in extreme cases it may be legitimate for the parents to force
the child to contribute to uphold itself and/or the family if the parents are
so poor that absence of the child's labor will imply death, essential health
problems or significant damage for the ability to have its rational potential
developed as an adult. 4.3.2 The beginning of life and
abortion Considering the legitimacy of abortion, the
central question is as follows: When does life start? If a new human life is defined
to start when the egg cell and sperm cell fuse, abortion will always be
right-violating against the embryo unless the life of the mother is at stake.
If we were to accept this definition, it would mean that we ought to rescue
one hundred fertilized egg cells from a building on fire in stead of saving
one adult individual. You also ought to be
punished as a mass murderer if you put a reagent vial with 100 zygotes
into the trash. Each
collection of matter that does not possess the ability to perceive happiness
and unhappiness does not have (independent) nature-given rights at all (see
Section 4.1 and 4.2.4). A fertilized egg does not possess the ability to
perceive happiness/unhappiness (e.g. pain), and does not have any independent
rights. This situation continues until the time point when the neuronal
system has developed in such a way that the embryo has obtained the ability
to perceive conscious feelings, i.e. perception of happiness/unhappiness. It
is assumed that pain is the embryo's first primitive conscious feeling. The
mother and father “own” the non-happiness-perceiving embryo, but an owner
(here: the mother/father “co-ownership”) does not have the right to keep his
belongings on another person's territory. Until the day for the beginning of
the embryo's ability to perceive pain the woman has unlimited right to do as
she likes with the embryo, and self-determined abortion is a matter of
course. After the embryo has obtained the ability
to perceive happiness/unhappiness (starts with absence of pain contra pain)
the embryo has rights, and self-determined abortion is no matter of course.
What kind of rights does it possess? Does it possess the right to liberty? No, but neither born children have that right.
Is the embryo alive at this stage? Yes, otherwise it could not be
happiness-perceiving. A living, happiness-perceiving baby has the right to life as a potential rational
human being. A being's nature-given rights arise from the fundamental nature
of the being's consciousness. Considering the period from the on-switch of
the consciousness and until immediately after birth, no alterations in the
consciousness' fundamental nature occur that possibly can result in the
embryo being anything else than a potential rational human. Accordingly, a
happiness-perceiving (pain-perceiving) embryo has the right to life. The woman has to give such an embryo sufficient
time to leave her body (i.e. until the time point of natural birth or
caesarean section), and this initiated, happiness-perceiving life may not be
terminated at will. Pain perception requires
conscious recognition or awareness of a noxious stimulus. Neither withdrawal
reflexes nor hormonal stress responses to invasive procedures prove the
existence of fetal pain, because they can be elicited by non-painful stimuli and occur without conscious cortical processing. Fetal
awareness of noxious stimuli requires functional thalamocortical connections.
Thalamocortical fibers begin appearing between 23 to 30 weeks’ gestational
age, while electroencephalography suggests the capacity for functional pain
perception in preterm neonates probably does not exist before 29 or 30 weeks
(Lee et al., 2005). If
a woman is to be guilty of murdering her embryo, it has to be proven beyond
rational doubt that she has killed a happiness-perceiving human individual.
If so, it has to be at least predominantly probable that the embryo has signs
of consciousness at the time of abortion. According to Lee et al. (2005)
it is less than predominantly probable that the fetus has consciousness
before the 29th week of gestation. Thus, a woman who chooses
provoked abortion in the 28 first weeks of gestation has not committed a
right-violating action. Therefore, the time limit for self-determined
abortion ought to be set until the end of the 28th week of
gestation. After this
time point abortion is only legitimate if the mother's life or health is in
danger, or if the child's outlook obviously is a non-viable pain hell. Someone argue that the fetus is
without any rights until birth, but immediately after it has left the womb,
it has the same rights as a child. The reasoning is that the child is able to
exist independently of the mother after having the cutting the umbilical cord
cut, and that it can breathe by itself and take food per os. The reason for this argument not to be valid is that no
change has occurred in the fundamental nature of its consciousness. Besides,
the child is still totally dependent on its parents for survival – not least by getting breast milk. The child does not become
independent by getting food through the breast rather than through the
umbilical cord. Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary
Review of the Evidence. Lee SJ, Ralston HJP, Drey EA, Partridge JC, Rosen MA.
JAMA. 2005;294(8):947-954. 4.3.3 The biological mother's responsibility for the child After the starting point for
perceiving happiness/unhappiness, the embryo has independent rights as a
child (see Section 4.3), and the biological mother may not do as she pleases
with it. Children have the potential
right to liberty and to pursue
happiness but are not able to care for themselves. As explained above,
the child has a nature-given right to at least one parent. Since the child
naturally is in its mother's custody already from the start of life (when the
embryo develops the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness), the State may
not withdraw her parental custody unless she violates the nature-given rights
of the child since that would be initiation of force. If the mother just
leaves the child, it means that she violates its right to parents since the child is not able to obtain new
parents by itself, and considered this way the mother is obliged to maintain
the parental custody until other volunteers take on the responsibility (and
the State always ought to be such a volunteer of last resort – see Section
4.3.5). But the mother may have an agreement with (normally) the biological
father over sharing the parental responsibility. 4.3.4 The biological father's responsibility for the child When a man and a woman meet at a
discotheque and have casual sex without
contraception afterwards, the intention is obviously not to have
children, but to feel good for a short time. The presumptive agreement (see
Section 5.3.2.4) in a case like this can not be “acceptance of maintaining
and caring for a child until it is of age”, but on the contrary, that the
woman shall have an abortion if pregnancy becomes the result or that she
takes emergency contraceptive pills after the coitus. Violations of this
presumptive contract – i.e. bringing the pregnancy into a child birth –
implies that she has to maintain and care for the child by herself (or
together with other volunteers) until the child is of age. In such a case the
woman unilaterally – and through a contract breach – decides to bring birth
to a child; it is not the man and woman who bilaterally choose to have
children when they have casual sex without using contraception. Since the
male does not make the choice to have children (on the contrary, he has been
the victim of a contract breach), he may not be forced to take on parental
responsibility unless he voluntarily signs a contract stating his liability.
If the man could have taken regret pill or abortion in the same way as the
woman, the case would have been different, but this is biologically
impossible. The case would also have been different if regret pills and
abortion did not exist. In the case of an abortion the man, having made the
woman pregnant, has to pay the complete costs of the abortion since he is
guilty in the existence of the embryo and additionally, he has to pay a lump
sum to the woman for tort and pain in connection with the abortion. The National Register administers
a document called “The Child Treaty”, which the biological mother and father
voluntarily may sign. This treaty includes that the mother and father are to
be equally important parents and that they are obliged to fulfill the
fundamental rights of the child as described in the Child Law. The Child
Treaty ought to state that if the parents stop living together, shared
custody arises unless the parents agree on something else or if one of the
parents is declared incompetent by the court. If only one of the parents gets
the custody after a split up including a Child Treaty, the other one has to
pay maintenance. If
man and woman lives together, it is not unnatural to have a contract of
marriage or cohabitation that automatizes the Child Treaty. Alternatively,
the pregnant woman tells the potential father that she is pregnant, and
proposes at the same time that they are to sign the Child Treaty. The
potential father may decide not to be the father for the child by refusing to
sign the Child treaty. The content of the Child Treaty will be effectuated if
the woman gives birth to a common child during the present pregnancy. A
corresponding treaty may be signed after the baby is born if this has not
been done before. But regarded from the female point of view the Child Treaty
ought to be signed before the deadline for abortion runs out. If man and
woman have not signed the Child Treaty together, the child will be registered
with only one parent in the National Register. This single parent may of
course find an adoptive parent of the opposite sex to sign the Child Treaty
later on. Thus, different scenarios may
arise: |
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1) |
The man does not sign the Child Treaty before the abortion deadline expires,
and the woman chooses to give birth to the baby: The biological father does
not have any economical or other responsibilities for the child, and he does
not have any rights connected to the child. The biological father may change
his mind and sign the Child Treaty later on (if the mother accepts it). |
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2) |
The man does not sign the Child Treaty before the abortion deadline expires,
and the woman chooses to take abortion: The man has to pay for the abortion
and additionally pay a lump sum for tort and pain. |
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3) |
The man signs the Child Treaty before the
abortion deadline expires, and the woman chooses to give birth to the child:
The man and the woman are 100 % equally responsible parents. |
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4) |
The man signs the Child Treaty before the abortion
deadline expires, but the woman chooses to take abortion anyway. No
punishment will be directed against the woman, but the man does not need to
pay for the abortion. |
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5) |
The man wants to sign the Child Treaty, but the
woman refuses. The man will then have no formal parental function, and point
1 or 2 is applicable. |
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Ideally, the child ought to have
one “boss” in the same way as a company has one CEO, but biologically, two
persons of opposite sexes are necessary for making a child. Since having
parents of both sexes is positive for the child's development and maturing,
the State has to give opportunities for having two parents (leaders) with
equal responsibility: mother and father. Thus, having a system that refuses
two females or two males to be officially registered as the child's parents
is not right-violating, but the opposite is not illegitimate either. The
father may be registered as the only parent if the mother and father agree,
or if a court order states this. 4.3.5 The State's
responsibility for the child The State is obliged to ensure that the
child's parents fulfill the parental obligations. How to do this in practice has to be decided
by empirical testing (HDM). From
a strict nature-given right reasoning the State could say as follows: The
parents made the decision of giving birth to a baby, and then they have to
face the consequences themselves or eventually with other volunteers. If they
physically refuse to be parents or are incompetent, the State has to provide
the child with adoptive parents or orphanage and finance this process at
their expense. This
is not considered to be a good way of defending the child's
nature-given rights. The State ought to give child benefit in order to
contribute to help the parents with their heavy parental responsibility. If
the mother and father have signed the Child Treaty, half of the benefit ought
to be paid to each of the parents. The child benefits should be inversely proportional with the income of
the parents; parents with economy exceeding a specified limit will receive
zero State support.
The State ought to assist and support persons who want to adopt away their
children regardless of the children's age. The State is not obliged to
implement these to benefits, but this ought to be done as long as the
benefits may be financed without violating the nature-given rights of the
individuals. If the parent(s) of the child do not fulfill its fundamental
rights adequately, failure of care arises. The State has to intervene to find
new parent(s) for the child or use the Child Care Authority in another way.
The original parent(s) may be held economically responsible for a period of
time. It
is assumed that a birth rate at a suitable level will contribute to maximize
the long-term happiness for most individuals weighted against how strong
non-right-violating influence they are able to perform on the State
executives (see Section 7.2). Therefore, the
tendencies of alteration in the annual birth rate ought to be one indicator
settling the magnitude of the child benefits. High birth rates imply
low child benefit. Low birth rates imply high child benefit. The parents – eventually with help
from other volunteers – are responsible for using their own money plus child
benefit for the maintenance, education and upbringing of the child. Since the child has the right to life (survival) and health on the parents' expenses, a
part of the child benefit ought to be used for a health and disabling insurance
and insurance against disappearance of the parents or their duties.
Sufficiently well-situated parents may be imposed to pay such insurances
completely with their own funds. If the child becomes medically disabled before he comes of age, he
shall be able to survive from this insurance the rest of his life with normal
length. If the parent(s) want, they may of course insure the child
additionally. 4.3.6 Other persons under
guardianship What kind of rights is provided
for mentally disabled and others who cannot live without guardianship after
reaching age of majority? These
people will continue to have rights as children: “right to parents” who
are obliged to provide them with maintenance,
survival (life), health, care. They will possess these rights until they
are mature enough to achieve complete liberty, eventually the rest of their
lives. The parent(s) of a disabled child may choose to continue their
function and receiving child benefit. Alternatively, she/he/they may renounce
the responsibility, and the State has to find another guardian, eventually
put the non-mature individual in an institution on the State's expense. Medical
research provides better opportunities for detecting mental disabilities in
the early embryo. Therefore, in the future fewer mentally disabled are
expected to be born since the mother often will abort a genetically damaged
embryo. Adults,
who become psychically ill or mentally retarded over a certain limit, will be
denoted as potential rational. They will temporarily lose the right to
liberty, and will obtain rights as children. They will be put under
guardianship. Imagine
a person who is not conscious, and who is in a condition where it is beyond
all reasonable doubt that he never can become conscious ever again. Thus, absence
of conscious is his nature. According to his nature he does not have the
ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness, and therefore, he does not
have the right to life. 4.4 The State
Firstly, let us establish the
legitimacy of the monopoly of the State on system of justice, Police and
military defense inside its territory: Competing systems of justice will
give rise to huge problems when the defendant/suspect and the plaintiff/victim
are members of different judicial systems, and establishing prosecuting
authority will be chaotic. Chaotic conditions will also arise with competing
systems of Police and/or military forces with large probability for “tribal
wars”. The systems of justice and public order will go into an anarchic
chaos, and the nature-given rights cannot be defended. Thus, presence of competing systems of justice,
Police and armed forces inside the same geographical area violates the
nature-given right of organized defense of the individual rights; one
does not have the right to organize
in such a way that the nature-given rights of others are violated. Accordingly, we cannot have competition on the obligatory
tasks of the State; by its
nature the State must have
monopoly inside its geographical area. Since one State already exists
defending the rights of all individuals inside the actual geographical
area, the individuals' nature-given right to organized defense of
their rights is not violated even if they are forbidden to start alternative systems of justice, Police and
armed forces. Establishing a competing system of
administration of justice, Police or military defense in a Rational Gaudist society is right-violating because
this will obviously afflict the population with
well-founded fear for anarchy-like conditions (i.e. initiation of psychical
violence) – and thus, well-founded
fear for violation of the right to organized self-defense of the natural
rights. The
first “protection organization” to offer protection of the nature-given
rights (without violating of the same rights) inside a given geographical
area has the “right” of being the State (first come, first served). This is
parallel to a situation where a farmer has established property right
on a piece of land – then no other farmers may compete over sowing corn on
the same patch of field (only on the neighboring fields). This State monopoly
does not exclude the existence of private security firms as long as their
activities are strictly regulated by the State. Private arbitrators may also
function as voluntary settlers in civil disputes as explained in Section
5.3.1.2. Since the State has to have
monopoly on those institutions being necessary for defending the nature-given
rights of the individuals (system of justice, Police, military defense), the
group establishing the State is obliged to defend the nature-given rights of all persons inside the territory of
the State. This is because the right to self-defense and the right
to organize are nature-given rights, and the others without such defense
would otherwise have the right to establish their own State, which is a
contradiction to the fact that the State from its nature has to be a
monopoly. The State is a necessary precondition for us
to use the powers and tools that nature has assigned to us. The State is to
ensure that the permissions (rights) legitimately assigned to us by nature
are not illegitimately withdrawn – i.e. by others than nature itself. These
rights are based on a genetically determined rationality, and a little
jocularly we may say that a germ to the existence of the State is resting
inside the human genome. We also observe from the ancestors of the humans and
the first primitive humans that it is the human nature to live in groups
(“states”) in order to obtain internal and external protection. At
first in the history of mankind, the State was not so clever in defending the
nature-given rights of the individuals, and the State performed many right
violations itself. But gradually, the humans started to learn how to use the
genetic germ for rationality, and they became aware of how the State should
work in order to realize the rational human nature. In 1776 the American
founding fathers acknowledged the fundamental function of the State by the
use of their rational abilities and experiences. Similarly, DNA has always
been in our cells, but first in 1953 the humankind became aware of its
fundamental function. See also Section 4.5 and chapter 7. 4.4.1 The right to rebel Individuals have a nature-given
right to self-defense and to organize. This is also valid if the existing
State violates the individual rights or largely ignores or fails to defend them. If a
group of individuals are to defend themselves against the right violations
from their own State (after having failed in trying the judicial system),
civil disobedience, armed rebellion or the establishment of a new State on
parts (or the whole) of the country's territory may be acceptable options. In
order to be legitimate such a rebellion has to lead to less violation of
nature-given rights (collateral damage) in the long-term perspective than
those violations which the rebellion is trying to defend the individuals
against. You also have to take into account the likelihood of the insurgency
to fail – if the
battle is lost, you may be unfortunate enough to get lots of collateral
damage in addition to the old regime continuing or increasing their
infringements. In order to start an armed rebellion, you should be very sure
of a relatively quick success on beforehand – sacrificing you own life is not
rational; unnecessary sacrificing of third parties' lives is right-violating.
If the old regime use right violations of moderate degree (e.g. compulsory
taxation), it will be cruelly right-violating if rebels carry out fatal or
crippling attacks even against the supreme leaders. A prime minister in a Western democracy of
today does not deserve the “death penalty” (see section 6.1.2) because he
fronts a regime engaging in compulsory taxation (which after all, to a
significant extent, is used for compulsory insurances and useful
infrastructure). Armed rebellion in today's Western democracies is completely
illegitimate; besides, a hypothetical group being able to organize a
successful, armed rebellion in a Western democracy, is necessarily so strong
that it will be significantly easier for the group to gain governmental power
through democratic elections (by similar argumentation tax evasion etc. is
not an acceptable way of fighting right-violating taxation in Western
democracies; the correct way is to vote for parties whose politics is located
inside the borders of Rational Gaudism). However, it can not be 100 % ruled
out that a majority regime performs so grave right violations that it justifies
armed rebellion (an extreme example of this is Nazi Germany in the 1930s
where Hitler came to power through democratic elections and in accordance
with the Constitution). It is under no circumstances legitimate to rebel or
make civilian disobedience against a State that does not violate the
nature-given rights of the individuals. A legitimate state has the right to
exercise self-defense against rebels, but the right violations that may be
expected following the defense, have to be significant less in the long-term
perspective than those right violations expected to be imposed on the
citizens by the rebels; thus, capitulation may not be absolutely disregarded
as an option. 4.4.2 Which actions may be
subjected to punishment? An action is punishable only if it
is right-violating (see also Section 6.1). If an individual performs an
action that violates the rights of another individual, organization of
individuals, child or animal, the Police and judicial system is obliged to
stop and/or punish him in order to prevent him from carrying out or repeating
such actions. If a person, according
to a rational evaluation and given the present reality, may expect to create
significantly more self-happiness in the long-term perspective by violating
the nature-given rights of others, it is not necessarily directly immoral to do so (see Section 3.6 and 9.4.2). In this case the State has
committed a neglect of duty by not
implementing punishments and crime clear-up rates/mechanisms of such a
character that crimes do not pay off (see Section 3.6). The latter is to
ensure that crimes become immoral based on the principles in Section 3.1-3.3.
Thus, in a rational and legitimate state roughly all criminal actions will be
immoral, and each individual ought to establish a
sense of duty against right-violating actions (see Section 3.9.1.1). But in
the light of the reality we have to realize that a very few persons may
become happy as a consequence of performing criminal actions, even though it
is not morally acceptable: The criminal may be lucky and avoid being caught,
and at the same time be so cold or stupid that the fear of being seized is
small. 4.5 The World Assembly
When several human beings are living
together on a limited area, the State is obliged to defend their nature-given
rights (in this context an extended family, tribe etc. may also be a kind of
State in a primitive society). This is important since we are rational
beings, and governmental authority is a prerequisite for the defense of those rights which are
necessary for the humans to fully practice their rational nature. But
what about the relationship to the neighboring state? How small or large
ought a state to be? Imagine that each “state” consisted of ten people,
making the total number of states in the world 600 millions. That would be a
very ineffective system with many neighbor quarrels. The individual rights
would be ensured inside the “state”, but the potential for violations of
liberty and life by wars and conflicts would be large. A nation or people do not
have any innate importance. The important consideration is that the State defends the nature-given
rights of all individuals in an adequate manner inside its geographical area
(where within it obviously must have physical control), that it does not
violate any of these rights, and that it does not attack likeminded states. Such a state is called a legitimate State. Nobody has the
right to force a legitimate State to fuse or enter into a union. Since a legitimate state by
definition does not violate any rights by defending the nature-given rights,
this State's “right to use to defending
nature-given rights” arises. Consequently, no subdivision within the
geographical area of a legitimate State has the right to break away creating
a new State and thereby preventing the existing State from continuing its
function. On the
other hand, a geographical area inside an illegitimate state has the right to
break away if the purpose is to establish a new, legitimate State. A
legitimate state may legitimately invade a right-violating (illegitimate)
state in the one and only purpose of establishing a regime with significantly
increased respect for the nature-given rights of the individual (see Section
4.4.1), but the legitimate state is not obliged to do so. In order to be legitimate such an
invasion has to cause fewer and less severe violations (summed both under the
invasion and in the long-term perspective afterwards) than those right violations
which the invasion is trying to free the individuals from; thus, one ought to
be very cautious with invading other countries. Rationally regarded, the legitimate state
should only undertake an intervention if it is in accordance with the
self-interests of its own citizens in the long-term perspective. We are living in a
semi-anarchistic global system where different states keep safety and ensure
rights inside their own borders. The thought is that these states are to
cooperate harmonically together. This works to a certain extent, but there is
a lot of chaos. There are also many states cruelly violating the nature-given
individual rights, and these have to be regarded as bunches of criminals and
not as legitimate states. Since gradually more of human action occurs
globally, it would be rational if the legitimate states in the world created “The World Assembly” which is to ensure that: (a) legitimate states are not violated, (b) the states are not
violating the nature-given rights of their inhabitants, (c) states keep their
contracts with other states, foreign individuals and their organizations, (d)
international crimes are stopped (environmental crimes included), (e)
property rights and other rights on international territory are respected
(international waters, The Antarctic etc.). The World Assembly's military machinery may not be used without
the approval of the General Assembly of this organization, which is pointed
out by the member states. The task of this military force is to stop and
punish criminal states which attack other, respectable states, or which
commit violations against the nature-given rights of their own inhabitants
(when exceeding a certain limit) and to eliminate their governments. The
long-term objective is to get as many countries as possible to voluntarily
join the World
Assembly. These
states will be sovereign members of the World Assembly, a sovereignty which is only limited by the
points (a-e) above. No legitimate states are to be forced into the World Assembly, and legitimate states may
withdraw from the World
Assembly. Right-violating states are “non grata”. 5. Specification of nature-given rights
In this chapter we are to explore more
rights being subgroups or direct logical consequences (corollaries) of the right
to liberty. These
“new” rights also fit into the concept of nature-given rights (see also
Section 5.7) since
they are logical consequences of rights given by nature; they are not
social “rights” upheld by violating some of the nature-given ones: 5.1 Property right
When the human being uses his right to liberty to perform actions in
the pursuit of creating self-happiness, physical manifestation in the form of
property arises since he has processed non-owned and unused natural resources
away from the natural state into a state of increased usability; the human
being has by its nature the genes that are needed for creating property
(genes for the use of muscles, rationality, free will, language and
handiness). Since the
natural resources used for creating the product are non-owned and unused, he
does not violate anyone's rights by creating the product. From the
definition of legitimacy (see chapter 4) the producer's use/disposition
of the product is also legitimate since nobody's rights are violated by using
or disposing the product. Consequently, he has the right to use and to
dispose his property (included to let it be untouched), and the property right is established as
logical consequence of the nature-given right to liberty. If
other persons use/take/dispose the product without the consent of the owner,
they violate the property right. By
depriving or impairing a person's property, he is forced to work a period of
time for replacing the property to reconstruct the situation before the
violation. Thus, he has his right to
liberty violated in this period of time as a consequence of the property
violation. If the product is permanently abandoned and without a known owner,
new property right may be
established according to the principle of “first come, first served”. Basically, the property right is based on processing
non-owned and unused natural resources away from the natural state into a
state of increased usability, but the creator may transfer the property right to others as a
consequence of the contractual freedom
being a nature-given right (see Section 5.3). The
basis of the property right is the
difference between the processed state (state of increased usability) and the
natural state, and the economic value is defined by the market's willingness
to pay for this difference. A vein of gold lying in the underground has no
value in its natural state; the value arrives when somebody digs out the gold
and produces gold jewelers, tooth fillings or gold coins. A natural resource
being in its natural state may not be claimed to be anybodies property.
Fencing in a non-owned field of land without processing it duly is a
violation of the right to liberty of other individuals. In order to
establish property right, the
natural state has not only to be altered, but it has to be altered into a state of
increased usability.
You may not
carpet-bomb or asphalt a huge non-owned and unused area for obtaining property right by claiming that the
bombing or asphalting is not the work of nature. These are attempt of
preventing other person's right to travel, to use or to establish property rights on non-owned and
unused areas (see also Section 5.1.3). It
is not correct to say that we have property right to our own body
because property right requires that we have processed something away
from the natural state, and that is not the case for the human body. But the right
to liberty directly gives us the right to dispose our own body (the genes
for rationality and use of muscles are legitimately assigned to us by
nature). It is also possible to achieve property
rights to intellectual property as outlines of non-trivial product ideas,
music, film etc. since the producer has created it with his own brain and
experiences legitimately acquired from others. In that way the producer has
created intellectual products, which did not exist in natural state. No other
than the producer has the right to these products, but others may take part
in such products on the premises set by the producer. Therefore, patents,
registered trademarks, design protection and copyrights are legitimate
instruments for defending the property
right. When a product idea has appeared in
materialized form in the market for a long time, the product idea is
gradually transformed into triviality, and consequently the patent rights
logically disappear over time. Therefore, it is legitimate to limit a
patent's validity to a certain number of years. If a human being hunts down a wild
moose on non-owned property, he has worked up property right for the moose meat. A lion may kill a zebra, and
one should perhaps believe that the lion obtains property right to the zebra meat. But the lion does not possess
the right to liberty since it is not a rational being (the concrete
proof for that is the fact that no lion has ever showed any sign of creating
“technological products”), and it is the right to liberty that implies
the property right. The property right can be violated by vandalism, theft and by staying
on another person's property against his will. Vandalism and theft mean that
the thug physically has destroyed/removed property in such a way that the
owner cannot carry out his actions of choice with his property.
Staying on an owner's property against his wish means that the intruder prevents
the owner from effectuating the choice of letting the property stay
untouched. The property right can
also be violated by contract breach (see Section 5.3.1). All kinds of confiscation or
expropriation of private property is in practice absolutely forbidden
whatsoever; it is only nature (elements without free will) that may withdraw
this nature-given right without being accused of illegitimacy; however,
extreme exceptions are mentioned in Section 7.6.1.1. Since all humans have the same property right and the same right to liberty in other respects,
the property right is expressed as
follows: “The right to acquire property and to dispose this property as
long as the owner does not prevent the similar right of others or violates
other nature-given rights or their logical consequences.” Expressed this
way the property right is a
non-violable right without any limitations (see also Section 5.1.2 for
working up property right). But one
question arises: How can a property or its use violate other people's property right or other nature-given
rights? Considering
“the use of property in such a way that other person's use of their property
is prevented”, the first person having initiated his use has the right on his
side (see Section
5.7). You may not
shoot out of your own window with your own shotgun risking harming persons on
the street. You may not play rock music at maximum sound level in such a way
that you invade the neighboring apartment with sound waves making it
impossible for the neighbor to sleep. You may not drive your car in 200 kilometers
per hour in a crowded city in such a way that people can be killed or
property is at stake of being destroyed. A factory owner may not emit poison
gases in such a way that the life and health of its neighbors are violated. If
reduction in the value of an already established usage of a property arises
through objectively measurable physical burdens or obstructions from
neighboring activity or new constructions, those who caused this have to pay
at least full compensation for the loss of estimated market value. If an
already established usage of the property de facto becomes impossible,
the burdens / obstructions have to be prohibited or reversed. However, this
does not mean that you may demand compensation for disliking the color of the
house or skin of your neighbor; neither that a new competitor has to pay
compensation for reducing the value of already established companies. 5.1.1 Property right is not based on initiation
of force Doubt over a person's property rights
may sometimes arise. Has person A processed a certain land area away from the
natural state in such a way that property
right is present, or has he fenced in the area in such a way that the
public's right to liberty on non-owned area is violated? If the
judicial system concludes in favor of A, the authorities have to use force
against those (B) who do not respect the decision. Is this initiation
of force or self-defense? When
the judicial system has stated that A has property
right, B initiates force if he violates A's property (similarly
for other nature-given rights). The existing legitimate State has monopoly on
Police and judicial system, settling disputes included; anything else would
be a contradiction to the individuals' right to organize self-defense (see
Section 4.4). Thus, eventual use of force by B will
mean that he participates as a part of a sum to violate the individuals'
right to organized self-defense of
their nature-given rights. The decision of the judicial system has to
be respected if it is in accordance with the nature-given rights of the
individual. However, B has the right to
use civil disobedience or rebellion if the nature-given rights of the
individual obviously is violated, but only if the severity of the
realistically expected third-party damages of the rebellion is less than the
severity of the right violations in the long-term perspective (see Section 4.4.1).
Organizing a rebellion with this argumentation on the basis of a peripheral
disagreement on the interpretation of the criteria for property right is practically impossible. 5.1.2 Working up property right
in non-owned area There are not so much non-owned areas today
as it was in the USA several hundreds of years ago, but it is still
interesting to consider the principles for civilized establishing of property rights on non-owned land
areas. Non-owned
areas are not the property of the State, and the State may not sell something
that it does not own. All human beings have the right to liberty, and
the State is obliged to defend this right. All humans in the world have the
same inherent genetic nature and thus, they have the right to try to work up property right on non-owned area (but
foreign citizens may be refused to stay on State property, included car
driving on roads in exceptional cases – see Section 5.5.7). A person who
wants to work up property right for
an area ought to start processing the area first. Then, as soon as possible,
he ought to send a claim to the State on the right to use (see Section 5.2) for processing this area away from
the natural state in such a way that property
right arises. If two or more persons make claim on the same area
simultaneously, a lot drawing ought to be carried out between the claimants.
The State is to accept the claim unless it is predominantly probable that the
planned activity will violate the rights of others. The claimant has a
protected right for e.g. 5 years to process the area in such a way that property right arises, and no others
may perform activities preventing this processing. During these 5 years he
has to process this area away from the natural state into a state of
increased usability in such a way that the property right to the area (or parts of it) arises. If he does
not, the field will stay non-owned area, and others may claim the right to
work up property right for it. Some
limits ought to exist for how large area you may claim for the right to use of establishment of property right for a given purpose; if
it is predominantly probable that the claimant is not able to establish property right over the whole area
within the specified period of time, he will violate the right of others to try
to establish property right on
parts of the same non-owned area. The claimant ought to pay a fine for the
part of the area that he is not able to work up the property right for. 5.1.3 Property that lie fallow A property can go back to the
non-owned state if nature re-establishes a state similar to the natural
state. Imagine a man A entering a non-owned land area. A clears the field and
cultivates corn for two years. He has now worked up property right (and not only right
to use) for this field. Then he moves from his field. Twenty years later A returns, but one
year ago another man B had arrived and re-cleared and re-cultivated the area.
Just before B's work the
field was approximately as wild and untidy as when A originally cleared it 21
years ago. In this situation it is reasonable to say that A
legitimately has lost the property
right to that land, and that B
has carried out a legitimate acquisition of property. The principle may be
that if more that 15 years have passed since the field was cultivated (corn,
potatoes, hay etc.), the field returns to non-owned area. In a similar way a large garden around a
building (or without building) that has been turned into a tangle during e.g.
15 years will no longer be regarded as the property of the original owner but
as a non-owned area. The same principle will apply if the garden is not a
tangle, but where the tangle effect, which develops by long-term unused
state, has been hidden by asphalting, artificial turf, lawn mowing etc. The
owner still has property right over
the building (unless it has been left vacant for a similar period of time and
is tangle-like). Then, another person may apply for working up property right around the house (perhaps
except 4-5 meters from the building). Let us consider a building that has been left vacant for more than e.g. 15 years and
resembles an uninhabitable ruin. The building represents something that is
processed away from the natural state, but not into a state of increased
usability, and the property right to the building
will also disappear and turn into a non-owned state. The similar principle may apply for factory
halls, airfields, overgrown roads, commercial building, blocks of flats etc.
It is nature by the ravages of time that withdraws the property right in these cases. Section 10.5 describes a principle
for transition between the states “in use” and “unused” for forest. If a person discovers a land area
or building which he means has laid fallow for a sufficient long time (e.g.
15 years for former cultivated fields, left building, empty house, garden
around a house etc.; for forest see Section 10.5), this person may go to an
court-like office (property right
office) for demanding the right to work up property right according to the principles of Section 5.1.2. Then this office has to consider
if the criteria for fallow is present.
The judicial office has to prove as predominant probable that the original
owner has neglected the property. If so, the former property is declared as
non-owned, and the new person may work up property right. This will
prevent “feudal” conditions.
It also emphasizes that the area itself is nobody's property, but difference between the
processed state and the natural state is. Prices on building sites and land
areas are expected to be reduced as a consequence of these principles. 5.1.4 Inheritance Considering the distribution of an
estate of a deceased person, the principle has to be that the one having processed
the natural resources away from the natural state (directly or indirectly)
into the actual property is the one to decide the distribution of the
inheritance. It is the testator who has performed this effort, and
accordingly his testamentary decision is the law for the distribution of his
property left. Each individual, who is not under guardianship, has the right
to transfer his property to anyone he may prefer, and he also has the right
to decide when this transfer is to occur; something else would be a
violation of his property right. By a testamentary decision he
may decide that the transfer of the property right to his belongings
is to occur at his death and who to be the
beneficiaries. Philosophically, “at his death”
will mean “infinitesimally before the time point of his death” since a
deceased person does not have any rights. When
a person dies without leaving a formal testament, one has to consider a
presumptive testament (see Section 5.3.2.4); i.e. the testament that the
deceased most probably would have composed if he should have expressed his
last will at the very moment before his death. In order to bring such
presumptions into civilized forms the Law prescribes that the
children/parents are the primary heirs; secondarily the children/parents of
the primary heirs. A presumptive testament will naturally have the content
that an eventual spouse / cohabitant will inherit in a way that depends on
how long time they have lived together. Cohabitants / spouses may also have a
binding inheritance clause in their living-together contract. If other
persons mean that they were equally close or closer to the deceased than
those mentioned above, they have to make this claim for a court within a
specified time after the death, and the burden of evidence is resting upon
them. It may also happen that e.g. one of the children claims to be
significantly closer to the deceased than other children, and if this is
proven as predominant probable in the court, he may get more of the
inheritance than the other children. When a person dies and does not leave
any children, parents, siblings, testament or contract of
marriage/cohabitation with inheritance clause, the property is considered as
non-owned property. All non-owned properties of this kind are distributed among
random nationals of the State by drawing lots each year. Archaeological
discoveries are – as the main rule – entirely the property of the finder (see
also Section 5.1). Exceptions from this are present when the owner is known
and still exists (e.g. a state or a very long-lived company), then the law
may specify a reward for the finder while the owner gets the rest. When
the testator obtains unlimited right to decide over his left property, it may
be used as an age insurance. The future testator may enter a contract with
one or more persons (or a company) on getting nurse and care – with parts of
or the whole inheritance as service in return. 5.1.4.1 Organ donation According to Rational Gaudism, an individual
obviously decides over his organs and body as long as he is alive. He cannot
transfer his organs or body to others “infinitesimally before the time point
of his death” in the same way as mentioned for inheritance of assets. As a
dead person, he cannot transfer anything since zero rights apply to elements
that do not have the ability to perceive happiness. His dead body is taken
over by those who are believed to be most interested in it, which will be his
heirs (funeral) unless otherwise is obviously rational. The latter will be
relevant for medically well-founded or forensic autopsy, and his heirs cannot
refuse. Obviously, people who need transplants have more interest in kidney,
lung or heart than the heirs. Therefore, medical staff may take donor organs
from e.g. traffic victims in order to save the lives of others without the
formal permission of the deceased or his heirs. 5.2 Right to use
Each individual has the right to use an untouched and unused natural
resource since such use does not violate the rights of other individuals;
this is one of the tools which nature includes in the right to liberty.
A resource that has been processed away from the natural state into a state
of increased usability is owned by the owner, and no other person may touch
this property without consent of the owner. But who has the rights to a
resource that is already being used, but is not processed away from the
natural state? Since the resource has not been processed away from the
natural state, the user does not possess property right to the resource. A human being who initiates the
use of a natural resource does not commit any right violation by doing so.
Accordingly, he has the right to continue this use; i.e. others may not
violate his use. If somebody uses the same natural resource in such a way
that the initiator's use is prevented, it is right-violating. If somebody
uses the same natural resource in such a way that the initiator's use is not
prevented, it is not right-violating. In practice, determining
“preventing” may sometimes be somewhat difficult, and therefore, a best possible objective judicial
evaluation has to be
the base for the estimation of the limits in this respect. This may be
specified in the Law and settled by the courts according to earlier court
practice. If the legitimate user of the natural resource ends his use,
another person may legitimately and free of cost restart the use since he
does not prevent anyone's use, and new right
to use is established. Of course, one person may sell his right to use to others. A
banal example follows: If you sit on a bough in an non-owned tree, nobody has
the right to force you down, but when you have left the bough, you may not
refuse others to sit down since your use of the bough has not made it more
useable for sitting (your sitting has not processed the bough away
from the natural state into a state of increased usability). In Section
5.2.1, 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 these principles for right to use are applied on forestry, fishing and hunting. It
is not possible to achieve rights on another person's property by
prescription through continuing use. Right
to use other person's property may only be achieved by an accepting
agreement with the owner. 5.2.1 The right to use to forest Right to use to forest arises when a lumberman
enters a non-owned and non-used forest area and hews a tree. Then he works up
the right to forestry inside a circle with the tree stump as centre and
radius similar to the length of the hewed tree. A forester has the right to use to a forest area since he
(or those he has bought or inherited
the area from) historically has performed forestry in the area. But he
does not possess property right to
the forest area since the area is not processed away from the natural state
into a state of increased usability. In fact, the usability of the area for
forestry has decreased since several trees have disappeared following the
hewing. The forester achieves property
right to those logs which actually have been hewed. Since the forester does not have
the property right to the area, he
may not rebuff activity in the forest that does not go against his forestry.
When a person makes a walk in the forest, he does not violate the right to use of the forester since
walking does not interfere negatively with forestry. Therefore, the forester
may not refuse a tourist to walk between the trees, and he may not refuse a
hunter to go hunting there (see also Section 5.2.3). One may raise tents
between the trees as long as the forester's right to use is not
violated (not in a planting area – the small trees will be violated). Cultivated fields appear
differently because it is impossible to walk without violating the corn
straws, which is the farmer's property.
A random person may not hew trees in the forest to build a house
because the forester's right to use
to forestry is violated. However, the forester may build e.g. a house in the forest (outside
hiking areas) and work up property right to a garden around it since
he does not violate anybody's rights by doing so. If a forester has built a road in the
forest, he has the complete property
right over it because he has processed the area away from the natural
state and into a road. Local people will often have
worked up right to use to walking and recreation in the forest (≈
today's public right). Therefore, the forester may not exterminate
forest to such an extent (e.g. by transformation into a residential or
commercial area) that the right to use to walking and recreation is
violated. Similarly,
a large forester may not exterminate forest en mass in such a way that the stock of moose disappears or
becomes strongly reduced from the area. That would violate the hunters' right
to a worked up hunting quota which is expressed in a share of the yearly
increase of moose (see Section 5.2.3). If the extermination of the world's forests should occur
in such a tempo that it is predominant probable to threat the level of oxygen
in the atmosphere, a supranational court of the World Assembly (see Section 4.5) may impose
hewing restrictions or timber taxes upon all foresters of the world with the
argument that each forester participates as a part of a sum to threat the right to life (see Section 6.5). A forester has the right to use to a forest area because
he (or those he has bought or inherited the forest from) historically has
performed forestry in that area. If the forester is lazy and does not keep up
the forestry, his right to use will
logically withdraw, and the area will again become unused and non-owned.
Then, other persons may pursue the establishing of right to use to the field according to the principles of Section
10.5. 5.2.2 The right to use to
fishing Imagine a stock of fish consisting of 1
million fish, which is not necessarily located inside a sharply limited area
since the fishes are swimming over large distances. The annual increase is
200,000 fish. Person A (or a fishing company) has historically caught 20,000
fish each year. Thus, he uses 10 % of the stock (100,000 fish) for
cultivating those 20,000 fish that he actually catches each year. Nobody has
the right to force him away from using these 100,000 breeding fish for
breeding new fishes as long as he actually keeps up the use (the fishing
activity). This means that each year he has the right to fish a quota of 10 %
of the annual fish increase, i.e. the surplus of fish that his breeding stock
annually gives. Similarly, we imagine Person B having a quota of 60% (uses 600,000
fish for breeding those 120,000 fish which he catches annually), while C's
quota is 30 % (uses 300,000 fish for breeding those 60,000 fish which he
catches annually). If other fishermen catches fish from the “breeding
stocks”, they violate A,B,C's right to
use. The State is obliged to defend this right to use in such a way that one fisherman does not “steal”
from another one by overfishing. Fishing boats may work up right to use to fish resources still
being unused. This may occur by discovering a fish resource which has not
been historically exploited, or if the annual increase of a known fish
resource is not fully exploited by existing users. If
A catches 40,000 fish one year, it means that he either steals from the
annual quotas of B and C, or that he catches 20,000 fish from the total
breeding stock. The latter means that he catches 2000 of his own breeding
stock (and that is not right-violating), but he also catches 12,000 from B's
breeding stock and 6000 from C's breeding stock, and that is a violation of their right
to use. If A had been the only fisherman, he had been able to legally
overfish as much as he had liked without violating anybody's rights, but it
would have been stupid in the mean and long term perspective since he would
have sawn off the bough that he is sitting on. The
100,000 breeding fish that A uses are not his property since they have
not been processed away from the natural state into a state of increased
usability. The breeding stock is a non-owned resource that A has the right to use because he has
historically used this non-owned resource, and because he still keeps up the
use. However, he has property right
to those fishes which he actually catches and later on processes further
since these are processed away from the natural state into a state of
increased usability. An office in the Ministry of
Justice will each year perform a scientific evaluation of the size of the
total fish stock and its annual increase, and on this basis they will
calculate how many fish (fish quota) each fisherman, fishing boat or fishing
company has the right to catch. The task of this State office is not
“to administer the joint fish resources of the society” but to ensure and
enforce the right to use of the
owners of the fishing boats. The fish quotas may be freely purchased and
sold. In this way we obtain an ideologically correct definition of “the right
to fishing” based on the fishermen's initiation and maintenance of the use of
the fish stock, and not the socialist idea that the fish in the sea is “the
joint property of the citizens”. If there is a large excess of fish compared
to the total fishing activity, everyone may catch as many fish as they like
without any quota regulations since no rights will be violated as a
consequence thereof. A
similar principle can be used for whales and other animal resources in the
sea. Since the fishes swim between different
nations' waters, nations ought to cooperate over establishing fish quotas.
Enforcement of the right to use to
fishing in international waters may be a task for the World Assembly (see Section 4.5). Thus,
fishermen can have right to use to a
fish resource in a sea area. But the fishermen do not have property right
to the sea floor or the water itself. If an oil company arrives pumping up oil
in the area, it does not violate the fishermen's right to use to the fish resources (unless the oil company pollute in such a way
that the stock of fish is eradicated or significantly reduced). 5.2.3 The right to use to
hunting Wild animals in the forest are not
the property of the forester since he has not bred the animals away from the
natural state (the animals are regarded as non-owned). The forester may not
refuse hunters to walk in the forest between the trees since this is not a
violation of the right to use to
his forestry (see Section 5.2.1). Thus, he may not refuse them to hunt down
the animals. Theoretically, he may refuse them
to drive on his forest roads unless an explicit or presumptive contract
stating otherwise. The
hunters work up right to use by the
fact that the individual hunter historically has shot a certain numbers of
animals each year. Thereby, he has used a part of the total animal stock as
breeding animals for producing the part of the annual increase that he has
hunted down. Thus, he has worked up the right
to use the same part of the animal stock as breeding animals also in the
future as long as the use actually is sustained. The hunter obtains full property right to the meat, fur, horn
etc. of the animals that he actually has killed. This is completely parallel
to “right to use to fishing” in
Section 5.2.2. The
right to use ought to be defined in
the same way as for fishing: Hunters who traditionally have hunted in the
forest (often the forester included) have the right to a quota of the annual
increase of the stock of the actual hunting object that is proportional to
the size of each hunter's historical use. A State office calculates the
annual increase of the stock, and the hunters' numerical quotas are
calculated thereof. This office is also to ensure that the animals are not
exposed to maltreatment during the hunting. If there is a large excess of
wild animals compared to the total hunting activity, everyone may hunt down
as many animals as they like without any quota regulations since no rights
will be violated as a consequence thereof. The
forester may not charge the hunters because he cannot sell something in which
he does not have any rights, but he may of course sell his own hunting quota
in the same way as the other hunters. He may also demand payment for the
hunters' use of his forest roads. If the forester severely
exterminates forest to which he has right
to use, moose, deer etc. will disappear and thus, extensive destroying of
forest will be a violation of the established right to use of the hunters. The forester may not manage his
forestry in such a way that the rights
to use of others are violated. Thus, right
to use to hunting will contribute to a natural preservation of the
forests with positive consequences for environment, oxygen production and
general well-being. An indigenous tribe (may function as a kind of
organization) or indigenous individuals may have the right to use to i.e. hunting and
gathering in areas of forest, jungle etc. based on their prolonging use. This
grants protection against companies or individuals that want to start other
enterprises in these areas, but the right
to use may of course be sold voluntarily. This does not apply for nomads
moving from one place to another over long distances; when they have moved
far away from an area and do not return for years, the right to use
ceases logically, and others may establish right to use and/or property
right there. It is important to emphasize that the right to use is not achieved on the basis of ethnicity; white
people will of course have the same right
to use if they have had the same prolonging use. 5.2.4 The right to use to oil The State is obliged to defend the
right to free enterprise (see
Section 5.5). This means that any oil company, regardless of nationality,
safely may search for oil on non-owned territory
(as long as the company does not violate the nature-given rights of others).
Before test-drilling, the company ought to carry out a process similar to the
one mentioned in Section 5.5.6. If two or more companies demand to start
test-drilling in the same area simultaneously, a lot drawing ought to be
carried out between the claimants. When the company discovers oil
(this may require a lot of searching, geological examinations and test
drilling) and starts pumping it up, the company's right to use to oil activity in the field arises. Other oil
companies are not allowed to pump oil from this field as long as the first
company actually performs oil production there. The company has property right to the oil that
actually is pumped up since it is processed away from the natural state into
a state of increased usability. The company is not to pay compulsory taxes to
the State (see Section 7.6.1). Thus, it is important that the State through
the State Stock Fund (see Section 7.6.4) has significant shares of ownership
in oil companies extracting oil from national and international territories.
The State may also demand environmental taxes from oil activity if a court is
able to prove that it is predominant probable that the consequences of the
oil activity in sum will violate the nature-given rights of the individuals
inside a geographical area equal to the jurisdiction of that court (see
Section 6.5). 5.2.5 The right to use and property right in the
beach area If the local people traditionally have used a
beach for sunbathing and swimming, they have established “right to use to sunbathing and
swimming” on the beach. A beach existing in the natural state, cannot be
regarded as property but as a non-owned area where it is possible to
establish right to use to e.g. sunbathing and swimming. Nobody may
legitimately violate an already established right to use by carrying
out construction activity on the beach. On an unused beach where right to
use has not been established, anybody may build anything as long as it
does not violate the rights of others, and property right to the beach
zone arises. When the beach has been processed away from the natural state by
construction, nobody else may establish right to use to sunbathing and
swimming. 5.2.6 Diffuse, collective rights to use As mentioned in Section 5.2.1 and
5.2.5 the locals have the right to use to walking in the forest and
the right to use in the beach area, and other similar rights to use
may probably exist. Persons outside the local area may also wander there
since they do not violate anyone's rights by doing so, but it is mainly the
local citizens who have established these rights to use on a diffuse,
collective basis through enduring use. It is impossible to individualize
these rights and therefore, the individuals of the local society do not have
any such individual rights to sell. Thus, these rights have to be
managed collectively at the local level by a municipality-based foundation
(or similar) whose representatives are chosen by the locals. Imagine
a relatively large forest area that in a significant manner are being used
for walking, berry picking and other kinds of recreation. The forester with right
to forestry in this area wants to transform the forest area into an
residential area or an area of commercial properties. He cannot do this by
his own discretion since he then violates the locals' collective right to
use. The forester has to enter into negotiations with the foundation, and
he may only transform the forest area if they make a contractual agreement.
The agreement may e.g. include that half of the income from the land sale (or
other kinds of profits from the area) are going collectively to the locals.
Oppositely, the local society has the option to prevent the razing of the
recreation area. The money may e.g. be used for disadvantaged individuals. If
the forester wants to transform a forest area which has not been used
significantly for walking, recreation etc., he may do so without entering
into the negotiations mentioned above. 5.3 Contractual freedom
Contractual freedom is freedom to renounce freedom if the individual believe that the
contract, according to a total evaluation, gives more self-happiness during
his life span than complete nature-given freedom. Thus, contractual freedom is obvious a subgroup of the general right
to liberty as described in Section 4.1.1, and since the right to
liberty is a nature-given right, the contractual
freedom also has to be so. The contractual
freedom naturally fits into the Superior Constitution (see Section
7.1.1.1), and no other law may infringe this fundamental right. Compulsory solidarity
arrangements are right-violating and therefore, voluntary contracts between
individuals and insurance company will take over much of the collective
solidarity in the Rational Gaudist society (see e.g. Section 7.6.11). 5.3.1 Why is contract breach right-violating? When two parties enter a contract,
the parties agree upon how much value (materialized liberty) they are willing
to transfer to the other party in order to obtain specified values from this
party (the concept value is being
used here and in the rest of Section 5.3 a little imprecisely in the meaning value tool – happiness is the only true form of value). If one party does not
transfer the specified values in accordance with the contract, contract
breach is present. If
the other party has lost objective measurable values through the contract
breach compared to if the contract had not been entered, he has been deprived
of values against his will, and thus, a right violation is basically present.
However, the contract breaker may avoid being identified as a right-violator by providing
compensation by conciliation or by complying with a judicial decision on
compensation. If committed by intent in the pursuit of profits, the contract
breach may be theft by the use of the intellect instead of the hand (swindle,
cheating). In
addition to depriving the other party of positive value, the contract breaker
may also cause the other person negative value; the other party may behave
differently in the period from the contract entering until the contract
should have been implemented compared to if the contract had not been signed.
A failure to
accomplish a one-sided contract stating that Peter will transfer $15,000
without any payback to Bill in three months, does not make Peter liable because
Peter deprives Bill of values, but because Peter's contract signature causes
Bill negative value. Bill may order a new car and start working on the house
as a consequence of the contract entering. When Peter's capital transfer does
not arrive, Bill will get into economic trouble; he receives a negative
value. Thus, contract breach often implies liability through a sum of
depriving of positive values plus transfer of negative values. If
the party, who complains about the implementation of the contract, either has
been deprived of any objectively measurable positive value or has been
inflicted any objectively measurable negative value, no liable contract
breach is present, but only a subjective breach of confidence from the
claimant's point of view. 5.3.1.1 Sanctions against contract breakers If one party breaks a contract,
the other party may not legitimately force him physically to fulfill the
contract, but the judicial system may order him to compensate the other
party's loss. Additionally, he may in certain cases be imposed “punishment”
deterring him from committing contract breaches in the future. In
the example in Section 5.3.1 Peter is judicially obliged to compensate for
the negative value he has caused Bill; he has not been deprived of any
positive value, so in that respect there is nothing to replace. This
compensation will also have the function of deterring Peter from similar
contract breaches in the future. George
signs a contract to receive 10 cents today, and as a payback he is to
transfer a Rolls Royce to Charles in three months time. George fails to
deliver the car. Thus, he has unjustly received 10 cents and has to
compensate for this. In addition, he is liable for the negative values which
the contract violation has caused Charles, but George is not liable for the
market value of the car. The
party having been exposed to the contract breach may legitimately reject
fulfilling some remaining parts of the contract, and this may have negative
consequences for the contract breaker. Additionally, the contract breaker may
have the following sanctions imposed by the courts: 1) compensation for the
positive values that he has unjustly obtained from the other party, 2)
compensation for the negative values that he has caused the other party, 3) sanctions to deter similar
contract breaches in the future (if the deterrent effects of points 1 and 2
are insufficient) but only if it is a premeditated or grossly negligent
breach of contract for profit purposes. In cases with only honest disagreement about
a contract there shall never be any extra sanctions, but just compensation. 5.3.1.2 Private arbitrators and contract fees When two (or more) parties enter into a
contract, the parties may, as an element of the contract, agree on which
arbitrator to judge over eventual future disagreements about the contract.
Therefore, several private arbitrators can be present competing with public
courts over this task. Since such arbitration does not become a State
monopoly task, both the State and the private arbitrator companies may demand
a fee when the contracts are entered, and these fees will partly finance the
State judicial system and completely finance the private arbitrator companies
(see Section 7.5.2). The fees may be regarded as
insurance premiums making it economical possible for the arbitrator to settle
eventual future contract disputes. Alternatively, the arbitrator companies
and the State may demand a relatively high fee when a dispute over the
contract eventually arises. The fees ought to be larger the more expensive
the settling of potential contract disputes is supposed to be. The State may
decide that certain contract types will be free from such fees at State
courts. If a contract is signed without a specified arbitrator, the State
automatically becomes arbitrator unless the parties agree on something else
when a contract dispute arises; the plaintiff has to pay a relatively high
fee for getting the State court to handle the case, and if he wins, the
looser has to refund the fee. If a private arbitrator has made a decision
over a contract dispute and the looser refuses to accept the decision, the
State judicial system and Police will ensure that the decision is enforced
upon the looser; exceptions apply if the settlement is in discordance with
the principles of the Superior Constitution (see Section 7.1.1.1). Considering
criminal cases, the State courts must have a monopoly on such lawsuits since
it is the society per se that is to be protected against future crimes
from the suspect; it is not only an internal affair between the suspect and
the victim. Besides, a criminal has no nature-given right to indirectly
choose his punishment by participating in electing court for his trial. 5.3.2 When is a contract valid? Since
all individuals have the same contractual freedom and liberty in other
respects, the contractual freedom is
formulated as follows: “The right to enter contracts as
long as the one does not violate the similar right of others, other
nature-given rights or their logical consequences.” Expressed this way the contractual freedom is a non-violable right completely
without limitations. But one question arises: How can contractual freedom violate the contractual freedom of other people or other nature-given rights?
This is described in the sections 5.3.2.1-5. 5.3.2.1 Rational voluntariness The contractual freedom does not have any limitations, but a contract
is not valid if it is written in such a way or entered into under such
circumstances that one party is deluded into entering the contract abeam of
his rational voluntariness (natural compulsion is not involuntariness). For
instance, this may happen when one of the parties is not with all senses
alert, has not reached the age majority, or when the producer of the contract
has written important elements with very small font in the purpose of
cheating the other party. If George signs a contract with Charles on selling
a Rolls Royce for 10 cents, and George refuses to fulfill the contract, he
has basically committed a contract breach. But it is good reason for asking
if George was with all senses alert at the time when the contract was signed,
or if there was any kind of cheating from Charles. The
more biased a contract seems from an intersubjective perspective and the more
serious restrictions in the nature-given rights it involves, the milder
proofs are required from the regretting party if he wants to abolish the
contract claiming absence of rational voluntariness (absence of rationality
or claims on fraud) and the stronger the case of the regretting party stands.
In simple cases this may be specified in the Law so the contract parties know
under what circumstances the contract has to be agreed on in order to be
considered juridical voluntary. The evaluations of the court with basis in
practice of justice will be decisive in other cases. But intersubjective bias
is not reason by itself for rejecting a contract; the absence of rational
voluntariness has to be proven. 5.3.2.2 Special contracts and obligation to inform If a contract text contains
elements that seemingly are very unfair, unusual, dangerous or
liberty-limiting, proportionally tough requirements on information to all
contract parties are necessary if the contract is to be regarded voluntarily
entered and thus judicially valid. If you download a program from the
Internet, you often have to click on a button in order to accept certain
terms. The software producer may not write buried in the contract text that
the downloader is to pay $10,000 each month to his bank account the rest of
his life. The producer may legitimately demand an extreme price, but the
potential buyer has to be extremely well informed on this special price if
the contract is to be judicially valid. But even if the customer is
sufficiently informed about the extreme price, the customer will be imposed a
relatively cheap compensation for the contract breach since the objectively
measurable value that the software producer has been deprived of is small.
This is due to the low probability for him to get the product sold to another
customer at the similar price. But the customer must, of course, return and
uninstall the software. See also Section 10.3.7. The
general principle is as follows: When two (or more) parties enter into a
contract, the entrance has to be voluntarily made by all parties in order to
be valid. If there is a significant information asymmetry between the parties
when a contract is signed, the “strong party” has an obligation to inform on
important, but unusual issues that the “weak party” realistically can not be
expected to know. Lawmakers
or the judicial system have to estimate which information (and in which way)
the “strong party” must have submitted to the other party prior to the
signing in order to be a voluntary contract entering. Examples of this may
be: (a) To write the peculiarities with large and bold letters in a central
place in the contract, (b) to place the peculiarities in a public register so
potential contract parties may learn about them on beforehand in order to
avoid accepting the peculiarities unwittingly, (c) to go through education
with corresponding exam in order to ensure that the contract party really has
understood the peculiarities, (d) requirements for witnesses, (e) Approval
from psychiatrists that the contract party is by all senses alert. The State
may not include whatever of “desired” contract restrictions (as opposed to
the illegitimate “automatic standard contracts” of Section 5.3.2.5), but only
make a realistic assessment of which relevant information that could have
prevented the “weak party” from entering of the contract. We can imagine contract-like
interactions where the content, circumstances and information asymmetry make
the information obligation of one party's become so extreme that
voluntariness in the interaction becomes virtually impossible. This will in
practice resemble a legal ban and can be called a de-facto-prohibition
(see e.g. Section 6.6.2). An extreme and weird example illustrating the
principle follows: A grocery store wants to sell a cheese having 90 %
probability of causing cancer death within 3 years if you consume more than
200 grams. Theoretically, the shopkeeper has the right to sell this cheese to
consumers who voluntarily want to eat it, but he has to state the dangers
very clearly; marking with small print is insufficient. In practice, the
requirements ought to be as harsh as for euthanasia. Failure to comply with this information
obligation could result in conviction for mass murder, and even if nobody
should die or be injured, the seller may be convicted for grossly perilous
action under particularly weighty circumstances. De facto, it will be illegal to sell the
unhealthy cheese. Any degree of information obligation may exist – from none to de facto prohibition. When entering contracts, one (or
both) party of the contract may want to “squeeze in” very special conditions,
and by alleging contract breach these may be very intricate to ‘investigate’.
The main way to prevent this from turning into a disproportionate load on the
treasury is described in Section 5.3.1.2, and essentially means that the
contracting parties voluntarily and freely may choose private arbitrators to
be “judge” of their contractual relationship (most likely to be agreed on at
the entering of the contract). Firstly, the load on the State judiciary will
be reduced. Secondly, the State may charge fees on its own arbitrator
services since arbitration will not be a monopoly State task, and the fee should
be larger the more costly the treatment of a possible future litigation about
the contract is expected to be. The motive power to include very
intricate contract terms will also be reduced by the fact that a contract
breach is liable only if one party can prove that the breach of contract
implies an objectively measurable loss (which in practice means a significant economic loss) compared to if the contract
had not been signed (see Section 5.3.1). If there are no objectively
measurable losses, only a subjective breach of trust remains, which will not
be enforced by the courts. 5.3.2.3 Slave, violence and death contracts A person who enters a very
long-term contract of slave-like character ought to have the opportunity to
break the contract without fear for judicial reprisals with the following
rationale: The
contract party has not been deprived of any positive values. However, he may
have been imposed negative consequences by getting problems with keeping
other contracts that were entered on the basis of the “slave contract's”
extremely favorable terms. However, the contract party is assumed to be
compensated already through the very favorable long-term conditions given to
him by the “slave contract”. Besides, the danger of reiteration is assumed to
be zero since the slave-like condition by itself is expected to have
sufficient deterring effect on the “contract breaker” (see Section 6.1.1).
Thus, a relatively long-term slave-like contract between two parties may be
broken without danger of juridical reprisals. An
employment contract with normal salary conditions but very long term of
notice may be broken by the employee without being economically responsible
for the total remaining term of notice. He is only responsible for the
negative value that the employer has been imposed (he has not been deprived
of any positive values), i.e. for the expected time loss and inconvenience by
hiring a new, similar employee. The
judicial system is not to enforce contracts where one of the parties has
accepted death, physical or psychical violence as a part of the contract. To
the contrary, the one committing violence against the other party abeam his
will often be punished (see also Section 10.4.2). Contracts that are signed
under physical force, threats thereof, or strong psychical force are to be
declared invalid by the judicial system. 5.3.2.4 Presumptive contracts When two parties interact
voluntarily without the existence of any explicit agreement, disagreements
may occur afterwards. When eventual disputes over the interaction are to be
settled, one must primarily examine whether other parts of the right to
liberty than the contractual freedom have direct logical
implications in the present case; if so, this applies. If not, the applicable
principle is that each of the parties are assumed to have interacted out of
an unspoken voluntary agreement, each of them believing that they would
generate significantly more happiness with this agreement than if there had
been no interaction. But maybe one party had another agreement in mind than
the other party when the interaction occurred, or perhaps they thought of the
same agreement, but that one of the parties tries to withdraw from it in the
pursuit of unjust gain. The legal system must, from a best possible objective judicial
assessment, estimate
which agreement the defendant realistically ought to expect the complainant
to accept given the moment and circumstances of their interaction. The State
may not include their own preferences in presumptive agreements (as
opposed to the illegitimate “automatic standard contracts” of Section
5.3.2.5), but the judicial system (or the legislature if it is usual,
recurrent interactions) is to estimate, based on a rational assessment of reality,
which agreement the previous sentence means in practice. An explicit contract
may be incomplete failing to cover the parties' interaction entirely, and
then it may have to be supplied by a presumptive contract. 5.3.2.5 Standard contracts An “automatic standard contract”
is a contract that is specified in a law, and which is considered valid
between two or more parties unless the parties explicitly have agreed on
something else (also called declarative law). In an automatic standard contract
the State can basically include anything at will (as opposed to presumptive
contracts of Section 5.3.2.4), and this will automatically apply to all
contract conditions that are specified by the standard contract, even if the
contract parties have not agreed to this. In order to cancel the contract,
all parties of such an automatic contractual relationship voluntarily have to
enter into a contra-contract canceling the automatic standard contract, and
this contra-contract has to be designed in a manner specified in the
automatic standard contract's accompanying text. Automatic standard contracts
can easily be created in such a way that their content theoretically may be
abolished by contra-contracts while it becomes impossible or very difficult
to do so in practice, and thus, the right
to liberty will easily be undermined. The State does not have the right
to impose such automatic standard contracts with the following rationale: By
entering a contract one renounces a little right to liberty in the pursuit of generating significantly more
happiness in the long-term perspective by signing the contract than by
relying on pure nature-given liberty. In an automatic standard contract the
State forces a contract upon the parties, and they are forced to do something
(e.g. signing a contra-contract) in order to obtain the nature-given right
that complete liberty is. This is a contradiction to the definition of a
nature-given (innate) right (chapter 4). All principles that shall have
automatic validity without an explicit contract have to arrive as a logical
consequence of the right to liberty
or through presumptive contracts (see Section 5.3.2.4). Nevertheless,
the State may make standard contracts that become valid if two or more
parties sign the contract through an active, voluntary act, and which is not
based on the principle of automatic validity unless active reservation is
carried out (see also Section 5.5.4). This kind of standard contracts may be
contracts of marriage/cohabitation, contracts between employer and employee,
sales contracts and other commonly used contracts. The parties have complete
freedom to choose other contracts than the standard contracts if they prefer
so. 5.4 Right to organize
According to Rational Gaudism,
perceiving happiness is the only value, and since an organization does not
possess the ability to perceive happiness, it does not have any values or
objectives by itself. Accordingly, an organization does not have any
nature-given rights of it own (see introduction to chapter 4). Individuals
have the right to liberty and
thereby the right to gather with others into an organization and to try to
use it in the pursuit of maximization of their self-happiness during their
life spans. The members have the right to make decisions and effectuate them
according to the constitution of the organization (as long as the
nature-given rights of others are not violated). The constitution is a
contract between the members and has to be accepted also by others who want
to interact with the organization; this also applies for the decisions made
in accordance with the constitution. The constitution does not need to be
based on democratic principles. Decisions made in opposition to its
constitution are considered to be contracts breaches (see Section 5.3.1) and
will potentially be a case for the judicial system. If a sufficient number of members want to use the organization in
the same direction, each and one of these individuals can generate
significantly more happiness together than what they would have done outside
the organization. If a member means that the organization does not any
longer contributes positively in the pursuit of his ultimate value, he must
have the opportunity to resign (see also Section 5.4.3). There exists no
right to become member of a particular organization unless the existing
members have made a decision in accordance with its constitution on something
else. The State itself is an
organization with certain modifications (see Section 4.4), and its primary
task is to defend the nature-given rights of the individuals. A
person of legal age has to actively accept a membership if it is to be
legitimate. A person of legal age who has been enrolled in an organization as
a child has to get a message (with a reasonable deadline, which is stipulated
in the Law) from the organization shortly after reaching the age of majority
where eventual obligations of continued membership are enlisted. The person
may choose to renounce his membership before this deadline without being
inflicted any obligations no matter what his parents have agreed with the
organization earlier on. In
the constitution of an organization the following paragraph can (and perhaps
sometimes ought to) be present: “This
organization, company, block of flats etc. comply with the State standard
constitution (or the standard constitution to another certification firm).
This paragraph may only be changed if absolutely all members agree.” It
may also be specified that this apply to the standard constitution
that the State/firm had valid at a certain time point – even if the
State/firm should change these later on (see Section 5.5.1 and 5.5.4). An
“organization” without a constitution is not considered to be an
organization, but a loosely collections of individuals. In such a collection
all decisions have to be made according to complete consensus since the
majority does not possess any right to decide unless a contract
(constitution) exists between the members on this. If it is not possible to
make consensus decision on a particular case, status quo has to be sustained
or the collection has to be dissolved. Nevertheless, a majority or a minority
may start a new gathering immediately after the break up. 5.4.1 When is
an organization legitimate? As a consequence of the above
statements an organization will function in the same way as if it had
possessed those nature-given rights as mentioned in Section 4.1. Since all
individuals have the same right to
organize and the same right to
liberty, the right to organize
is formulated as follows: “The right to
join organizations together with others and to manage the organization in
such a way that one does not violate the similar right of others, other
nature-given rights or their logical consequences.” Expressed this way
the right to organize is a
non-violable right completely without limitations. But one question arises:
How can an organization or its use violate the right to organize of other people or other nature-given rights? The
functioning and constitution of the organization may not disagree with the
following: An organization may not challenge
the State monopoly on Police, military force and the administration of
justice (see Section 4.4). An organization is not
to be considered legal if its objective is to violate nature-given rights or
solicit this in a situation where the solicitation may be expected to be
pursued. All political organizations have to be allowed as long as
they are not in conflict with the above limitations (see also Section 5.6).
It has to be an absolute requirement that each member may resign if he means
that the membership no longer promotes his happiness, but a civil dispute may
arise over eventual outstanding economical obligations. The resigning is not
to be followed by other obligations than those explicitly stated in the
organization's constitution (contract) at the time when the member enrolled
the last time or what he specifically and explicitly has signed later on.
This also applies for the organization that living together represents. 5.4.2
Citizenship The State has no nature-given duty
to give citizenship to any individual, but it is reasonable that the Law
offers citizenship to children if at least one parent is a national of that
State unless the child already has another citizenship. The State is an
organization (see Section 5.4). The constitution of an organization is a
contract that a new member accepts when entering. A contract is defined by
voluntary renouncing some liberty in exchange for the contract content, which
is expected to give significantly more happiness during the life span than
complete nature-given liberty. Therefore, forcing a contract (constitution)
upon an individual is a violation of his nature-given rights, and this is
valid even if the individual may resign at any time. Accordingly, no
organization, the State included, may take in members without their consent.
Children may acquire citizenship by birth as an accompanier to the mother's
or father's citizenship since initiation of force against children under age
is not right-violating if performed in their self-interest. A person of legal
age has the right to renounce the citizenship immediately after reaching the
age of majority without accruing any costs or obligations. If he renounces
the citizenship, he ought to wait a certain time before he may reapply for
citizenship. Any
adult individual has the same right to
liberty independent of geographical or ethnical origin, and the State is
obliged to defend this right inside the State's territorial jurisdiction in
order to legitimate the State monopoly on the obligatory tasks (see Section
4.4). Therefore, the State may not refuse a Chinese, African, Pakistani or
stateless person access to its territory unless he has committed
right-violating actions (but he may not intrude into another person's,
organization's or company's property without the consent of the owner). An
individual with citizenship of the State by birth who does not want to
continue the citizenship as an adult may not be expelled from the country's
territory or be deprived any nature-given rights against his will. Theoretically,
the State may impose obligations upon a national of the State through the
voluntary contract as the citizenship represents, but statistically, he ought
to expect receiving goods of similar value as he loses from the obligations,
otherwise the incitement to become and stay national of the State will
vanish. Therefore, the use of such obligations (e.g. obligatory taxes) will
make it difficult for the State to achieve large extra income or services
that may be spent on others than those who carried through the obligations
(see Section 7.6.7). Stateless individuals, who have possessed citizenship of
the State as children, ought to receive documents from the State showing that
this country is willing to take delivery of them unconditionally if other
States want to expel them for one or another reason. The only advantages
attached to the citizenship will be the right to vote, more easy and secure
identification documents, help when staying abroad, certain employments in
the Police, judicial system, military defense and State administration ought
to be reserved for nationals of the State, and you will participate in the lot
drawings over non-owned inheritance (see Section 5.1.4). For the single
individual the right to vote is of limited importance
(mouse-piddling-in-the-ocean effect). By the way, the right to vote is no
nature-given right, but a legitimate and rational option in the General
Constitution. Concerning rights on State
property, the following paragraph ought to apply in the General Constitution:
“Everyone who are or have been
nationals of the State shall have the same right to use State property (State
roads included) – eventually against objective payment – to the purpose which
the actual State property is intended unless the actual State property from
its nature only can be used by State employees. None of the individuals
mentioned in the first sentence are to be discriminated on basis of their
ethnic origin, race, political views, philosophical ideas or appearance. The
State may refuse whoever to use State property for right-violating action,
use that the actual property is not intended for, or use which may harm the
property, adjacent properties, other individuals or the reputation of the
property. Usually,
peaceful, law-obedient foreigners, who are not right violators or suspected
for right-violating actions, will have the same rights as mentioned above,
but in extraordinary cases the State may introduce limitations for
foreigners' access to State property, but not if the foreigner already has
acquired a legitimate right to utilize the actual State property.” 5.4.3 Living together with a
contract is an organization Living together with another
person (or several persons) also makes up an organization if they have a
contract on their marriage/cohabitation. Private institutions will naturally
grow up, and some of them will obtain significant social power through
support of large parts of the population. Such private institutions may e.g. be life
style or ethical organizations. These will take over a role in connection with contracts on
marriage/cohabitation. Pure tailor-made juridical contracts for the actual
couple (see Section 5.3) will also be commonly used according to the contractual freedom. If these
contracts are to be named marriage, cohabitation or something else, will be
up to the judgments of these organizations. There will be only in connection
with contract breaches, which the private organizations cannot handle
themselves, that the State needs to intervene with its monopoly of force to
enforce the contract. The State ought not to have any particular matrimonial
law, but the State may offer one or several standard contracts that
voluntarily may be signed by people who want to live together. The
contractual law will regulate such contracts. The term “marriage” will not
exist in the official terminology. For or against gay marriage will not be a
case for public discussion but eventually an internal discussion inside
different organizations. Contracts
of marriage/cohabitation explicitly forbidding divorce will not be enforced
for several reasons: The fact that marriage/cohabitation is an organization implies
that each party has the right to resign (see Section 5.4.1). If two persons
living together break up, it is not a contract breach per se whatever causes
or circumstances being present. The rationale is that when a person breaks
off with another, the causes are very subjective. One breaks off because one
expects to generate significantly more happiness without the partner than
with the partner, and who is the “contract breaker”? Is it the initiator of
the break up, or is it the one failing to make the partner happy? But the
contract of cohabitation/marriage may specify certain things to happen during
living together or at a break up, and in this respect there may be a contract
breach if the contract is not obeyed. 5.4.4 Trade unions If employees wants to be members
of an “undemocratic” trade union governing everything from the top, that is
all right. If this trade union wants to take decisions over strikes through a
little border of 5 persons (or only by the leader), it is an internal case
for the actual trade union. If the members do not like such centralism, they
may resign from the organization or try to make it more democratic. If a
trade union becomes too centralistic it is reasonable to believe that the
members will dislike it over time. The knowledge of this will reduce the
trade union's incitement to be centralistic. If the State was to introduce a
law stating that the members of a trade union only are
allowed to strike if there has been a general referendum among the members,
it would be a violation of the right to
organize.
If
the State by law is to prohibit a business owner to fire striking workers,
apart from those agreements the owner voluntarily has signed, this will be a
violation of the free enterprise.
Both striking workers and lockout-horny employers have to face the
consequences of their stubbornness or indulgence, and the fear of the
consequences will hopefully be so large that the number of strikes is held
relatively low. It is unacceptable that the trade unionists may strike as
much as they desire supported by the authorities refusing business owners to
let the trade unionists face the consequences. We emphasize that it is
right-violating to make laws that force employers to enter into collective
labor agreements with one or more trade unions. Both parties have to
voluntarily enter into such agreements without being exposed to initiation of
force by law or anything else. 5.5 Free enterprise
The consequences of the
nature-given rights of the individual are that individuals or group thereof
has the liberty to start and run companies in a free capitalist society;
something else would violate the individual right to liberty. Companies owned directly or indirectly by
individuals have similar rights as a consequence of the owners' nature-given
right to manage their property and to enter contracts unless voluntary
contracts (constitutions) on something else exist. As stated in Section 5.4,
also the State has the right to be involved (directly or indirectly) in
industry and trade. Since all humans have the same right to free enterprise and general liberty,
the right to free enterprise is
formulated in the following way: “The right to run one's enterprise
as long as one does not violate the similar right of others, other
nature-given rights or their logical consequences”. Expressed this way
the right to free enterprise is a non-violable right completely
without limitations. The
State may impose trade boycott of dictator states as a strategy of “peaceful”
warfare; trading with the dictator state will indirectly violate the
nature-given rights of the suppressed people in that country (see also
Section 7.6.5). Swindle is illegal: A company may not sell a product
containing 60% fat if it is written on the packing that the content of fat is
only 3 % (initiation of psychical force). Companies are of course not allowed
to use physical force or threats thereof in order to prevent their
competitors' access to the market; the similar principle applies for strong
psychical force. The forming of monopolies (in the meaning “company with very
strong market position”) is acceptable when they arise as a consequence of
voluntariness in the market (see also Section 5.5.2). The
State may not refuse the production or sale of sex, alcohol, narcotics,
medicaments or other products (to persons not being under guardianship and
with all senses alert who have been sufficiently informed on possible side
effects – see Section 5.5.4.1) having potential negative effect only on the
user. Drugs, which from its nature can harm other than the user, may be
regulated through the Law (e.g. antibiotics promoting resistant bacteria). 5.5.1 Companies If two or more people own something together,
consensus is required in all decisions concerning the property. The reason for the consensus
principle is that nobody has the right to decide over others property unless
there is a voluntary contract stating otherwise; this is a logical
consequence of the property right.
If consensus is impossible, the co-ownership has first to be virtually
dissolved and the values are distributed individually as ownership shares
according to how much each of them has “contributed to processing the natural
resources away from the natural state into a state of increased usability”.
This is also a logical consequence of the property
right. Then the group, which is largest with respect to shares and which
simultaneously agree internally, has the right to buy out the others at the
estimated market price. If several groups simultaneously are in the first
place regarding size, lots will be drawn. If no one is willing to continue
the co-ownership according to this principle, all assets have to be sold at
market price and the economical outcome will be allocated according to the
fraction of ownership. This break-up and distribution are considered to be
made from a presumptive agreement (see Section 5.3.2.4). The
consensus principle will often be impractical, and it will be suitable to
make a constitution (contract) for the co-ownership that states how to make
binding decisions for its members/co-owners. No particular legislation regulating the
activity of companies will exist, except that they may not violate the
nature-given rights of others. Basically, a company does not have any nature
and it does not possess the ability to perceive happiness/unhappiness. Rights
are deduced from the fundamental nature of an element. The constitution of
the company expresses its nature. Its rights originate in the moment when one
or several humans make a constitution for the company. Company establishers
have a nature-given right to liberty,
and nobody may refuse them to make a constitution for the company as long as
the constitution does not violate others' nature-given rights or logical
consequences thereof, and consequently the company has the right to be run
according to its constitution. We simplify by saying that a company has
rights, but principally it is correct to say that the company acts as if it
has rights since happiness-perceiving establishers/investors have rights
through the contract represented by its constitution. The
constitution is a contract between the different investors of the company,
between the company and its employees, customers, creditors and others having
relationships with the company. The State is obliged to defend its rights
(see Section 7.5, 5.3 and 7.2). A company without a constitution is not
regarded as a legal subject (unless there is one person running an enterprise
in his own name), and each person claiming to represent the company will be
held personal responsible in eventual legal disputes. In
practice the constitution of the company ought to be registered at a State
office and has to be available for the general public. According to the
constitution, the ones contributing with the risk capital do not necessarily
need to be the ones making the decisions. A company establisher may create a
constitution stating that he is to be life-time dictator, but willing
investors may invest in the firm and obtain economical profit according to
the paragraphs in the constitution. Thus, it is not obvious that the company
has owners at all – it all depends on the constitution of the company. The
State, and probably also private certification firms, will make standard
constitutions that ought to be rational for many companies to choose. This is
important in order for customers, creditors, owners/investors, and employees
etc. to easily have survey. 5.5.1.1 The interaction between the company and the
employees The employer and the employee have the
complete freedom to agree on the working conditions. But the more dangerous
and unusual working conditions, the stricter obligations on the employer to
inform about the special conditions, and the heavier burden of evidence on
the employer for proving voluntariness by the employee at the time point of
entering the contract (see Section 5.3.2.2). If an employee suffers a loss and the
employer did not comply with the obligation to inform and/or cannot give
sufficient evidence for contractual voluntariness, the employer may be
inflicted economical compensation or even criminal accusation. If the
obligation to inform is kept and the contractual voluntariness is proven by
the employer, he has no responsibility for the employee. Examples of
requirements on the employer with respect to information and proofs of
voluntariness are given in Section 5.3.2.2 a-e. This will be the worker
protection in a society based on the nature-given
rights of the individual; in addition private and state certification
agencies may rate employers with respect to worker protection (see Section
5.5.4). Peter
is employed by an employer without any specific contract. What kind of rights
do the employee and the employer have in such a case? Let us say that Peter
has worked for one month without any contract. The employer is the buyer of
labor, and Peter is the seller of this “product”. If Peter has never worked
for this employer earlier, the average market price is the guideline (see
Section 5.5.3) – the price which the buyer (employer) realistically could
expect at the time point when the seller (Peter) accepted that the customer
(employer) started the consumption of labor. Peter has to be paid an
approximate average of what is common in the labor market in the actual
geographical and professional area. Peter has no right to continue working in
the company if the employer does not want so. Peter can not claim that
he is about to “consume” employment in the workplace, and that he therefore
has to be allowed to keep on doing so until he is finished with the
consumption (i.e. until retirement). Firstly, the employer is the consumer
(buyer) in this case (should the employer claim that Peter should be serf the
rest of his working life!?). Secondly, an employee may not demand to use the
working place for an indefinite time – in the same way as a friend of Peter,
who stays one month at his place, may not demand to live in Peter's apartment
the rest of his life. In this case it is other parts of the right to
liberty than the contractual freedom that have direct
implications, namely that the employer sovereignly disposes his property
(company) and the employee is the sovereign chief of his body. Peter may be
immediately fired, and he may quit instantly without compensating for any
breach of notice period. 5.5.2 Monopolies A monopoly is here defined as “a
company with very strong market position”. Previously, there were many small
grocery shops. It was relatively inefficient for each shop to make purchases
from the wholesale dealers. The prices were high. Today, many of these small
shops are history, and some large, nationwide supermarket chains have taken
over. If the State had upheld the system with many small, independent shops
with artificial means (e.g. by holding the big ones down), the price level on
groceries would have been higher. If one large grocery chain was to buy up all
the other chains, this large company would have to show price moderation all
the same; otherwise a new competitor would emerge and threaten its monopoly. The
presence of many competing units may
be a waste of resources (with administration, offices etc.). In those cases
where this is correct, capitalism will contain mechanisms ensuring that these
units over time are merged. But the potential negative tendencies in a monopoly structure are balanced by the
monopolist's fear of new competitors to arrive the market. Thus, private
monopolies are not to be regulated; that would be a violation of the right to liberty. Natural monopolies
(regardless of type of ownership) are deemed differently since they are
characterized by de-facto-absence
of fear for new competitors to enter the market (see section 5.5.3), and
thus, the customers may be “trapped” in/of the monopoly if essential products
are involved. 5.5.3 Price settlement The price of a product or a
service is defined by a contract (deal) between the seller and the buyer. A
commodity or service does not have any natural, inherent, objective value. If
a contract (deal) is not present, the applicable principle is the logical
implication from the right to liberty that the one having produced the
product has the property right.
Therefore, the producer/seller may refuse to deliver the product or demand to
get it back if the buyer does not accept his price. But if the
product/service already has been consumed or is under consumption without an
agreement on the price on beforehand, a problem may arise; examples are taxi
tours and café customers drinking caffè latte
without knowing the price on beforehand. Then the price in effect is settled
by a presumptive agreement whose content is estimated by what the customer
realistically could expect at the time point when the seller accepted the consumption
to start (see Section 5.3.2.4). This means that the seller in such cases
cannot legitimately claim payment significantly exceeding the accustomed
price (old customers) or average market price (new customers); to not significantly exceed
average market price means to reside within one standard deviation over
average market price.
If it's a
long time since the old customer had his last purchase, “accustomed price”
has to be adjusted for price increase in this specific product range.
Similarly, the concepts “accustomed conditions” and “average conditions” will
be valid for other important consumer matters without reference to price. The seller may gladly charge a
price that is extreme compared to the average market price or accustomed
price, but this has to be made very clear to the customer on beforehand, and
the more extreme price, the stronger demands have to be imposed on the
seller's information. Let us consider the
situation where a product is under consumption, and where the price is not
agreed on in advance for the entire consumption. Then the seller may
not charge a significantly higher price than the accustomed price or the
average market price even if he gives notice of higher price during
consumption. If the seller is to charge a higher price legitimately, this has
to be done before the seller accepts that the consumer starts the
consumption. Examples of this follows: If you drink a caffè latte
without having agreed on the price in advance, we may imagine that the café host says the
following when you have finished half the glass:
“This caffè latte costs $1,500 per glass. You can pay average market price,
$2, for the half glass that you already have drunk. You may choose whether to
drink the rest of your caffè latte to the price of $750, or leave it at the
table.” In such a case, the café guest may continue to drink the whole glass
to average market price. In order to be legitimate, the extreme price must be
agreed on before the seller accepts that the consumer starts his
consumption. Two months ago a surgeon performed an
operation on a patient, and the price he paid was $1,500. Now, the patient
will have the same operation by the same surgeon once again, but they have
not specifically settled any new price before the new operation. In the
middle of the operation the surgeon says that the price of the operation has
been put up to $1.5 million. Further, he tells his patient that either he
pays the price; otherwise the patient has to leave the hospital with open
abdomen. Of course, in such a case accustomed price ($1,500) applies. A house owner and a tenant enter into a
rent contract where the tenant rents a small apartment for 5 years without
the possibility of termination, but the price is not specifically stated. One
month after moving in (i.e. while the product is under consumption) the house
owner says that the tenant is to pay $150,000 per month in rent. In this case
average market rent applies. A person has saved $150,000 in the bank
on a high interest account during 10 years. In the saving period he is in the
process of using the product “dollars”. Then the FED suddenly prints a
lot of dollars so that the $150,000 in practice only is worth $1,500. This is
a right-violating against the depositor. A currency issuer may legitimately
make an intended hyper-inflation only if it is clearly specified in its
constitution before the currency is introduced (see also Section 5.5.5). A taxi driver is to transport a person
from Oslo to Bergen a winter evening, but the price is not agreed on in
advance. When the taxi is in the middle of Hardangervidda, the taxi driver
claims $150,000 for continuing the trip to Bergen; otherwise the passenger
will be thrown out of the taxi. The taxi trip is under consumption. In such a
case average market price applies to the whole trip, not only for the
distance Oslo - Hardangervidda. Taking such an extreme price is only legitimate
if the price for the whole trip is agreed on in advance, and the cab driver
has extremely strong demands on information about this extremely unusual
price (see also Section 5.3.2.2). Similar principles will apply to
situations where you are “trapped” in/of a natural monopoly: From the time
point when the consumer became customer at the monopolist and until the
customer quits his relationship with the monopolist (or dies) is regarded as
a continuous consume, and therefore, the above mentioned price limitations
applies. Thus, all customers who start a consumption and become “trapped” in
a natural monopoly are to be regarded as “new customers”. Average market
price will have a different meaning since market price is a unreal
concept in a natural monopoly. The prices should be regulated according to
the principle that the monopolist's relative profits is not to be
significantly higher than the average relative profits in the industry being
most similar to the monopolist's industry and where “trapping” market relationships
are absent. This may e.g. be done by regulating the prices so that the
quotient between profits (before repayments and interest) and invested
capital, which is needed for creating the monopolized products, does not
exceed one standard deviation over the similar average quotient in the
comparable, non-monopolized industry. The road net is an example of this, and
is described in Section 6.6.3. 5.5.4 Consumers' rights The consumers will be protected by
the fact that swindle is right-violating. If a new product is sold without
any particular contract, it has to be expected that the product functions for
some years or months depending on the nature of the product via a presumptive
contract (see Section 5.3.2.4). If the product is defect or becomes so rather
soon, the seller/producer has to repair it or give a new, functioning
product. If he refuses, he may be convicted for swindle in a worst case
scenario. Generally, the seller's information obligation towards the customer
is proportionally with the degree of controversy in the product (see Section
5.3.2.2); if this obligation is not fulfilled, the purchase may be completely
or partly cancelled, or the seller has to pay compensation (see Section
5.3.1.1). If
a new product is purchased with a contract explicitly stating that the
product is bought without any obligations for the seller, it is the stupidity
of the buyer if something goes wrong. The buyer has to take all the
consequences himself. The
seller/producer may of course use a contract where they take on more
obligations than what would apply without a specified contract. A system of governmental
certification, but without the option to use force, ought to exist in order
to help the customers. These certification agencies make rational rules for a
group of products, services, companies etc. (e.g. doctors, butchers,
groceries, and blocks of flats). These governmental certification agencies
have an easily recognizable logo. The producer may choose to produce
products/services according to these rules and if so, the producer may put
the agency's logo on the product or claim the certification in other ways.
Then the producer enters a contract with the customers where he guarantees
that the product satisfies the requirements of the rules of the certification
agency (see also Section 5.3.2.5). If the producer uses the logo or claims
the certification without following the rules, he is a swindler and may be
punished by the authorities. If the producer do not want to follow the rules
of the State, that is all right, but then he cannot legally use the agency's
logo or in other ways claim to be certified by them. Presumably, many
customers will be skeptical towards buying products and services without
logo. Private certification firms may also make their rules and similarly,
producers may put the logo of the private certification firms on their
products as a quality proof. Gradually, it is possible that the certification
agencies of the State will be competed out by the private certification firms
if the latter act sufficient trustworthy over time. 5.5.4.1 Buying and selling of drugs Buying and selling of drugs are
basically allowed, but there are some complicating factors. A person has used
narcotic substances for a long time, and has been so addicted and psychically
disturbed that his rationality has decayed to a level where he is no longer
by all senses alert. Thus, he has logically lost (at least parts of) the right
to liberty, and he may be (at least partly) put under guardianship. He
may legally be refused buying narcotic substances, and sellers will not be
allowed to provide him with drugs (in the same way as they are not allowed to
sell drugs to children). Such an addict may also be legally imposed forced
treatment. When
a drug seller offers his products to his customers, he has a duty to inform
them with respect to the drug's side effects (see Section 5.3.2.2). The State
may propose as a legally preapproved standard that the buyer receives
abundant information by a physician (or similar) on the drug's side effects
and this is proven to the seller by a prescription. If the drug user is not
“with all senses alert”, he will not receive such a prescription.
Alternatively, the seller may use his own information, which he believes
fulfils the requirements for valid voluntariness, but then he risks problems
with the judicial system if his information retrospectively is shown to be
substandard compared to the State preapproved standard. The drug buyer may
summon the seller to a court if he claims to have got health problems because
of inferior information. If the court supports his claim, the seller may be legally forced to
pay for rehabilitating the drug user. Inferior informing means that the buyer
takes on significant hazard beyond his informed approval, and this may also
put punishment on the seller (grossly perilous action) even if no injury has
been detected on the buyer. It may not be excluded that a drug can be so
harmful and addictive that the principle of de-facto-prohibition arises. Since narcotic substances
are very special products, they ought not to be sold at places where the
informed approval of the user may be questioned. Thus, the State may specify special outlets
that are guaranteed in advance to be safe for the seller with respect to
reactions from the judicial system in this respect. A
similar principle as here described may apply for non-trivial medicines. 5.5.5 Monetary politics and banking According to the right to liberty, the State may not refuse private companies
(banks) to issue their own money. Therefore, anyone may establish banks and
issue their own money, and the market will decide to what extent the money
will be used as exchange medium. But the State is obliged to prevent fraud.
National Central Banks and some large private banks will probably be issuers
of their own currencies. At least the latter will probably have to back up
their currencies by precious metals (gold, platinum) or already existing
national currencies in order to achieve sufficient confidence in the market
(at least in a very long transitional period). There has to be a design
protection of the design of the different bank notes so competitors cannot
parasitize on generally recognized money issuers by plagiarizing their
design. Private
banks issuing their own currency ought to enter a contract (through its
constitution) in their self-interest with the money users on the principles
for the bank's business activity, including the growth in the money supply.
This may be done by certification firms making standard contracts which the
banks voluntarily may use as constitutions (see Section 5.3.2.5). Banks
operating abnormal, but legitimate, business activity must have
correspondingly strong demands on how they inform their customers on these
peculiarities. If the constitution is broken, it is swindling and harsh
punishment may be expected from the judicial system. If the constitution
(statutes) does not say anything else, the currency may not be inflated
significantly more than what the customers are used to; if the currency is
newly-established, the inflation cannot be significantly larger than what is
normal for commonly used currencies (see Section 5.5.3). If the currency
legitimately is to be consciously and extensively inflated beyond this, the
option for this has to be clearly stated in the constitution before the currency is introduced in
the market for the first time. Currencies that have
been compulsory tender or that have been monopolistic by law (or these
currencies' successors) may legitimately never have an increase in the money
supply beyond the real increase in GDP (see also Section 10.7.4.1). Banks
may receive deposits and lend out money without any State regulations, but
have to accept the rules of the money issuer (unless the bank issues its own
currency) and that swindling may not occur. Banks that want to engage in
deposit and loan activity with the State run currency have to accept the
money issuer's (i.e. the State through the National Central Bank) rules that
protrude from the explicit or presumptive statutes that underlie the
currency. In a system with free currency enterprise, the State will not be
able to implement any “dictatorship” in this respect. The
State and the Central Bank should manage the monetary policy targeting stable
production-adjusted money supply, and not by the desire to keep the consumer
price index at a specified, low level or stable exchange rates. Thus, the
State ought to pursue the growth in the money supply to match the annual
increase in the real gross domestic product. Then the national currency will
be competitive against private currencies backed by gold.
Section 10.7
describes in more detail how Rational Gaudist banking and monetary politics
may be designed. 5.5.5.1 Bankruptcy In the event of a bankruptcy, one has taken
on obligations that one is unable to meet. According to 5.3.1, the
responsible ones are not right violators if the creditors are given
the compensation imposed by the judicial system. This compensation is the
settlement of the bankruptcy estate and its distribution to the creditors.
The debtor has hopefully learnt a lesson, while the claimants will regain at
least some of their money and are stimulated for better risk management in the
future. On the other hand, it will be a right violation if someone has
speculated to go bankrupt or has hidden funds for the bankruptcy estate; in
such cases, the State should impose additional penalty on those responsible
discouraging the repeating of similar rights violations. 5.5.6 Building permits The constructor ought to
voluntarily send a request, including the signatures of the neighbors, to a
court office. In the request, he describes what he plans to build. The
constructor hopes that the court office will say that the new construction
will not violate the (near and distant) neighbors' lives or properties. If
so, he may safely build; in the opposite case he may not build. If the latter
becomes the judicial result, the constructor may start negotiations with the
potential violated parties and offer them economic compensation stimulating
them to renounce their rights; then local people may obtain significant
profits since “the sky is the limit” – e.g. when companies are to establish
oil fields or mining. If
he carry through with the construction without applying for building permit,
it is possible that one or more neighbors mean that the consequences of the
new construction violate their lives, liberty or properties. They may take the
case to the court, and as a worst case scenario the court may order the new
building to be torn down and in addition the court may impose compensation
upon the builder. The
fear for these unpleasant economical consequences will “stimulate” the
builder to go to the court office in advance; then he is guaranteed to avoid
tearing down his construction. He should also ensure that the infrastructure
(electricity, water, sewage etc.), which the building is dependent upon, can
be delivered by the owner of this infrastructure. 5.5.7 Enterprising activity
and work for foreigners Foreign companies and individuals
have the same nature-given rights as the nationals of the State, and the State
is obliged to defend their rights on all territory belonging to the State's
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the State has basically the right to refuse
foreigners the use of State property (see last part of Section 5.4.2 and
6.6.3), which includes car driving on public roads. The foreigners have
(probably) acquired the right to use the road system that their real estate
in their home country is connected to, but this is not owned by the State of the new country. However, by purchasing
or renting, fixed or temporarily, a home in another country the right “attached to
the road network” (see section 6.6.3) automatically follows, since the
right was attached to the residence, hotel room or equivalent already before
the purchase/renting. The same applies if the foreigner owns or is employed
by a domestic company. In this way, foreigners will acquire the right to use
the road network. Thus, it will only be only foreigners who do not have such
ownership or rent before entry who can (not “have to”) be given road refusal.
This means that foreigners may normally use the road network in the same way
as nationals of the State (i.e. by paying road fee). Access to the realm
still requires that the foreign national meets the criteria in Section
6.4.1-2, that he is law-abiding, and that he can support himself or has
credible, legally binding support by others (see Section 6.4) for the period
during which the stay will last. Restrictions
on foreign companies operating domestically can be imposed if their profits
help to finance right violations in their home country or elsewhere (e.g. a
North Korean company contributing taxes or profits to the Kim dictatorship,
which in turn use the money for building prison camps). 5.6 Freedom of speech
This is an obvious right arriving
as a consequence of the right to
liberty. But freedom of speech
also follows as a consequence of the fact that the State wants to use HDM in
order to create the best possible politics in those areas where the State
legitimately may function. Since
all humans have the same freedom of
speech and the same right to
liberty in general, this right is expressed in the following way: “The right to express one's opinion as long as the one does not
violate the similar right of others, other nature-given rights or their
logical consequences.” Expressed in this way the freedom of speech is a non-violable right completely without
limitations. But one question arises: How can expressing one's opinion
violate the freedom of speech of
other people or other nature-given rights? The freedom of speech means that one may not express one's
opinion with the use of physical or strong psychical force (including swindle,
threats of physical force, soliciting right-violating actions in a situation
where the solicitation may be expected to be pursued). Examples of this follows: Defamation means exposing another
person for public contempt that is not based on public concerns, and this is
right-violating since it is initiation of psychical force; the defamed person is
inflicted damage on his “good name and reputation” (others may make more
negative decisions concerning him on a wrong basis), and he is forced to make substantial efforts if it is
to be restored. The
defamator wants to achieve gains by putting down another person – not by
exchanging value tools against value tools. Defamation may also mean theft of
self-confidence. If
the content of the defamation can be proven and also is located outside the
boundaries of privacy, it is not right-violating. Contempt directed against a group of individuals (e.g. a race, ethnic group, class, sex, sexual orientation) is to be considered as collective defamation, and thus right-violating if the present situation indicates that the contempt may be expected to contribute to incorrectly based negative reactions from parts of the population against this group. Since defaming one person is right-violating, defaming many individuals may be even more right-violating. On the other hand, it cannot be significantly right-violating to collectively slander 5 million human beings in the presence of the same 5 millions, because no person exists from whom the slandered need to redeem their “good name and reputation”. Contrarily, a subgroup of one hundred thousand slandered individuals within a group of 5 million human beings have potentially 4.9 million humans from whom they need to redeem their “good name and reputation”. Therefore, collective defamations are especially serious if directed against significant minority groups. This is illustrated in the figure below: Figure
2:
However, it is collective
defamation of individuals that is
to be regarded as right-violating; defaming an ideology, philosophy, cultural
element, or religion may never be right-violating. Claiming Islam to be shit
is not right-violating. Claiming
all humans from Islam-dominated countries to be shit is right-violating. Racist statements may be right
violating, and Nazi groups strongly focusing on racism may be forbidden. If a
Nazi claims Jews to be subhuman swine that ought to be collectively gassed to
death, it is considered to be a collective defamation and thereby
right-violating. It
is a defamation to publicly claim that a person or groups of such are criminals
without having a rational basis for this claim. In this way it may be a
defamation to publicly support official or private use of force against
groups of individuals on the basis of actions that obviously are not right-violating. This may apply to
conservative / radical Islamists publicly claiming support for death
punishment for homosexual practice or defection from Islam or whipping of
women who shake hands with men – wherever in the world the support is directed. The former is
approximately the same as saying that Jews are so terrible subhumans that
they deserve to be killed in a gas chamber. Collective defamations are also
committed by religious fanatics who publicly claim that non-believers deserve
to be burnt in Hell for all eternity as their skin constantly are being
renewed in order to make the pain constant at its maximum. Such Islamists
have to reinterpret Islam if they still want to preach their religion outside
the prison cell. If
a Nazi party works actively (e.g. in the National Assembly) in the pursuit of
getting such politics carried out, it is planning and solicitation of
right-violating actions, and that is also illegitimate. If a person
knows or ought to know that Holocaust did happen, but denies this in order to
achieve gains (political or other kind) at the expense of others, it is to be
considered as swindle and is therefore right-violating. If an ignorant “poor soul” really believes that Holocaust did
not occur, and expresses this claim, he needs to be enlightened and not
punished. Similarly, e.g. preachers who seriously claim traditional existence
of God, Paradise or Hell may be accused of swindle if the believers are
imposed losses or burdens – or danger thereof – by believing the delusions.
Circumcising small and healthy children by reference to “God” is child abuse
and is obviously right-violating. Threats of eternal torture in Hell are
considered more severe child abuse than non-executed threats to kill
disobedient children. Based on the property right or the freedom
to organize the owners or executive staff of companies, restaurants,
organizations, etc. may hire, enroll or accept employees, customers or
members as they like, and similarly, they may exclude groups of certain
persons (i.e. discrimination in itself is legitimate). But when they
(eventually) provide a justification for such inclusions or exclusions, it
may not contain individual or collective defamation. To give away military secrets or
other secrets of the State is not in accordance with the freedom of speech, and the reason is as follows: Such secrets
have necessarily originated from an employee in the Ministry of Defense or in
the military. His contract of employment with the State ought to emphasize
that he is not to give away secret information. An employee, who mediates
such secrets to (for instance) a journalist, gives away or sells information
to which he does not possess the property
right. The journalist receives or buys information that he knows (or
ought to know) does not originate from its legitimate owner, and accordingly
he commits a receipt of stolen property. The State employee commits a
contract breach. Similar considerations are valid for leakage of business
secrets from private firms. Nobody has the right to use others' property as a
tool or medium for expressing his opinions without the consent of the owner.
A person may not command a newspaper or TV station to distribute his opinions
if the owner, through his editor-in-chief, does not want to do so. 5.7 Which
nature-given rights are the most important ones?
All nature-given rights mentioned
in chapter 4 and 5 (and all logical consequences thereof that is not directly
mentioned) are absolutely non-violable. A person, company or the State does not
possess the right to violate the rights of others (see Section 4.1.1) by
referring to his right X being more important than right Y of others. An
individual may not be totally or partly deprived of a nature-given right with
the justification that many other individuals will profit from violating it.
The rights of an individual are not to be weighed up against the
rights of another individual. Rights are rigid, objective and absolute, and
all legitimacy is based on not violating already
achieved or directly inborn rights (see the introduction to chapter 4);
this applies even if other people believe that the already existing right has
little importance. Remaining passively to other humans or other elements will
never be right-violating unless you on beforehand voluntarily have committed
to something else or if yourself or your property poses a danger to them. When evaluating whether an action
is right-violating or not, we have to examine if any rights are attached to
the object to which the initial action is directed at the time point when the
action is performed (exceptions exist when the performer of action is a
non-owned element belonging to the concept “nature”). The claimed needs by performer of action are
irrelevant for evaluating if the action is right-violating, unless such needs
are included in the attached rights mentioned above. The fact that the rights
of others are not to be violated is included in the definition of “the right to liberty” and other rights.
Therefore, you ought not to say: “the right to liberty as long as you do not violate the similar right
of others”. The correct expression is simply: “the right to liberty”. Sometimes it is crystal clear that an action violates the rights of
others. In other cases this may be more difficult to establish, and then the
legislature or the judicial system according to the best possible evaluation
have to set as objective standards as possible for the limitations of right
violations. The State does not have the
right to confiscate a little property (e.g. through compulsory taxation) in
order to help a poor person so he can survive with the argument that the poor
man's right to life is more
important than the rich man's property
right. The property right is already established
at the time point when the poor person (through the State) makes his claim on
the funds, and it is the status of rights (here: the property right to the funds) of the object to which the initial
action – or claim for action – is directed, which determines if a right
violation is present – not the needs and wishes of the one making the claim
for action against the object. A trade union may not violate the right to free enterprise / property right of the employer by forcing him to hire trade unionists
by referring to the right to organize
being more important than the right to
free enterprise and the property right. The property right and right to free enterprise to the
factory are already established at the time point when the trade union makes
its claim that unionists are to be employed, and it is the status of rights
(here: the property right and right to free enterprise to the
factory) of the object to which the initial action – or claim for action – is
directed, which determines if a right violation is present – not the needs
and wishes of the one making the claim for action against the object. If the
factory owner prior to this time point voluntarily had entered a contract
with the trade union on hiring its members, the company would have been
committed to hire its members (the contract is “attached” to the company). A person may not refer to the freedom of speech and thereby force a
newspaper to print his opinions; that would be a violation of the right to free enterprise / property right of the newspaper owner. The property right and right to
free enterprise to the newspaper company are already established at the
time point when the person makes his claim on getting his opinions published,
and it is the status of rights (here: the property
right and right to free enterprise to
the newspaper company) of the object to which the initial action – or claim
for action – is directed, which determines if a right violation is present –
not the needs and wishes of the one making the claim for action against the
object. A farmer may not hold chickens in
a cage of 10 x 10 cm by referring to his property
right being more important than the chickens' right to follow their
fundamental instincts. The chicken's right
to follow its fundamental instincts is directly inherent in the chicken
at the time point when the farmer establishes his property right to the chicken (even if he owns both the hen, the
cock and the egg prior to the chicken's existence), and it is the status of
rights (here: the chicken's right to
follow its fundamental instincts) of the object to which the initial
action – or claim for action – is directed, which determines if the farmer's
action is right-violating – not the needs and wishes of the farmer carrying
out the action. A plantation owner may not hold
slaves by referring to the property
right being more important than the individuals' right to liberty. The potential slave's right to liberty is directly inherent in this individual at the
time point when the plantation owner's requests to have the person enslaved,
and it is the status of rights (here: the right
to liberty) of the object (here: the potential slave) to which the
initial action – or claim for action – is directed, which determines if a
right violation is present – not the needs and wishes of the plantation owner
making the claim for action against the object. The employees in a factory may not
hold the employer as an economical “slave” with the argumentation that the
right to income for the employees is more important than the employer's property right and right to free enterprise. The property right and right to
free enterprise to the factory are already established at the time point
when the employees make their claim on life-long employment even if the
factory owner loses money en mass (it is presupposed that the factory owner
did not enter a voluntary, binding contract prior to this time point
matching the employees' claims). It is the status of rights (here: the
property right and right to free enterprise) of the
object to which the initial action – or claim for action – is directed, which
determines if a right violation is present – not the needs and wishes of
those making the claim for action against the object. In the examples above it is not
the tax payer, factory owner, newspaper owner or potential slave who
initially has directed action (or claims for action) against their respective
counterparties. Their only claim on their counterparties is to have
themselves, their property or right to use in peace, which is the only
legitimate claim anyone has against other human beings unless they on
beforehand voluntarily have accepted otherwise (explicitly or implicitly).
The chicken has a legitimate claim against the peasant on having its
fundamental instincts in peace.
The right to liberty
includes or implies contractual freedom, property right, right to use,
right to free enterprise, right to organize, freedom of speech, right to life
and other freedom. One part of each of the six first rights is used to
sustain life (which secondarily is a prerequisite for generating
self-happiness). These rights are partly a fraction of the right to life.
The rest of each of these six rights is used for generating happiness without
directly contributing to sustaining life. The right to pursuit of happiness is in practice equivalent with the right to liberty since the adult human
being's only means for creating happiness is to use his freedom to choose to perform
alternatives of action (unless the consciousness is coupled to a computer
passively feeding it with input of happiness and simultaneously paralyzing
the will). 5.7.1
Nature-given rights on other person's property On another person's property no
other than the owner has rights, unless the owner voluntarily has entered
into a contract on something else (see Section 5.3). No other than the owner
has the right to stay on or dispose his property, and consequently no others
have the right to live, to speak, to organize or to perform actions on the
owner's property. Person
B may allow person A to enter his property by signing a contract where the
preconditions for the stay are specified (rights, obligations, duration
etc.). If person A has
received a non-specific permit to enter person B's property, person A may,
whenever he likes, leave the property (without risking judicial reprisals)
whatever orders person B gives. If they have signed a contract stating that A
may not freely leave B's property, B may still not physically prevent A from
leaving the property, but A may later on be juridical liable to make
compensation for the contract breach. B may, whenever he likes and
independent of reason, tell A to get off his property unless A and B has
agreed on something else in a contract, but in this process A has to get
reasonable time to move off the property. If
A is permitted to stay on B's property, and A carries out an action on B's
property that would not have been right-violating if it had been carried out
on non-owned area, the action is neither to be regarded as right-violating
when it is carried out on B's property unless B has told A that he does not
accept that kind of action on his property. B
may not violate A's nature-given rights while A is located on B's property
with the argument that “I do as I please on my own property”. If B
legitimately is to use those means against A which otherwise are used for
violating rights, i.e. initiation of physical or psychical force (see Section
4.1.1), this has to be agreed on in a contract before A enters B's property
or by A voluntarily signing a similar contract after having entered B's
property in a process where A has the opportunity (and sufficient time) to
get off B's property before the contract is accepted. The type of physical or
psychical force being accepted ought to be specified in the contract, and
ought not to be a non-specific acceptance of force since the demands for
proof of voluntariness (see Section 5.3.2.1) when accepting a contract will
vary with the contract's degree of limitation of the nature-given liberty. If
B carries out an action against A that elsewhere would have been
right-violating, but which is agreed on in the contract, B may not be
punished for this. Besides, A may whenever he likes abolish contracts on
accepting initiation of physical or psychical force by moving off B's
property without any risk of judicial consequences, and in that process he
has to get reasonable amount of time to leave the property without being
exposed to such force counted from the time point when A tells B that he no
longer accepts such force (see also Section 10.4.2). If B still uses force
against A after this time point, B may be punished. The reason for A's unlimited
opportunity to abolish contracts on acceptance of force is that otherwise
would mean acceptance of compulsion, which is self-contradictory. Basically, noxious environment at
the working place is right-violating, but not if the employee has accepted
this in a contract. Basically, initiation of scolding is right-violating, but
not if an employee or cohabitant has accepted this in a contract. Basically,
being knocked down is right-violating, but not if this is contractually
agreed on for a boxing ring. If an owner's dog bites a person in the butt, it
is basically a right violation from the owner but not if the owner has told
the other person in a sufficient manner that an angry dog stays on his
property. Playing very loud music at night so the neighbors cannot sleep is
basically right-violating (you have the right
to use to the night for sleeping) but not if the constitution of the
housing co-operative states that such music playing is allowed. We could
perhaps say that passive tobacco smoking is right-violating, but not if the owner
of the restaurant informs his customers in a sufficient manner that smoking
is allowed in the room. The
establishing of what is to be counted as right violations is to a certain
extent a matter of discussion (specifies in the Law and practice of justice)
because a little bit of an action may not be right-violating while much of
the same type of action may be right-violating. Whether it is right-violating
by the restaurant owner to allow smoking in a restaurant without having
informed the customers about this may be discussed, but letting mustard gas
into the restaurant is obviously right-violating. 6. Fundamental politics on essential areas
6.1 Crimes and punishment
6.1.1 Liberty-restricting
punishment The right to liberty may be
expressed in the following way: “the right to do as you like as long as
you do not violate the similar right of others, other nature-given rights or logical
consequences thereof”. A logical consequence of this is that if a person
violates the liberty of others, he has no longer this complete right to
liberty. Therefore, the State has the right to limit this person's
freedom e.g. by putting him in jail or into psychical custody if psychical
sickness was a strong predisposing determinant for the criminal action. The
point is not that the State is to revenge the crime, but that his absolute right to liberty logically ceases.
According to Section 3.6.1 and 4.4, it is the task of the State to ensure
that his liberty is limited in such a way that the crimes cannot continue. When a person commits a crime, his
full right to liberty logically
ceases. But to what extent does the
right to liberty cease? The duration
of the punishment is not obvious. The principle has to be that the criminal is to be prevented from
committing crimes while being in prison or similar, and the punishment should
make him think better in order to reduce the probability of reiteration after
the release as much as possible. A loss of liberty exceeding this principle is basically
right-violating against the criminal. A loss of liberty which is less than
this is basically right-violating against the potential victim. When it is
generally known that criminals receive punishment, a deterring effect is
imposed on potential criminals (general preventive effect). When evaluating the risk of
reiteration, one has to consider i.a. if the personal qualities, which
underlie the action, imply risk of recurrence. However, if the probability of reiteration of a criminal action is
equal to zero, the criminal action is not to be punished since punishment
with the purpose of achieving general preventive effect is
not acceptable. The general preventive effect has to arrive as a side
effect of imprisoning the thug for preventing him from
committing new crimes. The fear of punishment from the authorities against
criminal actions will strongly contribute to make such actions immoral and
thereby to reduce the probability for their performance. In addition to the
punishment the criminal may be forced to pay compensation to his victims. It is right-violating to perform
activity which, alone or as a participant in a sum (see Section
4.1.1), inflicts other human beings fear by having significant danger of
manifesting into physical right violations even if such violations do not
appear in practice, but only if the danger (i.e. the severity of the
manifestation multiplied with the probability of occurrence) provably exceeds
a judicially estimated threshold (significantly perilous); see also Section
4.1.1, part 2, iii. A person acting threshold-exceeding dangerously in such
respects may be accused of right violation. Activity,
which is not a call for right-violating action but which others may be
affected by to carry out physical right violations, is not right-violating. “Well-founded fear” means that it has
to be a clear logical link between the essence of the activity and the
potential manifestation of physical right violations. When a person acts significantly dangerously, but
without manifestation, there is high probability of reiteration of actions with the similar
degree of danger. One of the next times the hazardousness will be converted
to real damage with high probability. Such dangerous actions will create
well-founded fear for manifestation of physical right violations, and thereby
the daredevil initiates psychical force against (parts of) the population. In order to stop the well-founded
fear and to prevent physical damage, the daredevil might be taken care of by
the authorities, but not if he is by all senses alert and only exposes
himself for danger. The rationale for punishing a criminal who has inflicted
real physical damage on life, health or property, is the danger of
reiteration as mentioned above. Thus, the danger of reiteration may also
justify punishment for a person who “only” acts significantly dangerously; the probability for the latter
type of person to cause real physical damage in the future may be as high as
the probability for a manifested vandalist or violent criminal to reiterate
his damaging actions. Some right-violating actions have
by nature so low degree of severity that it would overload the juridical
system if they were to be punished as single actions. This applies e.g. to initiation of
low degree psychical force. In such cases it cannot be excluded that the
offended person legitimately may retaliate with means that had been
right-violating and punishable if the means had been used for initiation of
force. If the initiator escalates the conflict further, the threshold for criminality may be surpassed. If such
right-violating actions with low degree of severity are repeatedly
reiterated, they may give the basis for juridical punishment on their
own. The reality has a predisposing
determining effect on the individual's choices of action (see Section 2.5.4)
and therefore, it is not always fair to say that the cause behind a criminal
action only rests upon the criminal; sometimes, parts of the cause has to be
assigned other human beings and coincidences. At the first glance, it could
seem rational to reduce the punishment of the criminal. But the punishment is
not to be revenge proportional to the blame of the criminal. A person
may have low IQ because of genetic factors and therefore, he may be
predisposed for bad thinking and thereby performing criminal actions. But the
person's low IQ is not the fault of the potential victims, and the low IQ does
not reduce the probability of reiteration; on the contrary. Therefore, the
liberty of the criminal has to be restrained, and the punishment is to help
him (and others) to think better in the direction of not violating other
persons' nature-given rights in the future, and additionally, he will be
physically prevented from performing criminal actions while his liberty is
restrained. When a serious crime has been
committed, we normally have to assume that there is a risk of reiteration of
a crime with similar degree of seriousness. It is even more important to prevent a serious crime than a less
serious one and therefore, the punishment's loss of freedom ought to be larger the more serious the crime is. In
this respect the punishment ought to be proportional both with the degree of
seriousness of the crime and the risk of reiteration, but the punishment is
not to be measured out according to the revenge principle “an eye for an eye,
a tooth for a tooth”. Revenge is an unacceptable reason for measuring
out the punishment. Prisoners ought to work under atonement in order to
reduce the fiscal burden of running a prison. It is reasonable that the
criminals are given chances to improve their behavior, but it has to be
certain limits. When a person obtains his first conviction for having
performed a criminal action, he ought to be sentenced to an imprisonment of
normal length. But if a person obtains reiterated convictions for criminal
actions exceeding a certain degree of seriousness, the State ought to say
that enough is enough. He has shown that he does not possess the ability to
use his liberty with dignity, and he ought to be sentenced to significantly
longer imprisonment. This will keep criminal elements away from the streets
in addition to having a general preventive effect. The principle for punishment ought
to be: Use the most civilized method of punishment that achieves the purpose
of the punishment (the purpose is to prevent the criminal from committing
crimes in the future, but a positive side effect is that potential criminals
are deterred from committing crimes). 6.1.2 Death penalty A person has the right to
liberty which includes the statement: “as long as he does not violate the
nature-given rights of others”. If a person murders another human being, the
murderer has used his liberty to violate another human life, and it follows
logically that he does not any longer have the complete right to liberty. But it does not follow logically that the
murderer is to lose his life. The murderer uses his liberty to kill, the
thief uses his liberty to steel, and the pyromaniac uses his liberty to
violate another man's property. In all cases it is right-violating use of
liberty and therefore, it is the liberty that has to be limited. Of course
you will limit (eliminate) the murderer's freedom by death penalty, but
according to the statements in Section 6.1.1, death penalty is
right-violating since it limits the liberty of the criminal more than what is
necessary for preventing reiteration (preventing his future crimes can always
be achieved by less loss of freedom – maximum real life time sentence). The
death penalty is not to be a part of the judicial system since we can achieve
the purpose (to restrict the liberty of the murderer) in a significantly more
civilized way by imprisoning him. The
death penalty is only actual as an extreme exception in a chaotic anarchy or
war where the situation in practice makes it impossible to physically hold a
dangerous murderer locked up in jail. The risk of
escaping from prison because of war, civil war, anarchy etc. will legitimize
death penalty or converting already sentenced imprisonment to death penalty. Death
punishment may also be an option for dangerous criminals in situations where
all other options for liberty-restricting
punishment involve unacceptable third-party damages (see Section 7.6.1.1).
The death penalty may also be an option if the convicted murderer asks for
this punishment in replacement for long imprisonment. But in this case it has
to be proven that this really is his rational wish, and that he does not ask
for death penalty as a mentally deranged person. But you do not need to have
a legislation that gives killers the opportunity to choose the death penalty
instead of long prison sentence – a convicted criminal has no nature-given
right to decide his own punishment. 6.1.3 Torture and uncivilized
punishments In the section on the animals'
rights it was established that torture of animals in human custody is
right-violating. Animals do not have any “right to liberty”, and therefore, a criminal can not have less right
to liberty than an animal. Accordingly, torture of human prisoners also
has to be right-violating. Besides, it does not serve the purpose since
torture may lead to false confessions and information. A suspect shall not be
exposed for physical or psychical violence. All interrogations ought to be
carried through with rational argumentation only. The use of force is
acceptable only if the prisoner himself uses physical or psychical violence (e.g.
handcuffing him and guiding him back to his cell). It
is right-violating to amputate the hand of a thief as punishment for burglary
because it is possible to achieve the purpose with the punishment in a less
freedom-limiting way. It may be achieved significantly more civilized by
locking up the burglar in jail for an appropriate period of time. 6.1.4 Evidences in criminal
cases When a person is charged for a
criminal action, the principle of today is that his guilt has to be proven
“beyond all reasonable doubt”. But what is “reasonable doubt”? According to
jurists, the judicial system has to be 98-99 % certain in order to be “beyond
all reasonable doubt” (Dybedahl, 2003).
Regarding “beyond all reasonable doubt” as the principle of choice, we realistically
have to expect and accept that approximately each 100th convicted person is innocent
according to the charge. But by using the principle “beyond all reasonable
doubt” many guilty persons will not be imprisoned. Realistically, we have to
expect that several respectable citizens are exposed to crimes as a
consequence of this. If we were to operate with absolute 100.000 % (beyond
all theoretical doubt), nobody could be
convicted, and many right-violating actions would be committed as a
consequence thereof. The principle has to be that the accused may be punished
if his guilt has been proven with a certainty exceeding a specified limit,
and it is not self-evident that this limit is at 98-99 %. The Rational Gaudist principle is
that when a person is accused of a crime, his guilt has to be proven “beyond
rational doubt” where this principle of justice is defined in the following
way: A) Consider the degree of
seriousness of all criminal actions that are committed as a consequence of
guilty persons being released and committing new crimes, and summing up these
degrees of seriousness. B) Consider the degree of
seriousness of all right violations arising as a consequence of innocent
persons being imprisoned, and summing up these degrees of seriousness. The principle is that the sum A +
B is to be minimized, but the guilt of the accused has at least to be proven
beyond predominantly probability (> 50 %); otherwise several persons can
paradoxically be convicted for a crime that only has been committed by one
person. It is not obvious at which certainty percent we achieve the lowest
value of A + B. This has to be settled by HDM, and may depend on the type of
crime; the average will perhaps be in the interval of 93-96 %. If a person
has been innocently convicted but is acquitted at a later time point, he
ought to get economical compensation from the State. Let us consider a person who has
been charged for three crimes independently of each other. It has been proven
as 80 % probable that he is the thug for each of the three cases. Thus, he
cannot be sentenced for any of these crimes alone. But it is 99.2 % probable
that he has committed at least one of the crimes. Even if 80 % probability is
too thin basis for conviction, 99.2 % is enough. Therefore, the person may be
given a sentence that is in accordance with the penalty for the least serious
crime. Lie detector test ought to be used
as a valid element in a chain of indicia as the basis for a conviction. The
background is scientific proofs showing that such tests have an accuracy of
97 %. If the suspect refuses to take the test, it will be an indication of
his guilt. Dybedahl N. Beviskrav i sivile saker. Paragrafen.no.
(2003), 7. april, id 148 6.1.5
Surveillance, search warrants, interrogation, and Police custody If the State is to use force
legitimately against an individual in cases covered by the caption of this
section, the same criteria as mentioned in Section 6.1.4 have to be
satisfied: The sum A + B has to reach its minimum, and at least it has to be predominantly
probable that the individual carries out or has carried out a right-violating
action. The level of certainty at which the minimal value of A + B is reached
will be significantly lower here than in Section 6.1.4 since those right
violations which weak erroneous use of force (surveillance, search warrants,
interrogation and Police custody) implies, is much softer than those implied
by the use of strong erroneous force (sentence to prison). Therefore, it is
usually assumed that it is sufficient that the power of evidence exceeds
predominant probability when considering surveillance, search warrants,
interrogation and Police custody. According to the property right, an owner of a property
has the right to survey his property as he likes, but he has to inform the
users of his property that surveillance occurs since such surveillance would
have been illegal on non-owned area. Thus, also the State may unrestrictedly
survey its property (roads, streets, squares). The
State's right to survey private property is more limited. A private owner of
a property may not use or allow others to use his property for
right-violating actions. If it is predominantly probable that e.g. a street,
telephone number, telephone net, emails, email server or chat channel is used
for right-violating actions, the Police may obtain a court ruling for
surveying these properties without permission from the owner. If the owner
was to reject such surveillance, it would mean that he allowed use of his
property for right-violating actions, and that is right-violating. If it is
not predominantly probable that the private property is used for
right-violating activity, the property may not be surveyed without the permission of the owner. If it is predominantly probable
that there are stolen goods or other right-violating things on a person's
property, the Police may get a search warrant. This is justified because
refusing such Police search would mean that the owner uses or accepts the use
of his property for right-violating activity. If the Police have
significantly more failures than successes with their search warrants, it
indicates that the search warrant practice is too liberal. Imagine a person being suspected
for a right-violating action, but he is not suspected so strongly that it is
predominantly probable that he has committed the crime. The Police may
politely ask him to please meet at the Police station for an interrogation.
If the person refuses, this may increase the suspicion against him so much
that it becomes predominantly probable that he has committed the
right-violating action. If so, the Police may take him in by force for an
interrogation. The
authorities may not call in
witnesses by force for Police interrogation or for testimony in the court.
This has to occur voluntarily since they are not suspected for having
committed any right-violating actions. Police custody may only be used if
it is predominantly probable (probable cause) that the suspected has
committed a right-violating action and the danger of escape, loss of evidence
or reiteration is significant. If the prisoner later on is acquitted, he
ought to get compensation. If the prisoner later on is acquitted, he ought to get compensation. Summoning persons by force for
serving in a court or a jury is right-violating since they have not initiated
force against anyone. Volunteers could be summoned, but questions over guilt
and punishment ought to be reserved for professional judges. 6.2
Self-defense of nature-given rights
All individuals possess the right to pursuit
of happiness, to liberty and life and all logical consequences thereof. The
State is obliged to defend these rights. If a violent criminal breaks into
your house and hits you down, there should idealistically have been a
policeman near your house to stop him before you were beaten up. But in
practice it is difficult to have a so effective Police that all right
violations are eliminated. Basically,
a potential brute has the right to do
as he pleases as long as he does not violate the similar right of others,
logical consequences thereof or other nature-given rights (i.e. the right to liberty). In the very moment
he tries to violate the rights of others, his unlimited right to liberty logically vanishes, and to an extent that
equalizes what is necessary to prevent his right violations. The individual
has the right to perform those actions being necessary for sustaining life (right to life). If a criminal tries to
kill you, you have a nature-given right to perform those actions being
necessary to ensure your own survival, i.e. you have the right to
self-defense. But you do not have the right to deliberately violate the right to liberty of third-parties
since they have not performed any actions implying a fading of their right to liberty or life. If an action
of self-defense against the criminal is performed optimally for preventing
collateral damage, but nevertheless causes injury upon life, health or
property of others, the responsibility is resting upon the criminal and not
upon the defendant. If the act of self-defense involves exaggerated use of
force leading to clearly unnecessary and serious consequences for third
parties, the self-defendant and the aggressor have to share the
responsibility for the collateral damages. However, force may be legitimately
used in self-defense directly against the tools used by a crook (a
totalitarian state included), even if the “tools” are human beings of “flesh
and blood” and in the same manner as if the force was directed against the
crook. You may also not use unlimited
force in self-defense directly against a crook even if high degree of force
is the only way of stopping the right violation. If a youth steels some candy
from a shop, the shop owner may not shoot the thief running out of the shop
even if this is the only way of stopping him. If so, the thief is imposed
death punishment or uncivilized punishment in the form of life-lasting
handicap. In such a case the shop owner has to let the thief run away and ask
the Police to catch him later on. The principle is that self-defense may not
be exercised in such a way that the right-violator is inflicted exaggerated
disproportional consequences compared to the degree of severity of the right
violation; e.g. death, mutilation or infliction of life-lasting handicaps may
never be used for self-defense (see Section 6.1.2 and 6.1.3) unless it is
necessary to avoid death, mutilation, ruin, enslavement, physical/psychical
handicapping etc. The individual has the right to
self-defense, but has not the right to acquire or carry weapons that impose
other human beings with real danger of exaggerated third party damages (or
exaggerated damages on the criminals) and the well-founded fear following
thereof. You do not have the right to reduce your fear of right violations by
preparing self-defense in such a way that you impose other people with even
larger fear of right violations via danger of exaggerated third party damages
and retaliation damages (cf. Section 6.1.1). Keeping nuclear rockets in private gardens
will obviously be potentially extremely dangerous for life, health and
property; it will function threateningly and will hurt people's psychical
health. Additionally, private nuclear arms will undermine the State monopoly
on its obligatory tasks (see Section 4.4). Considering the necessity of this
monopoly, weapons of war ought to be exclusively kept by the State's military
forces. Keeping a
bread knife in the kitchen cannot be regarded as a threat of
exaggerated third party damages or retaliation damages creating fear and
hurting people's psychical health. If weapon
freaks were to walk on the street with bazookas on their shoulders, it would
obviously impose real danger of exaggerated collateral and retaliation
damages creating fear and hurting people's psychical health; similarly with
lion kept on a leash, machine guns, hand grenades etc. When considering a little, hidden
pistol, the case is not so obvious. Whether general carry permit type is to
be ordered for a given weapon will depend on the safety situation, the
country's history etc., but regarding firearms the solution will usually be
to provide carry permit (after education) only to those who have special
self-defense requirements. Hunters and competition shooters may be permitted
to keep weapons according to the authorities' safety instructions. The State has to estimate the
limitation of the right to self-defense with respect to which tools
the individual may use for self-defense according to the following principle:
Given (a) the danger of damages carried out by the crooks, (b) the danger of
exaggerated third party damages, and (c) the danger of exaggerated
retaliation damages, the sum a+b+c in society should the minimized. This may vary somewhat with time
and place. Of
course, private armies and similar organizations will be forbidden. When a
single individual does not possess the right to carry weapons of war,
collections of individuals can neither possess this right. Besides, it would
undermine the State monopoly on its obligatory tasks. 6.3 Military defense
“Of all the statist violations of individual
rights in a mixed economy, the military draft is the worst. It is an abrogation
of rights. It negates man's fundamental right – the right to life –
and establishes the fundamental principle of collectivism: that a man's life
belongs to the State, and the State may claim it by compelling him to
sacrifice it in battle. Once that principle is accepted, the rest is only a
matter of time” (Rand, 1967). All
service in the military has to be voluntary, and the Constitution (see
Section 7.1.1.1) has to contain an absolute prohibition against military
draft. Amendment XIII from 1865 in the
American constitution is interesting in this connection: “Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, nor any
place subject to their jurisdiction.” It is rational to volunteer in a war if at
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You obtain so many economical benefits (e.g. good
salary, priority with respect to supplies), other gains (e.g. excitement and
heroic admiration by your peer citizens), and absence of drawbacks (e.g. absence of
social disrepute) by being a soldier and a so miserable life as non-soldier
that these factors rationally compensate for the
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2) |
According to a rational evaluation, you
expect to generate significantly “more happiness” as dead than as alive under
the totalitarian regime that arrives if the war is lost. At the same time you
calculate your own effort in the war to be completely decisive for the
outcome of the war. The latter is important because if your own effort in the
war only has “mouse-piddling-in-the-ocean”-effect, it is more rational to
hide until the war is ended and then commit suicide if the totalitarian
regime wins. |
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3) |
You expect to generate somewhat more happiness
under the totalitarian regime than what you would do as dead. You calculate
your own effort in the war to be completely decisive for the outcome of the
war. You estimate the increased probability of dying or being injured to be
so small in comparison with being a non-soldier that you will take the risk
of entering the war in order to try to avoid the disadvantages of a
totalitarian regime. |
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The probability of being injured or killed is
larger for the civilians than for the soldiers. |
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5) |
You want to commit suicide but lack the
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Voluntary participation in a war may be tertiary
self-happy-motivated, but such incitements are mostly dangerous, emotional
and irrational. For more on “military defense” also see
Section 4.5 about the “World
Assembly”. Rand A. Capitalism – The Unknown Ideal.
ISBN:0451147952. Signet Nonfiction. In: The Wreckage of the Consensus. 1967,
pp. 255-256 6.3.1 Individual rights during military conflicts The
military forces of the State do not have the right to violate the
nature-given rights of the individuals during military operations. The State is not allowed to
introduce military draft or compulsory taxation. But the State may impose
significant increase in the citizenship fee (see Section 7.6.7) since
citizenship-free people probably will feel great insecurity if the aggressors
were to prevail and the incitement to pay the fee is therefore assumed to be
very large. In
extreme cases “confiscation via collateral damage”
may be used for financing the military defense (see Section 7.6.1.1) but never
for justifying military draft. The primary goal is to have a defense
(possibly included in an alliance) so strong that no potential, realistic
enemies consider a military attack to be conceivably happiness-profitable; on
the other side the defense ought not to be extravagantly expensive. According to the right to life,
the military forces are not allowed to kill other humans than the attacker's
military personnel in self-defense. Any attack into the enemy country must
have the aim of destroying installations or military personnel that directly
or indirectly can be used for attacking the home country. During such attacks
maximum efforts has to be made in order to restrict civilian casualties to a
minimum, but this has to be weighed against the risk of the defendant's own
soldiers and civilians. Besides, indistinct boundaries will exist between
civilian and military installations. When attacking legitimate military targets,
the responsibility for civilian casualties is then resting completely upon
the aggressor. The use of nuclear arms for eradicating whole
cities in order to terrify the aggressor into capitulation is not legitimate
if other methods, which cause less collateral damage, can be used for
self-defense. An
alternative to nuclear deterring is to have an anti-missile defense system
that is so advanced and outsized that all nuclear missiles (irrespective of
number) can be shot down before making damage. Nevertheless, the use of
tactical nuclear arms against military targets, which would be difficult to
destroy in another way, may be legitimate. Regarded from a Rational Gaudist
point of view, the primary goal has to be a world free of nuclear arms.
Alternatively, an anti-missile defense system as mentioned above may be
developed, and afterwards one's own nuclear arms may be destroyed. Even if
the world was to be free of nuclear arms, a certain anti-missile defense
system ought to exist defending the nation against rogue states acquiring
nuclear arms. Fundamentally, when considering the property right, the military does not
possess the right to confiscate private property for military use.
Basically, military forces are not allowed to enter private property at all,
but the military may be forced into private property by the aggressor, and
the responsibility for such a violation of private property is resting upon
the aggressor (see
also Section 7.6.1.1). When the war is won, the State may call the
aggressor to account for the destruction of private and public property, but
history shows that extensive use of this principle may be unwise (e.g.
Germany after World War I). If the legitimate forces enter the hostile
country for strategically defensive operations, private property is not to be
violated unless the private property is being used for military operations or
if the aggressor forces the troops to violate private property. The property
of the hostile State may be confiscated as war compensation or be used in
military operations. Practical cooperation with the aggressor
or soliciting
such cooperation is a direct or indirect violation of the nature-given rights
of the individual, and is punishable. Expressing literal or verbal support for the
aggressor during a military conflict is not allowed if it solicits right-violating actions in a context where
the solicitation may be expected to be followed
(see Section 5.6). Violations of the individual
nature-given right during military conflicts will be a juridical matter for
the World Assembly
and its legal system (see Section 4.5). 6.3.1.1 Compulsory military
draft If the current situation has triggered
“confiscation via collateral damage”, you may have to give up some financial means since the aggressor in
this case “pushes” the State into your property and the State is forced to use the
property for defense against the aggressor. If you avoid enrolling into the military, the State may not force you to
do so since it is philosophically meaningless “to confiscate people”. Thus, any
form of compulsory military service (or compulsory service in general) is
illegitimate regardless of the situation because it is initiation of force by the State. 6.4 Immigration politics
The immigration politics of the
State is neither to violate the nature-given rights of its own nationals nor
foreigners. Since a
foreigner has the same nature-given rights as a national of the State, the
State does not have the right to refuse a foreigner to come into the country,
but mandatory liability insurance may be required (see Section 6.4.1 and
7.6.2). A Pakistani,
a Zulu or a Chinese has the same fundamental genetic equipment as an ethnic
Anglo-Saxon, and accordingly they possess exactly the same nature-given
rights (see also Section 5.4.2). If a foreigner commits
right-violating actions on territory of the State's jurisdiction, the
punishment may be that he is expelled from the country and that he is refused
to return. The
State will own roads and some other areas and thus, the State may limit
certain foreigners' access to State property, but not if the foreigner
already has acquired a legitimate right to utilize the actual State property
(see Section 5.5.7 and 5.4.2). In practice, it is impossible to reside in the
country without the use of state property (in particular roads), and in
practice this means that such foreigners may be rejected at the border
(sufficient reason for suspicion of planning of illegal residence on
another's property). Let us consider a foreigner who
arrives in another country for a longer stay. He has not been hired by any
employer on a survivable salary; has no credible, binding maintenance; and
not enough financial means to stay in the country without work or
maintenance. Then it
could be (at least) predominantly probable that he is planning theft or other
right-violating actions in the new country. On this basis, he can
legitimately be denied access to the country (see Section 6.1.5). Let us imagine that there are 2 %
foreign cultured people in a district or city. Then the original culture is
by far the dominant culture. During the next 10 years the foreign culture
increases to 70 % because of massive immigration from “Longawayistan”. The foreign culture has
become the prevailing majority culture. Many of the original citizens might
feel as if they have been exposed to culturally forced displacement to “Longawayistan”. In a society based on
absolute respect for the nature-given right the locals may avoid this in the
following way: If
local condominiums or housing cooperatives (or similar) feel discomfort by
having a high immigration rate that in foreseeable future may lead to foreign
cultural dominance, they may adopt statutes (constitution) limiting foreign
cultural inhabitation in their building(s). How to define “foreign cultural” is entirely up to each
condominium / housing cooperative to decide (see Section 5.4), but it ought
to be objective. This may mean ethnical discrimination, but this is
legitimate since no outsiders have rights on other's property (see Section
5.6). If a sufficient number of original inhabitants in the district/city
dislike potential foreign cultural dominance, a significant amount of housing
associations will certainly adopt such statutes (constitution). This will
ensure that the original population does not need to worry about being
exposed to “culturally forced displacement” to
a foreign culture. The authorities ought to try to
defend their own nationals against right violations wherever in the world
they might occur, but in practice the authorities of one State cannot operate
in other countries without permission. Therefore, the State ought to be a
watchdog in order to ensure that the authorities in other countries defend
its citizens' nature-given rights when staying abroad. State violation
against foreign citizens' rights ought to be handled by the World Assembly (see Section 4.5). This
supranational union ought to instruct their member States to receive real
refugees who flees their home country because of harsh State violations of
their nature-given rights. The immigration politics ought to
be performed in such a way that it maximizes the long-term happiness for most
citizens weighted against how strong non-right-violating influence they are
able to perform on the State executives, but the politics may not violate
nature-given rights (see Section 5.4 and 7.2). 6.4.1
Passport and border control As mentioned in Section 7.6.2 each
adult citizen of the state will be charged a premium for mandatory liability
insurance in order to be able to pay for the expenses that he may impose on
society through his future right-violating actions. A foreigner visiting our
country will also imply such a “risk” for society. Thus, also he may be charged such a premium for
the time he spends in our country – and to an extent matching the risk that
he represents with respect to right-violating actions. How large this risk is
might depend on which country he comes from – a random Finnish citizen will
be regarded as less risky than a random person from Tourists
and other visitors from countries resembling our own with respect to level of
prosperity and safety do not need to pay premium for liability insurance to
the other State. Roughly speaking as many Frenchmen visit Consistent with the property right, the owner of an
airport has the right to control the travelers the way he pleases according
to Section 6.1.5 and 5.7.1. From experience we know that it is predominantly
probable that airports are used for right-violating actions and thus, the
State may instruct the owner of the airport to carry out control of luggage
etc. (see Section 6.1.5). If the owner of the airport refuses such controls,
he accepts his property to be used for right-violating activity, and that is
right-violating. The similar principle applies for owners of ships, harbors,
and roads and railways at national borders etc. 6.4.2 Restriction on immigration Let us consider a person
emigrating from his original home country to another nation. In his original
country, the idea of respect for the nature-given individual
rights is weak. This single person's immigration to the new country does not
pose any risk against the nature-given rights of its existing resident, and
does not justify immigration refusal (unless there are special issues
attached to him as mentioned in Sections 6.4 and 6.4.1). If many immigrants
from such countries come to “the promised
land”, and especially if they come over a short period of time, they will in
total be able to grow into a mass that can change the basis of ideas in
society and thereby encourage and force right-violating politics into action
in their new country (even the Superior Constitution may in practice be
pushed out of function if the pressure against its ideas becomes sufficiently
strong). The legitimacy for political actions is not based on the will of the
majority, but on the avoidance to violate the nature-given rights of the
individuals and on the defense of these rights. Thus,
the individual immigrant from such countries (as mentioned above) will, as
part of a sum, contribute to a risk of encouraging rights-violating political
actions, in a context where the encouragement can be expected to be
effectuated, if this sum of immigration exceeds a certain limit (see section
4.1.1 , point 2iii). This limit will be lower the weaker the idea of respect
for nature-given rights stands in the immigrants' original homeland (e.g. in
the Middle East). For countries where the support of this idea is
sufficiently large no such limit exists. Thus,
immigration from countries with very low support for the idea of respect
for nature-given rights should be limited considerably (but this should not
prevent real asylum seekers and refugees from getting protection).
Immigration from countries with very high support for this idea should not be
limited at all (beyond individual risks attached to the individual immigrant).
Thus, the immigration restrictions will increase inversely proportionally
with the support for this idea in the immigrants' original homeland. Thus,
foreigners have the right to emigrate to another country, but not in such a
way that the existing inhabitants are inflicted fear for encouragement of
rights-violating political actions in a situation where the encouragement can
be expected to be effectuated. Elements
of Rational Gaudist politics having a potential immigration-limiting effect
on the individual level are mentioned in Sections 4.3 - 5.5.7 - 5.6 - 6.4 -
6.4.1 - 7.3.5 - 7.6.2 - 7.6.11). 6.5 Environment protection
Pollution of the sea or air can
harm other people's life, health, property and right to use to non-owned land areas and resources. It can also
lead to pain for animals (e.g. birds being polluted with oil). If emission
from one particular factory has directly right-violating effect, the case is
clear: The factory has to be taken to the court, and if the environmental
crime is proven, the factory and its responsible representatives have to be
sentenced to harsh punishment. Imagine
a situation with emission of e.g. an ozone degrading gas where emission from
the single individual or single factory is non-dangerous
(mouse-piddling-in-the-ocean effect), but where the gas emissions in
summation from all persons and factories in all countries will break down the
ozone layer during the next 50 years and exterminate all life on the planet.
In such cases a person, organization, party, nation etc. has to take the
polluters collectively to a court under the World Assembly (see Section 4.5). On the basis of scientific
evidences it has to be proven as “predominant probable” that the effect of
the gas is as ozone-degrading as stated above, and that the emissions in
summation will violate the individual nature-given rights of now living
persons. A part of each polluter's emission will be right-violating (see Section
4.1.1). Then the court may impose emission restrictions upon all polluters,
environmental taxes or an absolute prohibition against use of the gas in such
a way that the total pollution stays below the limit of danger. If the
pollution problem has a more local or national character, an appropriate
local court ought to decide the question. If an international court under
the World Assembly (see Section 4.5), based on irrefutable proofs, was to
arrive at the conclusion that emissions of CO2 are as dangerous as IPCC
claims, this court may impose restrictions or taxes on all polluters in the
nations of the World Assembly. These nations may also be instructed to impose
economic sanctions on countries outside the World Assembly that refuse to
comply. E.g., taxes on fossil fuels will increase its price, and then the
private initiative will be stimulated to invent alternative, environmentally
friendly fuels. 6.6 Roads
Today, the State or its subunits own most of
the roads. As mentioned in Section 7.6.3 the State ought to continue to own
the roads since the State can use its strong market power to gain income. Since there will be no law against
private competition, the State may demand maximum legitimate market price.
For some single-standing stretches private roads may offer competition, but
there will not exist any real fear for the existing road net to be ousted by
competition, and thus, the road net is regarded as a natural monopoly, and
the limitations in Section 5.5.3 will apply (specified in Section 6.6.3).
Private road owners cannot link up to the road net of the State without
permission from the owner (the State), but private entrepreneurs can freely
dig tunnels under or build bridges over existing State roads in order to
complete their road. 6.6.1 How can
roads violate rights? Of course, the State
has no right to regulate the use of private roads as long as the road owner
does not violate the nature-given rights of others. But in extreme cases we
may imagine that a road owner, private or public, (or other proprietor)
prevents free traffic between other properties than his own. Given two areas/
real estates a and b that are owned by element A and B, respectively, or
which are non-owned without being naturally localized inside an owned area.
The area between a and b (or parts of it) is processed by element C (e.g. by
building a road, wall or buildings). In such a situation all individuals
still possess the right to move themselves and their movable property between
a and b in similar manners and conditions as they would have been entitled to
immediately before the processing except that they may have to accept a
reasonable detour. It is not C's construction that has made it possible to
move between a and b. A logical consequence of this is that
all individuals (in the whole world) have the right to move freely and free
of charge between two areas (a and b) with those transportations that are
possible to use in the natural state (i.e. before roads etc. were built).
This includes walking, running, horse riding, biking, motorcycling etc. When
it is practically impossible (included without unreasonable detour) to move
from one place to another without using the road net, the individual has the
right to use such transportations on the road free of charge and without
conditions (exceptions will e.g. be bridges across lakes since it was not
possible cross the lakes by these transportations in the natural state).
Further, you will have the right to move from one area (a) on one side of the
road over to another area (b) on the opposite side of the road without any
unreasonable detour, and since it is almost an infinite number of such areas
on each side of the roads, you will de
facto have the right to use such transportations freely and free of
charge on all roads. If natural-state movement has become impossible between
a and b because of C's construction, C has to provide an alternative free
solution. If a freeway has been built, you cannot walk or bicycle on that
road, and the road owner has to build a path for walking and bicycling next
to the freeway. But nobody may demand that a road is kept in good shape at
C's expense so they comfortably can drive freely with their cars between a
and b. 6.6.2 Speed
limits A private road owner may not
freely allow unlimited speed on his road since this may violate persons and
property located off road. The rational fear of this will also give people psychical
health problems. Pedestrians may be run over, and they have a nature-given
right to use the shoulder of the
road in the pursuit of moving from one place to another in the same way as on
non-owned area (see Section 6.6.1). Moreover, too high speed on a road may de
facto make the road unusable for the property owners, whose properties
are already connected to the road, since they – with good reason – may not
dare use the road, and this would be a breach of the presumptive contract
between the road owner and the property owners, which are discussed in
Section 6.6.3. If a road owner wants to have abnormally high speed limits on
a road where the pedestrians are safely placed on a protected footpath and
where there is no other property in the neighborhood that can be hurt, the
State has to put strong requirements on information of the high speed so
motorists do not get lost into a high-risk road against their will (see
Section 5.3.2.2). Similar
principles apply for prohibition against drunk-driving and mandatory
liability car insurance. 6.6.3 Road rights and pricing Today, many real estates are
linked to the public road net or private roads / mini road nets. Thus, the
owners of the real estates and the persons having their residence there
(hereafter called “the connected ones”)
are in the process of using the service which the road owner's road net
represents (see Section 5.5.3). This is a service that is consumed starting
when they connected to the road net and until they move or die (the owners
have usually built or purchased their property under the precondition of
connection to the road net). Thus, the owner of the road net has accepted the
connections to the road net; i.e. the road owner has accepted that the
consumption of the road net as a service started (see Section 5.5.3). Many of
the connected ones will be well
underway with their consumption of the road net service when Rational Gaudism
is introduced. The road owner may not increase the price infinitely since
that will be right-violating against the
connected ones (a logical consequence is that this will also apply for
the descending line of offspring of the
connected ones for all future unless the offspring disconnect permanently
from the road net). The road net is a natural monopoly, and the road prices
ought be regulated according to the principle that the monopolist's relative
profits is not to be significantly higher than the average relative profits
in the industry being most similar to the monopolist's industry and where
“trapping” market relationships are absent, which probably is rental business
the real estate sector (see Section 5.5.3). Let us assume that the
acquisition value (now-value) of a given public road net is $2000 billion. By
using the concrete suggestion for price regulation of natural monopolies from
Section 5.5.3 and assuming that average profits in the real estate market is
4 % pro anno of the acquisition value, a kilometer price of $80 billion [plus
stdev] plus maintenance expenses divided by the number of driven kilometers
per year will set a limitation for how much the Rational Gaudist State
legitimately may demand in payment from the connected ones for the
existing rod net. For others than the connected ones the price and
other preconditions may be different – for the public road net this may in
practice apply for foreigners without acquired road rights in the country
(see Section 5.5.7), while for minor private roads / mini road nets it may
apply for passing traffic. In
order to get the latter consequences of nature-given rights into simple
forms, the clause in the General Constitution suggested in Section 5.4.2 will
be highly applicable for roads (see also Section 5.5.7). When a new road is built, the road
owner may charge as high price as he wants for the road use, but he has to
make it very clear for real estate owners who want to connect to the road
that he will take (or may take in the future) very high price for the use of
the road. The more extreme price regime he wants, the stronger requirements
will be set on his information to the (potential) real estate owners when
connecting to the new road. If a person want to buy or build a cabin or house
next to a private road, he ought to enter a contract with the road owner so
he may use the road as long as he want for a fair price. Then he will not
arrive into a situation where the road is blocked or where an extreme
increase of the road price in practice blocks the road. State and private
certification firms may contribute with well-established standard contracts
for this purpose. 6.6.4 Closed
and unusable roads If the road owner suddenly closes
a road making it permanently unusable, it is according to Section 6.6.3
right-violating against any real estate owners who are in the process of
using the road service (unless there is presence of a contract accepting – or
absence of an implicit contract prohibiting – such an extreme “price”). An
example of this may be a slippery road owner who closes down the roads
leading in to a district or village in such a way that the accessibility for
the inhabitants deteriorates extremely. Then the house prices will fall, and
the road owner may buy them cheaply, and later on he can open up the road
blockages. In addition to the right-violation mentioned in Section 6.6.3,
such a blockage will be a physical obstruction that impairs the value of the
usages of the houses (even if living there is not impossible). Thus, the road
owner becomes liable for this loss of market value, and he will not be able
to make any profits from the blockage. Exorbitant road pricing can act as
“closing light”. The
property right to a road will cease
logically if: 1) a stretch of road is closed so that it cannot be used
neither by the owner nor others, 2) the road descends to a state where it is
useless, or 3) the road is permanently not used because of unavailability.
The road areas in these cases are correctly processed away from the natural
state, but not into a state
of increased usability. Anyone (including the government) may apply to
take over the ownership of the road free of charge (see Section 5.1.3). 6.7 Fire
brigades and fire safety
If a fire breaks out
in a building in a city or densely populated area, the fire can easily spread
to neighboring properties, and the fire can spread further to include larger
parts of the city. In less densely populated areas, this could be different.
Thus, a building in a city or town will involve a significant fire hazard for
both close and more distant neighbors if the building has poor fire
protection. The owner of such a building will expose his neighbors to
significant danger, and the authorities can therefore order him to pay a fee
to help finance the fire service and to comply with other fire-technical
regulations in their building. In a house where there are no neighbors
within a fire-hazardous distance, the owner can theoretically live as
fire-hazardous as he wants, as long as the house is not a place for children
to stay and as long as he informs visitors sufficiently about the fire hazard
(see Section 5.3.2.2). If he cannot prove that he has complied with this
obligation to provide information, he may receive a severe penalty
(non-accepted risk). Therefore, a rational home owner must in practice accept
a legally pre-approved standard for fire protection. 7. The function of the State
A short summary of the
nature-given rights of the individual and the legitimating of the State: Perceiving happiness and avoiding
unhappiness are the only valuable aspects in the Universe. The humans are
beings capable of perceiving happiness and unhappiness. Considering a
permission/licence (to obtain value) that you accept to be legitimate. You
cannot violate/prevent this permission and simultaneously claim the
violation/prevention to be legitimate. Nature's evolution has given each human being
(person A included) his fundamental
nature – defined as “the fundamental qualities used by the consciousness in the pursuit of its values (happiness)” – which in turn
gives the individual human being permission/licence to NRI. NRI is obviously legitimate since
it is meaningless to claim nature to assign a permission/licence illegitimately to the individual.
Nature has given exactly the same permission/licence to person B. Person A
realizes that person B has received a legitimate licence from nature, and
thus, he cannot violate/prevent B's licence and simultaneously claim the
violation/prevention to be legitimate (and vice versa). In a social context
person A (and all other human beings) has a legitimate permission to NRS –
i.e. whatever violation/prevention of NRS is illegitimate. NRS is a nature-given right – (a
logical consequence of) a legitimate license to obtain values assigned by a
being's fundamental nature. (NRI = to think up and to
choose to perform those actions which are necessary in the pursuit of
maximization of self-happiness during the life span. NRS = to think up and to choose to perform those
actions which are necessary in the pursuit of maximization of self-happiness
during the life span as long as one does not violate the similar right of
others or other nature-given rights or their logical consequences). Unfortunately,
nature does not automatically defend the individual against right violators.
The combination of the right to self-defense and the right to
organize implies the formation of a state that is to defend the
nature-given rights of the individuals inside a given geographical area. The State is obliged to defend
these rights for all individuals inside the judicial borders of the
State in order to legitimate its monopoly position on the system of justice,
Police and military defense (see Section 4.4).Since the nature-given rights
of the individual are legitimately given / implied by nature, not even the
State may legitimately violate these rights. How much of his nature-given liberty the
individual is to give up, is an exclusive decision of the individual himself
– not a decision of the majority, a dictator, an emperor or a president. If the State still violates the
nature-given rights of the individual, we do not deal with a legitimate State
but a State with different degree of illegitimacy. The question whether a
illegitimate State is to be transformed into a legitimate State if the people
believe to generate significantly more happiness in the long-term perspective
by illegitimacy is answered in Section 7.4. The right to liberty cannot
be interpreted to mean that the State has the right to do whatever it pleases
as long as dissatisfied individuals may emigrate (see explanation in Section
7.5). 7.1 The
obligatory function of the State
The nature-given rights of the
individual are deduced from the inductive knowledge that the humans are
rational beings with the ability to think in the purpose to choose to act in
the pursuit of maximization of self-happiness in the life-long perspective.
The rights are deductively defined. They are not defined from the inductive
knowledge that a society lacking defense of these rights generates
significantly less “society happiness” than societies with a good defense for
such rights (even if this is the case). The rights are not defined through empirical
testing (HDM). In
order to be legitimate, politics may not violate the nature-given rights,
which are deduced from the fundamental nature of the individual human being
(and animals). Thus, the parts of politics that are aimed at defending the
nature-given rights and avoiding violating them are implied by the
fundamental nature of the individual human being and the essence of the
concept legitimacy, and not by the Rational Gaudist ethical principles. It is
not legitimate for the State to perform empirical political testing violating
these rights (see Section 4.1 and 10.2). The biological evolution occurred
with the surrounding environment as limitation. The technological evolution
has its limitations in shortage of resources and capital. The evolution of legitimate
politics has also its restricting environment, namely the individual
nature-given rights.
The State does not have the right
to violate these nature-given rights even if it – against supposition –
should generate a larger amount of total happiness when summed over all
individuals inside the jurisdiction of the State (see Section 7.5). The obligatory function of the State is to carry out system of justice (child welfare services
included), Police and military defense in the
strict sense (no kind of social politics are included) with the objective
of preventing right violations. 7.1.1 Laws The system of laws ought to
consist of three parts: 1) The Superior Constitution, 2) The General
Constitution, and 3) The Law. Basically, nothing is permitted
unless a permission exists stating something else. A stone does not have any
permission to perform actions. An animal has permission from nature to follow
its instincts in the pursuit of its values. A human being has permission from
nature to perform actions based on his rational evaluation in the pursuit of
his values. All
legitimacy is based on not violating already legitimately assigned
permissions. An action is legitimate if it does not violate a legitimate law.
A law consists of a permission or a prohibition, and is legitimate if and
only if it does not violate those permissions (rights) given in the
Constitution. The Constitution is legitimate if and only if it does not
violate the permissions (rights) assigned to the individual by nature. The
permissions of nature are always legitimate since nobody but nature was
capable of assigning permissions before nature gave the human beings their
permissions (rights), and accordingly there were no permissions to violate
(see chapter 4). Besides,
claiming elements without free will (i.e. nature) to violate permissions
(rights) is contradictory. The nature-given rights of the individuals (and animals) and their
unavoidable consequences are formulated in the Superior Constitution. 7.1.1.1 The Superior
Constitution Many people will agree to limit
the power of the majority, and modern democracies claim to do this by
implementing Constitutional Laws. But such Constitutional Laws are sustained
at the mercy of the majority since the majority may change the Constitution
(although the process may be longer than for a usual law alteration). In
other words: the horse is guarding the sack of oats. In a Rational Gaudist
system the Superior Constitution is deduced from the fundamental human
nature, and it ought to be implemented by similar means as used by the
existing regime. The Superior Constitution may never be legitimately changed
no matter the magnitude of the majority in the people or in the National
Assembly since this constitution consists of nature-given rights deduced from
the fundamental human genetic nature. The
Superior Constitution will state the individual nature-given rights and the
most important consequences thereof as holy and non-violable (the right to
life, liberty, property, use, speech, organizing, entering contracts, and
free enterprise). Similarly, the nature-given rights of children and
animals have to be stated. This constitution has to make it crystal clear
that the State does not possess the right to introduce laws violating these
rights. All actions are to be allowed unless the action violates these
rights. This has to be specified so clear cut that no slippery jurist later
on can interpret the Superior Constitution away from its original intention.
It has to be a very distinct border between the private sphere of interests
and the sphere where the State may intervene. 7.1.1.2 The General Constitution The General Constitution has to be
in complete compliance with the Superior Constitution and shall contain
specifications of the paragraphs of the Superior Constitution that are too
important to only be stated in the Law. These are law paragraphs that are strongly
expected to stand “the ravages of time” and therefore, they are elevated over other
law paragraphs. The
General Constitution ought to contain the State's fundamental internal rules:
that the country is a republic, how the State is to be governed, and
fundamental rules for the fundamental management of the State property and
citizenship etc. These are not really laws since a law is to regulate
the relationship between elements in order to prevent violations of
nature-given rights. Changing
the paragraphs of the General Constitution is not right-violating, and these
paragraphs may be changed by 2/3 majority in two following sessions in the
National Assembly. A simple majority of the National Assembly are basically
allowed to make whatever law as long as the limitations of the Superior
Constitution and the General Constitution are fulfilled. 7.1.1.3 The law All the paragraphs in the Law
shall be direct implications or specifications of the principles in the
Superior Constitution or the General Constitution. Some of the paragraphs of
the Superior Constitution and the General Constitution may be carried out in
different ways, and the legislators have to test this out by HDM. The
Superior Constitution and the General Constitution often contain general
principles, and it is necessary to perform precise definition of these for
adaptation to specific conditions. No “unlaws” shall exist. An “unlaw” is a
law that does not arise as an implication of the Superior Constitution and/or
which violate the paragraphs of the Superior Constitution. 7.1.1.4 Supreme court The
Supreme Court has to have a clear cut task in defending the Superior Constitution and the
General Constitution letter for letter, and to be an angry watchdog against
eventual politicians who want to violate the nature-given rights of
individuals (and animals). The Supreme Court has to be completely
independent of the Government and the National Assembly by judges in the High Courts electing judges
to the Supreme Court for a period of e.g. 8 years. The Supreme Court hires
the judges of the High Courts, and the High Courts hire judges of the County
Courts. It is possible that the Supreme Court ought to have to chambers: the
superior chamber takes on constitutional cases only, i.e. its only task is to
ensure that the National Assembly and the Government do not make laws, rules
etc. that violate the constitutions. The lower chamber takes on usual appeals
from the higher courts and special trials going directly to the Supreme
Court. The
military defense ought to swear loyalty to the Superior Constitution and the
Supreme Court and nothing else. 7.1.2
The State has some obligatory welfare tasks It is a State task to protect the
individuals' nature-given rights. Some psychical unstable persons may be a threat against life, health and property of
others. Therefore, it
will be an obligatory task for the State to treat them (if necessary by
force). This will usually be financed by mandatory liability insurances (see
Section 7.6.2) supported by other legitimate State funds, but may be financed
as “confiscation via collateral damage” in emergency situations (see Section
7.6.1.1 and 10.3.2).
A consequence is that no such psychical unstable persons will ever avoid the
health care system in fear of the economical costs. They will be prevented
from violating other person's life, health or property by being cured or by
being physically prevented from committing crimes when they are locked in
hospital. The similar chain of reasoning is valid for persons with strongly
infectious and dangerous diseases (tuberculosis, SARS, AIDS, Ebola etc).
Compulsory treatment of an adult person is only acceptable if 1) he has lost
his rationality to such a level that he is put under guardianship (see
Section 4.3.6), but then as a non-obligatory task, or 2) he has committed
criminal actions (included threatening actions and actions which create fear by
being dangerous for other humans), and then as an obligatory task. 7.2 The
empirical function of the State
The majority does not have any nature-given right
to make decisions. Since the State is an organization, each national of the
State has a nature-given right to try to use the State in the pursuit of
maximization of self-happiness during his life span within the limitation of
its constitution – a constitution that is limited by the Superior
Constitution so no nature-given rights may be violated (see right to organize in Section 5.4).
Individuals who are not nationals of the State are also allowed to try to
influence the decisions of the State as long as the influence is performed in
a non-right-violating way. Since all individuals are self-happy-motivated,
the first glance could make us believe that a Person A is rational by trying
to use the State for performing actions of the type: “the State is to give
50% of the State income for my personal use”. If such a suggestion had been
approved, Person A would have generated a lot of self-happiness, but the
probability of getting approval for such a proposal (especially since the
nature-given rights cannot be violated) is in practice like zero since no
other persons have any interest in the proposal. Therefore, Person A has to
ally with other persons for using the State in the pursuit of maximization of
his self-happiness, and in order to get them to join him he has to reduce the
focus on his egoistic interests and increase the focus on the interests of
his potential allied. Therefore, the existence of political organizations is
rational (parties, professional and industrial bodies etc.). Since the right to organize is a nature-given
right, all such organizations have to be legitimate as long as the
organization does not solicit, plan or perform right-violating
actions. The
next question is how the State is to be organized through the General
Constitution (and also the Law) in order to maximize the self-happiness of
the persons who actually are governing the State, but without violating the
nature-given rights of others. With the existence of a large number of
political organizations it is rational for the authorities to cooperate with
these, and especially with the largest and most powerful ones – anything else
will be very difficult in the long-term perspective. The result is that the
State will pursue non-right-violating politics that maximize the long-term happiness
for most individuals weighted against how strong non-right-violating
influence they are able to perform on the State executives. The latter
principle is the Rational Gaudist view on how the State ought to be governed.
In the Rational Gaudist spirit the State ought to be as rational as possible
in the performance of this process according to similar principles as those
mentioned in Section 3.4. It
is not possible to directly deduce from the nature-given rights how the State
is to be organized in detail, but a system where the largest and most
powerful political organizations elect representatives to a common general
assembly seems reasonable. The governing elite (government, president, king)
ought not to carry through politics that is opposed by a significant majority
in this general assembly; otherwise, governing will be difficult over time.
In order to make such a process as orderly and predictable as possible, the
General Constitution ought to contain clear cut rules for the organizing of
the governing of the State. This system may be based on universal suffrage
with a parliamentary system where the government is dependent on the approval
of the National Assembly, or it may be an US system with an elected president
who cannot be overthrown by the Congress. 7.2.1 How to
carry out the empirical function of the State? How the
State is to carry out the judicial system, military (civil) defense, and how
the laws are to be formulated inside the limitations of the nature-given
rights, is settled by empirical testing (HDM) – or popularly spoken: by
trying and making mistakes. The individual is allowed to
perform any action of choice as long as the rights of others are not
violated. Similarly,
the majority (simple or 2/3) of the National Assembly may do as they please
as long as the rights of others are not violated as specified in the Superior
Constitution. This is
a consequence of the right to organize
(see Section 5.4). Money, which the State has gathered in non-right-violating
ways, is the property of the State, i.e. the collective property of all
nationals of the State. It is not the their individual money, and the
State may also use this money on non-obligatory tasks according to the
judgment of the majority of the National Assembly as long as the consequences
of the money spending do not violate the nature-given rights of others, and
if the obligatory tasks already have been financed. The National Assembly may sponsor
e.g. social projects. This cannot be prohibited by the
constitution – at least not by the Superior Constitution. National elections are empirical testing
(HDM) that gradually are to guide the politicians to adopt the best
hypothesis (politics). The
parts of politics contained in “the empirical function of the State” are
implied by Rational Gaudist ethics since their aim is to maximize happiness
within the limitations of legitimacy. As mentioned in chapter 7.6 the
State will acquire some money without using right-violating taxation.
Nevertheless, this amount of money will be relatively restricted. Therefore,
it is possible that it is rational to restrict the areas where the State may
use money through the General Constitution. Economical support contributing
to ensure the fundamental needs of the children ought to be number one
priority. The Rational Gaudist idea is that voluntary insurance (see e.g.
Section 7.6.11) and savings are to take care of people's welfare in
connection with diseases, old age, disability, pension etc. and hence,
compulsory collectivism is replaced by voluntary collective arrangements.
Persons who participate 100% in the Voluntary
Welfare Insurances (see Section 7.6.11) may receive social welfare
benefits while others have to rely on private charity. Thus, the State will
not necessarily have additional expenses here, but State subsidizing the Voluntary Welfare Insurances ought not
to be ruled out. In our globalized world it will be possible for persons with
low national insurance income to move to a cheap country (e.g. Thailand),
bring along the insurance money and obtain significantly more goods for the
money there. Persons with some capital but without work or insurance may buy
an apartment in a cheap country and finance the daily expenses by working
locally. Some land areas will be considered
to be non-owned (see Section 5.2.1, 5.1.3 and 10.5). On such areas anybody
may try to work up property right
or right to use. This is considered
to be an initiative of social politics – even if it is a consequence of the way
in which the property right arises.
7.3
What is the Rational Gaudist sign of good politics?
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1) |
The Superior Constitution has to be obeyed for
defending the nature-given rights, but without violating them in the pursuit
of defending them – otherwise the politics becomes more or less
criminal/evil. When
the boundaries for right violations are not clear cut, the State must,
according to a best possible evaluation, set optimally objective standards
for these limits. |
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2) |
Different strategies may defend the
nature-given rights as described in point 1. The strategy of choice is the
one maximizing the long-term happiness for most individuals weighted against
how strong non-right-violating influence they are able to perform on the
State executives (see Section 7.2) according to the principle that the good
politics has to resist intense attempts of dethronement (HDM). |
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3) |
Carrying out non-obligatory State tasks
inside the restriction of the Superior Constitution ought to maximize the
long-term happiness for most individuals weighted against how strong non-right-violating
influence they are able to perform on the State executives (see Section 7.2)
according to the principle that good politics has to resist intense attempts
of dethronement (HDM). |
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If points 1, 2 and 3 are
fulfilled, we have the optimally good politics regarded from a Rational
Gaudist point of view. But this is of course difficult to measure in practice
since especially points 2 and 3 contain the subjective term “the happiness of
the citizens”. The support for the governing political parties at elections
will be a good indication. 7.4 Why shall the majority obey the Superior
Constitution?
Since the individual human being is
predetermined to try to maximize his self-happiness in the life-long
perspective, the following question arises: Why are the people to accept the
limitations in the Superior Constitution if a sufficient large majority
believes that the State can generate significantly more happiness for the
individuals by violating the Superior Constitution? The majority is not given any power by nature
to be in charge, and in practice a traditional democracy is dependent on the
non-existence of minority groups that are so strong (where strength also includes degree of
determination and well-organizing) and have so much to gain from establishing
(minority) dictatorship, that they will overthrow the elected government. The reality has to be shaped in
such a way that all minority groups with their rationality understand that
they do not gain anything from attempts of introducing and sustaining
(minority) dictatorship in the long-term or medium-term perspective. This is
or has been a problem for many newborn democracies (Argentina, Italy in the
1920ies, Czechoslovakia in 1948 etc.). If the Superior
Constitution is to be introduced and sustained in practice, the reality has
to be changed (inclusive a radical enhancement of the support for those
philosophical principles bearing Rational Gaudism) in such a way there do not
exist any sufficiently large and influential groups that alone or together
have the power to violate the Superior Constitution and which believe they
have something significantly to profit from such violations in the long-term
or medium-term perspective. If Rational Gaudism, and thereby the Superior Constitution, is to be introduced in practice, a majority of 2/3 of the National Assembly has to approve the replacement of today's Constitution with the Superior Constitution plus the General Constitution. In such a situation strong Rational Gaudist trends have to be present in the population with a significant majority completely or partly supporting Rational Gaudism – approximately in the same way as today's strong European Social Democratic trends (see Section 7.4.1 and 10.10.1). This majority believes that they will create significantly more self-happiness in the long-term perspective by installing the Superior Constitution than by not doing so (even if violating the Superior Constitution may sometimes be happiness-profitable in the short term perspective). Regarded from the Rational Gaudists, it will be rational to contribute to form the reality in the long-term perspective by implementing mechanisms and feed-back systems which ensure that State violations of the Superior Constitution is irrational (immoral) and supporting it is rational (moral). Such mechanisms and feed-back systems are listed 1-7 below: |
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1) |
It is dubious if it is profitable with respect
to happiness for a sufficient number of individuals and influential groups to
violate the Superior Constitution since it is deduced from the fundamental
human nature (see Section 7.4.1). It is important to emphasize that
introducing a little violation of the right
to liberty will gradually wipe away the principal and gradually, the
society will be more and more characterized by restraints and force until we
end up with something close to socialism. |
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2) |
In today's society the majority rules because
this philosophical principle is well recognized among all sufficient large
and powerful groups in the society. In a Rational Gaudist society the
philosophy of the Superior Constitution will be generally recognized among
most of the sufficient large and powerful groups in the society. |
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3) |
If a person considers violating other's
rights, the fear of punishment shall be an important reason for omitting the
crime. Similarly, if the National Assembly or the Government considers
effectuating right-violating politics, the fear of veto by the Supreme Court
and the consequences thereof shall be so large that it will be rational to
omit making such decisions. |
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4) |
The National Assembly controls the
Government, the majority of the voters controls the National Assembly and
indirectly also the Government, the Supreme Court controls the will of the
majority by administering the Superior Constitution, and the judges of the
Supreme Court are elected by the judges of the High Courts. |
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5) |
The political election programs ought to be
evaluated by the Supreme Court, and parties with obvious right-violating
politics may be refused to participate in the election. |
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6) |
Within the scope of the Superior
Constitution, non-obligatory politics ought to be evolved in such a way that
no sufficient large and powerful groups believe that they have something to
gain from violating the Superior Constitution. |
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7) |
The Superior Constitution has a “holy”
character since it may not be changed. |
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If the Government or the majority
of the National Assembly refuses to accept a decision of the Supreme Court,
it is in practice coup d'état. In such an extreme and improbable case the
Supreme Court may dissolve the National Assembly and/or the Government, if
necessary by the use of Police and military forces, but not if the expected
amount of right violations thereof against third-parties is significantly
larger than the long-term consequences of the illegitimate politics. In
practice the Superior Constitution can be abolished by coup d'état, but this
can also happen in today's system even though the probability is very small. Too many examples exist in world history
where different groups in the society fight with directly violent means in
order to settle how property inside a geographical area is to be taken from
someone and be given to others. In such a system there is large probability
that precisely my group will be a
loser; in fact in it is probable that all groups will be losers. In a
democracy (almost) all groups enter into a permanent ceasefire, which
basically states that the group achieving the largest number of votes by
elections seizes and distributes property and makes other limitations in the
personal freedom as it pleases inside the actual geographical area. This is a
large progress compared to openly violent conflict. Rational Gaudism
represents a further progress, namely a society system where (almost) all
groups enter into a peace agreement, which basically states that no group
takes anything from anyone or makes limitations in the personal freedom of
peaceful humans – a society system absolutely free for all “gang rule”. The
motive power to enter into such an agreement is that the sum of the present
predisposing determinants makes all (important and large) groups realize that
in the long run, no group achieves high enough probability to profit from committing
even non-bloody “gang rule”. 7.4.1 Why become a political Rational Gaudist? If a person is to
become a political Rational Gaudist, he has to believe that he will generate
significantly more happiness during his life span by being a Rational Gaudist
than by not being a Rational Gaudist. Why should a person believe that he will
generate more happiness during his life span by being a political Rational
Gaudist compared to having another political view? Let us assume the
opposite, namely that a specified person is not a political
Rational-Gaudist. Since Rational Gaudism is a
framework for legitimate politics (see Section 7.1.1 and 11.1), there are two
possibilities: |
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1) |
The person realizes that his politics is
illegitimate, but he does not care since he believes supporting illegitimate
politics will give him more happiness through his life span than supporting
consistent legitimate politics. |
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2) |
The person does not accept that the human
individual has nature-given rights, i.e. that nature has not legitimately
given the human individual permission (license) to choose to perform actions
on the basis of his rational judgments with the natural resources as the
basis. |
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If point 2 is the case, there are
several possibilities: |
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a) |
He is a supporter of determinism. |
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b) |
He believes that human beings are not
rational beings, but slaves of nature like animals. |
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c) |
He believes that these licenses are granted by
God (or something similar) that has authorized “the King”, “Der Führer” or
other strong elements with the right to withdraw them. |
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d) |
He believes that a partial evil being with free
will has assigned the licenses to us, but that the “partial evil being” has
violated some being's rights by assigning them, and that “good humans” have
the right to exercise self-defense on the violated being's behalf by
preventing other people from carrying out their actions. |
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e) |
He believes that Gaia is an organism with property right to “its” resources. |
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About Point 2: This
means is that the person is philosophically irrational, and the number of
such persons may be reduced by spreading rational philosophical ideas. About Point 1: Regarding people who support the ethics of
Rational Gaudism, it is explained in Section 10.2.1 why implementation of
natural rights in practical politics (i.e. legitimate politics) is an
expected consequence of their ethics. The arguments in Section 10.2.1 will to
some extent also apply to people who realize that the individual has natural
rights, without being supporters of Rational Gaudist ethics. The points in
Section 10.2.1 related to PMI and duty of virtue are expected to be
significantly more important for ethical Rational Gaudists than for the
second category of persons, while the other points are expected to be equally
important for both. Thus there is reasonable to believe that many of those
who realize that the individual has natural rights also will take the
consequences of this view during voting and practical politics, so that the
number of “point-1-persons” may be significantly reduced. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that
a substantial majority of the people can be political Rational Gaudists
especially under a regime of highly educated population on the basis of
rational philosophical pillars (see also Section 10.10.1). Then the Superior Constitution can be introduced. Most
Rational Gaudists will probably realize that they sometimes may profit from
illegitimate politics in the short term perspective, but the likelihood that
this will pay off through their life spans, will be so small that they
realize that it is not worth betting on. Regarded from the Rational
Gaudists, it will be rational to contribute to form the reality in the
long-term perspective by implementing mechanisms and feed-back systems which
ensure that State violations of the Superior Constitution is irrational
(immoral) and supporting it is rational (moral). Such mechanisms and
feed-back systems are listed in point 1-7 in
Section 7.4. 7.5 The sovereignty of the State and the
individual rights
Can the right to liberty be
interpreted in the following way? “The individual has right to liberty,
but the different States have unlimited right to make laws, regulations and
taxations. The freedom of the individual consists of the right to leave the
country if not being satisfied.” Why may not the State (as organization) have
a constitution stating that some nature-given rights may be broken by the
State? Then, people who believe that they will create more self-happiness by
living under such a constitution may do so while those who do not accept the
right-violating laws, may move to another country with another politics. The
only individual right that the State needs to consider is the “right to free
emigration”. We can argue against this at different levels: 7.5.1 Only the individual is
sovereign It has been claimed that WE (the
majority, the people, or the nation) have the right to choose what kind of
politics to be conducted in the country, included confiscation of private
property through taxation and initiation of other kinds of compulsions.
Nature has not given US the right to perform choices of action. Nature
has not provided the people or the nation with a consciousness with
the ability to perform choices of action and to perceive happiness and
unhappiness. Nature has only provided the individual with such a
consciousness. The people or the nation can only perform choices of action
through the consciousness of a chief of government and his executive staff.
If these choices of action imply restrictions in the nature-given liberty of
the individuals, each individual has to voluntarily sign a contract with the
State where he accepts these restrictions. Theoretically, the State might say
that you have to accept 70 % taxation and several State regulations and
compulsions in order to obtain citizenship of that State. If you refuse to
pay tax, you have committed a contract breach, and the State may use force
against you. But if so, few well-off and productive people would accept to be
nationals of the State since absence of the citizenship does not mean loss of
the right to liberty and defense
thereof on the territory of that State (see Section 5.4.2). If you have not
entered a contract on paying taxes, you have not committed any right
violation by not paying, and therefore, the authorities may not take money
from such an anti-taxpayer by force. Another
trick to cheat the public into believing that statism is in accordance with
the right to liberty might be to regard
a nation as a “condominium” where each private real estate makes one unit and
where the “condominium” has a Board (Government), General Assembly
(Parliament / general referendum) and statutes (Constitution), which may be
changed by 2/3 majority in the direction of nearly unlimited authority to
make regulations and determine “joint expenses” (taxes); dissatisfied
co-owners may sell their unit (property) and move out of the “condominium”
(country). The condominium trick is obviously right-violating since it means
initiation of force by compulsory joining private properties, without the
voluntary contractual consent of each owner, into a large “condominium” where
major parts of private property (in the form of compulsory taxes and
extensive regulations) are compulsorily converted into common property. The
result is that the State de facto has committed massive violation of
private property (see also Section 7.5.3). If
the State was to charge the use of State roads (or other State property)
similarly to today's taxation, it would be right-violating against existing
real estate owners who are connected to the existing road net (see Section
6.6.3). A pro-argument for the State's
right to compulsory taxation could be that by staying in the country the
inhabitants accept implicitly a contract on paying tax to the State. It is
the same as saying that the State has made an automatic standard contract
stating that each inhabitant is to pay taxes, but each individual may avoid
this contract by emigrating. Rational Gaudism does not accept such automatic
standard contracts (see Section 5.3.2.5) since they are considered to
undermine the right to liberty.
Each individual has a nature-given right to liberty inside the
territory of any State, and you do not need to accept a contract in order to
achieve a nature-given right. Thus, it is also meaningless to claim that you
accept a voluntary presumptive agreement on taxation by becoming resident in
the country. The State initiates threats of
violence in order to achieve tax income and to carry out other compulsions,
but the use of violence or threats thereof is only legitimate in self-defense
explicitly against those who initiates violence or violent threats. The fact
that the victims of the threats have the option of running away, does not
give the threats legitimacy (besides, there exist presently no non-right-violating states that you
may move to, and you cannot establish your own state as you can with a
private company). It
is similar to a situation where the mafia demands “protection payments” from
its “customers”. You do not need to live where the mafia operates; you may
move away and escape the black-mailing. The conclusion is that the right
to liberty cannot be interpreted in such a way that the “right to
free emigration” is the only real right. 7.5.2 Payment for the
obligatory tasks of the State? May the State demand 80 % tax and
25 % VAT and then refuse carrying out monopoly services on the defense of the
nature-given rights of the non-payers? An ordinary organization could say as
follows: “Pay 99 % of your income as member fee otherwise you may not use our
services.” Why may not the State say the same? Assuming
that the State may demand payment for carrying out monopoly services on the
defense of the nature-given rights, and then refuse defending the rights (or
some of them) of the non-payers. The non-payers possess the right to
organize and a nature-given right to defend their nature-given rights.
Thus, non-payers without State defense for their nature-given rights will
have the right to establish their own State in order to defend these rights.
But then there are two States on the same territory, which is a contradiction
to the fact that the State has to possess a monopoly on system of justice,
Police and military defense in order to defend the nature-given individual
rights (see Section 4.4). The assumption that the State may demand payment
for its obligatory monopoly services and refuse defending the non-payers
implied a contradiction. Ergo, the State may not demand payment for carrying out
monopoly services on the defense of the nature-given rights and refuse
defending the rights (or parts of them) of the non-payers. However, the State
may force a person to pay for monopoly services if his omission to pay means
a right-violating action (see Section 7.6.2), but the State may never refuse
to defend his nature-given rights. The State may also demand fees for
services that are not monopoly-based (see e.g. Section 5.3.1.2). 7.5.3 Absurd implications of
the State sovereignty If the right to liberty is defined as “the right to emigrate from your
home country if not being satisfied” the State acts as an owner of its entire
territory (and on the owner's territory nobody else has any rights unless
entitled by the owner). Then the State has in practice committed massive
right-violating confiscation of private property and non-owned areas. If so, the right to liberty is in practice an international treaty between
the different “nation owners” that ensures the citizens freedom of emigration
from their home countries, while the citizens become serfs or cottars with
the State as the squire (of stolen property). But this is a clear contradiction to the
originating of the legitimacy of the State, namely to defend the nature-given
rights of the inhabitants inside the borders of the State. The right
to liberty in a Rational Gaudist society implies that the State is
obliged to defend the individual freedom when someone tries to violate this
right. It does not only mean: “The ‘right of the citizens to try to
find another State to live in if not being satisfied’, and if somebody tries
to prevent them from emigrating, the State will stop the wrongdoer.” Besides,
it is somewhat unclear what is meant by “the right to free emigration”. Does it mean to be able to leave
your fatherland and bring all your assets along, or does it only mean the
right to crawl naked across the border? It does probably not include the duty
of other countries to receive you. A large part of the estates is physically impossible to move; it is
not so easy to put a house with a garden or a crops field into a rucksack and
bring it abroad! If we stretch the concept of
“liberty” even further, the following absurdity arises: “The State grants its
inhabitants freedom to emigrate within an interval of one month after their
18th birthday. After this time period the inhabitants do not have
the right to emigrate, and before this time period they are not of age and do
not have the right to liberty anyway. In this way the individuals have
‘freedom to emigrate’, and if an individual avoids using this opportunity, he
has accepted being exposed to harsh taxation, confiscations, torture, and
violence. Accordingly, he has to blame himself if he is exposed to such
treatments.” The argument: “you can move if not
satisfied” can easily defend most dictators' actions. Democrats using this
argument ought to be pretty reluctant with criticism against dictator states.
If we were to accept the idea that the authorities may do exactly as they
like as long as the inhabitants possess the freedom to emigrate, torture,
gagging of the freedom of speech
and violation of the right to organize
etc. would be acceptable. By accepting small right violations as compulsory
taxation a sliding into more totalitarian tendencies might be the result.
Imagine a world consisting of 5 States: Stalin's Soviet, East Germany, North
Korea, Pol Pot's Kampuchea, and Hoxha's Albania. If a person in Soviet was not
satisfied, he could just move to North Korea; ergo liberty!!! And if the
whole world fuses to one World State, where are right-violated individuals to
move? To Mars? 7.6 The State's income
The proposals in this
section on how to finance the State's expenses are the author's thoughts and
are of course not mandatory for Rational Gaudism. However, avoidance of
violating nature-given rights in the efforts of generating income is
absolutely mandatory, and thus, the options are limited. 7.6.1 Compulsory taxation No taxation of individuals or
companies that involves initiation
of force is acceptable since it is right-violating (see Section 7.5 – 7.5.3).
Besides, it is possible to acquire enough money in alternative ways. When we
use the concept “compulsory taxation” through this document, we mean
“taxation by initiation of force”
unless something else is directly specified; forced taxation may be legitimate
if it involves retaliation against initiated force. The following incorrect statement may be tried used for
justifying compulsory taxation: The individual does not have the right to
liberty in Rational Gaudist meaning since a presumptive contract (see Section
5.3.2.4) is entered between “the society” and the child at birth (or at
conception) on paying back their upbringing expenses and pay for the benefits
that the child is born into (goods obtained by “the society” through
centuries of technological development). As an adult, the individual must
fulfill this contract by paying taxes (and accepting other intrusions). Correcting
answer: Contractual freedom arises as a consequence of the fact
that adult individuals use their right to liberty to voluntarily enter
into a contract (see Section 5.3); the contractual freedom is a
subgroup of the right to liberty (see Section 5.7). It is totally
meaningless to argue that a newborn or unborn child can enter into a contract
since it does not have the right to liberty. It is impossible to refer
to the contractual freedom to refute the right to liberty since
the contractual freedom is based on the right to liberty. 7.6.1.1 “Confiscation via collateral damage” Will Rational Gaudism accept
compulsory taxation if it is not possible to maintain the judiciary system (child welfare services
included),
Police and military defense by legitimate methods? The answer to this is no. But in such a situation,
criminal persons or foreign governments initiate force against the citizens,
and the State may be accidentally “pushed”
by the criminals into citizens' property, confiscating some of
their property in exercising self-defense on behalf of the citizens
(collateral damage). This confiscation is not legitimate, but the initiators of force, and thereby the right-violator, are the criminals and not the State. All blame rests entirely
on the criminals, but only if the State has done its utmost to minimize the collateral
damage (see also Section 6.3.1), included maximum efforts to obtain
legitimate income to fund Police, military defense and the judicial system. The collateral damages must clearly involve less right
violations in the long-term perspective than what the crimes are expected to yield. In practice, the confiscation is carried out resembling compulsory
taxation but should be called “confiscation via collateral damage” (see
Section 10.3.2). “Confiscation
by collateral damage” can by its very nature only be used for retaliation –
and its preparation – against rights violations (criminal persons and states)
as well as escape from rights violations (asylum seekers and child welfare)
since the principle requires the presence of a right violator urgently
forcing the State into another person property in its mandatory defense of
the nature-given rights. Thus, alleged crime-preparing measures such as
social support, leisure clubs, social housing construction and the like
cannot be paid with funds that are “confiscated by collateral damage”.
Therefore, it is only the State's mandatory tasks that can be financed in
this way; i.e. military defense, police and the judiciary (including child
welfare). The
State's use of “confiscation via collateral damage” is without right
violation only if all possible legitimate collection methods (see Sections
7.6.2 – 7.6.9) unsuccessfully have been used to try to fully fund
the obligatory tasks of the State. However, it is impossible for the State to
immediately stop the financing of all non-compulsory tasks. All increase in
financing of non-compulsory tasks must be stopped while “confiscation via
collateral damage” is ongoing. Any increase in legitimate income must be used
to reduce the need for “confiscation via collateral damage” for the mandatory
tasks, and the State is obliged to seek to reduce the costs of non-mandatory
tasks. The rest of section 7.6 shows that financing of the State's compulsory
tasks is generally possible without “confiscation via collateral damage”. The
latter is only relevant to use in an exceptional situation. The principle can
also be used for topsoil protection and expropriating private property (with
full compensation from “legitimate” sources) even in a situation with normal
financing of State expenses if this is absolutely necessary as the very last
resort for carrying out the State's obligatory
tasks (e.g. a road needed for military transport, but which can also be used
for other transport). Persons
who arrive in emergency (danger to life, mutilation or permanent disability)
as an obvious consequence of right violations can also use the principle of “confiscation via collateral damage” if the State
is in an emergency situation as described in this section. In order to attain
civilized forms, the needy ones must use the State as their extended “hand”, which
means that the State reinforces the instruments already used under the
State's “confiscation via collateral damage”.
The increased revenues are used strictly to cover their emergency expenses.
In retrospect, the State has to try to force the right violators to cover the
citizens' losses caused by the confiscation. If the State is in a normal
situation, the State has to help the needy from its usual budget. In
principle,
the citizens should be compensated when their funds are being destroyed via
collateral damage, but the State has no obligation to provide such
compensation since the State has not initiated force. It is only the
criminals who have an obligation to pay back and therefore, the State should
use fines against right-violators, when possible, to reduce the effects of the collateral damages (see Section 7.6.8). 7.6.2
Mandatory Liability Insurances Police, judiciary and penal care: Nobody may exclude the possibility of
committing right-violating actions in the future. It is considerable costs associated
with stopping (Police), prosecuting (administration of justice) and punishing
(prisons) a criminal. Basically, a criminal should pay for the costs that he
imposes on society – it is not the victims or other citizens who are to be
blamed. In order to have guarantees for the existence of funds to pay for the
costs that one's right-violating actions inflicts on the society, all
inhabitants may be obligated to pay for a mandatory insurance which are to
pay for Police, administration of justice and prisons. This is comparable to
demanding mandatory liability insurance for car owners in order to be able to
pay for those injuries and damages that one's driving may impose on others. A
person who refuses paying premium for this insurance exposes other inhabitants
for a danger (associated with fear) of not being able to finance those
expenses that are necessary to handle his possible future crimes. According
to point 2(iii) in Section 4.1.1 this may be regarded as a right-violating
action and thus, the State may force the person to pay premium for such
insurance. This also legitimizes a public register where each citizen has his
unique identification number. Inhabitants
with income exceeding a certain limit have to pay full insurance premium.
Persons with lower income have to get the insurance premiums subsidized by
legitimately acquired state funds (see Sections 7.6.3 – 7.6.8). The subsidies
ought to increase gradually and “smoothly” with decreasing quality on the
citizens' economy. Persons having committed crimes or are in risk groups
thereof, may be imposed higher premiums (but some of these may be so high
compared with the economical ability that they in practice have to be
subsidized by the State). The insurance premiums will cover a significant
part of the State's expenses to Police, administration of justice and
prisons, while the rest of the expenses have to be covered by the subsidies
mentioned above. Infection medicine and psychiatry: With approximately the same argumentation
the citizens may also be compelled to pay for a mandatory insurance for
financing parts of infection medicine and psychiatric care. The former can be
financed by all individuals paying a compulsory insurance premium as a
percentage of their personal income (with upper and lower ceilings) with the
following justification: A rich person can infect a poor person who in turn
can infect a third person. Thus, both the rich and the poor person are
theoretically liable for the spread of infection to the third person, but
since the poor cannot pay, the rich must take the whole bill. Child welfare services: Children may find themselves in a situation
where their parents are unable to care for them physically or economically.
The parents have a duty to comply with the parental duties (see sections 4.3
- 4.3.1), and this also means securing the child in the event that the
parents are not able to fulfill the parental duties. Therefore, the State
should order the parents to insure the child against parental failure; in
other words, the parents must pay a compulsory insurance in addition to the
compulsory health insurance. Parents with good economy over a certain limit
must pay the entire insurance themselves. Parents with poorer advice must
gradually get the insurance subsidized by the State with funds provided by
the State without initiation of force. In this way, much of the child welfare
service will be financed through parents' insurance premiums. How
will the financing of poor parents' insurance take place in a situation with “confiscation via third-party damage” for financing the compulsory tasks? Such
parents commit a right violation by not securing the child by paying the
premium for “child welfare insurance”. They philosophically force (“push”) the child
into another person's property to confiscate funds to pay for the insurance,
and in this way the confiscation is to be regarded as collateral damage. In
practice the child cannot carry out this emergency confiscation by itself, so
therefore, the State must confiscate on behalf of the child. This can e.g. be
done by imposing a small sales tax on certain goods. 7.6.3
Income based on natural monopolies 7.6.3.1 Road fees, electricity
fee etc. Under Rational Gaudism, a private
road owner may demand the road fee (toll money) that implies the maximization
of the economical profit of the company inside the limitations of Section
5.5.3 and 6.6.3. Regulating the price would be a violation of the property right of the company.
Similarly, the State may, as the owner of the public road net, demand the
toll money that maximizes the economical profit of the State, but this will
be limited by the principles of Section 5.5.3 and 6.6.3, increased use of
motor bikes (see Section 6.6.1), dissatisfaction of the voters, problems for
trade and industry, and some fear for the arising of single-standing
competing private roads since such competition cannot be outlawed (while
competing national road nets are de
facto impossible).
Because
of the arguments above it will not be rational to sell State owned roads.
Especially roads around and inside the cities will be ideological correct
milking cows for the State in order to gain money without initiating force
against individuals. The State may gain significantly more money from such toll
money than the cost of sustaining them. The State is in a legitimate
monopoly-like situation and may, if desired, refuse private roads to attach
to already existing roads. Besides, State ownership of most of the roads will
be a practical advantage (see Section 6.6). The roads will be equipped with digital
cameras photographing the license plates of the cars, and on this basis,
bills will be sent to the car owners according to each car's use of public
roads. An alternative system may involve electronic devices in all cars that
are recorded by the GPS satellite, and the car owner's bank account is
automatically debited. The electricity net is to be
considered as a natural monopoly that the State ought to continue to own for
using as a legitimate income source, and the reason for this is the same as
for the roads. Similar evaluations may be done for other natural monopolies,
e.g. the water and sewer system. The State should continue to possess the
rights of the waterfalls that are already in public possession since this can
be viewed as a perpetual cash flow. However, the private sector may have an
important contributory role. An alternative to State ownership
of roads and other natural monopolies is the following: The State sells the
natural monopolies to private companies with significant clauses in the sales
contracts (regulations, taxations etc.). The sale profit will depend on the
strictness of the clauses, and this money will be invested in the State Stock
Fund making it larger with the prosperity of significant more annual income
than stipulated in Section 7.6.10. 7.6.3.2 Transport fees resembling sales tax As mentioned in Section 7.6.1,
compulsory taxation is right-violating. Nevertheless, it is legitimate for
the State to demand payment for the use of State property according to the
principle of market price as long as the State does not have law prohibition
against competition. Therefore, the State ought to introduce a transport fee
on goods (inclusive persons) on State roads (see also Section 6.6.3 and
7.6.3.1), and may e.g. be collected in the following way: Merchants
paying sales tax today, continue paying a similar tax, but now called
“transport fee”. This fee ought to be about 4-5 % on average of customer's price.
But by proving as predominately probable that the State's roads are not used
for transporting the goods, they avoid the fee completely. Digital goods
being uploaded or downloaded via Internet are obvious examples of the latter.
If transporting the goods
takes place with helicopter or drones or only on private roads, the fee is
avoided. The
transport fee is zero for services taking place off-road. It should be
different steps in this transport fee depending on the degree of road use for
transporting the goods: e.g.; some use of roads: 2 %; normal use of roads: 4
%; a lot use of roads: 7 %. This will resemble today's sales
tax. It is important that the State shows moderation with respect to the size
of the fee otherwise some of the following may occur in order to avoid the
fee: Stores may be located very near the borders of the country or the sea,
floating stores at sea, use of drones, helicopters or private airports to
transport the goods. Such transport fees will not be right-violating
according to the principles of Section 6.6.3 as long as the sum of the fees
in Section 7.6.3.1 and 7.6.3.2 does not significantly exceed legitimate road
price (see Section 6.6.3). 7.6.3.3 Restricted printing of money Using the monetary system
described in Section 10.7.4, the State can provide funding for the State budget without creating inflation by
printing a quantity of electronic money making the total money supply
increase in line with the increase in real GDP. Printing more money than this
means taking money from people's pockets and is therefore illegitimate.
Printing less money than described is not illegitimate, but generally
considered to be unwise since people will generate profits by having money in
the mattress. 7.6.4 The State Stock Fund A paragraph in the General Constitution ought
to state that if the State sells public property, the income is not to be
used for the running expenses of the State. The income is to be used for
investments in new, important property (e.g. Police Station, prisons, administration
building) or to join the State Stock Fund. Since the State has the eternity
as time perspective, the fund ought to invest in the leading emergency
markets of the world. 8-10 % of this Stock fund may be used each year for the
financing of the State's running expenses. This will statistically be a
sustainable management of the fund. Rent income from the State property,
dividends, interest income exceeding the inflation etc. may be used for
running the State. If the State is to be owner in companies inside its own
jurisdiction, the State's ownership in each company usually ought not to
exceed 25% (does not apply for natural monopolies) and usually, the State
usually ought to be a passive owner through the State Stock Fund. 7.6.5
Taxation of interactions with right-violating states
With similar argumentation a lot of
other interactions with
elements in right-violating states
may be taxed; some examples follow: plane travels, tourist operators, sale of
imported goods, companies' abroad enterprises; dividends, gains and
transaction of foreign stocks, and the enterprises of foreign companies. If and to what extent such taxation is rational,
has to be evaluated for each single case. The
purpose is to encourage the regime to stop its right violations and to
encourage the importers, exporters, companies and individuals to look for
commerce partners in freer countries. It will not, under any circumstances,
be acceptable to tax interactions with companies or individuals in a
completely legitimate, foreign state. The revenues from these taxes should be
used to finance the military defense since the existence of right-violating
states is the only basis for maintaining such a defense. Funds from such taxes can also be
used to subsidize agriculture for food security in the event of future war. In a completely free world getting
funds through such taxation will be impossible, but on the other hand, the
need for funding military defense will not exist in such a scenario. 7.6.6 Environmental fines Some environmental fees (or fines)
may be legitimate. In order to be justified it has to be proven in a court
that the sum of the effects of the fined product influences the environment
negatively in such a way that nature-given rights of individual humans or
animals are violated (see Section 6.5). There have to be strong scientific
evidences for this harmful, right-violating effect. The fines ought to be so
high that the total emissions are reduced to a level that is not
right-violating. The fines may be significantly higher than what is needed in
order to repair the damages; the objective is to prevent damages to occur. 7.6.7 Citizenship fee The State may take a fee for being
a national of the State through the voluntary contract that is accepted when
the individual at the age of majority (or later) chooses to become (or stay)
a national of the country. The State may not refuse non-nationals to stay in
the country since all individuals of the world have a nature-given right to liberty, and the State is obliged
to defend this right for everyone staying inside the borders of the country.
The fee ought to be in line with the advantages obtained by being a national
compared to be without citizenship; otherwise very few would accept
citizenships. These advantages are listed in Section 5.4.2. A suitable fee
may be $500 a year. 7.6.8 Other fees The State is not to impose
fees and taxes etc. for carrying out monopoly services on defense of
nature-given rights and then refusing the implementation of the services for
those who do not pay (see Section 7.5.2). The State may take fees for public
services that are not monopoly services in defense of individual rights (see
e.g. section 5.3.1.2). The State ought to use powerful fines in stead of
imprisoning for economical criminals and other well-situated persons when
imprisonment is not necessary for preventing new crimes. Persons or companies being forced
to pay compensation to another party through a judicial process may have
committed right-violating actions, and if so, they may be forced to pay a fee
to the State for covering costs of the administration of justice. The fee ought to proportionally linked to the
amount of compensation. If a person with all senses alert
buys a product that is dangerous only for him, the State does not need to
worry. It is basically his own problem (and people or organizations that
voluntarily want to help him) as long as there is no swindle involved from
the seller. Thus, State taxation of tobacco, alcohol and drugs is not a
legitimate means for financing the users' health costs, but it may happen
that health insurances companies (e.g. see Section 7.6.11) in one or another
way will increase the premiums for people who smoke or drink alcohol. Alcohol
and drugs may influence some users to commit right-violating actions, and
this clearly increases with the intake of substances. This increases the financial
load on the budget of Police, administration of justice and prison system.
Therefore, a part of the mandatory liability insurances in Section 7.6.2 may
consist of a percentage fee on tobacco, alcohol and other substances. 7.6.9 Voluntary Citizen Contributions All citizens and companies may be asked for voluntary
contributions to the State for financing important tasks. This contribution
is a low percentage (e.g. 5 %) of the income/surplus or of everything you
purchase. Basically, the incitement for such donations will be too small for
weighing heavily in the State treasury (see Section 10.9.1). In order to
increase this incitement without violating any nature-given rights, all
contributors have to accept being registered in an Internet register (similar
to Tax Lists) – a positive reputation list showing who taking part in the
Citizen Contribution System and paying the requested percentage. No register
of non-payers will exist since that would be initiation of force, and thus
right-violating, but by examining the names of the contributors the
elimination method will easily unveil the non-contributors. If a sufficiently
large part of the population mean that the tasks, which the citizen
contributions are to finance, are important, non-contributing persons and
companies may be met with breach of social relations or market boycott
(however, harassment / psychical violence is not legitimate). The awareness
of this may be rational incitements to participate in the voluntary Citizen
Contribution System (see also Section 10.8, paragraph 6-7). 7.6.10 Balance According to the
income suggestions presented above, a state of the size and economical power
of the United Kingdom ought to be able to generate an income of about $320-$350 billon
(2004) according to the following accounting:
* Is funded partly by the State (fundamental education included),
partly by the parents. The State contributes more the less the parents earn.
Parents with the lowest income receive 100% State funding. The richest
parents have to pay all child expenses themselves (inclusive fundamental
education included). For a surplus up to $150 billion
it is possible to carry out some social politics, e.g. subsidizing the Voluntary
Welfare Insurances in an emergency. In addition local income may be
acquired by the principles of Section 5.2.6. The rates, which the table is based on, may
be adjusted somewhat up, and increased income may be obtained. It is also
possible to use the minimum of non-right-violating money collection that is
needed for financing the expenses of the obligatory tasks of the State
without any additional State expenses (but that is not recommendable). A
compromise between these alternatives is also possible. There are many
possibilities inside a Rational Gaudist frame. 7.6.11 Voluntary welfare system There ought to be an arrangement
where the inhabitants voluntarily make choices on a “tax form” for
national-wide insurance with respect to health, disability, eldercare and
pension. Each
voluntary member of this arrangement pays some percents of his income in
insurance premium: Voluntary Insurance of Health Care: When you come of age (18 years
old), you have to take a very important decision: “Am I going to join the ‘Voluntary
Insurance of Health Care’ or not?” If you say “yes”, you are obliged to
pay X % of your income to the Voluntary Insurance of Health Care each
year, basically for the rest of your life. The Voluntary
Insurance of Health Care may automatically be initiated when adult
citizenship is acquired (see Section 5.4.2); if so, you have to actively renounce these
insurances if you want to avoid paying premium. Probably, it ought to be an
upper limit in dollars on how much one person can pay in annual premium; this
in order to not frighten away too many wealthy humans. At
the time point when you come of age, it will usually be difficult to predict
for the future if you become poor, rich or in the middle, and usually it is
difficult to know if you will be much sick or healthy. By participating in
the system you will both have health insurance and insurance against low
income preventing you from paying a traditional private health insurance. Diseases with onset before you
come of age will be covered by the mandatory Child Insurance (see Section
4.3.5). If you choose
not to join, you have to use private insurance, your own savings or
rudimentary arrangements based on charity. If you want to join after having
been a non-member for a number of N years, you have to pay the insurance
premium for these N years minus what you would have been expected to pay for
private insurance during the same years, and the insurance will not cover
expenses for already onset diseases. If you want to resign from this
insurance system after having been a member for a number of M years, a kind
of contract breach has occurred, and you have to pay the expected price for
private insurance through these M years minus what you actually have paid to
the Voluntary Insurance of Health Care. Voluntary Welfare Insurances: A corresponding
insurance system may apply for disabilities (minimum insurance), minimum
pension and eldercare.
With a joint conception it may be called the “Voluntary Welfare
Insurances”. Unemployment benefit and sickness benefit are proportional
to the income, and insurance for this may be carried out through a trade
union or a private insurance company where the premium is a tiny share of the
income. But having these insurances as voluntary elements in the Voluntary
Welfare Insurances will of course not be right-violating. Those who voluntarily join all parts of the Voluntary Welfare Insurances may receive social welfare benefits;
the expenses for this are small and are included in the premium of the
different parts of the system (see the table). But this will potentially
weaken the sustainability of the Voluntary Welfare Insurances, and it cannot be excluded that the expenses for
social welfare benefits ought to be partly supported with funding from
the State budget. Persons who
skip at least one of the insurances in the Voluntary Welfare Insurances have to rely completely on private charity in stead of social
welfare benefits. Rich and poor: Some persons who become rich during life or who strongly expect at
the age of 18 to be rich in the future (e.g. children of rich parents), will
probably skip the Voluntary Welfare Insurances, but they will not
debit this system either. The fact that rich people avoid paying large
compulsory social expenses will be a strong incitement for staying in the
country, and at the same time rich foreigners will be attracted to the
country. This will be a large economical advantage for ordinary people, and
thereby for the strength of the Voluntary Welfare Insurances, because
of the positive consequences that will be created by the investments and
consumption of the rich. These advantages will probably surpass the
“disadvantage” that many rich people will skip the Voluntary Welfare
Insurances. If
problems should arise with too many poor participants contra “good payers”,
the State may subsidize them with surplus from other incomes, or the poorest
may be demanded to pay a certain fixed amount of dollars as a minimum
premium. This last option will perhaps encourage some of the poorest to skip
the Voluntary Welfare Insurances and be left to private charity, but
this may be an uttermost emergency solution if the sustainability of the Voluntary
Welfare Insurances should be threatened. One
of the pillars of the Voluntary Welfare Insurances is that when you
become at age you do not know so much about your future health condition, and
neither if you will be rich, poor or in the middle. The latter may be a
problem in nations that are more class-divided than e.g. the Scandinavian
countries. Increased degree of class division will probably require more
State subsidies into the Voluntary Welfare Insurances. Transition and challenges: The compulsory National Insurance of today will
gradually be transferred to the Voluntary Welfare Insurances. The new
system will either be owned by the State, or it may be organized as a
cooperative where the insurance members are equal owners. Private insurance
companies may probably compete on carrying out the administrative and
practical tasks connected to the Voluntary Welfare Insurances in order
to achieve maximum efficiency. Irrespective of ownership, the State will be a birth helper for
transforming the compulsory system into the new voluntary system. A State
including such a system may be called a
voluntary welfare state and may be regarded as a reformation of the
existing welfare state.
It will probably be easier to introduce the Voluntary Welfare Insurances when the starting point is a compulsory
system than if it was to be introduced de novo. The
inhabitants are used to the compulsory National Insurance system, and the new
system will be its “light” version, and it is expected that many (80-90 %)
will join such a system. The motivation to pay premium to the “light” system
is the fear of the consequences by being sick, unemployed, disabled, poor
etc, while for today's compulsory system the motivation is the fear of
imprisonment if you do not pay tax. The new voluntary system will be easier
to accomplish in a country with relatively high social motility, and it will
probably work best if it is more catastrophic oriented than today's
compulsory National Insurance system. The following factors will be decisive
for the practical success of the Voluntary Welfare Insurances system: 1) the degree of catastrophic
orientation, 2) the strictness of the criteria, 3) in which way the premiums
depends on the income (e.g. an inversely progressive or constant percentage),
4) the mean size of the premiums, 5) subsidies from the State (even if this
ought to be utterly avoided). By adjusting these factors by HDM, it is highly probable that the Voluntary
Welfare Insurances will function well.
Foreigners: Basically, the Voluntary Insurance of Health Care may include both immigrants and persons who have
grown up and come of age in the country, but the rules on paying compensation
when joining the system N years after the 18th
birthday (or when you resign) will apply to everyone. A forty years old
immigrant has perhaps paid a significant amount of premium or tax to his
original fatherland during the last 22 years, which to a large extent is
calculated to pay for problems at his older ages, and that State will now
avoid paying for his potential future problems. Therefore, the Voluntary Insurance of Health Care may have an agreement with his
nation of birth on completely or partly covering the compensation. If there
are large differences between the economical levels of his originally home
State and the State he moves into (or if the two States do not have such an
agreement), he has to pay the part of the compensation that his original
fatherland does not pay. Alternatively, he may use completely private insurances. Health and reduction of expenses: Both the Voluntary Insurance of Health
Care and private health insurance companies will be interested in having
their customers as healthy as possible in their efforts to reduce costs.
Therefore, it is in their self-interest that people eat healthy and carry out
physical exercises. Thus, the Voluntary Insurance of Health Care may
introduce a system where e.g. food stores and health studios are offered a
scanner to scan the fingerprints (or irises) of willing customers who are
also members of the Voluntary Insurance of Health Care. Thereafter,
electronic signals are sent to the health insurance office about which
healthy foods the person has purchased. The healthier the shopping cart is,
the greater basis for reduction of the insurance premium will arise. Families
where mainly only one person makes the purchases may get registered in the
system that reductions in premiums are to be distributed between the family
members. Healthy people will obviously have an incentive to scan their finger
at payment, and the stores will have an incentive to accept the scanner in fear
of losing many healthy customers. Private insurance companies may also want
to use the scanner since they have the same health requirement for their
customers. There should be no penalty for the purchase of unhealthy foods
since the incentive to scan their finger will not be present in people with
unhealthy food intake. 7.6.11.1 An alternative to “The Voluntary Insurance of
Health Care” The system described in Section 7.6.11 is not
the only way to organize health insurance in a Rational Gaudist society. One
alternative may be the following (not least in a more class divided society): Basically,
all adult persons choose whether to take insurance or not, and if so, which
private insurance company to select. Those who have income above a certain
limit (e.g. 75 % of average income) must pay the entire insurance premium
themselves. Those who have income below this limit receive, in whole or in
part, subsidized health insurance by the State – of course with funds not
being forcibly acquired by the State. The subsidies should increase gradually
and “smoothly” with decreasing income; People with a lower level of income
(e.g. 30 % of average income) will get the entire insurance premium paid by
the State. These limits must be defined so that the system becomes sustainable
by using only the State's legitimately acquired funds for subsidies. The
State may have to decide which insurance company the subsidized persons are
to use to prevent them from choosing extravagant solutions. 7.6.12 “Altruistic”
bloodsucking Let us imagine two patients. One of them
needs kidney transplantation, while the other needs blood transfusion. If I
am antigen compatible, it would be correct from an altruistic way of thinking
to take blood and one kidney from me by force, and then transfuse and
transplant into my two fellow men. I do not need all my blood, and I can live
with one kidney! Most people will not accept such an extreme “altruism”. But
in today's society exactly the same is carried out at the economical area.
Money is taken from someone with the use of force in order to give it to
others with larger needs. The “altruist” will claim that taking money is
something else than taking body fluids and inner organs. That is in one way
correct, but on the other hand it is not so important to receive money
as it is to receive blood transfusion or kidney transplantation
either. As shown in Section 7.6 it is possible to finance a lot of State
projects without the initiation of force – in similar way as it is possible
to achieve blood and kidney from volunteers and recently deceased persons,
respectively. 7.6.13 The
transition period towards the Rational Gaudist society Radical changes are needed in order to
transform the society into Rational Gaudist principles, and such radical changes
can not be carried out overnight. There has to be a long transition period.
In order to change the present constitution and to implement the Superior
Constitution, parties sympathetic to the Rational Gaudist ideas must at least
have a majority of 2/3 in the National Assembly. But a lot of changes may be
carried through if the support for Rational Gaudism is between 50 % and 66.7
%. No political alteration during the transition period may point in the
direction of increased degree of right violation in the short-term or
long-term perspective; e.g. it is not acceptable to increase or
introduce new compulsory taxes even if others are removed or reduced as
compensation. In the transition period we have to accept compulsory taxes and
other right-violating regulations, but these have to be gradually reduced
until the State can make all its income and politics according to Rational
Gaudist principles. Persons having paid compulsorily for their own pensions
to the National Insurance have to get their future pension payments covered
by others paying compulsory taxes until Voluntary Welfare Insurances
completely take over. Thus, we may anticipate a transition period of
approximately 40 years before Rational Gaudism is completely implemented. The
State has from immemorial times obtained nearly all its property by means of
right-violating taxes, fees and regulations. When Rational Gaudism is
introduced, these properties will not be returned to the original owners.
Firstly, it is an impossible task, and secondly, there should be a statute of
limitations for State financial crimes carried out before the onset of the
Superior Constitution. IV. Aesthetics
8. The Rational Gaudist view of
art
The projection of the outer
reality into an individual's consciousness has been described in the chapter
2. The definition of art (artistic expression) is the projection of a part of
the consciousness of an individual into the outer reality. Thus, a painting of a landscape is
a reduced mirror image of a part of the reality, and the consciousness of the
artist works as the mirror; similarly if he paints a portrait of a person. We
may say that the artist works as a function y = ax, where “y” is the artwork
and “x” is sense perceptions from the outer reality, and “a” is a factor
significantly less than 1. Thus, a caricature cartoon is a mirror image of a
person with the consciousness of the artist as a mirror with “turn-around”
element. Art may be regarded as a function y = f(x1,x2,...,xn) where “xi” are sense perceptions from the
outer reality, “n” is the number of perceptions needed for creating the
impressions in the consciousness that the artwork is a consequence of, “y” is
the artwork, and the function “f” is the consciousness and skill of the
artist. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the
senses are used as vectors for projecting the outer reality into human
beings' consciousnesses. Art may be regarded as vectors for transferring the
ideas of the artist (through the senses) to the consciousnesses of other
people. Initially, the artist has the ideas inside his head, and then he
produces an artwork projecting these ideas into the consciousnesses of the
spectators / audience. Political or ethical ideas may be expressed through
the artwork. The fundamental purpose of the artist will always be that the
artwork (or the production of it) should be a contribution to maximize his
life-long sum of self-happiness. He may achieve self-happiness by other
people admiring or attaching other kinds of attention to the artwork; an
evolutionary mechanism for the artist to generate self-happiness through the
production of the artwork is given in Section 3.3.3.1. The artist may of
course also obtain happiness through the profits generated by his artwork. Each collection of fermions and
bosons is a tool for the individual in the pursuit of maximization of
self-happiness during his life span, and art is no exception. Therefore, each
individual ought to consume the kind of art that gives the maximum
contribution in the pursuit of happiness during his life span. Regarded from
a Rational Gaudist point of view, good art is defined from its ability to
influence positively on the long-term happiness of the maximum number of
individuals, which means that good art often will impact positively upon the
principles of Section 3.4. It is difficult to give a concrete definition of
“good Rational Gaudist art”, but loud music destroying the hearing or
glorifying right-violating actions may hardly be good art. God kunst
bør stimulere hjernen, f.eks. til å styrke sine dyder (se avsnitt 3.3.4),
ikke minst dyden oppfinnsomhet ved
å stimulere hjernens kreativitet. Art giving both short-term and long-term positive happiness effects is
better than art giving only positive short-term positive effects. The objective component in the
perception of beauty is believed to originate from evolutionary selection
mechanisms: e.g. a woman is perceived as beautiful if having relatively wide
hips relative to the waist since it indicates that there is plenty room for
the baby in the womb. Large breasts are perceived as beautiful since it
indicates good ability to give the upcoming baby milk. Symmetrical people
(and thereby symmetry also in other contexts) are perceived as beautiful
because a symmetrical body signals good health. Economical support from the State
is not regarded as acceptable policy. An artwork may exist only if someone voluntarily
wants to pay for it. If an artist creates an artwork without selling it, the
artist pays for the artwork with his own labor. V. Appendix
9. Appendix – Metaphysics, Epistemology,
Ethics
9.1 Level of
happiness and perception of happiness
The level of happiness is the sum of the
predisposing determinants that are present as the basis for perceiving happiness
and unhappiness. The individual has different levels of happiness at
different time points. Today I may live at a high level of happiness; in a
month I may live at a significantly lower level of happiness. Thus, we may
express the level of happiness as a function of time: L = f(t) If person A lives in a luxury castle, he
lives at a high level of happiness. If person B lives as a hobo, he lives at
a low level of happiness. If person A falls from living in his luxury castle
at time point t1 to live in a 20 m2 flat at time point t2, his life will be dominated by negative
perception of happiness in the period from t1 to t2. If person B moves into a 20 m2 flat, his life will be dominated
by positive perception of happiness in the same period (disregarding all
other factors influencing the perception of happiness). Therefore, positive
slope of the curve of level of happiness is associated with positive
perception of happiness, while negative slope is associated with negative
perception of happiness – independent of the present level of happiness.
Considering very low levels of happiness, a perception of unhappiness will
probably be present even if the level of happiness is not descending. Thus, it is rational to describe the sum of
happiness during the life span by Figure 3:
Figure 3: The sum of the perceptions of happiness
during the life span is proportional to the sum of the pale grey areas minus the
sum of the dark grey areas of Figure 3. ti expresses a maximum or minimum
point for f(t), where t0, t2, t4,…, tn are local minimum points and t1, t3, t5,…, tn-1 are local maximum points (t0 is the time of birth, tn is the time of death and f(t0) = f(tn) = 0). The number of extreme
points on f(t) through life is n+1. The above statements show that it
is rational to perform a relatively long-term build up of the level of
happiness. Inevitable setbacks ought to be taken as fast as possible, to be
followed by a long-term rebuild up of the level of happiness. The key for the
maximization of the sum of perceptions of happiness during the life span
seems to be to take the downs significantly faster than the ups. When you
understand that a given strategy for generation of happiness is close to its
local maximum of happiness level, you ought to start a new strategy in order
to restrain the loss of perception of happiness that necessarily has to
accompany the realization of this maximum. The very best would be to perform
a quick build up of the level of happiness and let it continue straight ahead
with high slope, but from experiences we know that no tree grows into heaven,
and that the setbacks are inevitable. 9.2 Religion – before and now
Religions (especially Christianity and Islam)
are founded on the principle that we are to follow “the Holy Writ” because it
originates from God and therefore, it is morally correct to comply. God is
perfect because the “Holy Book” says so, and the words of the Holy Book are
perfect because they are written or inspired by God. In this way, the
religions argue into a meaningless ring. Changes in society have occurred
as long as the human beings have existed on earth. These changes occur with
increasing speed, and an extrapolation of this development implies that
changes also will happen in the future, probably even more speedily.
Considering whatever change in the society, it is possible to produce new
hypotheses (or modifications of existing hypotheses) on how to organize and
govern the society. When new fossils are discovered, modified hypotheses may
be proposed on the origin and development of life. It is difficult to see how
rigid religious dogmas produced centuries ago can be the optional tool in the
pursuit of knowledge and understanding in a world affected by an increasingly
dynamic development. It is interesting to watch liberal
Christians. They twist and interpret the Bible in order to fit it into
left-winged point of views in such a way that femi-socialist and semi-Marxist
principles are superior to the real content of the Bible. In spite of the
fact that the Bible talks clearly about homosexuality as sin, the leftist
Christians are able to say that homosexuality is OK in the eyes of God. Of obvious reasons the Bible does
not condemn nuclear or gas-based power plants, but all the same the liberal
Christians are able to interpret the Bible's words on “human responsibility for
God's creation” as the main argument for condemning such power plants. The
same persons escape away from the clear cut statements of the Bible on the
unacceptability of homosexual practice. It could be oppositely argued that
nuclear or gas-based power plants will reduce the need for coal-based power
plants and thereby reducing the total amount of CO2 emissions and this will be a
better way of “taking responsibility for God's creation”. It
is all right to be both supporter and opponent of nuclear or gas-based power
plants, but do not use the Bible to support the one or another point of view.
Moses and Jesus did not know such power plants. Significant parts of the
Christianity have become the enlarged limb of the left-wing radicals. The essence in the above
statements is that the Christians of today are not able to resist the
hypothetical-deductive method overthrowing the religious dogma. The Christians ought
to face the consequences and establish a new forum of ethics eliminating all
divine dogmas but keeping parts of Christ's teaching as positive. On this
basis the Christians and humanists could fuse into a large ethical
organization. Religion may be regarded as
primitive hypothesis to explain the origin of the world, the development of
the species and how interhuman relations ought to be organized. At the time
point when the religions were founded it was a good scientific approach to
adopt these hypotheses as explanatory models since they were the best ones
available to explain the observed data. But when these are transferred into
dogmas that are to be excluded from empirical testing (HDM), religion and
science split apart. Thus, religion is basically primitive science which at
one point becomes dogmatic; the supporters of the religion are so in love
with their main hypotheses that these are nailed to the wall of dogmatism. As time goes by, more and more
observations will challenge the main hypotheses of religion, and the
religions will in an increasingly febrile manner be forced to search for
auxiliary hypotheses for rescuing the main hypotheses – without having any
independent reason for their existence (ad
hoc hypotheses). This strategy works for a while, but finally the main
hypotheses diminish completely until nobody really believes in them. At this
final point the main hypotheses has been transformed into “cozy” memorials
over an extinct faith. The religion of the liberal
Christians and human ethics will fuse into a common system on the premises of
human ethics (in the similar way as East and Western Germany fused on the
premises of Western Germany). Exactly the same development may be observed in
communism, another dogmatic ideology that gradually collapsed until nobody
really believed in its dogma – not even the members of the polit bureau of
the Communist party. 9.2.1 The God
hypothesis is de facto scientifically falsified Each time stones or other elements
have been dropped from above they have fallen to earth (we disregard the air
resistance). One hypothesis to explain the phenomenon is what we know as the Law of Gravitation. An alternative hypothesis states that it
is coincidental if the stone falls, ascends or flies out with one or another angle between 0 and 360;
the reason why stones until now in history always have fallen straight to
earth, is purely coincidental. According to
this alternative hypothesis, it is
completely uncertain which track a stone will follow next time such an
element is dropped (if the stone is to fall straight to earth also next time, it is still a pure coincident).
However, from the alternative hypothesis it is very unlikely that the stones
always have fallen straight to earth, but
statistical-theoretically it is not impossible. Even if you test the hypothesis
by dropping stones from above one million times, you cannot from a strictly
science-philosophical view say that the hypothesis
is directly falsified; this is caused by the
fact that you may introduce a very far-fetched auxiliary hypothesis (ad-hoc
hypothesis) stating that all stones have by pure chance fallen straight to earth until now in history. But in spite of the fact that we cannot directly falsify
the alternative hypothesis strictly science-philosophically, we will not
hesitate to say that the hypothesis is de
facto scientifically falsified since the
auxiliary hypothesis is absurdly improbable. In exactly
the same way we may falsify the hypothesis of (the Christian) Gods
existence: Let us regard the following hypothesis: “The
Christian / Jewish God exists.” This hypothesis means that God is perfect, almighty, good, that he has
created the world, and that he has revealed himself through the Bible (i.a.
by giving laws, rules and commandments). This
hypothesis is consistent with all relevant observations under presumption of
the presence of a number of auxiliary hypotheses. Let us briefly regard the
most important auxiliary hypotheses that have to be present in order to
support the main hypothesis for avoiding direct falsification and the well-foundedness
of each of these auxiliary hypotheses: 1)
There are many examples in the Bible that God apparently acts unwisely,
inconsistently, illogically and anti-almightily. Some examples follow: Why did the almighty
God create a very high number of uninhabited planets and solar systems with
the little human-inhabited Earth as a small grain of dust in the Universe (it
seems as a meaningless waste)? Why did God create the caretaker of his creation (i.e. Homo sapiens)
for only about 200,000 years ago, when the first multicellular life was
created somewhat less than 1 billion years ago? How can the human beings be
liberated from their sins by the death of God's son, Jesus; does God depend
on the sufferings of Jesus in order to be able to forgive our sins (but wait
a little, he did not die after all!)? Why does not the perfect, good and
almighty God eradicate all starvation, diseases, sufferings and poverty? Why
does not God cure everyone who prays for it (the frequency of healing by
prayers is not higher than what is expected from the placebo effect and
“spontaneous healing”)? Since it apparently is important for God to be
worshiped and obeyed, why does he not show himself clearly and unmistakably
so there is no doubt about his existence? An auxiliary hypothesis 1 has to be produced stating that
these remarks (and many similar incidents in the Bible and in present times)
are completely in accordance with a perfect, wise and almighty God even if it
may seem otherwise for us imperfect humans. Absence of auxiliary hypothesis 1
will imply falsification of the main hypothesis. 2)
There are many examples in the Bible where God acts in a way that easily is
perceived as evil. Some very few, but shocking examples follow here: Large
scale ethnical cleansing, directly ordered by God, in connection to the
recapturing of the land of Canaan (e.g. Joshua 6:21), execution of a man who
collected wood on the Sabbath day (4 Mos. 15:32-36), disobeying sons are to
be executed at the city wall, non-believers are to be tortured in Hell for
all eternity, the Sin Flood exterminated 99.9 % of the human population on
Earth. Laws, rules and punishments for breaking them were not significantly
different or more civilized in God's culture than in an average heathen
culture in biblical times. An auxiliary
hypothesis 2 has to be produced stating that these remarks (and many
similar incidents in the Bible) are completely in accordance with a good God
even if it may seem otherwise for us imperfect humans. Absence of auxiliary
hypothesis 2 will imply falsification of the main hypothesis. 3)
The rise of the Universe and the origin of life as explained in the Bible do
not agree with serious scientific research. Besides, Genesis has obviously
been influenced by the heathen religion of Babylon when the Jews were
captured there. There is no real scientific doubt that life has evolved
through evolution. An auxiliary
hypothesis 3 has to be produced stating that the present science in
this area is “quack” or that God has been involved in the evolution through
more than 3 billion years (why would an almighty God use 13.7 billion years
on creating the human beings and other mammals in a process where random
chemical reactions are tested against the existing environment??). Absence of
auxiliary hypothesis 3 will imply falsification of the main hypothesis. 4)
A large number of different religions have existed during the world history –
let us estimate the number to be 100. These religions have basically originated
in similar ways as Christianity and are concerned about the same phenomena.
Each of these religions will usually claim their truth approximately as
firmly as Christianity, and this “knowledge” has been established by the same
epistemological tools as used by Christianity, namely faith without hard
facts (by the way, the same applies to the “knowledge” about the Tooth Fairy,
Easter Bunny, goblins and trolls). According to Christianity, only the belief
in Jesus Christ as God's son gives salvation, while all other religions
(possibly except Judaism) are untruth and superstition. Thus, the Christians
admit that the use of their epistemological tools has produced a great lot of
“quack”. An auxiliary hypothesis 4
has to be produced stating that faith nevertheless is a good epistemological
tool for achieving truth. Absence of auxiliary hypothesis 4 will imply
falsification of the main hypothesis. Let us set the well-foundedness of
the auxiliary hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 to 10-3 while for auxiliary hypothesis 3 it
is set to 0,01 (Of course, it is impossible to give exact numerical values;
all we can say is that they are very low, and thus, numerical values are only
introduced for illustrating the epistemological principle behind the
argumentation). The product of the well-foundedness of the 4 auxiliary
hypotheses is 10-11, but we compensate by a factor of 10 because of some mutual
dependence between the auxiliary hypotheses, which means that the
well-foundedness of the hypothesis of the existence of the Christian / Jewish
God is ≤ 10-10. In this way the hypothesis of the existence of the Christian /
Jewish God is scientifically falsified de
facto (see Section 1.5.2, 1.5.6 and 2.3) when we simultaneously take into
consideration that it is very unlikely that the auxiliary hypotheses in the
future may become so much more well-founded that the God hypothesis crawls
above the de-facto-falsification cut-off (and besides, the next
sentences reveal alternatives that are much more well-founded). Only
absurd-philosophical considerations may give another answer (see also www.godisimaginary.com). 9.2.1.1 The well-foundedness of
other religions, deism and atheism If we anticipate the other 100
religions that have existed during the world history to have approximately
the same well-foundedness as Christianity, the probability for one or another
God to have real existence is ≤ 10-8. Thus, it is ≥ 0.99999999
probable that one of the three following statements are true: 1) One or
more unknown gods exist who want to be known and/or be worshiped by humans; 2) deism – an unknown God (or
several unknown gods) exists, but he does not want to be known or worshiped;
he has kick-started the Universe, the laws of nature and free will and does
not intervene against these (at least not yet), but he is in all probability
not almighty (see point 1 and 3 above; 3) atheism is true. It is very unlikely that point 1
is to be true since it requires the far-fetched ad hoc hypothesis that
it is perfectly OK that the God(s) has not yet revealed himself even if 100
billion humans have existed on earth since immemorial times. Therefore,
atheism/deism (point 2+3) is assumed to have ≥ 0.9999999 probability of
being correct. Deism implies a different concept
of God than what is normally associated with religion (“God” may be regarded
as a kind of physical force, energy or particle type), and this is de facto a form of semi-atheism that
may almost be regarded as an argumentation trick to deceive religious people
over to atheism (see Section 1.2.1.2). Nothing,
i.e. vacuum, has vacuum energy, and may be transformed to mass (E=mc2). Scientific “Genesis” assumes
that this vacuum energy initiated the Big Bang, which in turn gave birth to
the Universe as we know it today. In this way the energy resting in nothing may be regarded as a deistic
“Good” being the initiator of our universe. In this way deism and atheism may
merge. The hypothesis of vacuum energy,
Big Bang and inflation as the creator of the Universe takes part in a larger
theory network (namely modern physics) with large potential of prediction.
Thus, this theory network gives a significant “inheritance” of
well-foundedness to the main hypothesis (see Section 1.5.2). The hypothesis
of an unspecified deistic God (being outside the energies, particles and forces
of physics) as the creator of the Universe is very ad hoc since it does not take part in a theory with a additional
potential of prediction, and therefore, it does not “inherit” any
well-foundedness (Besides, the introduction of a deistic God does not solve
the problem of creation since a new being is introduced, namely the deistic
God, which also needs a genesis). Thus, the “Genesis proposed by physics” is regarded as a considerably
more well-founded hypothesis than the “unspecified deistic Genesis” (but even
the “Genesis proposed by physics” is supported by auxiliary hypotheses with
suboptimal degree of well-foundedness). Therefore, the deistic hypothesis
ought to be considered dethroned (unless we speak of e.g. vacuum energy as
the deistic God) but not to such an extent that it can labelled de-facto-falsified. The “Genesis
proposed by physics” ought to be adopted as the best available explanatory
model for the origin of the Universe. 9.2.1.2 Liberal Christianity Liberal Christians “put under the
carpet” and interpret those parts of the Bible that they do not like (such cherry-picking
is typical crackpot epistemology) claiming that God did not carry out or order the bad
and unwise stuff stated in points 1-3 in Section 9.2.1. Then the well-foundednesses
of the auxiliary hypotheses 1-3 increase significantly. But it is a very large potential
for interpreting and “under-the-carpet-putting” (about 4000 episodes through
the Bible), and by claiming that the unpleasant parts of the Bible are not
God's work, a dark shadow will also fall over the credibility of the divinity
of the other verses of the Bible. There are a waste number of combinations of what you can “put under
the carpet” and interpret according to your own agenda or political view,
which reveals a strong suspicion that such an understanding of “God” is a
pure human work without any credible divine touch. If divinity is to have
credibility, the biblical texts should form the culture; the culture should
not form the meaning of the Bible (i.e. the word of God). To avoid direct
falsification of the “God hypothesis” you have to introduce an auxiliary hypothesis 5 stating
that exactly your combination of
“carpet puttings” and interpretations represents the real wisdom of God among
a waste number of alternative combinations (why could not a perfect and
almighty God state his wisdom clear cut so nobody needs to live in false
wisdom?). The well-foundedness of auxiliary hypothesis 5 is lower the more
liberal the interpretations and “carpet puttings” are. A more fundamentalist
Bible reading will give higher well-foundedness of auxiliary hypothesis 5,
but the well-foundedness of the auxiliary hypotheses 1-3 will be
significantly lower than for liberal Christianity. Thus, a liberal
Christianity is not necessarily more credible than a more fundamentalist one.
But if you wipe out
the idea of divinity, Christianity has no problems with the “God hypothesis”
(see Section 9.2.1.3). 9.2.1.3 Respectable
Christianity As shown in Section 9.2.1 the
hypothesis of the existence of the Christian God is de facto scientifically falsified since the product of the
well-foundedness of its auxiliary hypotheses, which have to be introduced to
avoid direct falsification, is absurdly low. Thus, there is no reason to have
respect for the claim that the Christian God exists; delusions are, with all
respect, something that do not deserve respect. However, all human beings deserve respect (in
variable amounts) included those who bear this delusion. It may though be
regarded as respectable to force yourself to believe in this delusion during
a personal crisis, e.g. in the terminal phase, in order to induce a placebo
effect for avoiding psychical injury (similarly, it may be rational to use
morphine for reducing extreme pain even if daily use is dissuaded). One
type of Christianity that does deserve respect is a philosophy identifying
all references to divinity in the Bible as superstition of ancient times,
which are caused by lack of technology and rational epistemological
principles. Furthermore, this respectable type of Christianity states that so
large parts of Christ's philosophy is very good that its supporters choose to
call themselves Christians. But
they retain the right to dissociate from the parts of Christ's teaching that
are outdated and negative, while the whole or most of the Old Testament are
“trashed”. Such respectable Christianity is not religion, but Christian human
ethics (Christianity and human ethics merges). However, this type of
Christianity is not in accordance with Rational Gaudism, but it
deserves nevertheless respect since it is not epistemologically absurd. 9.2.2 Why is
agnosticism wrong? An agnostic will claim that it is
meaningless to make a statement on whether (the Christian) God exists or not,
since we never will be able to know anything certain about it. The problem is
an exemplification of the fact that a hypothesis almost always may avoid
direct falsification by using sufficiently far-fetched auxiliary hypotheses
as crutches. As shown in sections 2.3 and 9.2.1 the hypothesis of the
existence of God may absurd-philosophically escape direct falsification by
being supported by several very far-fetched ad hoc hypotheses, but the product of their well-foundedness is
so extremely low that the God hypothesis de
facto is scientifically falsified. Being an agnostic is in practice as
absurd as saying that you will not make any statement whether a given stone
will fall to earth when dropping it from 1 meters height next new year
evening, since we absurd-philosophically can not exclude that the stone will
rise into the sky at this time point; induction from a finite number of known
observations can not yield absolute certainty about the general case (se
Section 1.8). You can introduce an ad
hoc hypothesis stating that a shift in the Universe will happen at/before
this time point reversing the gravitation, or you may apply the alternative
hypothesis of Section 9.2.1! Considering the question whether the Flying Spaghetti Monster exists
or not, an agnostic must say that sufficient knowledge will probably never be
present to settle the issue, and therefore he will not take a stand on the
question. 9.3 Can
morality be completely objective?
A given action has been performed
by person A. When he made the action choice, he believed that this particular
alternative of action was the best tool in the pursuit of the maximization of
the sum of happiness during his life span, and that no other alternative of
action would work better given the present reality. But to what extent was
this “belief” based on an optimal rational evaluation? We
will try to come as close as possible to an objective evaluation of this
question; the goal is to decide if the action is completely immoral, completely
moral or exactly X % immoral. Then we have to consider to what extent person
A followed the principles of Section 3.4. The closest we can get to an
objective evaluation of the question whether the action of person A was moral
(rational) is the following: A group of persons, which have experiences with
similar actions, has to evaluate to what extent person A followed the
principles of Section 3.4, which also includes that the group ought to have
the best possible knowledge of how A experiences happiness from different
consequences (whether this evaluation is performed before or after the
consequences actually have occurred does not matter since they are to
consider what A could predict or ought to predict at the time point for the
choice of action). The “experts” will probably arrive
at somewhat different evaluations since there are so many factors influencing
their consciousnesses (see Section 2.2.1) even if “the expert panel” makes
the judgements from the philosophical
considerations in Section 3.4. But often there will be a
non-insignificant degree of consensus since the “experts” consider similar
actions that in fact have occurred in the world of reality independently of
any subjective consciousnesses. On this basis, we can never completely objectively
(independent of the observing subjects) say that a choice of action is
immoral (irrational) or exactly how immoral (irrational) it is. The best we
can obtain is a best
possible objective judicial evaluation whose degree of consensus – described by “inverse
standard deviation” – usually is proportional to the degree of objectivity in
the morality / rationality. Considering
a given murder, the evaluations will perhaps be that the action was 99-100 %
immoral/irrational. Intersubjectively, we may say that the action was 99.5 %
immoral/irrational with a standard deviation of 0.5 %. Considering a man who
took a 10 minutes walk and unfortunately was hit in his head by a meteorite,
the evaluation will probably be in the range of 0 and 0.00000001 for immorality/irrationality.
Theoretically, also this action is only intersubjectively morally correct,
but for all practical purposes we may say that his walk objectively is
completely free for immorality. 9.4 Examples of TEM actions
9.4.1
Examples of irrational TEM actions A beggar sits on a pavement and
half-sleeps in front of a mug with some money inside. A pedestrian puts $5
inside the mug. Why? What is the real motive power? The
most important motive power is a strengthening of his self-image if the
self-picture is to be a helpful person, and he makes the evaluation that this
strengthening of the self-picture has a value of more than $5. Or expressed
in Rational Gaudist terms: He has previously built up a self-picture in his
consciousness of a helpful person, and to sustain this self-picture he has
implemented the sense of duty “perform helping actions”, i.e. TEM. The
consciousness gives him a short-term perception of happiness when donating
$5. But the presence of tertiary self-happy motivation does not exclude
simultaneous presence of the two other types of motivation: He
thinks that he could have been in a similar situation himself, and this
thought makes him afraid. The donation of $5 contributes to a reduction of
this fear. This is PEM where the instinct of fear gives a perception of
unhappiness, which is suppressed by donating the money. The donor may also
achieve a feeling of being strong when another human has to accept support
from him. The motive power has to be characterized as primary self-happy
motivation. Perhaps the beggar says “thank you” when he drops the coin into
the mug, and this gives the donor happiness that is worth more than $5 for
him. The motive power is secondary self-happy motivation. If
he is a Christian, he may donate money to obtain good-will in the eyes of God
in order to reduce the probability of entering Hell and to increase the
probability of entering Heaven. This is SEM where the motive power is a
(irrational) pursuit of reward or fear of punishment. A person passes the pot of the
Salvation Army and donates $10. Why? Nobody says “thank you”. There is nobody
in the neighborhood watching the donation. What is the motive power? The
tertiary self-happy motivation is exactly the same as mentioned in the
example above. The same applies partly for PEM, while SEM (receiving a “thank
you”) is absent. A lot of private charity,
voluntary communal work etc. is based on tertiary self-happy motivation. A girl goes to church in spite of
the fact that this primarily gives her a negative perception of happiness.
She goes to church because she has a self-picture telling her that she is a
bad human being if she do not, and she has a corresponding sense of duty
saying “go to church” to sustain this self-picture (i.e. TEM). She has
implemented this sense of duty as a consequence of the exhortations from the
Pope. If she skips the church visit, her self-picture will give her a
perception of unhappiness, which is even stronger than the primary one. A typical presentation of
“altruism” as an ethical ideal is found in the novel series of Olav Duun
“Juvikfolket”. In the last volume, The Storm, the evil Lauris and the
good Odin have competed in sailing and the overturned boat are able to keep
only one of them floating. Odin, who is the strongest one, let Lauris sit on
the overturned boat, and Odin chooses the death. Odin sacrifices his life,
and he does so because he, according to the writer, is a better human than Lauris.
At the first glance, this seems as a pure altruistic action. How is it
possible to explain this type of action with self-happy motivation? If Odin
does not scarify his life, he will regard himself as a coward the rest of his
life (tertiary self-happy motivation), and he is perhaps afraid that other
people are to look upon him with similar eyes (secondary self-happy
motivation). The reflection on the bad feeling, which this consequence will
give him the rest of his life, makes him calculate the death as a less worse
alternative. Considered in the light of the reality, it is very probable that
Odin makes a miscalculation. For people doubting self-happy motivation in this case, it is referred
to aristocrats who in earlier times were willing to risk their life in a duel
in order to re-establish their honor for what others would perceive as a
microscopic defamation.
The thought of living with the defamation the rest of their life was worse
than the thought of losing their lives. 9.4.1.1 The effect of “a mouse
piddling in the ocean” The politics carried out by the present
government is a part of the reality influencing my choices of actions. In
practice, I have very small opportunities for changing this reality. I may
vote, and thereby I have 0.00003% influence on this part of the reality, but
for practical purposes this is equal to zero. It is equivalent to the mouse
piddling in the ocean. ”You
have to join politics in order to improve your own future.” This is a
hypocritical statement trying to make us believe that political activity is
rationally secondary self-happy-motivated, but the improvement of your future
arising as a consequence of your own efforts, are for practical purposes
equivalent to zero. The real motive power hidden in such a statement is a
self-picture in your consciousness telling you to be a beautiful human being
if you contribute in politics to the common good, and the corresponding sense
of duty sustaining the self-picture is: “participate in politics!” The
similar principle is valid for other “mouse-piddling-in-the-ocean” actions. “You
should not use once-diapers because it violates the environment.” The
negative effect of using once-diapers on your own environment is extremely
tiny since the effect is spread over millions of other people. The real
motive power hidden behind such a statement is a self-picture telling you to
be an excellent human being if you contribute to take care of the environment
for the common good, and the corresponding sense of duty sustaining the
self-picture is: “do not use once-diapers!” “You
have to give money to starving people in Africa because you may be hungry one
day and then you may need help from the Africans.” If Africa becomes so rich
that the continent are able to assist USA during an eventual future hunger
catastrophe, is for all practical purposes realistically regarded independent
on your contribution. The real motive power hidden behind such a statement is
a self-picture telling you to be an excellent human being if you contribute
to help the starving people, and the corresponding sense of duty sustaining
the self-picture is: “give money to Africa!” Thus, there are other factors than
the vanishing tiny effects from the consequences of your action that
represent the real motive powers in the above cases (see also Section 10.8
and 10.9). When someone tries to make us perform actions according to the
“mouse-piddling-in-the-ocean” principle, we are often cheated to perform
irrational TEM actions hidden as rational PEM or SEM actions. As an apropos to political
activity: Is it always immoral (irrational) for a person to be active in
politics since the probability in practice is zero for an individual to
change anything? No, it is not necessarily irrational. The rational
motivation is as follows: |
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a) |
He gains a short-term, direct feeling of
happiness (PEM) by exposing his passion for ideas that he believes in. This
may be rational if he cannot spend his time with other activities that may be
expected to give more happiness, and if his political activity nor may be
expected to inflict him with significant negative happiness effects in the
future. |
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b) |
Pleasant company with other people with similar
opinions. When you are to seek friends, it is an advantage to find someone
having common interests – more coziness and less quarrelling (rational
secondary self-happy motivation). |
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c) |
Perhaps he has a little function of
leadership in the organization that makes him feel important; he takes
responsibility, and in that way his self-confidence increases (rational
primary self-happy motivation). |
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d) |
If he writes contributions in the newspaper and
holds speeches, it is intellectual challenges. He obtains a confirmation of
his skill; he obtains self-realization, and the self-confidence is positively
affected. He attends activities, and perhaps he is able to convert some
people into his party. This is productive work making him feel successful,
and this gives perception of happiness through primary self-happy motivation
(see Section 3.3.3.1). |
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e) |
The skills and contacts acquired in his
political work may be useful in his future professional career (rational
primary self-happy motivation). |
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9.4.2
Examples of senses of duty and rational TEM actions PMI: A boy
attends a party and is offered to smoke a pipe of marihuana. He has a self-picture
of a civilized human being. When he considers smoking the pot, the
corresponding sense of duty strongly contributes to choose the non-smoking
alternative even if it gives him a perception of unhappiness to say “no” to
the comrades and even if he renounces the delicious feeling. He rejects the
offer, and he obtains a perception of happiness from the PMI (“yes, yes, I am
no drug swine”). Additionally, he may be directly self-happy-motivated by
possible negative consequences of the pot smoking. A
person A has cancer, and he knows that he has only a short time left to live.
Thus, long-term creation of happiness is irrational. Person A can kill a
relative and steal $300,000 from him without being detected. During the short
remaining time of his life he can have a lot of fun for this money. Is it
morally correct for person A to perform these right-violating actions? It is
not directly immoral (irrational),
but the immorality is located at another level: It is immoral not to
establish PMI early in life. PMI is supposed to make it rational to reject
these actions, also for person A. If person A really commits the murder and
theft, he has performed an immoral action previously by not establishing and
sustaining PMI. This has with very high probability resulted in many problems
earlier in his life, problems having reduced his life-long sum of happiness
significantly more than he can regain by consuming the stolen $300,000 during
two months. PFR: A
student hates making homework, but he makes it all the same because he has a
self-picture of a hard-working student in his consciousness. Previously, he
has implemented the sense of duty “make homework!” in his consciousness because he has realized by
regarding historical students (and perhaps his own previous school
experience) that persevering efforts at school pay off in the long-term
perspective. Virtue of duty: A person observes a cat being stuck in the top of a tree. He has a
self-picture of a courageous human being. When he considers climbing into the
tree and save the cat, the corresponding sense of duty strongly contributes
to choose the salvation act. He climbs into the tree, saves the cat and gets
a perception of happiness from the self-picture of courage (“yes, yes, I am a
brave human being”). If the cat had been sitting one meter in front of a
crocodile, a Rational Gaudist would not have saved the cat because that is
foolhardiness and not courage. 10. Appendix – Politics
10.1 The right to liberty implies the right to
life
Hypothetically, we could imagine
that the fundamental principle was right
to life (the right to perform those actions needed for sustaining life),
but this does not imply the right to take your own life if suicide is
happiness-profitable. The right to life
does not automatically imply freedom to perform those actions giving positive
surplus of happiness – only to perform life-sustaining actions. But
the right to liberty includes all
aspects mentioned above: the right to perform the actions for sustaining
life, the right to end your own life, and the right to perform all other
(non-right-violating) actions in the pursuit of maximization of
self-happiness during the life span. It is not the right to life that implies the right to liberty, but the right
to liberty that implies the right
to life. Human life is more fundamental
than happiness and liberty since life is a prerequisite for these. Thus, the
following faulty statement may be proposed: “If you do not have life, you
cannot use the freedom for the creation of happiness. Therefore, the right to liberty is founded on the right to life.” By pursuing this
argumentation, the following result appears: “The plants are prerequisites
for human life. Consequently, the right
to life for plants is more fundamental than the right to life for humans. Consequently, humans may not eat plants
(or animals since they fundamentally are depending on plants). Ergo, the
human life cannot be sustained!” Therefore,
we cannot say that the right to life
is more fundamental than the right to
liberty and the right to pursuit of
happiness by arguing that human life is a prerequisite for freedom to
perform those actions implying happiness. Or to put it in another way: If we
can say that the individual has the right
to life without saying that the plants have the right to life in spite of the fact that the plants are
prerequisites for human life, it has to be acceptable to say that that the
individual has the right to liberty
before saying that the individual has the right
to life in spite of the human life being a prerequisite for freedom. We
have to distinguish between “life” and the “right to life”
(“the right to perform those actions needed for sustaining life”). The right
to life, liberty or pursuit for happiness requires that life is given. A dead person or a person whose life has not yet been initiated does not have any rights. It is LIFE that is a prerequisite
(fundament) for the “right to
liberty” and thereby for the “right
to life”. 10.2 The
relationship between nature-given rights and ethics
Basically, the nature-given rights
are indirectly physically given in the individual human being's fundamental nature, defined as “the
fundamental qualities used by the consciousness
in the pursuit of its values
(happiness)”; see Section 4.1. An action is illegitimate if and only if it violates nature-given
rights and legitimate if and only if it does not violate such rights (chapter
4). Accordingly, the jurisprudence is basically and implicitly given by
nature (by the human individual's fundamental nature), and is made explicit
through the Superior Constitution and is exemplified and specified through
the General Constitution and the Law (see Section 7.1.1). The State is not to choose what is legal and what
is illegal in order to create maximum happiness for the community. Therefore,
it is not a moral choice for the State to decide which human actions to be allowed
and forbidden; it is given by nature. We may in practice have a State making “laws”
in disagreement with the nature-given rights, but then this State is an
illegitimate one making “unlaws”. The motive power for the self-happy-motivated individuals governing
the State to respect the nature-given rights and to implement these in the
Rational Gaudist Law system is mentioned in Section 7.4. Legitimate laws express statements
of the type “it is not legitimate to do A” or “it is legitimate to do B”. If
you break the law, the State has the right
to use some force against you. The laws are not moral norms that the individual must follow, but the individual may choose whether he is to
include the content of the laws as a part of his moral code. Basically, the
moral code of Rational Gaudism
tells us to choose to obey a command if and only if compliance according to a
optimal rational evaluation gives larger probability of maximizing the
life-long sum of happiness compared to if we do not obey the command (see Section
3.1). Punishment and clear up rates for right-violating actions together with
social sanctions are predisposing determinants that are to influence the
pattern of action in such a way that it becomes morally correct to avoid
violating nature-given rights (see Section 3.6.1 and 4.4.2). But under normal
circumstances each individual ought to have a sense of duty against right-violating actions (PMI – see Section 3.9.1.1)
since such actions beyond reasonable doubt statistically will be
non-profitable with regard to the maximization of the probability of gaining
the largest possible life-long sum of happiness when social sanctions are
combined with Rational Gaudist punishment and clear up methods. Therefore,
legitimate laws in practice become imperative Rational Gaudist moral
guidelines anyway. 10.2.1 Why
should a supporter of Rational Gaudist ethics become a political Rational
Gaudist? A person completely supporting
Rational Gaudist epistemology (which is in accordance with main stream epistemological
reasoning) will realize that Rational Gaudist politics is the only legitimate
basis for all politics (se chapter 4). However, the ethical fundament of
Rational Gaudism is to maximize the sum of self-happiness through life by
consequent use of optimally rational evaluations. Therefore, critics will
claim that Rational Gaudists ought to organize and use HDM unlimited for
collective maximization their self-happiness and disregard if nature-given
rights are violated since there is no obvious logical consequence between
consequent avoidance of violating nature-given rights and maximization of
happiness for most people. The following four chains of argumentation
repudiate these objections. 1) An ethical
Rational Gaudist will implement PMI against right-violating actions (see
Section 3.9.1.1) – also in the years prior to introduction of political
Rational Gaudism in the country. This is caused by the fact that the
pre-Rational-Gaudist state also punishes the individuals for right-violating
actions (even if it also punishes non-right-violating actions) and that it is
large probability for right-violators to be met with negative social
sanctions. It will also be rational for a Rational Gaudist to implement sense
of duty for the virtue ‘honesty’
(see Section 3.9.1.3) since this is a rational means in his pursuit of
maximization of his life-long sum of self-happiness. Therefore, he will not
try to cheat by explaining away the fact that that initiation of force by the
State against the individuals is as right-violating as those force-initiating
actions which the pre-Rational-Gaudist State prohibits the individuals to
carry out (and which it is rational to implement PMI against). If he tries to
support illegitimate politics (i.e. non-Rational-Gaudist politics), the PMI,
in combination with the duty of virtue ‘honesty’,
will give him a bad feeling in his consciousness. This is an important reason
for a Rational Gaudist to believe in greater life-long sum of self-happiness
by supporting politics which he recognize as legitimate, than by supporting
politics which he recognize as illegitimate. It will also be psychologically
and socially difficult to support and promote politics that he realizes is
illegitimate, and attempting this will easily give him a negative feeling
(unhappiness). 2) We need
rational epistemological principles, direct deductions from de facto accurate knowledge included,
not at least because technological and scientific progresses have shown us
the superior potential and importance of rational epistemology compared to
crack-pot like religion, superstition and conspiracy theories. If the State
fails implementing the logical deductions of the human individual's
fundamental nature in the legislation, but cheats by saying it is legitimate
to neglect this, it will contribute to the weakening of the respect for
rational epistemological principles in general. Then we will undermine the
fundamental principles for acquiring knowledge that have given mankind a
giant leap in technological progresses and increased standard of living. The
two latters are obviously rational means in the pursuit of maximization of
self-happiness during life and thus, a logical link arises between the
fundamental politics of Rational Gaudism and its ethical guidelines. 3) It has
been demonstrated empirically that “happiness for most people” (and economic
progress) increase proportionally with the degree of liberty in the governing
politics (Ovaska and Takashima, 2006).
4) Having
the Superior Constitution as a rock solid and unwavering legitimacy basis for
all politics (as shown in chapter 4 there is no other true legitimacy basis)
functions as an insurance against a smooth and slow transition to a more or
less totalitarian regime (including social democracy, which has some hints of
semi-totalitarianism). It also acts as an insurance against an insidious
collapse of the economy due to an ever-bulging welfare state (see Section
10.11), but disadvantaged groups do not need fear falling into the “black
hole” since Rational Gaudism legitimizes certain State assistance for such
groups. The points 1-4 above show that a
person who completely supports Rational Gaudist ethics does not contradict
his ethics if he also embraces political Rational Gaudism. Ovaska T and
Takashima R. Economic Policy and the Level of Self-Perceived Well-Being: An
International Comparison. Journal of Socio-Economics 35 (2006): 314. 10.3 Nature-given rights in emergency situations
10.3.1
Seeking emergency shelter in a mountain cabin Imagine an emergency situation
where a person is lost in the mountain during a snow storm. He arrives at an
unoccupied cabin, and the only option for survival is to break in for getting
shelter and food. Is this a violation of the cabin owner's property right? Usually,
this will not be a violation of his property
right since the tourist realistically regarded may expect the cabin owner
to accept the housebreak if economical compensation is paid afterwards
(presumptive acceptance, see Section 5.3.2.4). If the owner has written on the door that he does not accept emergency
break-ins, a break-in will ought not to be punishable in a future court trial
since the danger of reiteration is equal to zero (see Section 6.1.1) in the
sense that the right-violating action in no way emanates from the intruder's
principles of action choice; besides, the degree of severity is very low. However, the intruder may be
juridically forced to pay for the damages and the food that he has consumed
during his stay. If
the cabin owner is present, and the traveller tries to force his way in
despite the owner's denial, he violates the cabin owner's property since a
snow storm involves natural compulsion and does not involve a criminal who
forces the lost person into the cabin. Then the owner may legitimately use
force against the “intruder” to prevent the violation – e.g. by keeping the
door closed. The judiciary will not punish him for this. The owner has
processed nature away from the natural state by building a cabin, but it is
not the presence of the cab that prevents the needy from rescuing himself.
However, it is immoral to not give the lost tourist shelter and food during
the storm. The traveller will act morally correct if he tries to break in and
overcome the miser and, among other things, this risk should cause the cabin
owner to open both the front door and his heart. Other rational motive powers
for helping the lost tourist are empathetic instincts (see Section 3.7.1) and
the fact that he will get a bad reputation by behaving so badly. 10.3.2
Emergency break in for defense against right violations Considering a situation where a
criminal tries to kill you. You break into a house for borrowing the phone to
call the Police. In this case you are indirectly “pushed” into the house by
the criminal, and the break-in is right-violating, but the violator is the
criminal and not you. The criminal has to compensate the home owner's loss.
If he has no economical capacity, the home owner or his insurance company has
to cover the loss; you are innocent. The home owner may not
legitimately use force against you because the initiator of force is the
criminal. In
another example, a criminal chases you and tries to kill you. Then you pass a
garden and observe a sharp loaded weapon lying there. The only way to survive
is to cut through the fence, take the gun and shoot the bad guy. In this case
the criminal forces you into another person's property. He is to blame for
the destruction of the fence, loss of ammunition and tear on the weapon. You
are not liable. This
also emphasizes the philosophical basis for the State's “confiscation by
collateral damage” to fund the judicial system, Police and military in
defense against criminal persons or states in very exceptional cases (see
section 7.6.1.1). 10.3.3
Cannibalism after plane crash in the In another imaginable situation
two persons have survived a plane crash in the Andes Mountains. There is
absolutely nothing to eat, and both will die quickly if they do not get
anything to eat. Is it right-violating if one person kills the other one in
order to eat him? This
would be right-violating since he has not accepted to be killed. The danger
of reiteration is extremely small, but on the other hand it is impossible for
the “killer” to compensate the victim's loss, namely the life. However, his
life has only been shortened by some hours or a very few days. Thus, the
“killer” ought to be sentenced to a short stay in prison. If the crashed
passengers had accepted to make a draw over who to be killed, cannibalism in
such a situation would not be right-violating. 10.3.4
Shipwrecked seaman arrives hermit's island A shipwrecked seaman swims ashore onto a “private”
island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean where a hermit lives in his house.
The hermit may not legitimately deny the shipwrecked to go ashore and stay on
those parts of the island that have not been processed away from the natural
state and into a state of increased usability (i.e. “outlying fields” to which the hermit does not have property
right). If the whole island is under
the property right of the hermit,
the shipwrecked seaman may legitimately save himself by climbing on this
property since in such a case, it is the hermit's processing of the land away
from its natural state which is the reason why the needy is not able to save
his life by entering the island in another way (cf. Section 6.6.1). The
hermit does not violate the seaman's nature-given rights by not helping him
ashore (the passivity principle) since this does not involve any initiation
of force. But it represents a shameful attitude unless it is significantly
dangerous for the hermit to help rescuing him. The
hermit may not legitimately deny the shipwrecked seaman to subsist by food
gathering, hunting and fishing in this area. If the hermit has been so
“greedy” that he has put so large parts of the island under his ownership
that the shipwrecked seaman does not have enough outlying fields to live
from, the hermit will be required to support the needy in full or in part
according to the principle of minimum subsistence, but he has to contribute
with reasonable labor as a pay-back. The reason is that it is the hermit's
“fault” that the shipwrecked cannot live on the island by his own hand. The
shipwrecked seaman has to repay any outstanding expenses as soon as possible
after he has been rescued back to the civilization. If the hermit is not
present, the shipwrecked seaman may expect that the hermit will accept
confiscation of food if receiving financial compensation later – such
“emergency theft” will not be rights-violating. If there are not sufficient
livelihoods for both, it is the hermit who has the right on his side (first
come, first served). Morally
speaking, the hermit should, of course, help the shipwrecked seaman with
food, lodging and stay in a human way beyond the minimum mentioned above.
Otherwise, the shipwrecked seaman will eventually be a danger to him, but by
providing help he will be able to get a good friend for the rest of the
sailor's stay on the island (and maybe longer too). Although many people will
help their peers in emergency situations regardless of economic incentives,
the State should consider giving premium to ordinary citizens saving other
people (e.g. from drowning) so that the rationality (morality) for carrying
out rescue operations increases. 10.3.5 Asylum
seeker If the seaman from Section 10.3.4 is
a refugee from e.g. a North Korean ship, he has been “pushed” into the
property by the North Korean regime. In this case the Kim-dictatorship forces
the refugee to take food and shelter from the hermit. Initiator of force is
the North Korean regime, and eventual force may only be directed against them
and not against the refugee, unless he later on commits right-violating
actions (e.g. takes more than the emergency principle implies). He has
“license to take food and shelter”; in practice the hermit has to accept that
the refugee takes simple food and lodging (until he may provide for himself).
In this way the right to asylum originates as protection against severe, imminent right
violations (killing,
torture etc. or long-term imprisonment for non-right-violating behavior). An
asylum seeker has to provide for himself (will be easier in a society with
completely free economy) as fast as possible or be supported by volunteers,
but in a minimal transition period it cannot be excluded that he has to
receive absolute existence necessities from the State, and in extreme situations this may
be funded by the principle of “confiscation via collateral damage” in an
acute phase (see Section 7.6.1.1 and 10.3.2). It is his first arrival into a
safe country which decides where he is to be regarded as an asylum seeker; if
he migrates further on, he will be regarded as jobseeker / migrant with his
first safe country as his origin. If the asylum seeker commits
right-violating actions during his stay, he may not be returned to North Korea but
has to take his punishment in the asylum country. 10.3.6 Poor
man A person is extremely poor and
does not have any food. He steels from a well-off man in the pursuit of
survival. Has the poor man committed a right-violating action? Yes,
he has. The Police have to arrest him, and he has to be punished since the
danger of reiteration is significant. In the prison he will receive food; a
cheaper alternative may be house arrest with ankle monitor plus “bread and
water”. In a society with complete capitalist
freedom the incitement to economical progress will be large, and this will
minimize the probability of poverty. Besides, the Voluntary Welfare Insurances (see
Section 7.6.11) will strongly reduce poverty through solidarity-based insurances,
and those who participate completely in this system may receive social
welfare benefits (others have to rely totally on private charity). The
probability for the combination of optimal rational economical politics, The Voluntary Welfare Insurances, private charity and non-compulsory
acquired public funds to succeed in helping the poor in a legitimate state is
not assumed to be less then the probability for a Social Democratic society
to succeed with the same (e.g. Greece anno
2012). 10.3.7 Lifejacket
for a drowning person William falls into the sea while Peter is
safely located in his luxury yacht. Then Peter suggests a contract for
William: “I will give you a Lifejacket and as a payback you accept to be my
slave for the rest of your life. If you do not accept the contract, I will
not throw out the Lifejacket, and you will drown.” William accepts the
contract and saves his life, but after a short time he breaks the contract.
Are William judicially obliged to pay a compensation that matches what Peter
has to pay a servant for achieving the similar services as William promised
in the contract? No,
he is of course not obliged to do that since Peter has not been deprived of
any objectively measurable positive value, and he has neither been imposed
any objectively measurable negative value and thus, no liability exists. This is due to the fact that the
probability for Peter to be able to enter a similar contract with another
party in practice is absent. The fact that Peter entered a contract with
William has not spoilt another similar contract. Peter could not have printed
an advertisement in a newspaper and assumed to enter a similar contract with
another person. 10.3.8
Summary on emergency situations Emergency situations
where the cause of the emergency is “natural compulsion”: |
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|
|
1. |
Seizing property in a situation where it is
impossible to ask the owner is not right-violating if you may expect that the
owner would have accepted the seizure. However, this presupposes that the
owner is completely compensated later on. |
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|
|
2. |
Beyond what is stated in point 1, the use of
force by the distressed against another person or his property is formally regarded
right-violating. However, a distressed person may legitimately dispose other
people's property if this property causes his inability to rescue himself in
another way. |
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|
|
3. |
A right violation may not be legitimately hindered by actively imposing the right-violator exaggerated disproportional
consequences compared to the degree of severity of the right violation. Counteracting the violation
within this restriction is always legitimate. |
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|
|
4. |
A right-violator may always later on be forced
to compensate for the damage he has caused. |
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|
|
5. |
If the Police come across a person in an
emergency situation who is in the process of carrying out a right-violating
action in order to escape from his emergency, the Police shall intervene and
prevent the right violation. As a detainee he will get his urgent basic needs
covered (simple food, water, lodging etc.). |
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|
|
6. |
If a right-violating action is carried out in
a situation, which from its nature is probable to be reiterated, probability
of reiteration is present, and the action is punishable in a court trial. If
the probability of reiteration is not present, no punishment is to be
imposed by any court. |
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|
|
7. |
Avoiding to carry out a service for a person
who demands so or who strongly may be believed to wish so is never
right-violating (the passivity principle), unless one on beforehand
voluntarily has committed to something else. |
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|
Emergency
situations where the cause of the emergency is a crook initiating force
against the distressed (criminal persons, totalitarian states etc.): |
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|
|
1. |
When the distressed exercises force in
self-defense with consequences for a third party, this is not necessarily right-violating
since it is the crook who is the initiator of force. |
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|
|
2. |
During the emergency situation the distressed
may confiscate what is strictly necessary for exercising self-defense without
being a right-violator (“confiscation via collateral damage”). |
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|
|
3. |
If the use of force is to be legitimate,
however, the collateral damages have to imply a significantly less value loss
for the third party (subjectively regarded) than the value loss which the
defense is aimed against. |
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|
|
4. |
The distressed may not be arrested by the
Police or the violated person (unless he confiscates more than what is
strictly necessary for the self-defense), and he may not be punished in a
court process. |
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|
|
5. |
The distressed shall not pay any compensation
thereafter (unless he confiscates more than what is strictly necessary for
the self-defense), but the crook is obliged to pay compensation. |
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|
|
6. |
Avoiding to carry out a service for the distressed
is not right-violating in such situations (the passivity principle), unless
one on beforehand voluntarily has committed to the service. |
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10.4 Violence
10.4.1
Physical and psychical violence Ann and Peter are cohabitants. Ann is a real
bitch, and yells at Peter even if he is kind as a lamb. She abuses him
verbally in a humiliating, disgusting way. She often uses very insulting
words and expressions, and she almost always uses a sharp, humiliating
intonation. Peter feels deeply violated by this behavior, and the continuous
verbal abuse has a similar effect upon Peter's psychical health as if he had
received moderate electrical pulses. One
day Peter gets enough of this psychical terror. In a particular moment he
becomes so edgy that he gives Ann real spank. At first, she receives a couple
of slaps on her ears and then some firm hits on her butt. The following question arises: Is
Peter to be blamed 100 % for this episode of violence? Is he to be regarded
as an evil criminal deserving harsh penalty in prison? Perhaps Ann has to
take a very large part of the responsibility for Peter's violence? According
to both political correctness and old fashion gentlemen's way of thinking, no
excuse exists for a man spanking a woman. A spanking man has always 100 % of
the guilt on his shoulders. Rationally, it is easy to disagree with this
biased opinion. In the above example Peter made a
large mistake when he became cohabitants with Ann. He should have examined
her personal qualities better. When she started being bitchy, he ought to
have left her as fast as possible. In this concrete situation he ought to
have left her or expelled her from his apartment in stead of spanking her.
But human beings are not perfect. We imagine that Peter's physical violence
already has occurred, and that we are to consider it juridically and morally.
Ann has to take at least 90 % of the blame for this act of violence herself.
There are so strongly extenuating circumstances that there is no reason to
punish Peter, nor is there any reason for moral criticism. Contrarily, there
is moral basis for criticism of Ann. According to Rational Gaudism,
psychical violence may be equally serious to physical violence (it depends on
the degree of severity). It is generally accepted as legitimate to defend
oneself with physical violence against physical violence in self-defense (but often such violence may be a
substandard solution).
Similarly, in special situations the use of moderate physical violence in
self-defense against corresponding degree of psychical violence ought to be
decriminalized (but that does not mean that this always is the best
solution). The law has to be equal independent of sex, race, sexual
propensity etc. In this way, a negatively moral spotlight will be set on the
psychical violence and thereby contributing to its reduction. In a juridical trial some years
ago a man was declared “not guilty” for violence against his cohabitant
because she had been an extreme bitch. Of course, this provoked strong
reactions from the politically correct feminists. They were terrified over
the fact that such “reactionary” attitudes still existed among male
judges in law courts. In
another trial a woman over long time had been physically abused by her
husband. One day the woman was sufficiently pissed off and killed him by a
shot gun. The woman was declared “not guilty”. Thus, it is not unfair that a
man slapping a psychical violent bitch also is acquitted both juridically and
morally. The physical violence that had been carried out against the
acquitted woman was significantly more serious than the psychical violence
that the “bitch” is assumed to have committed, but on the other hand there is
an even larger difference between killing a human being and slapping a person
physically. There are too many incidences (even one
single incidence is too much) where a man systematically suppresses a woman
with physical violence with the consequence that the woman is constantly
afraid. Such men should of course be imprisoned. But as a corrective to this
it need to be mentioned that a part of the physical violence committed
against women is caused by men's more or less desperate attempts of
self-defense against female bitching and psychical violence. Perhaps such
psychically violent women also ought to be imprisoned? 10.4.1.1 Temperament as
psychical violence Controlling the temperament is
very important, but has not been debated significantly publicly in spite of the
fact that violence often starts with bad temper. When two honest, but disagreeing persons are
to achieve a common solution on a common problem, rational arguments ought to
be the basis for the solution. When aggressive temper, shouting and yelling
are mixed into the discussion, the strategy is to try to scare the opponent
to accept your positions. There is no logical correlation between “being
right” and “being clever in using verbal aggression”. There is no logical
correlation between being good at physical fighting and being right. In a rational culture only the
rationality of the arguments should influence the results of the discussions
and not the psychical violence which too often accompanies the arguments (see
Section 4.1.1). If
verbal aggression is the strategy in stead of rationality, a lot of solutions
will be wrongly chosen because the rational ideas are not able to overpower
the irrational ones because of the fear accompanying the “psychical
violence”. It is a kind of cheating where you are victorious in the
discussion on the wrong premises – approximately as if Maurice Green should
use anabolic steroids and run the 100-meter at 9.40 while his opponents use
10 seconds. The use of verbal aggression against other
people is only acceptable as a last strategy in self-defense if you are
exposed to similar treatment. To learn controlling your temperament is an
absolutely necessary strategy in the development of a rational culture.
Spreading verbal aggression over other people is uncivilized, and the limit
for using physical violence is lowered. Additionally, uncontrolled temper has
negative influence on other people's psychical health. 10.4.2 The borderline between
right-violating violence and accepted violence As mentioned in Section 4.1.1, all
kinds of physical and psychical violence are right-violating. Both types of
violence have the purpose of frightening a person from using his rational
mind when making a choice of action. Another person does not have the right
to harm your body. Similarly, another person does not have the right to harm
your nerve system psychically with non-rational frights of non-physical
character. But if you e.g. voluntarily enter a boxing ring, you accept
physical violence. If the competing boxer gives you some hard punches, he
does not violate your nature-given rights. Where is the limit for acceptance
of physical or psychical violence? The principle is that accept of compulsion is self-contradictory and
therefore impossible, but acceptance of violence
/ force is possible: A person B owns a property. No
other human beings have the right to enter this property without B's
permission. Let us imagine B saying the following: “Person A is permitted to
enter my property on the specific condition that he accepts to be exposed for
physical violence.” Person A accepts this contract and enters B's property. |
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1) |
Person A may change his mind at any time and
regret that he accepted the violence-accepting contract. But if B demands it,
he has to leave B's property as fast as practically possible (within
reasonable time). From the moment A changes his mind and until he has left
B's property nobody has the right to expose him for violence. Person A is not to be pinpointed
as contract breaker in this situation. |
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2) |
If person A is exposed to violence on B's
property, person B or another performer of violence may in principle not be
convicted for this. |
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3) |
If A wants to get anyone convicted for violence performed on B's property, person A has to prove that the violence really has occurred and who the criminal is. If A manages this, point 4 is applicable. |
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4) |
In order to avoid punishment person B has to prove
that person A had accepted to be exposed for violence when entering his
property. This will often be difficult to prove, and the more harsh violence,
the more difficult to prove. Person B also has to prove that person A was
with all senses alert when accepting the violence contract. |
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The content of point 1-4 is valid both for
physical and psychical violence. It is valid for boxing rings,
cohabitation/marriages, factories, school etc. It is also applicable for
“contracts of violence” with validity outside (independent on) the real
estates of the contract partners. (See also Section 5.7.1). If it can be proven beyond
rational doubt that an employee is exposed to psychical abuse, his employer
(or other tormentors in the work place) has to prove that the employee has
accepted psychical abuse as a part of the employment contract in order to
avoid being convicted for psychical violence. In such a case strong
requirements have to rest on the contract to be regarded as voluntarily from
the employee's side. Even if such a contract exists an employee may quit his
job without any term of notice if he can prove with predominant probability
that the reason for quitting is psychically abuse; the employer may not
demand economical compensation for the breach of contract (see point 1). When a person is exposed to
physical and psychical violence by his mate, she/he ought to leave him/her or
expel him/her from the apartment (depending of the property conditions) as
fast as possible. Additionally, he/she ought to go to the Police if the
violence exceeds a certain limit. If the violence can be proven beyond
rational doubt, the sinner is to be punished; it is extremely improbable that
the contract of marriage/cohabitation explicitly accepts this kind of
violence. If a person breaks out from a violent relationship (physical or
psychical), she/he will not need to pay maintenance even if this is specified
in the contract of marriage/cohabitation (see point 1). It
has been claimed that a spouse/cohabitant who is being exposed for repeated
episodes of violence from her/his partner is guilty for this violence since
it is her/his own fault that she/he did not leave the brute after the first
episode of violence; by staying in spite of the violence she/he silently
signs a contract on violence accept. This is not correct. She/he has
(usually) the right to live in the apartment, and does not need to “sign” any
contract on violence acceptance for achieving a right that she/he already
has. Performing violence or violent threats in such a way that she/he
“chooses” to move out from the home, is a violation of this habitation right.
This is completely similar to the following situation: A person stays at a
public place. Then he is exposed for repeated beating and kicking, but he
chooses not to move away. He does not silently accept a contract on
being exposed for violence by not moving since he does not need to enter any
contract on violence acceptance in order to achieve the right to stay at a
public place (If the place had been a boxing arena, the situation would have
been different). If a human being accepts to be
killed, the killer is free for punishment if and only if it occurs as active
death help. The death helper has to prove the existence of a “contract of
death acceptance”, and that the victim was with all senses alert when
“signing” the contract. In practice, the victim has to be examined very
closely by psychiatrists on beforehand, and a court has to declare the “death
help” as legitimate in front of putting him to death. 10.4.3 Child rearing Physical violence against adults is
right-violating because one prevents
their (right to) liberty to think to choose to perform those actions being
necessary to try to maximize their self-happiness during the life span.
When using brutal violence against adults, bones may be broken, the brain may
be damaged, and it is not difficult to understand that this will violate
their right to liberty.
Additionally, this will give psychical wounds that will limit the freedom of
the victim for a long time into the future. When using weak physical violence,
this will not give significant physical wounds but has the effect that the
victim is frightened psychically in such a way that the freedom think up
rational choices of action is reduced. Pure psychical violence works in the
same way. It is also right-violating. The children have nature-given
rights because they are potential rational individuals. The parents are
supposed to raise the child to learn to use the right to liberty later in life, and the child ought to be
gradually accustomed to larger degrees of freedom. Children do not have the right to liberty. Therefore, it is not correct to say that initiation of
physical force immediately reduces the children's right to liberty. But
physical violence may give
long-term psychical and physical wounds preventing the child from developing
into a rational human being with the ability to use the right to liberty as an adult. The child has to be taught to act
in accordance with its long-term self-interest. Frequently, the child does
not have the rational capacity to manage this by itself. Initially, the child
ought to be explained what to do or not to do in an empathic manner. If this
does not work, the parents may use a sharp tone and verbal reprimands
attempting to get the child understand that the parents are the child's
leaders and not jesters for a small emperor. Historically, this has also been
carried out by “slapping the butt” or similar. If the State is to
legitimately ban a given mode of reaction towards children, it must be proved
beyond rational doubt that this specific mode of reaction violates the
child's conversion of child rights (see Section 4.3) to the right to liberty as an adult. The
State cannot refer to the child being entitled to “absence of initiation of
the use of force” since this does not exist for children (see Section 4.1.1,
point 1). There
are many ill-mannered children in today's society who are “the boss” over
themselves and the parents. This is very harmful for their ability to become
rational, grown-up individuals in the future. It is important that children
have clear limits for their behavior and are not given the freedom to do as
their instinctive feelings dictate. Both physical means and sufficiently
gross and constant yelling (psychological force) can damage the child's
development. Ideally, the parenthood ought to be performed in a way that such
means are unnecessary. 10.4.4 Prostitution Prostitution, where a customer
pays a prostitute to perform sexual services voluntarily, cannot be
right-violating since nobody initiates force against anybody. But what if it is generally known
from media that e.g. 50% of all prostitute immigrants from a given country
are directly forced to this profession by violent mafia? In that case
potential customers ought to know this. If a customer has had sex with 5
prostitute immigrants from that country, it is 97 % probability that at least
one of them has been forced to prostitution. Imagine
that it has been proven that one or more of these prostitutes really were
forced to prostitution by threats of physical violence by the mafia. Then the
sex customer ought to have known beyond rational doubt that at least one of
these prostitutes almost certainly were physically forced to prostitution,
and that buying services from them was an act of gross negligence. Therefore,
this sex customer can be convicted for rape with gross negligence. Imagine a revolver with one
bullet. I twist the revolver around, aim against a person's head (without his
awareness), and pull the trigger. The bullet leaves the gun, and the person
is killed. For my defense I say: “The probability for the bullet to be fired
was only 16.67 %. You cannot punish me!” This is a murder with extremely
gross negligence. Similarly: Imagine a sex customer buying
services from a prostitute. It is generally known that approximately 50% of
that kind of prostitutes is forced to their “profession” by violent mafia. In
the future it is proven that the actual prostitute really was forced to sex
sale. The sex customer says to his defense: “It was only 50 % probability for
the prostitute to be exposed to force. You cannot punish me!” This is rape
with gross negligence. 10.5 New acquisition of right to use to forest
If the forester does not perform forestry in
a forest area, the area will be regarded as unused and non-owned. Then the right to use of the forester is
logically withdrawn, and other people may free of cost try to re-establish right to use to forestry in the area
according to the principles in this section: When
a tree in a forest becomes significantly thicker than the state of mature age
(N), and there has not been hewed other mature trees in the closest neighboring
area the N last years, the tree and the closest neighboring area have been
unused for so long time that it is to be regarded as unused and non-owned
resource/area even if a forester earlier had the right to use to forestry. A rational forester ought to hew e.g.
spruce trees before they reach an age of approximately N years in order to
preventing others from taking over the forest. When
a man hews a tree, he has established property
right to that tree. If the tree is significantly older than N years, he
has additionally acquired the right to
use to forestry for all trees in a radius similar to the height (H) of
the hewed tree. For practical purposes this H-value should be set as a fixed
average for mature trees for each species (spruce, pine, birch, etc.). The
newly acquired right to use is also
valid for all trees that will grow up inside the “circle of right”. But the
statements above in this paragraph are valid only if no mature trees have
been hewed by other persons inside a radius of 2H the last N years. Only
mature trees give basis for “circles of right”, and their area will often be
in the order of 2000 square meters. If he hews a mature tree on an area where
he has the right to use, this will not
give the rise to right to use over
parts of the neighbor's forest even if the radius of H should make circles
invading the neighbor's area. Trees located closer to other types of property
than forest (road, tilled field, building site etc.) will not give rise to
“circles of right”. In
practice a feller, who wants to establish right
to use over a forest area, has to find an area with mature trees
fulfilling the criteria mentioned above. He marks the area using GPS
coordinates. Then he attends a “State Office of Right to use” and claims the area. During the handling of the
case nobody else may hew trees in this area. An expert from the office
determines – based on previous records, satellite photos and eventual field
observations – if the criteria for the acquisition of rights of use
are present. If so, the feller obtains temporary right to use over this forest area for e.g. 6 month. During this
time he has to hew trees in such a way that the acquisition of right to use is legitimate; if he
fails, he will lose the right to use
to the forest in this area and additionally, he has to pay a considerable
fine for “unreasonable occupation of non-owned and unused land area”. The
“State Office of Right to use” may
check the legitimacy of the right of use by satellite photos. The feller does not establish property
right to the forest by hewing some trees, and he may not refuse
others to walk or stay between the trees (outlying field). He may of course
build a house or cabin with garden on the cleared forest area, and thereby
obtaining property right to the area since it has been processed away
from the natural state, but restrictions on this are mentioned in Section
5.2.1 and 5.2.6. A
tree located in a garden or similar places may not be hewed by other than the
owner of the garden since the garden is a worked up land area, and nobody is
even allowed to walk on the lawn without an explicit permission from the
owner. Thus, a tree in a garden can become indefinitely old without becoming
a non-own resource. Foresters
(new and old ones) may manage the forest where they have right to use the way they want unless they violate the
nature-given rights of others and their logical consequences as mentioned in
Section 5.2.1. 10.6
Feminism
The basis for the fanatic feminist
dogmatism is the “extended proletarian dictatorship” philosophy. When Karl
Marx lived, the proletariat (people without private property) was the weakest
social class, while the capitalist class was the strongest social class. The
proletarians (the weakest) were supposed to suppress the capitalists (the
strong ones – the class enemy) by the proletarian dictatorship. The philosophy that the
traditional weak/inferior groups should perform a power take-over and chasten
the strong/superior groups, was extended by the leftists of the
1968-generation to have general application. Women should rebel against men,
children should rebel against their parents, the employees should revolt
against the employers, and people in the third world should rebel against the
capitalist world; in short: the traditional weak/inferior groups should rebel
against the traditional strong/superior groups. Left-winged mentality of the
1968 generation is nothing but the “culture revolution light”; the difference
is that China has abolished the negative outgrowths of the 1968-mentality. There are several positive aspects
in the 1968-mentality, but its left-winged outgrowths are clearly negative.
The 1968-mentality is a mixture of 1/3 communism, 1/3 anarchism and 1/3
pursuit of freedom (liberalism) (besides, anarchism includes some
liberalism). When Karl Marx lived, women were a weak social group compared to
men; therefore, women should exercise a kind of “proletarian dictatorship”
over men according to the leftists from 1968. Shortly, let us regard how the
“proletarian dictatorship” worked in the communist states. The proletariat
(represented by the Communist Party) exercised a dictatorship that was
supposed to suppress the oppressors (the capitalists). Criticizing such proletarian
suppression was regarded as support for the class enemy. After a while all
criticism of the politically correct communist positions was made so
extremely political incorrect that the opponents became victims of tormenting
or in the worst cases imprisoned or executed. The result was that all
criticism ceased, which means that the production of hypotheses was
eliminated in the HDM-like process. The result of absence of production of
new hypotheses is that the main hypotheses are not subjected to empirical
testing and therefore, the main hypotheses easily become rotten. The leaders
obtained irrational ideas of their own excellence, and they became very edgy
about criticism (all criticism was regarded as a scorn against those who
communism were supposed to salvage). In the 1970-ies workers in England
demanded higher and higher wages, often with class struggle as an important
argument (the capitalists exploit the working class even if the economical
surplus is infinitesimal, ergo the workers have to stop the exploitation by
“mugging” the capitalists at maximum speed). The result was that the radicals
undermined the competitive ability of the industry promoting unemployment and
depressions. Thus, socialism became the worst enemy of the working class. At
the same time the middle class was fed up with socialism. All this led to a
reaction against the traditional ideology of the workers movement
(socialism), and Margaret Thatcher came to power and stopped the socialist
madhouse. Similarly, the women (feminists) should
suppress men's traditional attitudes. Criticizing such “suppression” was
interpreted as support for male chauvinism and suppression of women. After a
while all criticism of the politically correct feminist positions was made so
extremely political incorrect that the opponents became victims of
psychically tormenting. The result was that almost all criticism ceased,
which means that the production of hypotheses was eliminated in the HDM-like
process. The result of absence of production of new hypotheses is that the
main hypotheses are not subjected to empirical testing and therefore, the
main hypotheses easily become rotten. The women obtained irrational ideas of
their own excellence and of men's mediocrity, and they became very edgy about
criticism (all criticism was regarded as a scorn against the females). The feminists want a system where
all families are governed according to semi-totalitarian principles. They
want the government to decide that in ALL families both parents are to be
working outside the home, the children ought to be forced into the
kindergarten, and mother and father are forced to take exactly 50 % of the
housework each. The feminists want this even if many women want to live
according to non-feminist principles. In this way, feminism becomes the worst
enemy of the women in the similar manner as socialism became the worst enemy
of “the working class”, and men begin to be fed up with feminism. Who is the
leader to end the feminist madhouse? If a person proclaimed his support
for a non-socialist party in a working class area in the 60-ies or 70-ies, he
often got the following bullshit back: “I see; you do not respect ordinary
workers!!” Of course, most non-socialists respected “ordinary workers” (by
the way; what is “non-ordinary workers”?). The respect for a given social
group is linked to a specific political ideology in order to psychically
intimidate the opponents of that ideology. In a similar way the men of today
are met with the following statement if they do not kiss the ass of
politically correct feminism: “I see; you do not respect women!!” The feminists of today try to mark
everything they want to change as “discrimination against women”. Thereby
they obtain politically perfect arguments for their positions. The feminists
wish to govern in detail all aspects of the society and the families in a
semi-totalitarian left-winged manner (totalitarian = the private sphere of
interests is converted into a State affair). The equality between the sexes
has come much too short. According to the feminists, complete equality is
achieved when there are 50 % female jointers and 50 % male jointers, 50 %
female nurses and 50 % male nurses, 50 % female midwives and 50 % male
midwives, and 50 % female chiefs and 50 % male chiefs. It has never occurred
to the feminist that there could be differences regarding choice of
profession that are related to biological differences between the sexes. Governmental overriding of
individual choices of profession or study in order to give the feminists
ideological satisfaction is a socialist infringement against the individual.
If there are 5 % female top leaders in the companies, that is OK if it is a
result of individual competence and free choices of profession. If a
situation with 50/50 distribution was to occur (or a 95/5 distribution in the
favor of women) between men and women concerning top leaders in the
companies, that is of course OK if it is a result of individual competence
and free choices of profession. But if such a distribution arrives as a consequence
of socialist governments overriding individual choices, it is not acceptable.
A lot of persons who officially
say that they are feminists or support feminism, probably do not, but they
express the opposite of their real opinion in fear of feminist retaliations.
In a similar way many Soviet citizens officially expressed more positive
attitudes for socialism than they really had inside their minds because of
fear of retaliations from the KGB (although another kind of retaliation than
the feminist reprisals). 10.6.1 Female representatives in the boards of
private companies The owners of private companies
will try to maximize their economical profit. The qualities of the leader and
members of the board are expected to significantly influence the profit of
the shareholders. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the owners minutely
will examine both women and men in order to find those board members who can
maximize the profit. If a particular potential female board member is
expected to generate significantly more economic profit for the shareholders
than the present male candidates, profit-loving shareholders will elect the
woman. It is unlikely that the shareholders are significantly more
male-chauvinistic than profit-loving. The politically correct feminists will
argue that the owners are not clever enough in searching for competent women.
If so, it is because it is so low probability for finding the best candidate
(and it is the best candidate we are talking about) among women that
the cost-benefit ratio by performing this searching realistically regarded is
too high, and how much searching that is rational to perform is most
competently evaluated by the owners. If the owners are whipped by the
Department of Sex Equality to find fairly competent female board members, it
may happen that the companies can write some female names on a list which
otherwise would not have been there. But the probability of finding the best candidate on that whipping-list
is very low since the companies have a natural economical incitement to
search for the best candidate without feminist whipping. A
system where the owners freely elect their board members is the best method
for obtaining maximum competence in the board room. The sex distribution of
the board room has to arrive naturally as a consequence thereof – no matter
if the average female touch is 1 % or 90 %. In such a free system we have to
assume that the observed sex distribution at a particular time point is the
one maximizing the companies' profit. But the most important argument is that
it is the nature-given right of the owners to decide the composition of the
board. Considering
representatives of the employees, many employees can contribute to increased
profitability by being directly or indirectly in the board rooms, and their
contribution will vary from company to company. The owners will certainly be
interested in such contributions in cases where they exist. In those cases
where board representation for the employees is expected to increase the profit,
it will be rational for the owners to voluntarily offer them membership in
the board. In those cases where board representation for the employees is
expected to decrease the profit, the owners will not offer them board
membership. 10.7 Monetary politics
10.7.1 Banking history Today's banking is a legacy from the past
“Fractional Reserve Banking” (FRB) with gold as the basis for the currency. Let
us consider a bank in the old days who received 15 grams of gold as a bank
deposit. The bank transferred the gold to the National Central Bank and
received a receipt – a bank note of $10, which the holder could exchange into
15 grams of gold in the National Central Bank. The depositor got a bank
account amounting to $10, and the bank was committed to pay this amount
immediately on the depositor request in the form of a $10 bank note. Now, the
bank could lend out the $10 bank note to a borrower, and voila, it was 20
dollars in circulation – $10 in the form of a bill and $10 in the form of
bank deposits. The basis for being able to do this was that the bank
considered it unlikely that all depositors would arrive simultaneously for
withdrawing their deposits from the bank, and therefore the bank only needed
to keep a small reserve in the form of bank notes (FRB). The depositors
thought, often mistakenly but in good faith, that the bank really kept all
the money (indirectly, the gold) that was deposited. Therefore, they were
shocked when the bank in times of crisis was not able to meet its
obligations. A “bank run” had encountered where the product of the average
withdrawal amount and number of withdrawers was significantly greater than
what was estimated when the bank reserve was established. The bank went
bankrupt, and many depositors lost a lot of money. However, when the dollar was linked to gold,
it was a limit to how much the money supply could grow even if FRB led to
growth in the money supply. Finally, the dollar was totally released from the
gold (1971). The same applied to other countries' currencies, and the
national central banks could print money straight from the air, which
resulted in a large growth in the general price level in most countries in
the 1970s and early 1980s. Today, banks rarely go bankrupt. They are usually
rescued by loans from the National Central Bank. Another possibility is that
they receive financial assistance from the State. The State may finance this
(or other expenses) by borrowing money from the National Central Bank
(usually by the National Central Bank buying State bonds in the second-hand
market), which prints money electronically from the air. In practice this
means that the State prints money and sends them into circulation. This means
inflation, which reduces the purchasing power of people who have savings in
dollars. Such money printing is de
facto theft and thus right-violating unless the specific criteria
mentioned in section 5.5.5 are fulfilled (see also Section 10.7.4.1). 10.7.2 Concrete proposals for new banking and
monetary policy FRB (especially in combination
with a money printing central bank) means that the growth in the money supply
is taken out in advance at the same time as the loans are given, and if an
adequate GDP growth does not arrive as a consequence of the loans within a
reasonable time, inflation will occur in the form of general increase in the
price level or bubbles e.g. in the housing market or the stock market. To
prevent this, a new monetary policy is needed. In order to avoid being involved in fraud,
the State may and must, through the National Central Bank as the issuer of US
dollars, add limitations on the money supply of this currency (see Sections
5.5.5 and 10.7.4.1). US dollars can be said to be a “trademark” for the
National Central Bank. However, this applies only to dollars and not to
private currencies based on gold, silver or other precious metals. In order
to be competitive against gold-based currencies, and to provide high stability
in the financial markets, the State should pursue the monetary policy
described below. It is emphasized that other monetary regimes also may be
legitimate within a Rational Gaudist frame: On a certain date in history the dollar is
defined to be e.g. 1/1013 of the goods and services that are traded in the market during that
year. If the annual growth in the money supply is adjusted to the real
increase in the gross domestic product (GDP), one dollar always has a fixed
value in accordance with its definition. The banks will not be permitted to engage in
lending according to fractional reserve banking as described above. This
means that the National Central Bank in cooperation with the State withdraws
the banks' license to increase the money stock through FRB and establishes
monopoly on money supply increase. This is similar to music producers who
have copyright on their CDs to prevent unauthorized mass duplication that
would undermine the musicians' economic basis. Therefore, when the bank
receives $100 from a depositor, the bank will not be allowed to write
$100 on his deposit account (which the depositor may use for buying goods the
next day) at the same time as the $100 are loaned to a borrower (who also may
use the $100 note the next day). Moreover, no physical dollars will exist,
only electronic dollars. Two types of bank accounts will exist within the new
system: 1) “On Demand” account (OD account) 2) Bond account The OD account is an electronic storage box
for money. Money that is deposited on such accounts may not be lent out by
the bank. No interest will be paid for money deposited on OD accounts; on the
contrary the bank may take a certain fee for managing the account. Since all
dollars are electronic, each dollar will be stored on some OD account in some
bank at any time point. A
depositor can choose to lend out his money (when they are at the OD account,
they are not lent out). If so, he buys a bond from the bank that the bank
agrees to pay back over a given number of years with an interest rate, which
may be adjusted periodically. The bond is registered on a bond account
associated with a National Central Securities Depository (CSD). Among others,
banks can be registrars of bond accounts, and several bonds from different
banks can be registered on the same bond account. The depositor (bondholder)
can not go to his bank to be paid the value of his bond immediately
upon request. The repayment is firmly linked to the annual (or semi-annual or
fourth annual) repayment periods. If the depositor wants his money back
outside the repayment periods, he has to sell the bond. This is done through
a Bond Exchange Market via the CSD. The
bank can now lend out the money that the depositor has transferred from his
OD account to the bank's own OD account. The bank will store the money as
short as possible on its OD account and will subsequently lend them out to a
borrower. This loan will be made in a similar way as today, where the
borrower in effect is issuing a bond to the bank, and the borrower pays back
over a given number of years with an interest rate that usually is
adjustable. In this way there will never be more money in circulation than
the 10 trillions dollars that the State initially put into circulation (plus
a controlled growth in the money supply, which we will discuss later). The
money supply will not increase as a result of FRB-like activity since it is
outlawed. The bank must have a fiscal balance in its
monetary and temporal obligations. Suppose that the bank lending and
borrowing go maximum 20 years ahead, and that we are to write the balance
sheet for the first bank year: For
year 2 the bank's total receivables from the borrowers have to be greater
than or equal to the total obligations to the bondholders for year 2. If this
is not the case, money from the bank's equity is added to the second year's
accounting column. If the bank for year 2 has a greater sum of receivables
than total amount due obligations, this may be used to balance the
forthcoming year's columns. The same is done for all years i (i = 3, 4 ,....,
20) when the accounting is done for the first year, the first-year accounting
therefore consists of a balanced overview from the 2nd year to the
20th year. If
the bank, after having balanced all the years from n+1 to n+19 for the nth
accounting year, gets the result that the sum of receivables and equity is
less than the obligations, the bank has to bring in new Share Capital as
quickly as possible. If this is not done, a part of the stockholder's stocks
will be zeroed out, and some of the creditors’ (i.e. bond holders’) bonds
will be converted into bank shares. The bank's management may also be
investigated for fraud. In practice, the sum of receivables and equity should
be significantly larger than the obligations so that the bank has reserve
funds to cover the losses that may come when some borrowers are unable to
meet their obligations. All banks that are engaged in borrowing and
lending with dollars must be subjected to the monetary system mentioned
above. Banks that want to engage in banking with their own currency backed by
gold, silver, platinum or other commodities, have the complete freedom to do
so – including using FRB. Such banks will not be subjected to any regulations
except that violations of individual nature-given rights – including fraud –
of course are not allowed to occur. Such banks will have strong claims to provide the customers with
information that explains how the pyramid-like FRB system works, and which
explains that there is no help to get from the State in the case of
bankruptcy; imposing significant hazard upon the depositors beyond their
informed approval is right-violating. Thus, FRB will almost reside on the frontier
of being de-facto-prohibited (se Section 5.3.2.2). FRB-banks and some companies
with significant deposits in such banks will probably obtain poor rating from
the certification agencies (see Section 5.5.4) since they are considered
financially unstable. It
will also be difficult for a bank to engage in FRB on a large scale in a
Rational Gaudist society with full economic freedom because wealthy investors
may easily short-sell shares of a FRB bank. This will be easier the less
reserve the bank has: A wealthy investor (or a collection of smaller
investors) borrows a large number of bank shares, which are sold shortly
afterwards. Then the investor(s) makes a deposit in the bank similar to the
bank's gold reserve (perhaps 5% of total deposits). Then the investor(s)
demands his deposit paid in gold. The bank's value decreases sharply or goes
bankrupt. The investor(s) still has his original deposit, but now in gold,
plus the sales revenue for the shares (the repurchase of shares will cost
about zero). If the bank is a close corporation rather than being a public
joint stock company, this will not be possible. 10.7.3 Advantages with the new banking system With this banking system “bank runs” will
never occur since there is always full coverage for the OD accounts (100%
reserve banking). Thus, there will not be any need for “inter-bank lending”;
the lack of such loans was a problem during the financial crisis in 2008.
Bankruptcies in the banking sector are very unlikely since the pyramid-like
system in FRB is not in use, but bankruptcies may not be 100% ruled out if a
bank is too uncritical in its credit judgments when giving loans.
Nevertheless, one can still imagine banks being 100% secure from bankruptcy
if the bank only undertakes to repay a percentage (p) of the bond's par value
(p = 100% minus the bank's total percentage loss on loans). This means that
if the bank has 2% losses on its loans a given year, the bondholders over the
next year only get paid 98% of the face value. These two types of banks may
exist side by side, but the latter type of banks must have somewhat higher interest
rates to compensate the bondholders' higher risk. The
new monetary system will prevent a general increase in the price level and
significantly reduce the likelihood of financial bubbles in the housing and
stock market. But e.g. when new technologies are introduced, one can not
exclude that excessive optimism will lead to local bubbles in the
price of labor, the technology itself or the stocks of companies that
manufacture or make use of the technology. 10.7.4 Growth in the money supply In the monetary system described
above, the money supply is basically fixed at 10 trillion dollars. When the
GDP increases, the general price level will continuously decline; rising
living standards will mainly result from lower prices, and not from wage
increases. In order to prevent any problems with such a general price
decline, the State (National Central Bank) ought to print a number of
electronic dollars equivalent to an earlier period's percentage increase in
real GDP (The
National Central Bank will then de facto function as a bureau under
the Treasury). This
controlled growth in the money supply should be specified in the General
Constitution. If the money supply in the
first place was 10 trillion dollars, the State will print 300 billion
electronic dollars as a response on one year's increase in GDP of 3%.
(assuming no influence from private currencies and that the turnover is
constant over time); see also Section 5.5.5 and 7.6.3.3. This money is
supplied to the market directly through the State budget. This is the money
issuer's legitimate profit for running the monetary system. If
the increase in real GDP in the previous year is e.g. 5%, the State does not
necessarily need to print extra money this year equivalent to 5% of the money
supply. The high turnover rate and activity in the economy do not do not
imply such extra stimulation; the State may print e.g. one-fifth of this, and
save the remaining four-fifths for skinnier years; for instance for a year
when the GDP growth is only 1%. In this way, price fluctuations will be
reduced. 10.7.4.1 Growth in the money
supply for former monopolistic and compulsory currencies
Let
us consider a given currency, VAL, which has been monopolistic or legal
tender until the introduction of Superior Constitution (called time point S).
Let us further assume that, prior to the time point S, was many years of
tradition with inflating VAL far beyond the real increase in GDP. Basically,
it is legitimate to continue inflating a voluntary currency (which is not
monopolistic or compulsory) when this has been a relatively constant
tradition for years, since the inflating then in practice means “accustomed
price” for the currency (see Section 5.5.3). The persons and companies who
possess VAL at time point S (hereinafter referred to as the SVALers) have
been compulsorily inflicted this currency (to a greater or lesser extent),
and we can not say that they have voluntarily chosen VAL. Therefore, before
time point S the high inflating served as a compulsory taxation, which
obviously is right-violating. After time point S, all private currencies will
be allowed, and basically you could say that those who are still stuck with
VAL do so voluntarily since VAL might be exchanged into private currencies.
If so, those who are voluntarily stuck with VAL have chosen to accept the
high “cost” of the currency in the form of continued inflating, and then the
inflating is not right-violating. The problem is that if all the SVALers were
to exchange their money during e.g. one year, there would be an enormous
pressure in the currency exchange market. The price of VAL would fall dramatically
and the purchasing power of the SVALers would fall drastically. Whether
redeeming VAL or continue possessing VAL, the purchase power of the SVALers
will be very much reduced. Thus, it is meaningless to argue that the SVALers
“have voluntarily chosen to accept the high ‘price’ of the currency in the
form of continued inflating”. If
the State should omit inflating VAL for many years after the time point S
(pending the ravages of time to make it possible to claim that everyone
possessing VAL many years after time point S do so voluntarily), the State
can not restart inflating VAL since then there will not have been many years
of relatively constant foregoing tradition with it. Based
on the above reasoning currencies that have been
compulsory tender or that have been monopolistic by law (or these currencies'
successors) may legitimately never have an increase in the money supply
beyond the real increase in GDP, unless for compensating for a controlled
withdrawal of another currency (e.g. lire to euro). 10.8 Motivation for charity
At the first glance, the individuals could be
supposed to never give anything to charity in a culture based on rational ethics
since such donations seemingly do not create happiness for the donor. What
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1) |
Lottery: Most people participate in lotteries
because the excitement and the opportunities for profit make them believe
that lotteries create more happiness during the life span then they would
obtain without participating in lotteries. Usually, they do not participate
in lotteries with the motivation of creating surplus for the charitable
purposes of the lotteries. The motive power to create surplus for charity is
the excitement and profit opportunities for the participants. But it would be
right-violating to deny commercial firms to compete with charitable
organizations over money games and lotteries. Participation in lotteries etc.
is primary self-happy-motivated with moderate degree of rationality. |
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2) |
Given a charity donor who donates according to
the “mouse-piddling-in-the-ocean”-principle. He has certain ideas on how he
wants to regard himself (self-picture). He creates a “movie” in his consciousness
where he is a hero being admired by the recipients and others. He obtains a
certain heroic perception of happiness in his consciousness for shorter or
longer time. This is a motive power, but the rationality is dubious. The risk
is that he contributes to build up a self-picture of “being kind to a fault”
with a corresponding sense of duty (see Section 3.9.1.3 and 3.9.1.4). This is irrational tertiary
self-happy motivation. |
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An unsuccessful person may feel strength by making other people dependent on his help, and in this way his feeling of unsuccessfulness is reduced. This is hardly rational in the long-term perspective, but nevertheless a motive power. This is a symptom of too low self-confidence. It will be rational to stepwise build up the virtue “self-confidence”. This is irrational primary self-happy motivation. |
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4) |
When a capitalist is accustomed to high
degree of capital accumulation, he will achieve a saturation of perception of
happiness (see Section 9.1). If he donates so much (but nevertheless relatively
little compared to his total fortune) that he observes results of his
donations, he will obtain a perception of success, which is a fundamental
human source for creating happiness via primary self-happy motivation (see
Section 3.3.3.1). Additionally, the donor contributes to build up a sense of
duty for “willingness to make efforts”/
productivity. An example of this is constructive donations where one or
more poor persons directly are assisted to become respectable citizens. |
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5) |
Private charity may give the donor a feeling
of creating something, even if “the
donor piddles in ocean”; this may also apply to economically weak
individuals. This may
give him a certain emotion of creative success, which is a basic source of
human happiness generated by the primary self-happy motivation (see Section
3.3.3.1). But his sense of happiness is not proportional to the size of the
donation. His perception of happiness will almost be independent of the
magnitude of the donation. Such a motive power for voluntary donations is
therefore considered rational only if the donation is at a very moderate
level ($15 - $30) that does not make significant negative impact on the total
funds of the donor. |
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6) |
Another motivation for charity donations may
be the fear of receiving scolding or other reprisals from friends and family
if you are rich and do not donate money. It is doubtful if surrendering for
this kind of pressure is rational (you contribute to build up an association
for cowardice). Oppositely, the motivation for donations may be a desire to
gain admiration from other people. A capitalist will perhaps obtain more
good-will in the market if he donates to charity, and secondarily he may
generate significantly more economic profit compared to non-investors in
private charity. The latter is secondary self-happy motivation, and may to a
certain extent be rational. |
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7) |
Donating money to private charity in such a way
that other people observe your donations, signals to your surroundings that
you are a helpful person. If we assume that observers are rational
self-happy-motivated, they will want to gain friends who they potentially may
get help from if such a need should arise in the future, while they will be
reluctant to make friends among unhelpful persons. People who observe the
donations may therefore be more interested in making friends with such
charitable donors than with “Scrooges”. Therefore, donating to charity may be
seen as a rational signaling of the quality of your friendship. This
secondary self-happy motivation is considered to be rational as long as the
donations are not to large, otherwise the observers may get the impression
that you are a spendthrift, which does not indicate a good friendship
quality. Besides,
wastefulness is based on irrational PEM. |
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Christians may fear arriving Hell if they do not donate to charity, and they may believe to increase their chances for entering Heaven if donating. This is irrational secondary self-happy motivation. |
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The human beings are assumed to have certain
elementary “altruistic instincts” (see Section 3.8.5 and 3.7.1), and this is
a part of the reality that we have to face. These “instincts” give us
perceptions of unhappiness when observing the sufferings of others. The
individual ought to make a rational evaluation: “Does the perception of
unhappiness, which is expected by the ‘altruistic instinct’, have so large
negative influence on the sum of my long-term perception of happiness that I
ought to donate 70% of my belongings?” No, of course not. Giving away that
lot of money will have much more negative long-term effect on the life-long
sum of self-happiness than what is imposed by a (short-term) negative,
instinctive feeling. But donating $10-$20 may psychologically relieve or
eliminate the bad feeling and therefore, it may be rational. This has to be
regarded as very weak rational primary self-happy motivation. |
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10) |
When a person has succeeded significantly and
is bursting of self-confidence, it is understandable that he feels a desire
for celebrating the success. To celebrate a success by sending up fireworks
may seem irrational, but it is probably motivated from rational primary
self-happy motivation. Another way of celebrating is to spread money to
charitable purposes; he has so much self-confidence that he boils over and
these residues go to charity. But it is important to not celebrate out of
proportions. |
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Thus, it may be rational to believe that some
money will be poured into charity. But several of these points only include
moderate or week degree of rationality. In a rational society the sum of the motive
powers to charity will be limited. Therefore, it is important that the State
makes efforts to contribute to areas that otherwise would have been left for
private charity, but this has to be done without taking people's money by
force. 10.9 Rational
egoism, altruism and Objectivism
Firstly, it has to be mentioned that the
Objectivists use the concept “egoism” in a way that is in opposition to the
general understanding in the public. Objectivism uses the term “egoism”
approximately synonymously with the term “self-happy motivation” of Rational
Gaudism. Objectivism: I give $1,500 to the
construction of a new hospital (with the total price of $150,000,000). The
reason for doing this is that I may get sick in the future and therefore, the
construction of the hospital is in accordance with my long-term
self-interests. Therefore, I have performed a rational, egoistic action. Rational
Gaudism:
According to Rational Gaudism, it is not a question whether the
construction of a hospital is in accordance with your long-term
interests. The question is whether your action, donation of $1,500, is
in accordance with your long-term interests compared to a situation where you
do not perform this donation. Your contribution has the same effect as the
mouse piddling in the ocean (see Section 9.4.1.1); the hospital is to be
constructed anyway since your donation realistically regarded will not
influence other people's willingness to donate. If you had not donated
$1,500, you would have received future hospital treatment anyway, and at the
same time you would have had $1,500 to pay for the hospital bill. In this example we may say that
the rational egoism of Objectivism is 0.01 ‰ more rational than “altruism”
since the donation for the hospital makes 0.01 ‰ of its total cost. “Rational
egoism” in the Objectivist sense is usually in accordance with “rational
ethics” (= rational self-happy motivation) of Rational Gaudism. But considering
the example above it is difficult to see that Objectivism and Rational
Gaudism is 100% overlapping on this subject. This is also exemplified in the
next section: 10.9.1
Altruistic financing of the State The Objectivists believe that they can
finance the State by voluntary contributions. The argument is that in a
“rational society” most citizens will realize that it is in their own
self-interest to have a State defending the nature-given rights of the
individuals. Therefore, a large majority will contribute with approximately 5
% voluntary tax since they are “rational egoists”. If
I pay $3,000 a year in tax, I will in reality only enjoy $3000 divided with
the number of citizens of my country – perhaps a tenth of a cent. Is it
rational primary or secondary self-happy motivation to invest $3,000 when
receiving only a tenth of a cent.? No, that can only be explained by what the
Objectivists in other connections call “altruism” – or to be completely
correct 99.9999 % “altruism”. Rational Gaudism explains the motive power to
such a bad investment from irrational tertiary self-happy motivation.
Observed from a Rational Gaudist point of view, the question is as follows:
Is the donation of $3,000 compared to non-donation in accordance with my long-term
self-interests. If I donate $3,000, I have 0.10 cent back. If I do not
donate, I have $3,000 left. Whether the State receives my $3,000 or not has
no practical influence on the function of the State. It is the effect of the
mouse piddling in the ocean. The only thing obtained by the donor is building
up an irrational self-picture for “altruism”/”being kind to a fault” with the
corresponding sense of duty. To further emphasize the double
set of morals of Objectivism on this subject, the following critical
description of altruism is quoted from the book “Frihet, likhet, brorskap: kapitalismen i teori og praksis”
(Translated: Liberty, equality,
brotherhood: capitalism in theory and practice) by the well-known
Objectivist Vegard Martinsen: “Imagine a building with 300 flats, which are
all owned privately. Each flat may be sold and bought at market price. But
the electricity is on joint account. All habitants use so much electricity as
they want, and the electricity bill is shared equally on all 300 flats. If
you are moderate with your use of electricity, switches off the light when
leaving a room, reduces the temperature when not using the room etc., you
will economically enjoy 1/300 of your effort. If you save electricity for
$16, then everyone save 5 cents. Oppositely, if you treat your electricity
wastefully – the light is lit all the time, all rooms always have maximum
temperature, and for instance increases the electricity bill with $16 – then
everyone has to pay 5 cents extra.” It
is possible that the obligatory tasks (in Objectivist translation: legitimate
tasks) of the State can be financed completely by voluntary donations (but
that is dubious), but this is not rational ethics in the Rational Gaudist
sense but pure “altruism”. If it had been rational, voluntary contributions
to reduce electricity expenses on joint account would also have been
rational. When the tertiary self-happy motivation to save electricity is not
powerful enough to lower the electricity bill, there is no reason to believe that the
tertiary self-happy motivation to pay voluntary tax is strong enough to
finance the expenses of the obligatory tasks of the State. If so, rational
incitements have to be introduced (see Section 7.6.9). It is an important principle for
Objectivism that the State is not allowed to gain money by the use of force,
but this philosophy needs “altruism” (irrational tertiary self-happy
motivation) to defend its vision of financing the State by voluntary
donations. Objectivism has to make use of the “enemy” (altruism). Objectivism
wants to make us believe that the motive power to pay voluntary tax is larger
than it really is and therefore, they put the label “rational egoism” on it
(see also Section 3.11). According
to Rational Gaudism, it is legitimate to collect money in a
non-right-violating way by the use of rational primary or secondary
self-happy motivation. Firstly, this has to be done in order to get hold of
money to defend the nature-given rights of the individuals (and children's
and animal's rights). But if it is possible to collect money in addition to
this, the money may be used for social purposes (or whatever) if approved by
the majority of the National Assembly. Martinsen
V. Frihet, likhet, brorskap: kapitalismen i teori og praksis. ISBN:9788291106021.
Kontekst forlag. 2004, pp. 35 10.10 Why vote?
The rational motive power for the individual
to vote for a given party at elections is not the prospect of generating more
self-happiness by getting the party program converted to real politics
compared to if one does not participate. The individual vote only contributes
according to the “mouse-piddling-in-the-ocean”-effect, and the result of the
election will realistically regarded be the same whether you vote or not and
regardless of which party you vote for. Your vote has real importance for the
outcome of the election only in a situation where one single vote may balance
the power. The probability for this to occur is so low that we for all
practical purposes may disregard it. Often,
the rational motive power for voting is the excitement of following the
ballot counting so you may “cheer” your party, and this feels more exciting
if you have participated at the election. In order to feel that it is “your”
party, you have to like the party
you vote for. You may like a party because its politics may be expected to
increase your life-long sum of happiness, or because the party has an
ideology corresponding to your own philosophy independent of its politics
ability to increase your life-long sum of happiness. It may also be exciting
to enter the polling station experiencing something special since elections
only take place each second year. Besides, the annoyance of entering the polling
station is very low. This is primary self-happy motivation. Participating
from the thought that voting is a “citizen's duty” is not rational, but
originates from irrational tertiary self-happy motivation. Some liberalists have claimed that it is
legitimate to sell their vote. That is not right. The right to vote is no
nature-given right; it is a right, legitimately given by the State, through a
contract from you are 18 years of age until death. This right may contain a
clause (and usually it is so) stating that you may not sell your vote. If you
sell your vote in spite of this clause, you have committed contract breach.
It is difficult to see that the other party (the State) has suffered any
objectively measurable loss because of this contract breach. The State may
legitimately refuse to fulfil some remaining parts of the deal; i.e. you may
lose your voting right in the future and/or be imposed punishment. 10.10.1 Why
vote for Rational Gaudism? It is difficult to obtain a good feeling by being
supporter of an ideology/politics that you realize to be illegitimate.
Therefore, it is a major probability of not voting for a party whose
politics you realize to be illegitimate even if you should believe that its
politics would give you larger life-long sum of self-happiness than other
parties' legitimate politics. Basically, the motive power to make a choice of
political party is not the practical politics' assumed influence on your
life-long sum of self-happiness, but whether voting for “your” party will
give you a good feeling compared to not-voting or voting otherwise (PEM), and
this “good feeling” will contribute (a little) to increase your life-long sum
of self-happiness. Whether your party's politics is carried out or not is in
practice independent of your voting (the mouse is piddling in the ocean). It is probable that Rational
Gaudist politics will influence very many people's life-long sum of
self-happiness positively, but people, who believe that their lives will not
be positively influenced by Rational Gaudist politics, may nevertheless get a
good feeling by voting for an ideology that they realize to be legitimate and
not illegitimate. If
a party's politics is both legitimate and is expected to influence one's
life-long sum of self-happiness positively, the incitement of voting for this
party will be even larger. It is reasonable to assume that it is larger
probability for finding the politics creating most happiness for most people
inside the framework of legitimate politics than by carrying out illegitimate
politics. Besides, it is empirically shown that “happiness for most people”
increases proportionally with the degree of liberty in the governing politics
(se Section 7.4.1). 10.11 The Welfare State
A major reason why today's welfare
states have a significant risk of future collapse is to be found in the
principle which they are based on, namely “from each according to
his ability, to each according to his needs”. Based on the fact
that man's basic nature is self-happy motivated, the answer to the following
question is self-evident: Why should you bother to make efforts to show your
best skills when profiting from convincing the keeper of the “money bag” that
your abilities are poor? “Needs” means largely “wishes and desires”, and
these are basically infinite, but the production capacity required to meet
the materialized needs / wishes / desires is not unlimited. When other than those having the
needs / wants / desires are to pay for the products, the motive power to
produce will easily arrive at a significantly lower level than what is
required to meet the needs / wants / desires. This becomes more apparent the more explicit
the principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according
to his needs” is obeyed. Ever increasing compulsory taxes and other
regulations are put on the successful, productive, creative and financially
prudent individuals and companies to fund benefits to those who act diametrically
opposite from prosperously, productively, industriously and rationally (but
some people with “non-negative” behavior also receive some funding).
Corporations and capital may be outsourced to countries with lower costs. By
imposing high, progressive taxes on the highly paid and wealthy, the
authorities will avoid dissatisfying the large majority of voters, but the
tax rate easily become so high that the State will obtain more funds by
lowering the tax rate, which was not enough in the first place. The
above-mentioned remarks will contribute to undermine the motive power for
positive actions and civilized behavior both for “high and low” in the
society. Today's compulsory welfare states have basically no limit on the
amount of taxes which may be imposed, except that voters may be angry if the
tax pressure becomes too high. In order to avoid this, the State takes on big
loans avoiding defeat in the next election. Fractional reserve banking in
combination with a central bank as “lender of last resort” and “printer of
fiat money” makes it dangerously easy to borrow money, and increases the
likelihood of bubbles in the economy which in turn can bust and cause
long-term economic decline. Thus, the State accumulates a huge debt burden
that can only be repaid through higher taxes in the future or if the economic
growth increases significantly. However, since the motive power for economic
growth is undermined (as mentioned above), sooner or later the tax pressure
has to be increased, which further undermines the economical growth. This
gives a death spiral that easily may end in a collapse like Greece anno 2010.
Rational Gaudism does not have the
principle of “from each according to his ability, to each according to
his needs” as its base, but is based on the full respect for property
rights. but on the
principle of 100% respect for property rights. In a Rational Gaudist society
successful, productive, industrious and economically rational individuals and
companies are not imposed any
compulsory taxes and consequently, the likelihood for this death spiral to
occur will be considerably less in a Rational Gaudist society than in a compulsory welfare state. The probability of
collapse is further minimized by the fact that Rational Gaudism almost de facto prohibits fractional reserve
banking, which removes the basis for a central bank in the traditional sense
as “lender of last resort” and “printer of fiat money”. The contents of the
last two sentences imply that it will be almost impossible to finance the
State expenses in a Rational Gaudist society by taking on large debts. A
100% Objectivist society would prohibit the State from engaging in anything
but the judiciary system, Police and military defense, and any State support
to disadvantaged people will be impossible. Objectivists assume that private
charity will generate sufficient funds to help all disadvantaged people. The
impetus to engage in private charity is limited since our fundamental human
nature is based on self-happy motivation, and therefore, it is highly
probable that a system with only private charity will lead to major poverty
problems. Rational
Gaudism is not an opponent of the welfare state, defined as a system where
the State has a significant role for the population’s welfare, but this has
to be funded without compulsory taxation. The State has in fact some unique methods to
obtain money without initiating force against anyone (see Section 7.6). By
these methods governmental welfare funds will naturally be limited in a
Rational Gaudist society, and thus, we will prevent disadvantaged social
groups from falling into the “black hole” without driving the society into
risk for falling into the abovementioned death spiral. 11. Appendix – Philosophy in general
11.1
Philosophical comparisons. Are you a Rational Gaudist?
Rational Gaudism has significant
philosophical overlaps with the philosophies of Epicurus, Aristotle, John Locke,
John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham and Karl Popper, and has similarities with
Objectivism. The
only absolute requirement for being a political Rational Gaudist is to be a
resistor of everything that is denoted as right-violating in this book (i.e.
supports every paragraph in the Superior Constitution). Considering the
empirical function of the State, there are no absolute requirements for the
political points of view that a political Rational Gaudist has to possess,
but the argumentation has to follow the reasoning that the individual is to
try to use the State in the pursuit of maximization of self-happiness during
his life span, and the argumentation has to follow the epistemological and
ethical principles of Rational Gaudism. Since the authorities necessarily
have to consider influential groups in the society, the non-right-violating
points of view ought to be of such a quality that as many individuals as
possible maximize their long-term happiness weighted against how strong
non-right-violating influence they are able to perform on the State
executives. Thus, there will be basis for many parties within a Rational
Gaudist framework. Rational Gaudism is “a house” limiting what kind of
politics that is legitimate to accomplish in practice. Similarly, a “democracy”
is a house where most political parties operate today, but this framework is
too wide because a democracy allows violations of the nature-given individual
rights if the majority backs it up. If
you are to be a philosophical Rational Gaudist, you have to additionally
accept the fundamental thoughts on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and the
deduction of the nature-given rights of humans and animals. 11.1.1 The
differences between Rational Gaudism and Objectivism The most important differences between
Objectivism and Rational Gaudism are as follows: |
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1) |
Objectivism has an axiom stating that each
object in the reality has its own nature, its identity, that A=A. A lion is a
lion both today and tomorrow. It will not transform into a snake tomorrow. Rational Gaudism does not regard “A=A”
as an axiom, but as a hypothesis with a certain degree of insecurity attached
depending on the specific object. Nevertheless, Rational Gaudism says that most objects have an identity (nature)
since we for all practical purposes often may disregard the uncertainty. |
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2) |
According to Objectivism, a human being's life is his ultimate value, while happiness
is his highest objective. According to Rational
Gaudism, the ultimate value of an individual is to maximize the sum of
self-happiness during his life span, and this is also the highest objective. Rational Gaudism regards it as
self-evident that the highest objective has to be to achieve as much as
possible of his values. The value standard of Rational Gaudism is HDM in addition to careful deduction from the
human nature (i.e. the principles in Section 3.1 - 3.4). |
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3) |
According to Objectivism, the individual chooses his values. According to Rational Gaudism, only one value
exists, and that is perception of happiness – avoiding unhappiness included; ultimately to maximize the sum
of self-happiness during his life span. Consequently, the individual human
being is predetermined to try to achieve maximum amount of happiness. |
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4) |
Epistemologically, Objectivism seems to mean that “accurate knowledge” is obtained
by induction if the number of observations
is large enough and no observations are in opposition. Basically, the
latter is the same as stating that a hypothesis has resisted intense attempts
of falsification, which main-stream theory of science calls “a well-founded
hypothesis”. It may seem as if Objectivism
tries to double-cross us to believe that its philosophy is more “accurate”
than it really is. The opinion of Rational
Gaudism is that we theoretically never can obtain 100 % accurate
knowledge by induction (unless the potential for observations is finite), but
that we may regard absolute certainty as an asymptotic value which the
induction process can come close to. Rational
Gaudism means it is correct to set a context-dependent cut off, and
inside its limits we have “accurate knowledge for all practical purposes”. |
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5) |
The
Objectivist standard for moral evaluations is that everything promoting
the life of the individual as a human being (pro-life) is good, and
everything restraining the human life, is evil. Rational Gaudism has rational use of HDM in the pursuit of
life-long maximization of self-happiness as the standard for the evaluation
of good and evil. It also uses deductions from the nature of HDM and from the
human nature (e.g. life-elongating actions); the latter as a tool for
producing hypotheses that may have to
show their justification by resisting attempts of future dethronement (i.e.
the principles in Section 3.1 - 3.4). |
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6) |
Objectivism uses the concept “egoism” where Rational Gaudism uses the concept
“self-happy motivation”. Rational
Gaudism considers this to be an inappropriate use of the word “egoism”
since it is not in accordance with the general understanding of the concept. Rational Gaudism defines the word
“egoism” in its usual negative meaning (see Section 3.6 and chapter 12). The Objectivist term “egoism” is an
ethical concept; the corresponding Rational
Gaudist term “self-happy motivation” is a concept on the fundamental
human nature. |
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7) |
Objectivism differentiates between altruism
and egoism, and considers altruism to be negative and “rational egoism” to be
positive. Moreover, Objectivism
counts some altruism (irrational TEM actions) for “rational egoism” with the
objective of creating a functioning society without initiating governmental
force (see Section 10.9). Rational
Gaudism considers all human actions to be self-happy-motivated even if
the specific action may seem otherwise, and that altruism does not exist in
the world of reality, but only as an ideal in some humans' consciousnesses.
It regards “altruism” as irrational TEM, SEM (eventually PEM) actions. In
contrast to Objectivism, Rational Gaudism manages to create a
society without initiation of governmental force against the individuals and
without being dependent on irrational TEM actions. |
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8) |
According to Objectivism, conflicts
of interest do not exist between
rational egoists. According to Rational
Gaudism, conflicts of interest may naturally exist between people acting
from rational self-happy motivation, and it is the task of the State to
create laws and mechanisms for punishment ensuring that a rational action
pattern does not imply right-violating actions. |
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9) |
According to Objectivism, right-violating
actions will be immoral independent of State punishment against such actions.
According to Rational Gaudism, a very
important reason for the immorality of right-violating actions lays in the
punishment from the State. |
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10) |
The
Objectivist basis is that the individual human being, according to his nature,
has to perform rational actions in order to survive, and thereof follows the right to life, and the other
nature-given rights are deduced from this. According to Rational Gaudism perception of happiness is the only value in the
Universe (see Section 2.2.2.2). All collections of atoms having the ability
to perceive happiness/unhappiness possess the right to pursue happiness
according to their fundamental nature. A collection of atoms lacking the
ability to perceive happiness and unhappiness does not have any rights
whatsoever. Other nature-given rights for humans and animals are deduced from
this. |
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11) |
Most Objectivists
seem to have the opinion that the “nature-given rights” are individual rights
which the individual may claim from the State; these rights are given by the
State and not by nature. If the State does not exist, neither do the
nature-given rights. Rational Gaudism states that the right to
liberty fundamentally is a legitimate license given/implied by nature,
which is implicitly innate and inherent in the
individual. This right exists independently of the State and is not given by
the State. Other rights are only logical consequences of the right to liberty, and the State has to
respect these if its jurisprudence is to be legitimate (these corollaries are
also called nature-given rights
since they are logical consequences of a directly nature-given right). The
State is obliged to defend the nature-given rights, and in a larger social
context they have insignificant value without such defense. |
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12) |
According to Objectivism, animals do not have rights irrespective of their
superiority. If a man tethers his dog in his garden and tortures it severely,
he does not violate any rights. In contrast, it would be a violation of the
man's property right (over his dog)
if the Police or the public were to use force in order to stop the
maltreatment. Nevertheless, most Objectivists consider this kind of torture
as immoral. Rational Gaudism states
that the animals have the right to act in accordance with their fundamental
nature (instincts) at the same level as humans have the right to liberty to use the animals. Humans have the
right to keep animals in custody (animals do not have the right to liberty
and life) and kill
to them, but the
State is obliged to prevent humans from violating the fundamental instincts
of the animals. |
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13) |
According to Objectivism, the State is obliged to defend the nature-given individual
rights by military defense, Police and administration of justice. These are
the only legitimate tasks of the State, and the State is not allowed to take
on other tasks whatsoever. Rational
Gaudism also states that the State is obliged to defend the nature-given
rights of the individuals by military defense, Police and administration of
justice. Additionally, the State may engage in whatever tasks as long as it
does not violate the nature-given rights of the individuals, included that no
compulsory taxation is acceptable. |
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14) |
According to Objectivism, the biological parents are obliged to maintain their
children through a “contract” that is signed by their voluntary sexual intercourse
and the fact that the mother did not take abortion or the regret pill. The
nature-given rights of the children are to be fulfilled by the parents
without any economic contribution from the State, elementary education
included. According to Rational Gaudism,
a person becomes a parent and acquires duties and rights by carrying through
the pregnancy or by signing a contract accepting to be a parent. The State is obliged to defend the
children's nature-given rights, i.e. to ensure that the parents fulfill the
children's fundamental needs. The State ought to fund many of the children's needs (without
performing right-violating taxation). |
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15) |
Probably, Objectivism
does not consider all “psychical force” in the Rational Gaudist sense to be right-violating (see Section 4.1.1
and 10.4). |
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16) |
According to Objectivism, property right to a non-owned and untouched land area arises when somebody initiates the use of the area without regard to if the area is processed away from the natural state or not. Considered Rational Gaudistly, property right arises when the land area is processed away from the natural state into a state of increased usability. If the use of the land area is initiated without processing it as described, right to use is established, but not property right (see Section 5.1 and 5.2). A similar principle is valid for natural resources. |
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17) |
Objectivism states that the principle for
punishment is proportionality with the damaging power of the crime in order
to revenge the crime, and this principle is used because of justice towards
the victims. Objectivism is
principally supporter of death penalty. Rational
Gaudism means that the State has to prevent the criminals from misusing
their freedom in the future. The punishment is to be given proportionally
with the seriousness of the crime and the risk of reiteration, but the
revenge motif is unacceptable. Rational Gaudism is under all normal circumstances
opposed to death penalty. |
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18) |
The principles of Objectivism oppose laws against child labor, while Rational Gaudist principles do not
exclude such laws. |
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19) |
Objectivists believe that a woman should have
the unlimited right to abortion until the child has left her body (usually
the 40th week of pregnancy). According to Rational
Gaudism women have the unlimited right to abortion up to the time when
the first seeds of consciousness turns on in the child, i.e. until the end of
28th week of pregnancy. After this time point the embryo has the right to life. |
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20) |
Objectivism supports completely free immigration
(except for immigrants who are criminals or have highly contagious diseases).
Rational Gaudism is also positive
on immigration, but its basic principles imply sensible collective and
individual restrictions. |
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11.1.1.1 Objectivism and “the
legitimate tasks of the State” The Objectivists claim that the only
legitimate tasks of the State is administration of justice, Police and
military defense. Regarded from the point of view of Rational Gaudism the
General Constitution may contain paragraphs stating that the State only is to
take on tasks within administration of justice, Police and military defense –
and then it will be illegitimate for the State to engage in other tasks (see
also point 13 above). But it is not illegitimate to have a Constitution
stating that the State may engage in other tasks provided that the State does
not violate nature-given rights when carrying out or funding the tasks.
Regarded from an Objectivist point of view this ought not be illegitimate since
this philosophy also claims an action to be illegitimate if and only if it
violates other individuals' nature-given rights. But in spite of this, the
Objectivists claim the only legitimate tasks of the State to be
administration of justice, Police and military defense. Here is a logical
inconsistency in Objectivism. The Objectivists may very well adopt the
hypothesis that it is unwise for the State to take on other tasks, but that
this is directly illegitimate, is logically inconsistent. According to Objectivism,
the State may not engage in other tasks than administration of justice,
Police and military defense since the State otherwise would risk arriving in
a “horse-guarding-the-oat-sack” situation by being both a judge and a party
in a court trial. But it is impossible to have a categorical principle
stating that the State never is to be part in a trial since the State has to
enter into contracts on employment and contracts on purchase of e.g. police-
and military equipment. Rational Gaudism makes maximum efforts to make the
judicial power optimally independent of the executive and the legislative
power by letting none of the two last mentioned employ judges in the judicial
system. If it still is regarded as problematic to have the State as a party
to lawsuits, a law may be introduced stating that such proceedings may be
settled in a court of another legitimate state, if the counterparty wants so,
but with the State's own law as the legal basis (this presupposes an
agreement with the other state on the application of this law). 11.2 Why
should I care about Philosophy?
When a spacecraft is to be sent
on a mission to Mars, accurate calculations are absolutely necessary. The mathematical formulas
of Kepler, Newton, and Einstein are prerequisites for reaching the right place to
the right time. Without the predictions contained in these formulas we had
never managed to send spacecrafts to other planets. Similarly, philosophy is
a “formula” in the pursuit of the ultimate value, namely maximization of the
sum of self-happiness during the life span. Ethics is supposed to discover
guidelines that I may use for choosing actions in the pursuit of the ultimate
value given the existing reality at each time point. Therefore, in order to
achieve maximum success I have to maximize my knowledge of the reality.
Epistemology expresses the basic principles for pursuing knowledge of the
reality, and besides, it is a tool for developing the basic principles of
ethics and politics. Politics is the branch of philosophy being occupied with
how I legitimately may use other humans (and animals) and groups thereof
(including the State) in the pursuit of my ultimate value. 12. Appendix –
Definitions
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Abortion |
The termination of a pregnancy after,
accompanied by, resulting in, or closely followed by the death of the embryo. |
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Aesthetics |
Part of the philosophy that is occupied with
discovering and defining norms and principles for beauty. |
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Altruism |
Action pattern where the purpose is to create
happiness for others without considering self-happiness. |
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Anarchist |
A supporter of a utopian society of
individuals living in complete freedom without governmental authority. |
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Anarchy |
A state of lawlessness or political disorder
because of absence of governmental authority. |
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Auxiliary hypothesis |
A hypothesis that
another hypothesis (main hypothesis)
depends on in order to provide its statement. |
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Axiom |
Basic truth that is absolutely unavoidable if
further epistemological progression is not to become meaningless /
indeterminate and that all further knowledge acquisition has to build on. |
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Boson |
Particle (as a photon or meson) whose spin is
zero or an integral number. Fundamental physical particle that causes
physical forces (electromagnetism, nuclear forces, mass). |
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Charity |
Generosity and kindness towards
poor and needy people. |
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Child Treaty * |
A contract between the mother and the father
where the father accepts to take on half of the parental responsibility for
the child. |
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Compulsory
taxation * |
Taxation involving initiation of force. |
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Concept |
An abstract idea created by the consciousness
from the similarities of two or more sense perceptions. |
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Consciousness |
Generally: The sum of functions in a neural network
resulting in independent perception of happiness/unhappiness. For known
biological species: The sum of all biological functions in the nerve
system that makes an organism perceive happiness/unhappiness. Such functions
may be sense perceptions, remembering, choice of action and thinking. What
functions to use depends on the degree of evolution of the consciousness. The
input of the consciousness always starts directly or indirectly with sense
perceptions. An organism that is able to record perceptions from the
surroundings, but does not possess the ability to record happiness/unhappiness,
does not have a consciousness. |
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Constitution |
A fundamental law describing the principles
on how to govern a country and which sets fundamental limitations for the
legitimacy of all other laws. |
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Contract (deal) |
A binding agreement between persons,
organizations, companies, states etc. where two or more parties renounce some
right to liberty in order to create significantly more values than
complete freedom would have provided. |
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Contractual freedom |
The right to voluntarily renounce some
nature-given liberty in the individual pursuit of gaining more happiness in
the life-long perspective than complete nature-given liberty is expected to
yield as long as the similar right of others or other nature-given rights are
not violated. |
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De-facto-falsification * |
Weakening of a hypothesis through a
scientific process making its well-foundedness fall below a low threshold,
which is regarded as the limit for deserving serious scientific
consideration, and at the same time it is very unlikely that this threshold
may be exceeded by further scientific efforts. |
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Dead-end hypothesis* |
A hypothesis of action which has
non-improbable fatal consequences. |
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Deduction |
Inference in which the conclusion about
particulars follows necessarily from general or universal premises. |
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Defamation |
A statement that without
legitimate reason exposes another person for public contempt. |
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Deism |
The belief in a God who created
the universe and then abandoned it, assuming no control over life, exerting
no influence on natural phenomena, and giving no supernatural revelation. |
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Democracy |
Governmental system where the
highest power is based in the people and executed by them directly or
indirectly through a system of representatives who are elected periodically
in free elections. The majority rules and may basically govern unlimited
against the minority unless the power of the majority is limited by a
constitution. |
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Determinism |
The idea that the human consciousness does
not possess the ability to choose between different alternatives of action. |
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Egoism |
Action pattern that often includes many
egoistic actions. |
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Egoist |
A person who often performs egoistic actions.
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Egoistic action |
Action where the purpose obviously is to create
happiness for the performer, but at the same time there is large probability
for significant negative consequences for other people or
happiness-perceiving animals. |
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Emigration |
Leaving one's place of residence or
country to live elsewhere. |
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Epistemology |
The study of how to acquire knowledge. |
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Ethics |
The branch of philosophy that is occupied
with discovering and defining moral values. |
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Evolution |
Process of continuous alteration from a
lower, simpler or worse to a higher, more complex or better stadium. |
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Fatal consequence * |
A possible consequence from a hypothesis of action
that will exclude testing of alternative hypotheses in the future if the
consequence really occurs. |
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Fermion |
A particle (as an electron, proton, or
neutron) whose spin quantum number is an odd multiple of ½. Building block for
all usual matter. There exist 12 elementary fermions, 6 quarks and 6 leptons.
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Free enterprise |
The right to run
one's enterprise as long as one does not
violate the similar right of others or other nature-given rights or their logical
consequences. |
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Free will |
A consciousness' ability to choose between
different alternatives of action. |
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Freedom of speech |
The right to express one's opinion as long as
one does not violate the similar right of others or other nature-given rights
or any logical consequence thereof. |
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Fundamental
nature of a being |
The fundamental qualities used by a being's consciousness in the pursuit of its values (happiness). |
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General preventive effect |
Deterring effect upon potential criminals by
their observing harsh punishment for crimes already committed by others. |
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Happiness |
Profit of the feelings. Each feeling is measured
by degrees of happiness. |
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Hypothesis |
A statement (often general), which has some
uncertainty attached, about a phenomenon or an object, and which is induced from
more certain individual observations (or individual sense perceptions), plus
possibly auxiliary hypotheses. |
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Hypothetical-deductive method (HDM) |
The hypothetical-deductive method is fundamentally
regarded based on a number of individual observations. Then we induce a hypothesis in
order to give an explanation of the phenomenon (”Ding an sich”) which the
observed data are exemplifications of. The next step is to deduce logical consequences
from this hypothesis. Then we carry out experiments to observe if these
consequences really occur. If so, the hypothesis is strengthened. Otherwise
the hypothesis is falsified. |
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Induction |
Process where an abstract conception about the
general case is produced from knowledge of a series of single observations. |
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Instinct |
A genetically based signal that works as a
motive power to a specific action without the use of rationality or
education. |
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Integrity |
Strict devotion to a set of moral rules. |
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Intersubjective |
Observed from the point of view of the
average of many individual consciousnesses. |
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Intersubjective knowledge |
Knowledge that originates from the average of
many individual consciousnesses. |
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Irrational action |
An action that is based on inferior
thinking. |
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Jurisprudence |
Branch of philosophy that is essentially occupied
with detecting the philosophical basis for claiming that certain permissions,
prohibitions, decisions or actions are not to be rejected/hindered in their
pursuit of values. |
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Legitimacy
(in the
jurisprudential sense) |
The philosophical basis for claiming that
certain permissions, prohibitions, decisions or actions are not to be
rejected/hindered in their pursuit of values. A
permission/prohibition/decision/action is legitimate if it is given / carried
out without violating already legitimately assigned
permissions/prohibitions/decisions, and is not legitimate (illegitimate) if
it violates a legitimate permission/prohibition/decision. |
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Level of happiness * |
The sum of the predisposing determinants that
is present as the basis for perceiving happiness and unhappiness. |
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Liberty |
Condition where beings with free will live in
absence of initiation of force from other beings with free will. |
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Life-elongating action * |
Action that contributes to sustain and extend
the life of the performer of the action. |
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Metaphysics |
The part of philosophy that studies the
fundamental nature of reality that cannot be detected by observation or
scientific methods. |
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Monopoly |
Company that operates in the
market without competition. |
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Moral |
Set of norms and principles for the guiding
of human actions. |
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“Mouse-piddling-in-the
ocean”-action * |
Action that has positive primary happiness
effects for n humans included the performer of the action, but the performer
only perceives 1/n of the happiness effect himself. |
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National |
A member of a given State. |
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Natural compulsion |
Conditions in the nature that make certain
consequences and corresponding probabilities strongly advantageous for
choosing a specific alternative of action. |
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Natural
monopoly |
Company without competition in an
industry where the quality of the physical conditions de-facto gives absence of fear for new competitors to enter the
market. |
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Nature |
The collection of all elements in the
Universe without free will that have not been created by elements with free
will. |
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Nature-given right |
A permission (power, license) to which an
object is legitimately assigned by nature in the pursuit of its values both
through the fundamental, inherent nature of the object and through external
natural resources; corollaries to such directly nature-given rights are also
included in the concept. |
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Nature-given
rights of a
child |
The right to pursue happiness, potential right
to liberty and the right to parents (“the right to life” included). |
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Nature-given
rights of an
animal |
The right to follow its fundamental
instincts. |
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Nature-given
rights of the
individual |
The right to pursue happiness, right to
liberty, right to life and all logical consequences thereof. |
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Non-Science |
The choosing of an
explanatory model of a ‘Ding an sich’ issue when there are alternative hypotheses
being significantly more well-founded in this respect or reluctance against
serious attempts to dethrone the most well-founded hypotheses. |
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Objective |
Observed from the reality (the outer reality)
and not from the consciousness of a human being. |
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Objective concept |
Concept whose content does not give room for
subjective interpretations. |
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Objective knowledge |
Knowledge of the reality that is independent of
the human consciousness. |
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Objectivism |
The philosophical system created by Ayn Rand.
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Organization |
A collection of humans (or other rational
elements) where each single element tries to create significantly more values
by attending the unit than what they expect to accomplish by standing alone.
The collection is governed by decisions that are made in agreement with its
constitution (statutes). |
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Parent |
An
adult who has taken on the responsibility to be a leader for the child in
order to develop its inborn rational genetic potential into an adult human
being who is able to use the right to liberty for
maximizing self-happiness. |
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Parental responsibility |
Obligation to develop the inherent
rational potential of the child through maintenance, care, natural biological
development (health), upbringing, and fundamental education. |
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PEM action * |
Abbreviation for “primary
self-happy-motivated action”. |
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Perception of happiness * |
The happiness that is perceived when moving
from one level of happiness to another. |
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PFR * |
Sense of duty for actions that historically
and beyond reasonable doubt have been proven to be very rational. |
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Philosophy |
Subject studying the fundamental qualities of
the reality, the humans and the relations between the humans and the reality.
With this as its basis, philosophy advices humans on how to live. |
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PMI * |
Sense of duty for actions that historically
and beyond reasonable doubt have been proven to be irrational. |
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Praxiology |
The study of purposeful human action (not
reflexive or unintentional behavior). |
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Predisposing determinant * |
An element in the reality that influences the
consciousness' choices of action. |
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Predisposing determinism * |
The power of influence that (elements in) the
reality possesses on a consciousness' choices of action. |
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Primary
self-happy-motivated action * |
Action that gives the performer direct
self-happiness as a consequence of the action. |
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Proletariat |
The class of industrial workers who lacks
their own tools of production and therefore have to sell their labor force
for their living. |
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Property right |
The right to acquire property and to dispose this
property as long as the owner does not violate the similar right of others or
violates other nature-given rights or any logical consequences thereof. |
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Prostitution |
Performance of sexual services in exchange
for money. |
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Psychical force * |
The use of non-physical activity for
preventing a human being from using his rational abilities during a choice of
action. This includes all forms of non-physical activity directly
addressed against another individual which this individual clearly has marked
that he does not accept or which the performer ought to know that he would
not accept, and which this individual has to do something actively to avoid
(e.g. threats of physical violence, screaming, scolding, roaring, exaggerated sharp tone, defamation). This also includes swindle,
contract breach and significantly perilous activities which, alone or as a
participant in a sum, inflict other human beings with well-founded fear for
manifestation of physical right violations even if such violations do not
appear in practice. |
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Rational action |
An action that is based on good
thinking. |
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Rational being |
Being which has the ability to process the sense
perceptions by logical thinking in order to choose to perform actions so the
being can influence its own destiny through technological evolution and
thereby liberate itself from its natural instincts. |
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Rational element * |
An element that functions as an independent
juridical unit (e.g. a human being, organization, company, State). |
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Rational ethics * |
The process for choices of action described
in the sections 3.1 – 3.4. |
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Rational TEM action * |
A TEM action that has a virtue, PMI or PFR as
its sense of duty. |
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Rationality |
The ability to process
the sense perceptions by logical thinking. |
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Religion |
The faith in a god or another supernatural being,
worshipping and serving for this god in addition to explanation of natural
phenomena and social relationships from the powers of the god. |
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Right |
Permission to which an object is legitimately
assigned in order to pursue its values. Since the permission is legitimately
assigned, nobody may legitimately remove the right except possibly the donor
(if an appropriate clause is included in the right) or the recipient of the
right. The assignment of the right occurs by providing powers (tools) or
liberties for realizing the values. The State is obliged to ensure that
rights are not violated by other humans or the State itself. |
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Right to life |
The right to perform those actions needed for
sustaining life as long as one does not violate the similar right of others
or other nature-given rights or their logical consequences. |
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Right to liberty |
The right to think up and to choose to perform
those actions which are necessary in the pursuit of maximization of
self-happiness during the life span as long as one does not violate the
similar right of others or other nature-given rights or their logical
consequences. |
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Right to organize |
The right to join organizations together with
others and to manage the organization in such a way that one does not violate
the similar right of others or other nature-given rights or their logical
consequences. |
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Right to parents |
A legitimate claim that children have on
their biological parents (or others who have adopted this function) to take
care of the child according to the definition of a parent. |
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Right to use |
The right to continue an initiated use as
long as one does not violate the similar right of others or other
nature-given rights or their logical consequences. |
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Right violation |
Preventing an object from executing or
receiving its rights. |
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Science |
The process pursuing to estimate ‘Ding an
sich’ of the reality with maximum accuracy, i.e. pursuing to identify the
most well-founded hypotheses (‘Ding für mich’) to give answers on ‘Ding an
sich’-questions with fundament in observations in a process where such
hypotheses are exposed to constant and maximum intense and sincere attempts
of dethronement. |
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Secondary
self-happy-motivated action * |
Action that primarily creates perception of happiness
for another human being and where the motive power is not to make this person
happy, but to receive positive feed-backs from this person or from others
observing the action. |
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Self-happy motivation * |
Motivation for action based on creating
happiness and avoiding unhappiness for the performer. |
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Self-happy-motivated action * |
Action that is motivated by the desire of
creating happiness and/or avoid unhappiness for the performer. |
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Self-picture |
Thoughts in a person's consciousness on how
he wants to regard himself and that give him positive feed-backs when he
meets these expectations. |
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SEM action * |
Abbreviation for “secondary
self-happy-motivated action”. |
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Subjective |
Dependent on the consciousness of the
observing subject. |
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Subjective concept |
Concept whose content gives substantial room
for subjective interpretations. |
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Subjective knowledge |
Knowledge that depends on the consciousness
of the observing subject. |
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Superior Constitution * |
Constitution deduced from the fundamental
human (and animal) nature and that may not be legitimately changed by human
resolutions. |
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TEM action * |
Abbreviation for “tertiary
self-happy-motivated action”. |
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Tertiary
self-happy-motivated action * |
Action that is not expected to give
perception of happiness for the performer as a direct consequence of the action
or by feed-backs from others, but its motive power is the expectation of
feed-backs from the self-picture in his own consciousness. |
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Theory |
Hypothesis that extraordinarily has resisted intense
attempts of rejection. The promotion of a hypothesis into a theory is
subjected to intersubjective judgments. Usually, a hypothesis is declared as
a theory when most of the research community accepts it as a sufficiently
probable explanation and useful tool for making predictions. |
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Torture |
Physical and psychical violence entailing
extreme pain or extreme unhappiness often carried out in order to procure
information or confessions. |
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Totalitarian society |
Society where most of the private sphere of
interest has been made into a State matter. |
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Ultimate value |
The final objective to which all other
objectives are means. |
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Value |
What a consciousness wants to achieve. |
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Value standard |
Guideline that is to guide a person's choices
of action in the pursuit of the ultimate value. |
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Violence |
A concept that describes aggressive actions
intended to cause harm, pain or humiliation. |
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Virtue |
A fundamental human quality that is necessary
in order to reach the ultimate value. |
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* |
Words
specifically constructed or defined for Rational Gaudism. |
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Rational GaudismÓ (version
2nd April 2020) is written by Comments
may be sent to xyzshb@cheerful.com (First published version: 2nd September 2013) |
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